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Introduction: problems in 
the financing of public goals in < urban regeneration in 
the Netherlands
This research project is motivated by the experience nowadays with the regeneration 
of urban areas in many Dutch cities. On the one hand, regeneration can and often 
does create a significant value increase on some of the plots of land: on a particu­
lar plot, a new function comes which gives a much higher value to the land, and 
although significant costs might have to be made on that plot to realize that new 
function, there is nevertheless a net value increase. This is the case for example when 
developing free market housing or office space. On the other hand, there are other 
plots of land on which money has to be spent and which either give no returns or 
which give a return less than the expenditure: e.g. historic buildings might be reno­
vated and integrated into the new buildings, inhabitants and firms might be com­
pensated because they must move, some plots might have to keep a public function, 
there might be need for new roads and public space, drainage, public buildings and 
social housing, etc. In short, urban regeneration involves not only profitable parts 
but also unprofitable parts that are in the public interest either directly (like parks) or 
indirectly because they are necessary for the profitable parts (like sewerage). From 
now on, all these unprofitable parts, including all possible compensations, are called 
'public infrastructure and facilities'.
When land is in public ownership, the public owner can choose to use the net value 
increase to cover (some of) the net costs of public infrastructure and facilities. When 
the land is not in public hands, public bodies can nevertheless sometimes require 
developers who own the land and benefit from the value increase to pay for the pub­
lic infrastructure and facilities. Developers might be willing to contribute. However, 
there is often disagreement about the size and scope of their contribution. For exam­
ple, often developers are willing to contribute only to local physical infrastructure 
situated within the development site, but not to other necessary compensations or 
infrastructure, such as off-site facilities (like access roads to the site, or public build-
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ings located somewhere else). A major problem comes when some developers, the 
'free riders', are not willing to contribute at all.
In order to understand this situation better, it is necessary to look first at the recent 
changes in Dutch land and housing policy.
1.1 Recent history in Dutch land & housing policies: 
towards more private involvement
The way urban regeneration is organized has changed in the last decennia more or 
less parallel to changes in urban development in general. Since the Second World 
War, and more or less until the 1980s, Dutch municipalities applied on a huge scale 
what was called an 'active land policy' (Greef, 1997: 9-17). An active land policy 
consists of buying that land that becomes zoned for development, providing the 
infrastructure, selling the serviced parcels and bearing the corresponding risks and 
eventual profits (Groetelaers, 2004: 20-23). This was applied to development for in­
dustrial areas, offices, and housing. For about four decennia, Dutch municipalities 
were the main parties in the market for urban land, which gave them a predominant 
position in urban development. This active public intervention was institutionalized 
through public land development companies, and almost all municipalities had one. 
Table 1 shows the extent to which municipalities were the predominant suppliers of 
serviced building plots, in this case for residential use. Housing associations and mu­
nicipal housing companies bought many of these plots and developed social hous­
ing on them. Commercial developers also played an important role, not only buying 
some of the plots to build free market housing, but also to build some social housing, 
mostly owner-occupied. The central government played an important role by subsi­
dizing and assuming the financial risks of both the active land policy of the munici­
palities and the building of social housing (Korthals Altes, 2007).
Table 1. Serviced building parcels sold for residential use, both in green field and urban
regeneration schemes.
Residential parcels sold 
by Municipalities (m2)
% Residential parcels sold 
by others (m2)
% Total
1965 8.645.000 67% 4.214.000 33% 12.859.000
1979 12.563.000 80% 3.177.000 20% 15.740.000
1980 12.011.000 81% 2.808.000 19% 14.819.000
1981 11.164.000 81% 2.567.000 19% 13.731.000
1982 11.086.000 80% 2.769.000 20% 13.855.000
1983 11.593.000 74% 4.140.000 26% 15.733.000
Source: own elaboration, based on CBS, Maandstatistiek Bouwnijverheid (in Needham, 1993: 92).
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When regeneration became an important policy goal in the 1970s, this too was car­
ried out in the same way, although with some delay. Municipalities became active 
not only on green field sites, but also in the existing city, buying, expropriating and 
redeveloping large deteriorated urban areas (Verhage & Sluis, 2003: 7-8). This led 
to a public predominance in urban regeneration instead of the previously common 
public-private partnership formulae (Kreukels & Spit, 1990: 388-389). Especially in 
large cities, municipalities bought much property, often deteriorated housing, and 
renovated it. For example, the Municipality of Rotterdam bought from 1974 to the 
middle of 1984 about 40,000 dwellings, drastically changing the property situation 
in certain neighborhoods from predominantly private to predominantly public own­
ership (Rotterdam, 1985: 18, 26).
At the end of the 1980s this way of working changed, both for greenfield development 
and for urban regeneration. Various changes coincided at that time. First, the economic 
recession in the 1980s led to an important rise in public expenditures on housing. This 
rise led to the need for budgetary cuts. Central government subsidies for public land 
development were reduced and those for the development of social housing abolished 
(Van der Schaar & Hereijgers, 1991: 183-189; Verhage & Sluis, 2003: 9; Priemus & 
Louw, 2003: 371-372; Groetelaers, 2004: 29, 32; Muñoz & Hoekstra, 2008: 202-203). 
Second, important changes in housing policy took place at that time, when the central 
government introduced in 1989 the housing policy called Volkshuisvesting in de jaren 
'90 [Housing policy in the 1990s]. Moving from a policy very much oriented to the 
building of social housing, the new housing policy gave market parties a more promi­
nent role in house building. This translated into a diminishing share of social housing 
and a rise of free market housing in new urban development. In 1993 housing associa­
tions became financially autonomous from the central government, consolidating a 
more general policy that was meant to situate public bodies in a new role of 'director 
at a distance'. Figure 1 illustrates the changes in house building by showing that since 
the 1980s social rented housing has diminished significantly its share in new building.
Figure 1. New dwellings for free market for sell and for rent, and for social rented.
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As a consequence of these changes, the role of municipalities and market parties 
in urban development changed significantly. Municipalities changed the way they 
operate on the land market, and now they seek to share the risks with market parties 
in public-private partnerships. Also, many municipalities now play a more passive 
role, which is called a 'facilitating' land policy and which relies mainly on public law 
instruments such as the land use plan and building permits1. Most of the municipal 
land development companies have disappeared. Market parties, on the other hand, 
have increasingly taken over the former role of municipalities on the land market. 
Since the rise of free market housing and the increase in housing prices in the 1990s, 
the profitability of urban development has increased significantly. The increased prof­
it margins, together with the strong position that the control of land gives in the de­
velopment of a site, have attracted commercial developers to buy land (Groetelaers, 
2004: 31-32; Priemus & Louw, 2003: 372). The introduction of the Fourth Memoran­
dum on Spatial Planning Extra (Vinex) at the beginning of the 1990s roughly indicated 
the locations for major urban extension. This created the expectation of development 
on many greenfield locations, which stimulated developers to buy land there. In 
addition, public bodies stopped attempting to buy all the land and made the way 
open for developers to do so. Not only commercial developers became interested in 
land, the same could be said of housing associations. Corporations traditionally own 
much land in urban regeneration sites, especially in social housing districts, but they 
became also interested in acquiring land on green-field sites (Needham & De Kam, 
2004: 2069-2070). Some describe the transition as a shift from a public monopoly 
on the land market towards private monopolies (Priemus & Louw, 2003: 369-370).
Municipalities still play an important role in urban development, and there are many 
examples of them applying an 'active' land policy. What is the situation with urban 
regeneration? Probably, active land policy is nowadays more common on greenfield 
sites than in urban regeneration, because in the latter land is more expensive and 
more difficult to buy. As a consequence, municipalities are less keen to buy land on 
regeneration sites than on greenfield sites (Buitelaar et al., 2008: 82, 100), although 
there are still many examples of municipalities buying land on regeneration sites. 
In any case, active intervention both on greenfield and on regeneration sites has 
changed in nature, as municipalities seek private parties with whom to share the 
risks. There is an increasing number of municipalities seeking new formulae in which 
private parties assume the financial risks and the responsibility for the implementa­
tion. As municipalities lose the powers they had as landowners, or at least must 
share their power with the developers that also control part of the land, they are 
increasingly relying on public law instruments such as land use plans and building
1 There is a distinction in European continental law systems between 'public law' or 'administrative 
law' and 'private law' or 'civil law'. The first ones regulate the actions of public bodies by which 
they impose their actions on others, e.g. expropriation law and planning legislation. Private law 
rules regulate obligations between equal actors, no matter whether they are public or private, e.g. 
the Civil Code, that sets the rules by which disputes between the actors will be resolved (Verhage, 
2002: 160-161; Needham, 2006: 24-25).
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permits, although they often combine these with private law agreements with these 
developers. In this way, municipalities are not intervening directly in the urban land 
markets, as they did until the 1980s. That is, they are not anymore buying all the land, 
providing the infrastructure and assuming all corresponding risks (Korthals Altes & 
Groetelaers, 2000). Increasingly, it is the market parties that buy the land, or most of 
it, and develop the site.
1.2 Problems with financing public goals in urban 
regeneration
Dutch municipalities have had high ambitions for their public regeneration schemes, 
and it was often possible to realize those when they owned most of the land and had 
the financial support of the central government. That is now different. If municipalities 
want to maintain their ambitions, they experience nowadays several problems. These 
concern a wide range of aspects: property rights, economic interests of users and 
owners, the expert knowledge available to municipalities, procedures, the coopera­
tion among municipalities, commercial developers and housing associations, lack of 
a clear legal framework for negotiations, etc (Kolpron, 2000: 31-53; Verhage & Sluis, 
2003: 11; Verhage & Needham, 2003: 20-21; Louw, 2008: 69-71; Van der Putten 
et al., 2004; Vrom et al., 2008: 19). Among those problems, the financing of public 
infrastructure and facilities, i.e. of the unprofitable parts, is an important obstacle to 
good urban regeneration: this was emphasized in a recent report of an advisory coun­
cil of the central government (Vrom-raad, 2009: 5). Because of the transition from 
the traditional public dominancy in land development to more private involvement, 
the financing of public infrastructure and facilities has changed. When municipali­
ties own the land and provide the infrastructure, public goals can be paid out of the 
profits from selling the plots, possibly complemented with public subsidies. However, 
when land is in private hands, municipalities have to work out other ways of financ­
ing, if they do not want to rely (or want to rely as little as possible) on public subsidies. 
The practice shows that it is difficult, in urban regeneration, to agree with landown­
ers/developers the contributions, whether in money or in kind, that they should pay.
As a consequence, a common situation in urban regeneration on privately owned land 
is that agreements between municipalities and the landowners are achieved only with 
great difficulty. Long negotiations hamper development processes, so that targets for 
the regeneration of deteriorated Dutch neighborhoods have had to be lowered (Ver­
hage & Sluis, 2003: 11). Another consequence is that public bodies, through subsidiz­
ing and/or direct realization, must pay an important share of the unprofitable parts. 
For an overview of the involvement of Dutch public bodies in the financing of public 
infrastructure and facilities in urban regeneration, see chapter 7.5. In short, Dutch 
public bodies are increasingly confronted with the need for large public subsidies.
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On greenfield sites also the financial problems were increasing (Neprom, 2007; 
Buitelaar et al., 2008: 18-19; ABF-research, 2008; Rigo, 2008; Vrom-raad, 2008: 
11-13). This situation has led to an important legislative modification. In 2008, a 
chapter dedicated to land development (from now on: Land Development Act) was 
introduced into the new Physical Planning Act with the goal of improving both the 
public steering of development processes and the financing of public infrastructure 
and facilities (Vrom et al., 2008: 20). This research studies how this recent legislative 
modification could be used to improve the situation.
1.3 Could legally binding land use rules help to 
improve the financing of public goals?
The Dutch Land use Plan (bestemmingsplan), together with the departure from it 
(projectbesluit, former vrijstelling ex art. 19.1 W RO) and the Development contribu­
tions Plan (Exploitatieplan) introduced in 2008 make it possible to impose a set of 
legally binding rules that regulate the use of land and real estate (from now on: bind­
ing rules). The owner or user of land is bound to use his land or property in the way 
prescribed by the binding rules (unless there are transitional provisions when new 
rules come into force). Binding rules delimit development rights or user rights, ful­
filling a regulatory function. At the same time, binding rules allocate and guarantee 
certain rights to the property owner.
In the Netherlands, urban regeneration often involves building something new or 
refurbishing something old on a wide variety of sites, e.g. central areas in cities and 
towns, monofunctional residential districts, and brownfield sites. This usually re­
quires a modification of the binding rules, whether this is for intensifying the actual 
use (e.g. more building volume), changing it for another use (e.g. housing instead of 
industry), maintaining the existing use (e.g. refurbishing historic buildings), or replac­
ing the existing use with public infrastructure and vice versa (e.g. a park instead of 
buildings and vice versa).
Such a modification of the binding rules can affect the economic value of the prop­
erty rights. For example, the value of land in the free market is lower when the site 
can be used for industry, than if it can be used for offices. Another example, very 
common in the Netherlands, is the difference in market value of land when it can 
be used for social housing, than if it can be used for free market housing. The basic 
idea that inspires this research, is that the increase in property values that follows 
the modification of binding rules could be used to finance all or at least part of the 
unprofitable parts, a sort of cross-subsidizing. The necessary modification of bind­
ing rules could be used in an operational way to achieve this. In short, this research 
focuses on how binding rules could be used in a strategic way to improve the financ­
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ing of public infrastructure and facilities in Dutch urban regeneration on privately 
owned land.
In addition to binding rules under public planning law, we have to consider several 
formal rules that rule property rights in land. Furthermore, during data gathering it 
became clear that also not-legally binding zoning plans and other policy documents 
interact closely with binding rules and are also very relevant for capturing value in­
crease. So this research considers all those formal rules that rule both binding rules 
(included the implications for property rights in land) and not-legally binding policy 
documents. We call all those formal rules 'formal rules relevant to zoning'.
1.4 Legitimacy of capturing value increase
The concept 'capturing value increase' includes several similar but not identical con­
cepts. Before analysing them, it is important to distinguish among different causes of 
value increase. Value increase can be caused first by specific investments, e.g. in in­
frastructure that improves the accessibility of a specific site. Secondly, value increase 
can be caused by public decisions about land use planning regulations that do not 
necessarily cost money, e.g. a modification of the land use plan that allows more 
lucrative building. And third, value increase can be caused, only and independently 
from the first and second causes, by the general growth of society, i.e. by the accu­
mulation of multiple decisions and choices of a multitude of anonymous actors in 
society (George, 1879: 89-94). For example the value of a house can increase very 
fast just because the area becomes fashionable.
But coming back to the meaning of 'capturing value increase'. In the literature there 
are multitude of terms, often meaning similar concepts, often overlapping each other 
(Alterman, 2009). Here we define three concepts that are relevant for this research: 
'cost recovery', 'value capturing' and 'creaming off plus value'. 'Cost recovery' refers 
to the recovery, through contributions from private developers, of those costs that are 
directly related to the realization of public infrastructure and facilities that benefit 
the development. Developers might contribute either by providing infrastructure and 
facilities directly, or by paying public bodies for doing so. It is not relevant whether it 
is the developer or the municipality that realizes the public infrastructure and facili­
ties, but whether those who benefit actually pay (in kind or in money) or not. 'Value 
capturing' or 'value capture' is the capturing by public bodies that have invested in, 
for instance, infrastructure, of the increased property values that are a result of that 
investment. Although private parties also might invest in public infrastructure, this 
term is generally meant for public investments. It is important to distinguish between 
the costs of the public investments, and the increase in value that results from them. 
For the costs might be greater, or less, than that value increase. If the costs are less 
than the value increase, full cost recovery can take place, leaving some of the value
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increase with the private developers. If the costs are greater than the value increase, 
there is no possibility of recouping all the costs. That is, 'value capturing' is limited 
to recouping the value increase that is the result only of public investments, and this 
value increase might be higher or lower than the investments. 'Value capturing' ex­
cludes thus the recouping of value increase caused by public decisions about land 
use planning regulations or by the accumulation of decisions of all the anonymous 
community members. 'Creaming off plus value' refers to a public body capturing 
the increase in value that is a result of any of the three causes: investments in infra­
structure, decisions of public bodies, or just the general increase in the demand for 
land. 'Creaming off plus value' embraces thus the largest possible capturing and is 
irrespective of any costs that might have been made (Alterman, 2009: 5-6; Krabben 
& Needham, 2008: 4; Needham, 2007: 175-178; Smith & Gihring, 2006: 752; Kruijt, 
Needham, Spit, 1990: 32-4; Kruijt & Needham, 1980: 112-3).
A fundamental question is who should receive the value increase that accrues from 
any investment, public decision or general economic growth. This relates to the 
broader discussion about the contents of the right of land ownership. There are no so­
cial systems in which landowners have an absolute freedom to use their property, as 
norms and regulations limit property rights. Because norms and regulations are cre­
ated by society, they reflect the prevailing powers and interests (Adams et al., 2001; 
Louw, 2008: 71). Translated to the capturing question, two conflicting theses exist. 
On one side is the thesis of full or conservative liberal ownership, where any value 
increase, no matter who or what caused it, belongs to the landowner. An alternative 
thesis, to be found also in liberal thinkers, advocates that the value increase belongs 
to the community because it is the community after all that is responsible for it. There 
is a distinction, based on an analysis of the historic evolution of ownership rights on 
land, between the 'use value' and the 'exchange value' of land. Full/conservative lib­
eral ownership considers that ownership includes both the right to use and the right 
to benefit from property (should it be exchanged), which must include the benefit 
from the value increase caused by any factor. This definition of land ownership rights 
might be the result of the reinterpretation of the old Roman Quirinian law concept 
of property rights, made by the new liberal regimes in the 18th and 19th Centuries 
(cfr. García-Bellido, 1993, 1994). The alternative thesis considers that the use value 
can be indeed considered as fundamental to individual and social well-being, but 
that the exchange value does not (MacIntyre, 1984: 251; Christman, 1994; Krueck- 
eberg, 1995). As Krueckeberg put it, the exchange value of land, "...has always been 
subjected to reasonable constraints for the benefit of the entire community and the 
society" (1995: 307). These constraints might have been inspired by the concept of 
the social function of property (García-Bellido, 1993, 1994; see also chapter 2.3.1). 
A common topic in the neo-classical theory of economic rent is the idea of taxing the 
value increase of land, which is considered as not being earned by the landowners 
because it arises from the general growth of society. The value increase is considered 
to be a surplus which, when removed, will not affect output or the price of the prod­
uct. There is a long tradition of economists proposing such a tax for the benefit of the
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community. Variants of this argument have been advanced by Adam Smith, David 
Ricardo, J.S. Mill, Alfred Marshall, A. Pigou and, specially, Henry George (George, 
1879: 89-94, 219-241; Prest, 1981: 7-21; Oxley, 2006: 103; Alterman, 2009: 4-5).
In short, there is much normative discussion about which sorts of capturing value 
increase are legitimate, and this discussion has crystallized differently in the planning 
system of different countries. For example these normative differences have led to dif­
ferent rationales behind instruments for capturing value increase. First there are those 
instruments that aim for a direct or 'pure' value capturing through direct taxation. The 
rationale of this first group of instruments is based on the argument that landowners 
do not earn the value increase, and that it is the community that deserves it. In other 
words, this rationale advocates creaming off the plus value. Other instruments do not 
use the 'unearned value increase rationale' but are based on the necessity of inter­
nalizing the negative impact of urban development, i.e. the need to compensate the 
costs that the community must make in order to implement or improve the necessary 
public infrastructure. This comes more in the neighbourhood of 'cost recovery' and 
'value capturing'. This second rationale might choose for direct taxation of the value 
increase (e.g. property taxes, to be taxed periodically or at the moment of develop­
ment) or for indirect instruments (e.g. land banking, land readjustment and developer 
obligations, Alterman, 2009: 3-5, 8-15, 23-24).
This research studies how the use of formal rules relevant to zoning influences any 
of the possible forms of capturing value increase, i.e. not only cost recovery, but also 
creaming off plus value. However, when formulating recommendations for the Dutch 
practice in chapter 9, the legal limits for capturing value increase in the Netherlands 
have served as a departing point. In the Netherlands, cost recovery only is permitted, 
excluding any additional capturing of value increase. The rationale here is the second 
mentioned: the necessity of internalizing the negative impacts of urban development. 
It must be said however that it is not always easy to clearly define cost recovery be­
cause it is not always clear what a negative impact is. Depending on the criteria used 
to define the negative impacts of urban development, cost recovery can include a 
narrow or a wide set of contributions. For the legal limits to capturing value increase 
in the Netherlands see chapter 7.2, in England see chapter 6.2 and in the Spanish 
region of Valencia see chapter 5.3.
1.5 Formulation of the problem
The problem to which this research wants to find a solution is formulated as follows:
H ow  could formal rules relevant to zoning be used in the development phase o f 
comprehensive urban regeneration developments on privately owned land in the 
Netherlands in order that the profitable parts finance the unprofitable parts?
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H ow  could formal rules relevant to zoning be used... means that this research wants 
to make recommendations for how Dutch public bodies, mainly municipalities, 
could use the relevant binding rules (those that might be relevant for the purpose of 
this research, which are in The Netherlands the Land use Plan, the departures from it 
and the new Development contributions Plan, including its implications for property 
rights in land) and other not-binding documents. The recommendations are of two 
sorts: the first fits within the existing Dutch legal framework, including the new Physi­
cal Planning Act and Land Development Act. The second sort of recommendations 
implies a modification of the legal framework.
... in the development phase o f comprehensive urban regeneration developments on 
privately owned land in the Netherlands ... means that this research looks for recom­
mendations valid only for the development phase of comprehensive urban regen­
eration developments that are situated on privately owned land. The 'development 
phase' starts from the original situation and ends at the delivery and the beginning of 
the exploitation of the final real estate products. 'Comprehensive urban regeneration 
developments' mean physical interventions in the existing city with dimensions that 
cause a notable value increase. They always involve the construction or refurbish­
ing, not only of profitable buildings but also of public infrastructure and facilities. 
This definition excludes other sorts of intervention in the existing city that might also 
fall under the category 'urban regeneration'. For example, those interventions are 
excluded that are only meant for the refurbishing of public infrastructure, without 
involving at the same time construction or refurbishing of commercial buildings. 
'Situated on private owned land' means that the land, all or a majority of it, is owned 
by non-public bodies, e.g. commercial developers or housing associations and other 
non-profit developers. Those comprehensive developments in which land, all or a 
majority of it, was already in public hands (i.e. any public development company), 
before development started, are not included in this research.
... in order that the profitable parts finance the unprofitable parts means that this re­
search focuses on getting those parties that benefit from development to finance (all 
or at least some of) the unprofitable parts, i.e. the public infrastructure and facilities. 
A wide range of unprofitable elements falls under 'public infrastructure and facili­
ties': not only what Ennis (2003: 6-9) understands as 'physical infrastructure' (high­
ways, footpaths, water, sewerage, electricity, parking, public transport infrastructure) 
and 'environmental infrastructure' (landscaping, open space, street furniture, green 
space). Other public facilities such as public buildings (schools, health centres, po­
lice, etc), social/affordable housing, etc. also fall under 'public infrastructure and 
facilities'. Public infrastructure and facilities can be both on-site (i.e. located within 
the development site) and off-site (located outside the development site, or located 
on-site but clearly serving a much wider area that the development site only). Also, 
any form of compensation that might have to be paid to realize the regeneration 
falls under this term. It is clear that with this problem definition, this research aims 
to improve in the Netherlands only a specific form of capturing value increase: cost
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recovery. This research excludes thus in its final recommendations any measure that 
might be used in the Netherlands for other forms of capturing value increase that go 
beyond cost recovery.
1.6 Research Questions
In order to find an answer to the problem as formulated above, three preparatory
research questions need first to be answered:
• Preparatory research question 1: H ow  can those formal rules relevant to zoning 
be used in comprehensive urban regeneration developments on privately owned  
land?
This question focuses on the variable 'formal rules relevant to zoning': how can 
they be used, following planning law and in practice? Here we do not try to 
make any connection with capturing value increase: that is the subject of pre­
paratory research question 3.
• Preparatory research question 2: What is the extent o f capturing value increase 
in comprehensive urban regeneration developments on privately owned land? 
This question focuses on the variable 'capturing value increase': which public 
infrastructure and facilities are paid or realized thanks to the profitable parts of 
the development in question? And, are the developments implemented on time, 
without delay and following previously established deadlines?
• Preparatory research question 3: H ow  does the way in which formal rules rel­
evant to zoning are used influences capturing value increase?
Here we link the answer to question 1 (use of formal rules relevant to zoning) with 
the answer to question 2 (degree of capturing value increase). We want to know 
if certain ways of using formal rules result in this or that degree of capturing value 
increase. Is there a way of using the formal rules that results in market parties 
paying all or at least some of the unprofitable parts? And to do so without delay?
The main research question uses the findings of the preparatory questions to work out
recommendations for the Dutch situation:
• H ow  could formal rules relevant to zoning be used in the Netherlands in order 
that the profitable parts finance as much as possible the unprofitable parts?
We want to know if certain ways of using formal rules relevant to zoning could 
help in the Netherlands to improve cost recovery in urban regeneration on pri­
vately owned land. This includes mechanisms for a more efficient plan process 
to lower development costs and to leave a larger part of the increased property 
values for cost recovery. And how could Dutch public bodies do that without at 
the same time delaying the implementation?
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1.7 The structure of this report
In this Chapter 1 I have introduced the motive, context, concepts and goals of this re­
search. In Chapter 2 I will introduce the relevant debates and conceptual frameworks 
that rule this research. They helped me first to position the goal of this research in the 
academic debate in such a way that the findings were relevant not only for the Dutch 
regeneration practice but also for science. In the second place they helped me to 
define and operationalize the research questions, for example, elaborating a causal 
model in which I positioned all the variables and the relations between them. In sum, 
chapter 2, together with chapter 3, sets out which data I will gather, where I am going 
to do it and how I will analyse the findings. In Chapter 3 I needed to prescribe how 
to successfully gather the data and produce valid findings. Therefore I first explain the 
general principles of how I will produce findings with the necessary degree of inter­
nal and external validity. This has led to several choices: to focus on case research, 
to compare the planning systems of different countries, to a careful selection of cases 
and to systematically check the generalizability of the findings. Second I operation­
alize the data gathering by defining the independent and dependent variables, by 
distinguishing different, specific, sub-variables and by prescribing which data is used 
to answer which research question.
Chapters 4-7 present the gathered data. In Chapter 4 I carry out an exploratory study 
of nine Western European countries: besides the Netherlands, also England, Spain/ 
Valencia, Germany, France, Italy, Flanders, Denmark and Sweden. The goal is to 
select those countries that could provide the most interesting findings for the Nether­
lands. To select them I first offer insight into de use of formal rules relevant to zoning 
in these countries, second I position the Dutch rules into this international context, 
and finally I select those countries that will be the subject of in-depth research. In 
Chapters 5 to 7 I present the gathered data from the in-depth research in the Spanish 
region of Valencia, England and the Netherlands. First I give an introduction of these 
countries and their planning systems, including the value capturing legal mecha­
nisms and their limits. Second I present the studied cases. Third I answer research 
questions 1 to 3, including an evaluation of how the legal mechanisms affect the 
capturing of value increase. These answers form the basis for chapters 8 and 9.
In Chapter 8 I draw conclusions for the academic debate and the theoretical frame­
work set out in chapter 2. Here I use the answers to research questions 1 to 3 to test 
the hypotheses. I use all those answers and the results of the hypothesis testing, but 
incorporating also specific knowledge of the Dutch situation (legislation, political 
and cultural considerations), to answer in Chapter 9 the main research question: how 
could the Dutch government (central and municipal public bodies) use the formal 
rules relevant to zoning to improve the capturing of value increase, but at the same 
time not delaying urban regeneration.
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1.8 The practical value of this research
Different actors involved in urban regeneration in the Netherlands can use the find­
ings of this research. This is, all those parties who might bear the responsibility for 
redeveloping urban areas, and therefore for finding financial sources to cover the 
unprofitable parts. These are mainly the municipalities, but also private parties: hous­
ing associations and commercial developers, or associations of property owners with 
commercial developers, which are in charge of the development.
The findings are also relevant to the introduction of the new Physical Planning Act 
and Land Development Act in the Netherlands. This law (the second is actually a new 
chapter included in the first) introduced in 2008 the Development contributions plan 
and modified substantially the legal framework for cost recovery. The findings in­
clude recommendations both for how this new legislation could be used to improve 
the financing of public infrastructure and facilities, and recommendations for further 
legislative modifications.

policy networks
<èÈËm
In this chapter we set out the theoretical framework that we use for investigating the 
practical possibilities for improving the capturing of value increase in urban regen­
eration projects. W e do this as follows.
First we look at the role of public bodies in general, and see them as acting in policy 
networks. More specifically, an urban regeneration project can be analyzed as a 
policy network in which public bodies try to achieve their goals by interacting with 
other parties. Second, we look at one of the most important power resources that 
are deployed in the interactions in the urban regeneration policy networks, namely 
property rights in land. It is in the nature of urban regeneration projects that this 
power resource is always present and cannot be ignored. We investigate the power 
that owning a property right in land can give, and how formal rules can affect that. 
Third, we look at one aspect in particular of the formal rules which affect how people 
in urban regeneration projects exercise their property rights in land. This is the degree 
of certainty about future development possibilities that is created by binding rules 
and other policy documents, and how this can influence the behavior of the property 
owner and the developer.
Finally, we apply those three sets of insights to the specific circumstances under 
which urban regeneration projects take place. This enables us to work out a causal 
model of the factors (including the use of the formal rules relevant to zoning) that 
affect the capturing of value increase. The chapter concludes with two hypotheses 
derived from this causal model. These are about two specific changes to the formal 
rules relevant to zoning which, it is hypothesized, will improve the capturing of value 
increase.
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2.1 Power and the role of public bodies in policy 
networks
Capturing value increase in practice, in any of its forms (cost recovery, value captur­
ing or creaming off plus value, see chapter 1.4) can be considered as an outcome of 
the interaction, in a network, of those parties involved in the implementation of pub­
lic planning policies. All of them occupy a certain position within the network, and 
each of them pursues its own goals and interacts with the others in order to achieve 
them. This interaction is determined by aspects such as the power they might have to 
impose on, or to stimulate, others, in order to pursue their own goals. In short, in the 
networks that prepare and implement planning policies, different sorts of interactions 
might result in different outcomes of captured value increase. Taking into account the 
goal of this research, the crucial question is how public bodies could use the formal 
rules relevant to zoning to modify these interactions in order to improve the capturing 
of value increase.
Literature on policy networks provides some tools to understand how the parties 
involved in policy implementation (public bodies, property developers and landown­
ers) interact with each other (Scharpf, 1978; Benson, 1982; Ostrom, 1986; Healey, 
1992; Kickert et al., 1997; Klijn, 1997; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000). The initial alloca­
tion of resources influences the position of public bodies within these networks, and 
public bodies have different techniques for intervening that might help to improve 
the capturing of value increase.
In the last decennia of the 20th Century, the role of public bodies changed significant­
ly. From a situation in which public bodies were supposed to play a dominant role in 
policy making and implementation, the practice arose by which private parties began 
to gain a more prominent role. In the 1960s and 1970s, the limits became clear of 
what is called the Rational Central Rule Model for policy making and implementa­
tion processes, according to which the government was supposed to play a dominant 
role above the rest of involved parties. At the end of the 1970s, the academic debate 
about governmental steering changed in Europe and the United States (Kickert et 
al., 1997: 1-8). The critics argued that, under the welfare state, where the Rational 
Central Rule Model ruled the relationships of the government with the market, '...a 
substantial number of governmental policies (...) failed to meet their original targets. 
Despite the fact that large-scale policy programmes consumed enormous sums of 
money, they often failed to meet expectations, and the results were disappointing.' 
Sometimes policies were too ambitious, other times 'The implementation of policy 
seemed to recognize its own dynamics whereupon numerous policy plans broke 
down (...). At the end of the 1970s and in the 1980s this led to a pessimistic view of 
the government's abilities to achieve its goals and to influence social development' 
(op. cit.: 4). The decline and collapse of the centrally steered countries in Eastern 
Europe at the end of the 1980s reinforced the perceptions of the failures of central
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governmental steering. In the resulting debate about the changing relationship be­
tween public bodies and market parties, some critics advocated a total withdrawal of 
government steering and a reliance on the market.
2.1.1 The Policy network approach to power relationships
The 'policy network approach' can be seen as one of the results of that debate (Kick­
ert et al., 1997: 3). The advocates of this approach position it as an alternative to 
the Rational Central Rule Model and to the market orientation approach, a sort of 
third way between both (op. cit: 7-8). In their overview of the foundations of the net­
work approach to governance, Klijn and Koppenjan (2000: 136-139) found the first 
signs of the use of the network concept in policy science in the early 1970s. At that 
time, they argue, the network concept was used in the bottom-up approach (Hjern 
and Porter, 1981) and the intergovernmental relations literature (Friend et al., 1974; 
Scharpf et al., 1978) ' . t o  map relation patterns between organisations and to assess 
the influence of these patterns for policy processes.' These two early proto-network 
approaches were influenced by the interactive policy approach (Allison, 1971; Co­
hen et al., 1972; Lindblom, 1965; Lindblom and Cohen, 1979) and the interorgani- 
zational approach (Levine and White, 1961; Negandhi, 1975; Aldrich, 1979). Kenis 
and Schenider (1991: 27-28) place the first signs of the use of the network concept 
in the 60s and 70s, seeing many aspects of the concept as an input from pluralist 
theories of policy making (see e.g. Bentley, 1967; and Truman, 1971; both quoted 
in Kenis and Scheinder, 1991: 27). Jordan places the first signs even earlier, in the 
1950s and 1960s (1990; quoted in Rhodes & Marsh, 1992: 4-5). We could consider 
the policy network concept as meso-level, in the sense that it provides a link between 
the analysis of the relationship between interest groups and governments regarding 
specific policy decisions (the micro-level of analysis), and the analysis of the distri­
butions of power within contemporary society (the macro-level of analysis, Rhodes
& Marsh, op. cit.: 1). For an overview of literature on policy networks in the United 
States and Europe, see Klijn and Koppenjan (op. cit.: 136-139) and Rhodes & Marsh 
(op. cit.: 5-10). For an overview of literature in the Netherlands, see Spaans (2002: 
34-36). For an extensive review of the literature and a discussion of the theoretical 
roots see Klijn (1996 and 1997). Besides being a different way of looking at govern­
ment and markets, the policy network approach is also a different way of looking at 
public management.
In the traditional intra-organizational approach '.management consists of three 
main activities: setting the goals of the organization (planning), structuring and de­
signing the organization (organizing) and "getting the job done" (leading). Manage­
ment is a top-down activity based on a clear authority structure (...)' (Kickert et al., 
1997: 11). The policy network approach advocates an alternative to this hierarchy. 
'In a network situation a single central authority, a hierarchical ordering and a single 
organizational goal do not exist' (ibidem). Table 2 shows the main characteristics of
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the traditional intra-organizational and of the policy network approaches regarding 
the style of management.
Table 2. Two perspectives on management (op. cit: 12).
Traditional intra-organizational approach Policy network approach
Organizational setting Single authority structure Divided authority structure
Goal structure Activities are guided by clear goals and 
well-defined problems
Various and changing definitions 
of problems and goals
Role of manager System controller Mediator, process manager, 
network builder
Management tasks Planning and guiding organizational 
processes
Guiding interactions and provid­
ing opportunities
Management activities Planning, design and leading Selecting actors and resources, 
influencing network conditions, 
and handling strategic complexity
In the policy network approach, the power relationship between the actors is related 
to their interaction in the networks. The idea is that there are some factors that can ex­
plain the characteristics of this power relationship. Scharpf (1978: 353, 366) suggests 
a structuralist approach as a viable research method for studying inter-organizational 
policy making and policy implementation processes. It consists of focussing on the 
more stable (structural) factors that facilitate or impede certain types of power rela­
tionship between the involved actors. Of course, these structural factors do not fully 
determine those interactions, there are also other non-structural factors that may do 
so (e.g. consolidated game patterns and the contingent behaviour of individual ac­
tors). But the structural factors will at least explain the impossibility or improbability 
of certain forms of power relationships, and the feasibility and probability of others. 
The 'structures' facilitate or hamper certain types of power relationships. This research 
follows Scharpf's recommendation (1978: 354) to focus on resource dependence as 
a method to discover the structural factors. From this point of view, there are several 
important characteristics of policy networks (Spaans, 2002: 36; Klijn, 1997: 30-33).
2.1.1.1 First characteristic of policy networks: Actors pursue their own goals 
and are dependent on each other for realising those goals
Policy networks consist of different actors each of them pursuing its own goals, each 
of them following its own strategy. This carries the potentiality of a conflict, because 
these goals and strategies might diverge. In addition, actors in a network are mutu­
ally dependent. Dependence is the reason for the existence of a network. It is very 
unlikely that the implementation of public policy of any significance can rely on 
a single actor (Scharpf, 1978: 347, 350; Benson, 1982: 141, 148; Klijn, 1997: 30;
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Kickert et alii, 1997: 2). As Klijn states, 'Networks develop and exist because of the 
interdependency between actors' (op. cit.: 31).
The concepts of power, dependence, rules and resources are central here. Following 
Giddens (1984: 14-16, 258; see also Verhage, 2002: 158), an agent exercises power 
if he or she can '.m a k e  a difference to a pre-existing state of affairs or course of 
events' (Giddens, 1984: 14). It is possible to categorise the following sorts of power: 
economic, politic, affective, and cognitive (Korthals Altes, 1995: 25). Almost all sorts 
of power (except maybe affective power, the capability to make others emotionally 
dependent) are generated thanks to what Giddens calls 'resources'. By means of the 
control of resources, an actor can influence the behaviour of others, and by doing so 
he 'makes a difference to a pre-existing state of affairs or course of events', he exer­
cises power. Thus, power exists thanks to the control of resources. Elias (1971: 84-85; 
see also Verhage, 2002: 157) describes dependence relations between persons as 
the inverse of power relations. Actor A can exercise power on actor B when B needs 
one or more resources controlled by A. If so, A can exercise power on B because B 
depends on A. Summarized, the unequal allocation of resources can create depend­
ence, and dependence allows the exercising of power.
The strength of this dependence depends on the importance of the resources, and 
on the 'substitutability' of the resource, i.e. the ease with which the resources can 
be replaced by other resources (Scharpf, 1978: 354-355; see also Klijn, 1997: 31; 
Spaans, 2002: 36). Scharpf distinguished different degrees of dependence, related to 
the importance and substitutability of the resources (ibidem):
• High dependence: high importance and low substitutability of the resources;
• Low dependence: low importance and low substitutability, or high importance 
and high substitutability;
• Independence: low importance and high substitutability.
Further, Scharpf distinguished three types of dependence (op. cit.: 356-358):
• Unilateral dependence: the interest of A in the maintenance of the relationship is 
greater that the interest of B. A is the more dependent party, B the dominant one. 
B might use this against the weaker party, A, and oblige him to accept interac­
tions that are unattractive for him.
• Mutual dependence or interdependency: both A and B depend on the resources 
of the other, and they do not have easily available alternative sources of supply.
• Mutual independence: neither A nor B depends on the resources of the other. 
There is no dependency.
Giddens (1984: 258) distinguished two kinds of resources: allocative and authorita­
tive. Allocative resources are the material features of the environment, the means of 
material production (technology) and the produced goods. Authoritative resources 
refer to the arrangements that create the time-space consuming patterns of socie­
ties, the arrangements that organize the interaction of people in societies, and the
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arrangements that create people's chances of self-development and self-expression, 
e.g. to be able to read and write. Healey (1992: 35; see also Verhage, 2002: 159) 
elaborates further on this distinction. She speaks of Giddens' 'allocative resources' 
and 'authoritative resources' as 'resources' respectively 'rules', and introduces a new 
sort of resource, 'ideas'. Using these concepts Healey develops a model to analyse 
the power-relationships in urban development processes.
Ostrom (1986: 466-467; see also Verhage, 2002: 160) made a distinction between 
'working rules' and 'formal rules'. Working rules are more than formal rules: they are 
partly based on the formal rules but also on cultural or social ways of behaviour. Ex­
amples of working rules are policy paradigms, the unwritten rules about how people 
handle situations, etc. These informal rules can be partly based on formal rules but, 
as Verhage states, '(...) the rules that govern behaviour of actors are broader than only 
the legal regulation.' (op. cit.: 160). Formal rules are formalised in laws and adminis­
trative arrangements, and regulate the interactions between actors by defining rights 
and obligations and stating to whom they belong. For example, the Dutch Civil Code 
defines the scope of property rights (how the landowner may use his land) and the 
Physical Planning Act and the Housing Act limit these rights (he can only build if the 
Land use Plan allows it, and provided he obtains a building permit). Formal rules also 
create 'new' resources that become necessary, and allocate them to certain actors. 
Following the example above, the Physical Planning Act and the Housing Act create 
the new resources 'land use plan' and 'building permits', which can exclusively be 
approved by the municipality.
H —>
rules
resource distribution
behaviour actors
<-
<-
other aspects
Figure 2. Relation between rules, resources, dependence and power in policy networks.
Thus, the relation between rules, resources, dependency and power is clear: rules 
regulate the behaviour of actors and the resource distribution in the network, and this 
shapes dependence among the actors. And finally, dependence shapes the power in-
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teractions between actors. However, this process is more complex, as the interactions 
within the framework often shape, consolidating or altering, the rules (Klijn & Koppen­
jan, 2000: 139; Klijn 1997: 33; Benson, 1982: 150-151). Summarized, rules shape the 
power interactions, but power interactions also shape the rules. See Figure 2.
2.1.1.2 Second characteristic of policy networks: There is no dominant actor, 
and governments are primus inter pares
Giddens said also that ' . a l l  forms of dependence offer some resources whereby 
those who are subordinate can influence the activities of their superiors.' He calls this 
the 'dialectic of control' in social systems (1984: 16). This means that each actor has 
at his disposal some resources/rules needed by other actors to achieve their goals, 
so that he can influence their behaviour (Verhage, 2002: 158). If each actor has re­
sources/rules needed by others, there is no actor who has all the resources/rules at his 
disposal. There is no actor who can exercise power over all the other actors, because 
there is always at least one other actor who has some necessary resources/rules. That 
is, there is no actor who can exercise an absolute power over all the other actors. In 
fact, the policy network approach applies to the policy field the principles of Gid­
dens' 'dialectic of control', when it assumes that various actors have a veto power. 
The need to cooperate is central in the policy network approach; policies can only 
develop or be implemented when each actor makes his resources available (Scharpf, 
1978: 347, 350; Benson, 1982: 141, 148; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000: 142-144). 
Kickert et al. emphasize this: 'Interdependency is the key word in the network ap­
proach. Actors in networks are interdependent because they cannot attain their goals 
by themselves, but need the resources of other actors to do so' (1997: 6).
Public actors occupy a special position, a position that is based on the unique re­
sources that they have and on the democratic legitimization they enjoy. But a clear 
starting point in this approach is that '.p u b lic  actors do not play the dominant role 
they often are ascribed in other public administration perspectives.' (Klijn & Koppen­
jan, 2000: 151). 'It is (...) clear that government cannot reclaim its post-war welfare 
state position as the central governing authority in society. The experiences of the 
1960s and 1970s have shown that the steering potentials of government are limited 
and that it must deal with many other important actors in the policy fields in which 
it operates.' (Kickert et alii, 1997: 1). Klijn and Koppenjan speak of an ' .  apparently 
broad consensus that has developed around the idea that government is actually not 
the cockpit from which society is governed and that policy making processes rather 
are generally an interplay among various acto rs.' (op. cit.: 136). In short, though the 
policy network approach recognizes that the government is a special party, a kind of 
primus inter pares, the government is not any more the central actor that characterizes 
the Rational Central Rule Model, typical in the welfare state of the 1960s and 1970s.
2.1.1.3 Criticisms of the policy network approach
There are criticisms of the policy network approach, namely that it is said to devalue 
the status of the public sector (De Bruijn and Ringeling, 1997: 151-157; Rhodes
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1997, quoted in Klijn & Koppenjan 2000: 151-154; Kickert et al., 1997: 170-171; 
Marsh & Rhodes, 1992: 263-268; Lowi, 1969: 85-97, 287-297: quoted in Marsh 
& Rhodes, op. cit.: 265; Ripley and Franklin 1987, Marin and Mayntz 1991 and 
Nelissen 1993: quoted in Kickert et al., ibidem). Compared to the dominant role 
that government has in other public administration perspectives, the policy network 
approach describes the public sector as being just another of the actors in the net­
work, putting it on the same level as the non-governmental actors and denying it the 
possibility of playing an old fashioned dominant role. Thus, the network approach 
proposes that government bodies engage in the networks as the only way of success­
fully elaborating and implementing policies. The criticisms focus on the problems of 
democratic legitimacy or accountability that arise when governments cannot play a 
dominant role and have to engage in networks. They should not enter into interac­
tions and partnerships with other parties in society because this hinders the fulfilment 
of the common interest. A government getting involved in networks is not able to 
fulfil the common interest it should pursue, because the decision making in networks 
is non-transparent and uncontrolled.
In a reaction to this criticism, Klijn and Koppenjan warn ".against mixing up the real 
world and the theoretical framework that is used to analyse, evaluate and improve 
it." (2000: 151). They argue that it is a fact that the government depends upon other 
actors, and that the policy network approach just tries to develop instruments, which
- given that fact - enable the public sector to defend in the actual network context 
the public interest and the primacy of politics. As sections 2.1.1.1 and 2.1.1.2 show, 
the idea of interdependence in the policy network approach is based on an analysis 
of the distribution of resources. It is clear that the policy network approach takes 
the starting point that there is always more that one actor who has a 'veto power', 
because the needed resources are distributed between several actors and there is 
no actor who controls all them. Governments depend on other actors because they 
do not have all the needed resources, the missing resources belong to other actors, 
and these missing resources are not replaceable or if replaceable, this is too costly 
and time consuming. Therefore, the collaboration of all the actors who control the 
needed resources is indispensable for policy-implementation.
The idea that governments are inevitably dependent can be the subject of criticism, 
as e.g. Koffijberg did in a recent study on housing policy networks in the Netherlands. 
He argued to have discovered effective ways for public bodies to play a dominant 
role (2005: 322-323). Following this line, my research can be seen as a fundamental 
criticism of the basic assumption in the Policy network approach, that public bodies 
always have to be heavily dependent on other bodies in land development projects. 
The conclusions in chapter 8 provide instruments for making public bodies less de­
pendent and allowing them to play a more dominant role, precisely in order to im­
prove the capturing of value increase.
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2.1.2 How to intervene in policy networks: Network 
management
Steering the interactions between the actors in policy networks may be necessary. 
One of the reasons is that these interactions are complex and there is always a poten­
tial conflict, since each actor pursues his own goals. Furthermore, because there are 
usually actors who have some veto power, the collaboration of all the necessary ac­
tors is necessary to obtain outcomes that satisfy all the actors. As Klijn and Koppenjan 
put it: 'Since co-operation and collaboration of goals and interests does not happen 
of its own accord, steering of complex games in networks is necessary.' (Klijn & Kop­
penjan, 2000: 140). The special position of public bodies makes them very suitable 
for the role of network manager. They can be a facilitator.
Obviously, the reason why a public body might want to intervene in policy networks 
is not only to guarantee that the outcome of policy processes satisfy other actors, but 
also to realise its own goals better. In this research we investigate whether the formal 
rules relevant to zoning could be used in an operational way to improve cost recov­
ery, i.e. to finance the unprofitable parts with the value increase of land. Translated 
into policy network terms, we investigate the possibility of influencing, through Net­
work management measures, the interactions within the networks and thereby the 
outcomes in capturing value increase.
It is possible to distinguish two types of network management: 'process management' 
or 'game management', and 'network constitution' or 'network structuring' (Klijn 
& Koppenjan, 2000: 140-142; Klijn 1997: 46-53; O'Toole, 1988: 426-433). Proc­
ess management tries to influence the interactions between actors, with the existing 
rules and resource distribution as the starting point. This management method is ap­
propriate for influencing interactions that are already underway. The second network 
management method, Network constitution, seeks institutional change. Network 
constitution is focused on making structural changes, and one of the ways of doing 
this is by changing the rules. This is based on the principle that rules can modify the 
distribution of resources and the behaviour of the actors.
In the rest of this chapter, two specific methods of Network management will be 
worked out, both of them involving the rules that public bodies might be able to 
modify. Both methods are inspired by two ongoing debates in the planning academic 
and professional world. The first measure (section 2.2) is inspired by the debate in 
the UK, but specially in Spain and the Netherlands, concerning the steering powers 
of public bodies in urban development, related to the contents of property rights in 
land. It is a clear Network constitution measure: modifying the contents of property 
rights that govern the transactions in infrastructure provision. The second measure 
(section 2.3) is inspired by the academic debate about the desired level of flexibility 
in planning. It also consists of a Network constitution measure that requires however 
almost no modification of formal rules and is thus feasible in a shorter term: it con­
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cerns the moment in the course of the development process at which public bodies 
approve land use prescriptions. Both measures have been analysed in a model that 
includes also all other factors that influence the capturing of increased value (section 
2.4). Finally, both measures have been translated into two hypothetical assumptions 
(section 2.5).
2.2 The formal rules governing property rights in land
Introduction
The owners of property rights in land1 have a very powerful position in urban re­
generation projects, and they can - and do - use that power in the pursuit of their 
own goals in such projects. However, the contents of those powers are determined 
by formal rules, under both public and private law. In section 2.2.1 we first discuss 
those rules in general terms. Then in sections 2.2.2-4 we illustrate this with an ex­
position of the practice and political debate in three countries - England and Wales, 
the Netherlands, and Spain - which concern the relationship between formal rules 
governing property rights in land and the possibilities for capturing value increase. 
The British nationalization of development rights in 1947 forms a clear reference 
point in the debate. The discussion in the Netherlands and Spain is certainly relevant 
to local academic and professional debate, and the similarities between the debate in 
both countries are obvious, e.g. in both countries controversial proposals have been 
made to separate development rights from property rights. In 1994 the Spanish region 
of Valencia devised an alternative to separation that in fact separated infrastructure 
provision from property rights. Today, this innovation has been introduced in almost 
all of the remaining 17 Spanish regions.
2.2.1 Restrictions on the exercise of property rights in land
One might think, and actually there are many with a libertarian perspective who do, 
that property rights in land give the owner total freedom to decide how to use his 
land. The Roman Law concept of 'dominium' might best define what are the con­
tents of such an absolute concept of property. 'Dominium' includes all the possible 
rights over a thing (thus also land) that one person can own: the right to use it (usus), 
the right to the fruits (fructus) and the right to disposal (abusus). However, the real­
ity is that all countries, and certainly any country with a mature legal system, have 
issued in the course of history, and still issue, formal rules that restrict the exercise
1 O f the variety of possible property rights in land, it is the right of ownership that is at the centre 
of attention in this research. There are other possible rights, for example that another person is 
authorized to walk on the land, even if he is not the owner of the land, or that another person can 
as a tenant use the property to live or work in/on it (cfr. Needham, 2006: 34-36).
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of property rights in land (Needham, 2006: 1-3, 36-38, 39). Before entering into the 
debate in England and Wales, the Netherlands and Spain, let us see first how private 
and public law can restrict the exercise of property rights in land and how this has 
evolved in the history.
The restrictions on the exercise of rights in land can come both from private and from 
public law. Private law rules are necessary to regulate how persons deal with each 
other with their property rights, i.e. how and what they can sell or buy or limit their 
rights. For example, if law (e.g. nuisance law in England and the United States) says 
so, one owner cannot use his property in such a way that he could harm a neighbour­
ing owner. Another example is that private law rules whether an owner can or cannot 
split off from his freehold property right the right of a building lease and transfer it to 
another person. In addition, the owner of the freehold may not enter onto the land 
without permission of the owner of the building lease. Thus, restrictions under private 
law regulate the normal traffic between persons (Needham, 2006: 43-45).
Restrictions under public law allow state agencies to impose one-sidely restrictions to 
the exercise of property rights in land. First, a state agency can impose restrictions on 
the use of the right, e.g. if you want to build on your land, you must follow the building 
regulations. This first sort of restriction attenuates the exercise of rights, but does not 
take them away, although if it is permanent that amounts in fact to destroying part of 
the right. Second, a state agency may compulsorily take away rights, e.g. expropriat­
ing freehold rights of land, or the right to develop it. In this second sort of restriction, 
the right is transferred to someone else, usually a state agency (Needham, 2006: 46).
Generally speaking, since the liberal revolutions of the 18th and 19th Centuries we 
could summarise the evolution of the restrictions under public law as follows. At 
that time, the victorious bourgeoisie of the new liberal regimes rehabilitated (and 
reinterpreted) the old Roman Quirinian law's concept of property rights. The goal 
was to guarantee the economic position of the new dominant social class. Up to that 
time, the absolute control of land by the bourgeoisie was hindered by medieval at­
tachments and rules. In the liberal reinterpretation, property rights included, as part 
of their essential contents, the faculty of doing whatever the owner wants on, under 
or above his land. Essential content means that it belongs to the structural or genu­
ine elements of the property right2. If the essential contents become hollowed out, 
property becomes seriously harmed. Whatever means that the owner can decide, for 
the owned object, the an (whether to do or not to do), the quomodo (how, in which 
way, what for), the quantum (how much) and the quando (when). On, under or above 
means that the owner can do whatever he wants with the space situated above his 
plot (up to the sky), directly on his plot, and under his plot (down to the hell). The
2 The 'essential contents' of property rights in land could be identified, grosso modo, with what in the 
Anglo-Saxon legal tradition is called the minimal 'bundle of rights' that someone has to own in order 
to be regarded as the owner (cfr. Needham, 2006; 34-35, 38-40).
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concept evolved with time showing some parallels with the historic transition of the 
Liberal State to the Social and Democratic State. First, the space above and under the 
land became public domain. In a second step, rivers, seas, coastal areas, etc. became 
also part of the public domain. The owner still controlled the space situated imme­
diately above and under his plot, but not for long. With the transition to the 20th 
Century the social function of property appeared. Sanitary (fire and building hygiene) 
and social considerations further limited the contents of property rights. The broad 
competences of the owner became gradually limited and the exercising of his rights 
subjected to obligations. These limits and obligations, which derive from the inter­
ests of other individuals, and from public and collective interests, now prevail over 
the interests of the owner and have become part of the essential content of property 
rights. The owner can enjoy his property only if he/she does so within the legal rules 
and prescriptions, and after receiving a public authorization or concession. In other 
words, the public administration fixes now the an, the quantum and the quomodo 
(cfr. García-Bellido, 1991b: §1; 1993: 176, 179-180, 182; 1994: 130 and following; 
Mazzoni, 1990: 32, 34, 99-101, 104-121, 253-257, quoted in García-Bellido, 1993: 
179; 1994: 136; Bassols, 1985a: 111-124; and 1985b: 11-24, 115-116: last edition 
quoted in García-Bellido, 1993: 179-180).
2.2.2 The nationalization of development rights in England and 
W ales
Already in 1909 and 1932, British planning law introduced the rationale of capturing 
the unearned value increase of land, without however effectively operationalizing 
it. Later on, the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, following the conclusions of 
the 1942 Uthwatt Report, introduced what is called the 'nationalization of the de­
velopment rights' (Booth, 2003: 89-92, 100-101, 105, 109; Cullingworth & Nadin, 
2006: 195-197; Alterman, 2009: 4-5, 7, 15-17). The right of ownership was stripped 
of one of its partial rights - the right to develop, or the right to change the use of the 
land - and this partial right was compulsorily acquired by the state. This meant that 
development rights were vested in the state, not in the landowner. No development 
could take place without permission of the local planning authority, and then only 
on payment of a betterment charge to the Central Land Board (for the right to develop 
was owned by the state, and the developer had to pay to use that right). From this it 
followed that, if permission was refused, landowners had no right to compensation, 
and that if permission was granted, betterment (any increase in the value of land) 
was subject to a betterment charge. Landowners owned only the existing use rights 
of their land. In case of compulsory acquisition of land, the price to be paid as com­
pensation would be equal to the existing use value, that is, its value excluding any 
allowance for future development. The act introduced a scheme of £300 million fund 
for payments (intentionally called 'payments', and not 'compensations') to landown­
ers who could successful claim that their land had some development value before 
the introduction of the 1947's provisions. Some decades later, in 1974 and 1975, the
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Labour government of the time proposed an initiative to nationalise land ownership 
(i.e. going a step further and nationalising all rights in land); however, this measure 
failed to materialise (Clusa & Mur, 2007: 122-136).
The 1947 Act had significant consequences for capturing value increase, as better­
ment (any increase in the value of land) became the subject of a betterment charge. 
From that time onwards, land value taxation has been short-lived and it was finally 
scrapped in 1985 (see chapter 6.2.1). Another important consequence of the 1947 
provision is that development plans are not legally binding: someone who wants to 
develop does not have the right to do that simply because the application conforms 
with the development plan. In other words, the state can impose conditions on the 
right to develop, irrespective of the development plan. However, the 1947 Act did 
not alter the principle that landowners are the only ones who can develop their land. 
Landowners remain, in case planning authorities grant planning permission, the ex­
clusive owner of the right to develop their land. They can exclude others from doing 
so. Before being entitled to develop, developers will have to acquire the land or to 
agree the availability of land with its owner.
2.2.3 The Netherlands: the debate about splitting development 
rights from land ownership
As mentioned in section 1.1, important changes took place in Dutch land and hous­
ing policies at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. The effects of these 
changes have been already discussed there: private parties have assumed a more 
important role in land development and in housing production, and a shift took place 
from predominantly social housing to predominantly free market housing. Another 
change was the interest of private parties in buying land long before development 
takes place, which was relatively new in the recent history or Dutch urban develop­
ment. These changes have consequences for the capturing of value increase in urban 
regeneration: the financing of the public infrastructure and facilities has come under 
pressure and development has been delayed significantly.
These changes, and their consequences, have been the subject of controversy and 
debate. The question has been discussed whether planning law and property rights 
offer enough instruments to public bodies to achieve their public goals. Often men­
tioned public goals concern the delivery of serviced land and the subsequent realisa­
tion of building quotas, and the financing of public infrastructure and facilities. Other 
debated issues, directly related to this discussion, concern the most desirable rela­
tionship between public and private actors, and whether municipalities need new 
statutory powers to regulate land markets. Probably, the most controversial issue has 
been the proposal for a separation of land ownership from development rights (CPB 
1999; BCR, 1999; Canoy and Van Ewijk, 1999; Overwater, 1999; Priemus & Louw, 
2000, 2003; Vrom-Raad, 2000; Korthals Altes and Groetelaers, 2000).
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2.2.3.1 The debate
There is a certain consensus about the analysis that is briefly set out in sections 1.1 
and 1.2. It is clear that the recent changes in land and housing policies do not allow 
municipalities to steer urban development in the way they used to do. The discus­
sion however focuses on the question whether or not planning law offers, in the new 
context, enough instruments for municipalities to satisfactorily control urban devel­
opment and its outcomes. Can municipalities sufficiently meet their public goals 
without performing an old-fashioned active land policy and dominating the land 
markets? In other words, without buying the land, providing the infrastructure and 
assuming all the corresponding risks?
Priemus and Louw (2003) are sceptical about the effectiveness of public law instru­
ments. For example, they argue that pre-emption powers cannot always prevent de­
velopers from buying the land. Also, expropriation is not an easy instrument to use, for 
it is expensive, politically sensitive, and not always applicable if the landowners are 
willing to develop. The authors carried out a study of the functioning of Dutch land 
markets, and found that municipalities complained that the recent changes make it 
difficult to implement public planning policies. The most important bottlenecks men­
tioned by the municipalities are the assembling of land, the overrun of public legal 
procedures, and the recovery of costs. Municipalities said that they experienced in 
practice difficulties in achieving a comprehensive and integral development (Priemus 
and Louw, 2000: 6-10). The authors argue that, because land ensures a strong posi­
tion in urban development, the chances for developers of surviving in the building 
market are based not on their abilities to offer a better and cheaper product, but on 
their position in the land market. Land is a necessary condition for urban regenera­
tion, and the one who controls it has a monopoly on the supply of buildings in that 
particular location. As there are always in a particular urban market a limited number 
of suitable sites for building, actually we could talk of an oligopolistic market: in one 
urban market, the distribution and use of suitable building sites is controlled by a 
limited number of providers, the landowners. Because of the importance of land as 
the 'key' to urban development, developers tend to pay high prices for acquiring the 
land. This leads to high land development costs, costs that have to be recovered in the 
public infrastructure and the constructed buildings. The consequence is a diminish­
ing and impoverishment of the public infrastructure and social housing, and of the 
quality of the development (Priemus and Louw, 2003). In a recent study of urban 
regeneration, Buitelaar et al. conclude that high development costs adversely affect 
the quality of public infrastructure. In addition, they conclude that high development 
costs stimulate maximisation of the building volume, which ultimately leads to mas­
sive buildings and scarce public space (2008: 17-18, 20).
A study conducted by Korthals Altes and Groetelaers (2000) put into perspective the 
claim that municipalities have lost their steering powers. In most of the 72 schemes 
they studied, the municipality exercised influence through buying land and/or through 
reaching contractual agreements with the developers. From this it is clear that the
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municipalities still retain, through buying land and/or contractual agreements, ways 
of influencing urban development and its outcomes. However, the question remains 
unresolved whether this is enough to sufficiently meet the public planning goals. 
Korthals Altes and Groetelaers take a step further by arguing that the available instru­
ments are indeed sufficient means for preserving the public interest and influencing 
urban development (op. cit.: 43-45). However, Priemus and Louw disagree and are 
more pessimistic about the effectiveness of public steering powers (2003: 373-375).
2.2.3.2 The proposal for separating development rights
Some authors argue the need to introduce more competition in the building market 
(Priemus and Louw 2000, 2003; CPB, 1999: 11, 21, 39-40; BCR, 1999; Canoy and 
Van Ewijk, 1999). In the current situation, they argue, the chances of private actors 
are based on their position in the land market, not on their creativity and efficiency in 
producing good and cheap real state products. Increasingly, private actors are acquir­
ing land in early stages of development processes. The authors argue that this limits 
the competition between property developers and harms the public interest in urban 
development, including the capturing of value increase.
To introduce more competition between developers, the authors argue that the con­
tents of property rights should be modified. Currently, property gives to the owner 
the right to develop the building prescribed in the binding rules, in the Netherlands 
most of the time a land-use plan. If the landowner is able and willing to implement 
the land-use plan, expropriation might be difficult. This is called the 'self-realisation 
right': the owner of the land has the right to develop it in accordance with the land­
use plan. This development right spans the whole development process, from infra­
structure provision to the building. In other words, property gives to the owner the 
exclusive right to develop and build on the respective plot. The authors argue that 
separating the development and building rights from the right of land ownership 
would stimulate free competition.
Several, similar proposals have been made for separating landownership from devel­
opment and building rights. Canoy and Van Ewijk (1999: 25) propose an obligatory 
public tender for the development of a site. In their proposal, the landowner must 
tender the development and building rights on his land. Similarly, Priemus (1996: 32) 
and Priemus and Louw (2003: 376-377) propose a modification of the Expropriation 
Act (Onteigeningswet) to allow expropriation when the landowner does not develop 
and build his plot in a 'competitive manner'. Landowners should be obliged to or­
ganize a public tender, and if they do not do so, the municipality would have the 
right to expropriate the plot and organize the public tender. From that time onwards, 
other reports have included in one or other way the topic of separating development 
rights from landownership, for example by analyzing the effects of a possible sepa­
ration and expropriation of development rights (Needham & Geuting, 2006: 18-19; 
Vrom, 2006: 4-5). The topic remains in the spotlights, as shown by the fact that a 
governmental advisory commission has recently proposed limiting in some strategic
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areas the self-realization right of landowners by e.g. facilitating expropriation or in­
troducing new forms of compulsory purchase of the land (Vrom-raad, 2009: 41-42).
2.2.4 The separation of infrastructure provision from property 
rights in the Spanish region ofValencia
In Spain, the course of the discussion is roughly as follows (Bassols Coma, 1996a, 
1996b; Bidagor Lasarte, 1996; García-Bellido, 1991a, 1996; Menéndez Rexach, 
1996; Parejo Alfonso, 1996; Perales Madueño, 1996; interview with García-Bellido 
in 2005; Muñoz & Korthals Altes, 2007). Since the 19th Century, the difficulties faced 
by public bodies in financing public infrastructure and facilities inspired proposals 
and measures that affected the scope of the contents of property rights. Public bod­
ies had neither an efficient legislative framework (expropriation, taxes), nor enough 
financial resources for the realization of public infrastructure and facilities. As a con­
sequence, buying the land and providing the infrastructure became a considerable 
challenge for public bodies.
Ildefonso Cerdá (1815-1876) was a consistent critic of the legislative framework for 
urban development. As an alternative, he proposed a formula for distributing be­
tween all the involved owners the costs that arise from urban development. Land­
owners should share the costs through a form of land readjustment. In 1861 a pro­
posal for a town planning act which included Cerda's approach was submitted before 
Parliament in Madrid. However, this proposal did not succeed, and the 1864 Town 
Extension Act, which relied on the existing inefficient expropriation legislation, was 
passed instead. Cerda's revolutionary ideas had to wait a century for another chance. 
It is not clear whether Cerda's ideas and proposals influenced directly the 1956 Act, 
but anyway this act included a similar approach. From 1956 onwards, subsequent 
planning acts fine-tuned the 1956's approach in order to facilitate a private financing 
and implementation of public infrastructure and facilities. From the 70's onwards, 
more fundamental criticism led to more radical proposals and to more audacious 
experiments in the deployment of available instruments and in developing new in­
struments. The Valencian 1994 Act could be considered as one of the most relevant 
of these experiments.
In 1956, the Land and Urban Planning Regulatory Act and in 1976 its modification 
succeeded in introducing a totally new approach: a land readjustment regulation 
geared at changing property rights. The regulation makes profiting from betterment 
conditional on taking responsibility for infrastructure provision. Landowners were, 
since then, obliged to provide the infrastructure, organized in joint development 
organizations and sharing the costs. As compensation, they could also share the 
serviced building plots, i.e. the development profits. To create certainty about the 
development profits, municipalities were obliged to approve a legally binding Gen­
eral Land use Plan for the whole municipal territory. This plan delimitated the future
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developable sites, and those to be redeveloped. The detailed character of this general 
land use plan, and its strong legal binding status has made Spain a singular case 
in the international context (see chapter 4). The land readjustment regulation was 
in principle based on voluntary participation, but it also included the possibility of 
compulsory readjustment and expropriation. However, the regulation failed to assure 
good and enough public infrastructure and facilities. Since the 1980s, critics such 
as García-Bellido (1989; 1991b; 1993, 1994) and Parejo Alfonso (1993) advocated 
reform, arguing that landowners usually had no background as developers and were 
not well equipped to organize development processes. For more details about the 
working of the 1956's land readjustment regulation, see section 5.2.1.
2.2.4.1 The proposal for separating development rights from land-ownership
In García-Bellido's view, the shortcomings of the 1956's system were due to a lack 
of real and effective liberalization in the production of urban land. He made a pro­
posal for re-shaping the system, giving the development rights to the public bodies 
and aiming at improving the functionality of the land markets. García-Bellido's ideas 
were based on a criticism of the historic fundaments of the contemporary concept 
of property rights (1989; 1993; 1994). The British 1947 Act, and legal reforms of the 
Labour government in 1974 and 1975, which reintroduced the taxation of land val­
ues and proposed the nationalization of land, influenced García-Bellido's proposals 
(Clusa & Mur, 2007: 122-136).
Incomplete evolution of the concept o f property rights
We have seen above in section 2.2.1 that thanks to the social function of prop­
erty, and to sanitary considerations, the broad competences of the owner have been 
gradually restricted, and that the public administration nowadays fixes the an, the 
quantum and the quomodo. However, García-Bellido argues that the problem is that 
the quando (when to use or build upon the property) remained under the control of 
the landowner. The realization of the public goals is still dependent on the decision of 
the owner to develop his land. Consequently, undesired phenomena, such as specu­
lative retention of land, cannot be avoided. As a reaction to this, since the 1956 Act, 
in Spanish planning law the social function has incorporated a new dimension, of an 
economic character: owners have also to comply with the obligation to implement 
the public infrastructure and facilities within prescribed deadlines. If they do not ful­
fill their duties properly, the municipality can apply compulsory land readjustment 
or expropriate the land. However, in practice it was under the 1956's legislation very 
difficult for public bodies to effectively control the quando. Public control instru­
ments were not always effective: for example, expropriation is a very controversial 
and politically troublesome instrument. Usually, landowners/developers can wait, 
while the public administrations have the goal of delivering large building quotas. 
Confronted with the choice between (1) maintaining the requirements but then not 
obtaining the collaboration of the private actors, and (2) lowering the requirements 
in order to achieve an agreement, many public bodies choose the second alternative 
(cfr. García-Bellido, 1993 and 1994).
32 Theoretical framework
The captive market
Together with this analysis that the historic evolution of the concept of property rights 
was incomplete, the idea of a captive market is central to García-Bellido's thought. 
Due to restrictive zoning and the natural features of land (each location is unique as 
land is not reproducible), land is not a normal production factor or merchandise. Its 
reproduction, distribution and use are not subjected to free competition. Property 
rights give powers to the owner to use his land and exclude others from doing so. 
Others cannot find an alternative provider of the land, except of course if they move 
to another location, where they will meet the same situation (again an owner who 
can exclude them from access to land). In other words, landowners do not need to 
compete with others, because they control the most important production factor: 
land. They form a monopoly (there is only one supplier) or an oligopoly (there are 
only few suppliers) in the land market, the virtual place where the producers of urban 
land are supposed to acquire undeveloped land. Competition arises to acquire land, 
not to develop it. The strength and survival chances of the supplier in the urban mar­
kets are based on his monopolistic or oligopolistic privileges, not on the quality or 
other advantages of his buildings. He can wait, without needing to make any invest­
ment or effort, and ask the maximal price for his land, absorbing all the residual profit 
margins from the building. The legal certainty about future development possibilities, 
provided by the obligatory General Land use Plan introduced with the 1956 Act, 
reinforces the position of landowners. Suppliers in housing and land markets show 
a common strategic behavior: they wait until the various segments of the demanders 
(price/quality ratio) are willing to pay the maximum price possible. Even when prices 
rise, an important part of the potential supply waits until prices reach even higher 
levels (García-Bellido, 1994: 114-115/578-579; Mangada, 1990: 179-180; Martín 
Mateo, 1980: 13-18; Roca Cladera, 1992: 13: quoted in García-Bellido, 1993: 191).
Proposal for a real liberalization
García-Bellido proposed an alternative to the above-mentioned liberal interpretation 
of property rights (Roca, 2007). He proposed the 'desaggregated' or 'separated prop­
erty' (1993, 1994). To improve the functionality of the land markets, it is necessary 
that at the same selling point at least two suppliers compete with each other, thus 
lowering the price and/or bettering the quality in order to sell more goods. Suppli­
ers can move to other selling points where more scarcity could provide higher profit 
rates, provided that there also at least a second supplier can compete with them. 
Only the actor who offers the best quality for the lowest price should develop each 
location. The community should control the quality of the different proposals and 
decide who earns the right to develop.
To formulate his alternative paradigm, García-Bellido uses the 'dualistic theory', 
which divides property rights in two, separated rights (García-Bellido, 1993: 186­
187):
a) The right to the non-urban use of land, which belongs to the landowner and al­
lows him/her to use the land for the non-urban functions, e.g. agriculture. In case
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the land becomes rezoned into urban land, the landowner has the obligation to 
give freedom to the owner of ...
b) The right to the urban use of land. This right can belong to a different person and 
gives this individual the development rights, i.e. the right to provide the infra­
structure, to build on the serviced parcels and to use the buildings.
García-Bellido positions his proposal as a logical and inevitable continuation of the 
above mentioned historic process of limitation of property rights. He places the dual­
istic theory as a continuation of the thesis of ius publicista, which is opposed to that 
of ius privatista. In the thesis of ius publicista, (b) belongs to the public domain, and 
not to the landowner (García-Bellido, 1993: 182; Parejo, 1991: 19-20). Both sorts of 
property, (a) and (b), become completely separated. The first belongs to the owner 
and his successors; the second belongs to the public bodies, which may use it or 
transfer it to a market party. After the building is finished, both rights come together 
again and are transmitted together to the successors of the owners. Later, should the 
building be demolished and ready for redevelopment, both property rights are again 
separated, and the right to the urban use comes again in public hands, which can 
decide whether or not to rebuild it, and who can do it. The economic rent generated 
in each redevelopment ends thus in public hands (García-Bellido, 1993: 186-188). It 
is clear that this proposal is very similar to the nationalization of development rights, 
introduced in England and Wales in 1947.
2.2.4.2 The Valencian model: separation of development rights from 
landownership?
In the early 1990s, the Ministry of Planning of the social-democratic regional govern­
ment of Valencia - one of the 17 Spanish regions - was willing to tackle stagnation 
and speculation in development processes, and to improve the capturing of value 
increase. The aforementioned criticisms influenced this aim, and García-Bellido be­
came directly involved in the preparations for a new planning act. Each Spanish 
region (or 'autonomous community') has its own planning legislation (Roca Cladera 
and Burns, 2000). The 1978 Spanish Constitution however reserves to the national 
government the competence of guaranteeing all Spaniards, regardless of the region 
in which they live, an equal level of protection of their property rights. Thanks to this 
constitutional principle, the essential contents of property rights became a central 
government competence. According to the central planning law, building rights be­
long to these essential contents of property rights. Regional legislation is therefore un­
able to remove building rights from the landowner, as García-Bellido's first proposal 
aimed to do. The makers of the 1994 Valencian Planning Act (Ley Reguladora de la 
Actividad Urbanística, LRAU), therefore, did not change the ownership of building 
rights, but devised an alternative. The alternative consisted of introducing important 
changes in the land readjustment regulation. The most important change was the 
revival of the figure of urbanizing agent, already introduced in the 1975-6 Planning 
Act. Public bodies could choose a developer to provide the infrastructure, without 
this developer necessarily owning the land. However, the 1975-6's novelty did not
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work, because this agent had no security, either about the acquisition of land for the 
public infrastructure and facilities, or about the financing of it. The Valencian 1994 
Act introduced some changes that made this way of development feasible (for more 
details about the 1975-76's and 1994's innovations, see section 5.2.2).
An important question must be answered: does the Valencia system separate devel­
opment rights from landownership? Infrastructure provision is a public task in Spain. 
Until the passage of the 1956 Land Act, public bodies were active in the implementa­
tion of this public task, buying the land and constructing the public infrastructure. In 
an attempt to make implementation feasible, the 1956 Land Act assigned the duty of 
infrastructure provision to landowners, with legal certainty about building rights as 
compensation, but without altering the rule that the ultimate responsibility is public. 
Consequently, if landowners do not fulfill their duties properly, the municipality can 
recover its original power of implementing directly, through compulsory land read­
justment or through expropriation. According to the 1956 legislation, therefore, fail­
ing to fulfill the duty to provide infrastructure could eventually lead to loss of prop­
erty rights. The Valencian model did not introduce this possibility; it merely made 
it practically feasible. The model made compulsory land readjustment the default 
procedure for urban development and reinforced the possibility, which had been in­
troduced in the 1975-6 Act, of appointing an urbanising agent - a third party, besides 
the municipality and the landowners - as the executor.
2.3 Binding rules which influence certainty and 
flexibility in planning
Introduction
When thinking about the use of binding rules in policy preparation and implementa­
tion, one has to think about two important functions. First, binding rules commit the 
public body that approves them. This public body might become committed to the 
implementation, e.g. promising the needed investments in public infrastructure and 
facilities or committing itself to fulfil the needed procedures. Second, binding rules 
have consequences for the expectations of others about the future development pos­
sibilities of land. After all, binding rules regulate the use of land and real estate. The 
owner or user of land is bound to use the property in the way prescribed by the bind­
ing rules. Binding rules delimit development rights or use rights, and once approved 
they also guarantee these rights.
Additionally to those two functions, we need to distinguish between three charac­
teristics of binding rules that affect the certainty that these rules create about urban 
development. First, the contents of binding rules, i.e. which commitments and which 
use possibilities and obligations do they exactly prescribe. Second, the moment of
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approval of the binding rules, i.e. at what moment in a development process do they 
create certainty about the commitments and the future development possibilities and 
obligations. The third characteristic is the possibility of modifying the binding rules, 
i.e. whether and how the contents of binding rules can be modified. All three charac­
teristics (contents, moment of approval and possibilities of modification) are more or 
less regulated in planning law. In some countries binding rules can include a wider 
range of obligations than in others, prescribe an earlier approval than in others, and 
in the course of the development process public bodies are allowed to modify the 
binding rules (or the interpretation of them) more easily than in others. When bind­
ing rules include much content and are approved early in the process and cannot be 
easily modified, the certainty is higher than if binding rules include little content and 
are approved late in the process and can be easily modified.
Not all the parties want certainty at all stages in the project. The public body might 
want to guarantee beforehand some public goals, but it is also reasonable that a 
public body might want to keep some flexibility about how it will commit itself, and 
also about how it will handle a planning application. And commercial actors might 
prefer that development requirements are known with certainty beforehand, but they 
might also want to be able to influence the content of a plan during the development 
process, and to react to changes that arise in the course of time. There are so many 
uncertainties in the circumstances surrounding a development process that parties 
might want to be able to react to them flexibly.
We make here a link with a lively debate in planning profession about the needed 
degree of flexibility in planning: must planning create certainty at early stages of 
development processes (fix the future) or be flexible (adapt to circumstances)? Here 
we define flexibility as the room for changes and alterations in the binding rules dur­
ing the development process. Flexibility was seen as a negative feature in the 1960s 
planning practice, whereas the planning profession, at least in the Netherlands and 
the UK today, perceives flexibility as a positive way of coping with the challenges of 
growing complexity, opportunism, and diversity in cities. The discussion about flex­
ibility contrasts two approaches. On the one hand, planning should be flexible to 
facilitate a non-linear and multi-layered decision making system. On the other hand, 
when implementation is too flexible, the public sector loses the controlling power 
and the private sector influences the urban development in an incremental (i.e. not 
planned) way. But before entering into this discussion, we first explain the differences 
in planning traditions regarding flexibility.
2.3.1 Plan-led versus development-led planning systems
There are different traditions in planning related to the moment at which, in develop­
ment processes, binding rules come legally into force. This difference causes differ­
ent degrees of certainty. Grosso modo there is a distinction between the 'plan-led'
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tradition, where legally binding land use plans are made before there is contact be­
tween public bodies, developers and land owners, and the 'development-led' tradi­
tion, in which the negotiations with developers and land owners precede the making 
of legally binding land use rules. If we define flexibility in planning as the room for 
changes and alterations in the binding rules during the development process, then 
the former tradition gives less flexibility than the latter.
The planning literature makes various categorizations of planning systems. Here we 
use a categorization based on the legal and administrative systems in which planning 
systems operate, for the distinction between plan-led and development-led planning 
systems is related to the distinction between the continental and the British system3 
(Nadin & Stead, 2008: 38-40). We complement this with Faludi's analytical distinc­
tion between theory A and B (1987), because this distinction connects better to the 
data gathering possibilities.
'Plan-led' systems are similar to what Faludi defines as proto-planning theory B. 'De­
velopment-led' systems, on the other hand, can be compared with Faludi's proto­
planning theory A (1987: 185-192; see Figure 3). Development-led systems charac­
terize the British situation, and plan-led, supposedly, planning in most of the other 
countries. In development-led systems, the public authority decides cases on their 
merits. The land use plan merely gives an idea of the intentions of the local authority. 
As Faludi expresses it for theory A, 'Zoning then merely expresses guidelines which 
the environmental authority gives to itself - for its own convenience so to speak - and 
from which it is at liberty to depart' (p. 186). Faludi calls this the indicative theory of 
zoning. In plan-led systems, the land use plan is more important. The local author­
ity fixes the desired environmental outcomes in the land-use plan, which becomes 
legally binding. This statutory fixation of the land-uses occurs at the plan production 
moment (this is the moment in which the first projections are made for development, 
and it is indicated with the star on the left in Figure 3), while in development-led sys­
tems this occurs at, or shortly before, the development moment (this is the moment 
in which local authorities and developers face a specific proposal for development, 
the star on the right in Figure 3). In other words, in plan-led systems the regulations 
about the future use possibilities are supposed to become legally binding before 
intending developers find out whether their intentions conform to the conditions 
imposed. Once the developer submits a building application, the local authorities 
check whether it fits into the legally binding land-use plan. If it does not, the applica­
tion should be rejected. Faludi calls this the imperative theory of zoning.
Summarizing, plan-led systems differ from development-led systems in two aspects: 
(1) there is in plan-led systems always a legally binding land use plan, and (2) this 
plan acquires legal status at an early stage, at the plan production moment.
3 In another approach, planning systems are classified using a wide set of criteria, such as the distribution 
of powers relevant to planning among levels of government, or the maturity of the system.
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Figure 3. Categorization between Development-led and Plan-led planning systems.
These differences between the British (development-led) and the plan-led system 
seem to be the consequence of historic differences in the juridical systems. Two long­
standing legislative traditions are important for understanding this British peculiarity 
(Booth, 2003: 4). The first is the heavy reliance on judge-made law in the common law 
system, where the UK belongs. In common law systems, the judgements of the courts 
on individual cases have a more central role than in other law systems (Waldron, 
1990: quoted in Booth, 2003: 4). The second legislative tradition that underlies the 
discretionary powers of public bodies in British planning is that of procedural fairness. 
As Booth states it, 'The power to decide is legitimated, not by reference to regulation 
carrying the force of law, but by the way in which the decision is taken' (op. cit.: 4).
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The rule of law, central in the plan-led planning system, is held in high regard by 
liberal thinkers. Its origins can be found in the struggle of the bourgeoisie against 
the arbitrary powers of the king and the administration. In the Middle Ages, law was 
found, not made, and authority was fragmented. There was no central legislator that 
could guarantee security and certainty. After the Middle Ages, new states with a cen­
tralized and professionalized administration worked gradually towards unification 
and streamlining of the fragmented law. In the 19th Century, the proponents of the 
Rechtstaat (literally a 'state of rights', but often linked to 'rule of law') pleaded for 
a state with a constitution, separation of powers, and with individual basic human 
rights. The notion of 'vertical legal certainty' came to its full development. In this no­
tion, certainty can be found primarily or exclusively in the text of the enacted law. 
This led to a central role for legislation, administrative authority based exclusively 
on enacted law, and judicial review of administrative action by independent courts. 
The translation into the planning system of the principles of the Rechtstaat had ma­
jor consequences. The land-use plans acquired a statutory character, as a piece of 
legislation that regulates the land-uses at the local level. When considering building 
applications, the public administration should just check whether or not the appli­
cation conforms to the zoning map. There should not be any room for discretional 
considerations (cfr. Van Gunsteren, 1976: 81-83; Faludi, 1987: 187).
In short, plan-led systems (like the Dutch one) are supposed to provide at early stages 
certainty about the future development possibilities. On the other hand, develop­
ment-led systems (like the British planning system), although there might be some 
indicative zoning plans in early stages, are supposed to give less certainty about the 
definite development possibilities.
2.3.2 The arguments for and against certainty and flexibility in 
planning
There are various reasons why planning practices move between more or less flexibil­
ity (Tasan-Kok, 2008). The planning profession has changed, in line with the changes 
already mentioned in section 2.1 about the role of public bodies in policy networks, 
from a dominant role to that of primus inter pares. Already in the 1970s, John Fried­
mann drew the attention of scholars by saying that direct control cannot be the role 
of the planner. However, although he emphasized that planning intervention should 
be filtered through a series of complex structures and processes (Friedmann, 1973), 
he still defined the role of the planner as a guiding/controlling one. Precisely 30 
years later, he emphasized the shift in planning from an instrument of control to an 
instrument of innovation and action (Friedmann, 2003). This illustrates the shift in the 
planning literature, which has implications for flexibility in planning practice as well. 
What might have happened during those 30 years is that planning practice incorpo­
rated greater flexibility and the loosening of rigid rules (Healey and Williams, 1993). 
This requires however some nuance: the trend in professional and academic debate
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has not necessarily resulted in practice in more countries extending development­
led practices, and it seems to coincide with a contradictory trend in which some 
development-led countries assume some plan-led practices4.
There are various arguments for and against more or less flexibility in planning prac­
tice. Moroni (2007: 146-7, 153), being critical of the current support for flexibility, 
claims that continental European planning systems are usually able to guarantee the 
certainty of the law due to the strict nature of master plan and zoning ordinances, and 
he suggests that flexible planning systems (such as the British development-led sys­
tem) are unpredictable and unstable as each case is judged on its merits and cannot 
be predicted in advance. In the same publication however he advocates that more 
flexible (abstract, general and end-independent) rules and actions are needed to deal 
with the complexity of the contemporary urban systems (op. cit.: 156). Needham 
(2006: quoted in Moroni, 2007) also gives the British system as a case of being too 
open to the state administration's discretion and not meeting the Rule of Law. On the 
other hand, he puts certainty in the framework of predictability when he emphasizes 
that public authorities do not want to be bound to the principle of predictability. In­
stead they want to be able to examine plans informally and if necessary change land­
use plans to accommodate to unpredictable planning applications. In such circum­
stances, certainty can be provided to citizens only if strict rules are followed when 
the plan is being changed (Needham, 2007b: 186). Thus, plan-makers, especially lo­
cal governments using public-private partnership instruments, do not want to provide 
this kind of strict certainty, for they want to leave some room for negotiation or for 
contingencies that might occur during the process of implementation (Buitelaar et al, 
2007). Faludi (1986: 185-192) argues that the assumptions underlying the plan-led 
system (i.e. planners can predict the nature and quantities of a community's needs 
and convert this quantification into an allocation and designation of land uses) are 
invalid. Moreover, the idea that economic and political forces in a community will 
respond compliantly with these designations and for prescribed uses might be incor­
rect. At the development moment, the developer may propose something better than 
what is already in the land-use plan. Or he/she may offer something that the local 
authority really wants, on condition that the municipality change the land-use plan. 
Departures from plans are inevitable, all-out commitment to environmental plans 
(legally binding land-use plans) is unreasonable, and as a consequence, departures 
from the land-use plan in order to adapt it to the circumstances of each development 
project are the rule, and not the exception.
4 In a comparative study, the European Commission found a double trend in planning practice: 
countries operating in rigid plan-led systems tend indeed to incorporate flexibility, but those 
operating in development-led systems seek to provide greater certainty (1997: 45).
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2.3.3 Some financial aspects of certainty in planning
During the data gathering, some additional aspects of the arguments for and against 
certainty became apparent.
The first aspect derives from the Ricardian rent theory, in which land price is a result 
of the disposal price of the final real estate products (Ricardo, 1821). Provided that a 
minimum developer's profit and the development costs are covered, any residual de­
termines the maximum market value of the land. In other words, the price of land in a 
free market is the residual value. From this it follows: (1) that certainty about building 
possibilities (i.e. the strong expectation that it is possible to build) affects the residual 
price of land; and (2) that variations in capturing value increase (i.e. the amount of 
obligations to be paid in kind or in money to the public bodies) also affect the re­
sidual price of the land, but not the final price of the real estate5. A second aspect is 
that certainty or uncertainty might affect the negotiating position of the municipality. 
If there is much certainty about future building possibilities, municipalities have less 
discretion and therefore less room to negotiate. On the contrary, if there is much 
uncertainty about what may be developed, the municipality might be able to ask for 
more contributions in exchange for creating certainty about building possibilities.
These considerations lead us to the assumption that, when developers have no ex­
pectation, or a low expectation, of being able to build, land prices will not rise' 
above the level of existing use value. The book value will remain low, and even if 
the land is transacted this will be at that low price. When initiating a project, the 
developer will bring in the land at a value near the market price in the existing use. 
Or, if the developer must buy the land, he will offer to the landowner a price near to 
the market price in the existing use. On the contrary, if there is a strong expectation 
of development, the developer will bring his land in at a higher book value, or will 
pay a price for the land that reflects the expected profits. In other words, certainty 
that building will be possible will have an inflationary effect on the price of land. 
This is relevant for capturing value increase, because high initial land prices narrow 
the financial room of the developer when asked to contribute to public infrastructure 
and facilities. Also, certainty about future building possibilities gives the municipal­
ity a weaker position in negotiations, which might also be negative for capturing 
value increase. The municipality cannot negotiate by allowing building possibilities 
(i.e. modifying the binding rules to allow more profitable building possibilities) in 
exchange for contributions.
The analysis of the financial aspects of certainty leads us to a second assumption. 
Namely that when developers are aware in early stages that they are likely to face ob­
ligations, they will incorporate them into the finances of the operation. For example,
5 This theory of land rent contravenes the argument that planning requirements of public bodies might 
be responsible for the raising of the price of land (Ball, 1983; quoted in White, 1986: 104-107).
Theoretical framework 41
if the developer already owns the land, he will - when determining the book value of 
land, other development costs and his profit margin - consider the obligations to be 
paid. If the developer has not yet bought the land, he can agree with the landowner 
that the agreed price will be subjected to a deduction for the obligations to be paid. If 
there is (at the moment at which developers calculate book price, development costs 
and profit margins, and at the moment when developers agree the price with the 
landowners) no certainty about the obligations to be paid, developers might make 
financial calculations that assume maximal profit margins and low obligations. In 
other words, if local authorities introduce new obligations too late in the process, 
there might be no financial room anymore in the developer's budget (confero Rowan- 
Robinson & Lloyd, 1988: 128-130; Campbell et al., 2000: 769-771).
Based on these two assumptions, made during data gathering, we differentiate be­
tween two sorts of certainty: certainty about the building possibilities (how much and 
what the landowner will be able to build), and certainty about future contributions 
(how much the landowner will have to contribute, in kind or in money).
2.4 Model of the causal relationship between formal 
rules relevant to zoning and capturing value 
increase in urban regeneration
Introduction
In section 2.1 we discussed urban regeneration projects and the outcomes con­
cerning the degree of captured value increase as being the result of the interaction 
between different actors, each of them with different goals and different means to 
achieve them. We also discussed the basic functioning of these policy networks and 
the ways of possibly modifying this functioning in order to improve the capturing of 
value increase. In Sections 2.2 and 2.3 we presented two topical discussions in Eng­
land and Wales, the Netherlands and Spain about the possibly role of formal rules in 
improving the capturing of value increase.
Based on these discussions it is possible to develop a model of the inferred causal 
relationship between certain ways of using the formal rules relevant to zoning and 
the capturing of value increase in urban regeneration projects. The model not only 
includes the formal rules relevant to zoning as causality of the degree of captured 
value increase, but analyses also the wider complex of causalities. It is the intention 
that this model be applicable not just to urban regeneration in England, Spain and 
the Netherlands, but also to other countries too. Let us see first which activities and 
which actors are involved in urban regeneration.
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2.4.1 The activities and the actors in urban regeneration
2.4.1.1 The activities
As already explained in section 1.5, this research focuses on comprehensive urban 
regeneration projects located on privately owned land. We mean here physical inter­
ventions in the existing city that have the following characteristics:
• They produce a notable value increase due to the rezoning of the land and to the 
dimensions of the development area. The value increase derives from the returns 
that will accrue from selling the final real estate.
• They require the making of important costs for public infrastructure and facili­
ties, costs that cannot be recovered by selling or managing that infrastructure or 
those facilities.
• We study only those comprehensive urban regeneration projects that are situ­
ated on privately owned land.
Within these projects, we focus on the development phase. The 'development phase' 
starts from the original situation and ends at the delivery and the beginning of the 
exploitation of the final real estate products. Within this phase, this research focuses 
on a specific phenomenon: the interaction between public bodies making use of 
their competences regarding the formal rules relevant to zoning, and the develop­
ers/landowners who redevelop the site. The capturing of value increase is one of the 
results of this interaction.
2.4.1.2 The actors
To identify the involved actors, we use a combination of two techniques. First is the 
'imperative' approach, which asks who has an interest in or feels the consequences of 
the problem. The second is the 'positional' approach, which identifies those actors who 
have a formal position in actual policy making (Mitroff, 1983: 33-34). Table 3 summa­
rizes the interests and formal position of the involved actors. This research assumes that 
actors pursue their interests rationally within the context of their interactions.
Starting with the imperative approach, we identify first the problem-owner (the ac­
tor that has a direct interest and that serves as starting point of this research). The 
problem-owner is that public body (possibly more than one) that wants to implement 
its planning policies (see section 1.2). In order to do that, it might have to subsidize 
urban regeneration in order to achieve the desired quality of the regenerated areas. 
Although not a problem-owner in that sense, property developers and landowners 
also have a direct interest: they have a financial interest in the regeneration of the 
site, namely profit maximization in the short or long term. However, when consider­
ing that profit maximization is also related to the quality of the regenerated areas, 
they could also be considered as problem-owners similar to the public body because 
problems with the financing of public infrastructure and facilities can affect the qual­
ity in a negative way. Other directly interested actors are the actual users and inhab­
itants of the deteriorated areas that are the subject of regeneration: they are mostly
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interested in receiving high compensation for any loss suffered. The future inhabit­
ants, i.e. people who stay in the regenerated area, or new ones, also have a direct 
interest because they will use the regenerated urban areas. The interest of the future 
inhabitants is similar to that of civic organizations, who are mainly committed to the 
physical, social and/or environmental quality of urban regeneration.
Within the public bodies it is possible to distinguish municipalities on the one side 
and the ministry of planning of the central government on the other. In Spain and 
the Netherlands there are in addition regional, respectively provincial, public bod­
ies that play a relevant role. Besides having a direct interest (always related to the 
implementation of their planning policies, and in the Netherlands also because often 
they subsidize), these public bodies have also a regulatory role (they are empowered 
to elaborate the formal regulations that rule the regeneration). There might be other 
national public bodies with some financial or political involvement, for example the 
ministries of Infrastructure, Finance and Economic Affairs, but usually they have few 
or no regulatory responsibilities.
Table 3. Involved actors, their interests and status in decision-making in urban regeneration
Actor Interest
Public bodies
- Municipalities
- Possibly Provincial/Regional government
- Ministry of Planning
Fewer subsidies; High quality regenerated areas 
(enough public infrastructure and facilities)
- Other ministries, e.g. Infrastructure, Finance and 
Economic Affairs
idem
C iv ic  society
- Current users/inhabitants High compensations
- Future users/inhabitants High quality regenerated areas
- Civic organizations High quality regenerated areas
Developers
- Without land Profit maximizing
- With land Profit maximizing
Landowners
- Large companies (see also developers with land) Profit maximizing
- Small owners Profit maximizing
Hatched: actors that have a final formal responsibility 
Transparent: actors without a final formal responsibility.
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Within the developers it is possible to distinguish between those that have not yet 
bought land within the development site and those that have already bought part 
or all the land. Within the original landowners there are two sorts: large companies 
owning land in regeneration sites (e.g. old firms, energy and railway companies), and 
individual owners-users. Large companies with land can sometimes be regarded as 
developers with land, because such companies often have a development depart­
ment (e.g. public utility companies such as electricity and railway companies often 
have such a department). Housing associations and other social housing landlords 
are often involved in urban regeneration because they often own land in those loca­
tions: they can also be considered as developers if they have a development depart­
ment.
Of all these actors, the only ones with a final formal responsibility (the positional 
approach) are:
- Public bodies at the central level: the ministry or department of planning (re­
sponsible for policy, planning law and for circulars and directives);
- Public bodies at the regional level: the Dutch provinces (responsible for regional 
policy and the application of planning law), and in Spain the regional ministry of 
planning (responsible for policy, planning law and for circulars and directives);
- Public bodies at the local level: the municipalities or 'local planning authorities' 
in England (responsible for the local policy and the application of planning law);
- The property developers (they have knowledge and financial means);
- The landowners (they control the land).
The other parties have an advisory role (see table 3).
2.4.2 Causalities of the amount of value increase finally 
captured
It is a necessary condition of being able to capture value increase that there is some 
value to be captured, that is, that there is an initial profit (or the potential profit) from 
the urban regeneration project. 'Initial profit' means that the economic value of the 
site clearly increases due to the regeneration. If there is, then some of this can - in 
principle - be captured by public bodies. However, whether this initial profit trans­
lates into a 'final profit' for the developer that allows him to contribute depends on 
the interaction of several variables. We need thus to make a distinction between the 
variables that influence the size of the initial profit, and variables that influence the 
distribution of that initial profit and result in the final profit. If for example an initial 
positive profit finally ends in excessive high prices paid for the development land, 
or ends in inflated development costs, the final profit for the developer might be 
negative. For both sort of variables, some of them are determined outside the urban 
regeneration project (they are context variables) and some are determined inside the 
project, either by the physical conditions within the site or by the actions of the vari­
ous actors in interaction with each other.
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We can identify thus four sets of variables:
A. Context variables that influence the size of the initial profit;
B. Context variables that influence the distribution of the initial profit, i.e. the for­
mal rules relevant to zoning;
C. Actions of those directly involved in the project, including those with formal 
powers, which influence the size of the initial profit;
D. Actions of those directly involved in the project, including those with formal 
powers, which influence the distribution of the initial profit.
Together, those variables determine the value increase that is finally captured for the 
benefit of the public infrastructure and facilities in the regeneration project.
Some of the variables under B, C, and D - namely those in bold print - can be de­
liberately manipulated by public bodies in order to influence the captured value 
increase. But all variables need to be taken into account when explaining a particu­
lar case. Some variables influence the final degree of captured value increase more 
directly than others. When the causal link goes through other variables, we speak 
here of 'intermediary variables'. We will now discuss each of those sets of variables 
separately. Figure 4 gives an overview of all variables, and section 2.4.3 illustrates 
them with one of the studied cases.
2.4.2.1 Context variables that influence the size of the initial profit 
(variables A ) 
A1) Real estate markets
The price of real estate is fundamental for determining the returns and costs:
• Returns: the prices of the final offices, dwellings and other commercial real es­
tate are one of the, if not the most, relevant factor.
• Costs: high prices for the finished product (the buildings) stimulate higher prices 
for acquiring the land and existing properties, as owners tend to ask for their 
property the residual value of the land after redevelopment, which is the final 
value of the real estate minus the costs of capital, workforce, building materials 
and knowledge. The price of the land and existing properties can thus be much 
higher than the minimum land price, which is the residual value of the land 
taking into account only the previous use possibilities. Thus the accounted cost 
of the land, i.e. the price of the land that is regarded as one of the costs of the 
development (inbrengwaarde in Dutch), can be much higher than the minimum 
land cost. The accounted land costs are often one of the largest costs of redevel­
oping a site. This is one of the main ways in which the initial profit 'leaks out',
i.e. in which the initial profit is not available anymore to pay the public infra­
structure and facilities. However, this difference between the 'minimum' and the 
'accounted' land costs is actually not only caused by the context variable 'Real 
estate markets', but also by the context variables A2, B1 and B2 and the actions 
of those involved in the project (variables D1.1, D2.1, and probably also D4 and 
D5) that influence the distribution of the initial profit (see under).
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A2) Plan and site features
Another relevant variable is the type, quality and quantity of the land and the previ­
ous public infrastructure and buildings that must be removed or refurbished in the 
regeneration site. This will have a direct effect on costs of the project (the minimum 
costs of acquisition of the properties, demolition of the previous buildings). The pres­
ence and type of soil contamination has a direct effect too on the costs of the project. 
The location of the site within the urban fabric will affect the development potential 
of the site (e.g. offices with a high or low rental value) and thus the possible returns 
from the development.
A3) Markets o f workforce and building materials, and fiscal regimes
The price of hiring skilled people to draft plans, studies, buildings and infrastructure, 
and to build them, is fundamental for the costs. Labour costs can differ from year 
to year, from region to region, from country to country. Also, the price of building 
materials might change with time and differ between regions and countries. Finally, 
differences in fiscal regimes can augment or diminish these costs, or the amount of 
taxes to be paid, e.g. profit tax, land transfer tax, etc.
2.4.2.2 Context variables that influence the distribution of the initial profit,
i.e. the formal rules relevant to zoning (variables B )
These are the more stable (structural) factors that facilitate or impede certain types of 
power relationships between the involved actors and thus their ability to take pos­
session of a share of the initial profit. They form the independent variable 'formal 
rules relevant to zoning', on which this research focuses (see chapter 3). In section
2.1.1 and Figure 2 we already introduced these structural factors: they are the rules 
that influence the resource distribution and the behaviour of the actors involved in 
urban regeneration projects. In other words, these structural factors, together with 
the context variables A, influence the actions of those directly involved in the project 
(variables C and D).
B1) Formal rules about property rights
We have seen earlier in section 2.2 how property rights in land have become weaker, 
from the almost unrestrained interpretation of the new liberal regimes in the 18th and 
the 19th Centuries to the increasing limitations based on the concept of the social 
function of property and other (e.g. sanitary) considerations. However, the landowner 
still retains the control over the quando, i.e. when to use or build on his property. 
Since the landowner can exclude others not only from deciding when to use or build 
on his property, but also from actually using or building on it, he acquires a privileged 
position in the urban markets: he is the only one who can provide land, and the only 
one who decides when. This power has major consequences for the capturing of 
value increase because it influences decisively the behaviour of the involved actors 
(see variable D2). This variable 'property rights' embraces formal rules under public 
law that might limit property rights, as e.g. the possibility of expropriating land or of 
obliging landowners to participate in land readjustment.
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B2) Formal rules about certainty and flexibility in the development terms
We have seen earlier in section 2.3 that certainty or the lack of certainty beforehand 
about the definitive development terms can have major consequences for captur­
ing value increase. This is because certainty influences greatly the behaviour of the 
involved actors (see variable D1). The variable 'certainty' embraces e.g. those regula­
tions under public law that limit the costs that can be recovered from the property de­
velopers and landowners, because these legal limits determine the possible contents 
of binding rules and other plan documents. Also included in this variable is whether 
local public bodies can prescribe not only the physical zoning, but also aspects re­
lated to the financing and implementation of public infrastructure and facilities. Do 
binding rules regulate only a desired final picture without stating who is responsible 
for its implementation, or also the obligations that must be fulfilled by the developer? 
How far can binding rules go in enumerating obligations? Can they include off-site 
infrastructure? Social housing? Also, the variable 'certainty' embraces those regula­
tions under public law concerning whether public bodies can condition the approval 
of legally binding plans to the developer securing his contributions to the public 
infrastructure and facilities. The approval of binding rules containing financing and 
implementation schedules about developers' contributions does not automatically 
mean that developers are committed to implement them. Additionally, there is the 
need of a contractual commitment of the developer.
B3) Formal rules about the procedure o f making land-use plans and granting 
planning permissions
Planning law might include some guarantees for the handling of development ap­
plications, and there are differences between countries in the sort of guarantees and 
how hard they might be in practice. Also, there are differences in how long and easy 
the procedures are for modifying binding rules. And finally, there are also differences 
in the possibility of approving binding rules gradually, plot by plot. We include these 
variables because they might influence the behaviour of the involved actors (see vari­
able D3) and thus be of importance for the capturing of value increase.
2.4.2.3 Actions of those directly involved in the project, including those with 
formal powers, which influence the size of the initial profit 
(variable C ) 
C1) Definition of the contents and geographical scope of the plan
At the start of a project, the involved actors must define the contents of the plan and 
the boundaries of the development site. The contents of the plan can be relevant for 
the possibility of capturing value increase. For example, depending on how many 
buildings the plan includes, the returns can be higher or lower. Also, it is relevant for 
the costs how much quality and quantity public bodies pursue for the public infra­
structure and facilities, or for the architecture etc., and how high are the contribu­
tions that public bodies expect from landowners and developers. More quantity and 
quality might imply higher costs. The cases show a struggle here between at one side
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the public bodies, which pursue a large contribution from landowners and develop­
ers, and at the other side the landowners and developers, which pursue large public 
subsidization. Large contributions might lower the accounted price of the land and/ 
or narrow the final profit of the developer. But at the same time large contributions 
relieve the municipality's budget and/or allow more quality and quantity of public 
infrastructure and facilities. And vice versa. Also, the boundary chosen for the plan 
area (or geographical scope) of the development site might be relevant, for example 
whether it excludes or includes the most profitable or unprofitable parts. The defini­
tion of the plan contents and geographical scope is thus one of the most important 
steps in urban development because it influences both the returns and the costs.
2.4.2.4 Actions by those directly involved in the project, including those with 
formal powers, which influence the distribution of the initial profit 
(variables D) 
D1) How the local public bodies use their formal powers about certainty in the 
development terms
The actions of local public bodies making use of their formal powers about certainty 
on development terms can influence the capturing of value increase. These actions 
do not influence the capturing of value increase in a direct way, but through other 
variables, or 'intermediary variables'. That is, the use of these formal powers influ­
ences intermediary variables, which in turn influence the final degree of captured 
value increase.
Dl.l) Accounted price of land and regular profit margins
On the one hand, if the local public body creates certainty beforehand about future 
building possibilities, this has an influence on the accounted land costs because the 
landowner, thanks to his monopolistic-oligopolistic position, is able to successfully 
ask a price for his land that internalizes the maximal possible price in the future. 
Thus he anticipates the future building possibilities by asking the price that would be 
economically reasonable in that future. On the other hand, if the local public body 
creates certainty beforehand about which contributions the developer has to deliver, 
this can also influence the accounted land costs, but inversely. When the developer 
knows how much these contributions will cost him, he will internalize them into the 
price of land in different ways. In case the developer has not yet bought the land, he 
will internalize the contributions into the price to be paid to the landowner. In case 
the developer has already bought the land, he will internalize the contributions into 
the accounted land cost or into the regular profit margin6 he will aim for in the op­
eration. Accounted land costs and regular profit margins are often not defined at the 
start of development processes. At that time, developers can often set them higher
6 W e  are talking here about the 'normal' or regular profit margin, i.e. the profit margin that the 
developer charges as a kind of normal fee to each operation. This is different than the 'final profit', 
which is additional to this regular profit margin.
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or lower. For example, developers often enter all the land for different development 
sites in a common account. Losses and profits are compensated with each other. A 
developer confronted with a high contributions package will tend to account the 
land for a lower price and accept that this development site will not contribute much 
to the losses in other sites. Conversely, a developer confronted with a low contribu­
tions package will tend to account the land for a higher price. Regarding regular 
profit margins, developers can consider at the beginning of development processes 
the size of the profit, which may vary7. Once the accounted land costs and the regular 
profit margin have been established, lowering them is usually complicated. Both are 
important 'channels' through which the initial profit can leak out, leaving less money 
over to contribute to the public infrastructure and facilities.
Dl.2) Negotiation position
If before the start of the negotiations the local public body has already created cer­
tainty about future building possibilities, this public body has lost a powerful nego­
tiation tool. It cannot offer anymore the building possibilities (i.e. to approve new 
binding rules or modify the existing ones to allow more building possibilities) as a 
medium of exchange. On the other hand, if the local public body has already cre­
ated certainty about which contributions the developer has to deliver, his negotiation 
position will be better as these requirements become the starting point of discussion. 
Finally, if the public body openly makes the approval of legally binding plans con­
ditional on the developer securing his contributions to the public infrastructure and 
facilities, its position will be stronger than if it does not.
D2) How owners use their property rights
The actions of private bodies using their property rights can influence the capturing 
of value increase. This influence takes place through other variables, or 'intermediary 
variables'. Property rights influence these intermediary variables, which in turn influ­
ence the final degree of captured value increase.
D2.1) Accounted price of land and inflated development costs
Since the control of land gives a monopolistic-oligopolistic position, there arises 
competition to acquire the right to control the land. The stimulant for actors to com­
pete for the land is that once acquired, there is no more need to compete. The initial 
landowners make a profitable use of this situation. They are in a privileged posi­
tion compared with the providers of the other production factors (capital, workforce, 
building materials and knowledge), thus they are in an ideal negotiating position that 
allows them to ask the maximum possible price for their right to control the land. The 
consequence is that the price of land in a free market tends to absorb all the profit: it 
tends to be the residual value of the land after redevelopment, which is the final value 
of the real estate minus the costs of capital, workforce, building materials and knowl­
edge. In sum, the privileged position of landowners stimulates the inflation of land
7 E.g. in the Netherlands the regular profit margin can differ from roughly 20%  to 5%.
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prices from their minimum to their maximum value. This causes high accounted land 
costs (i.e. the price at which the land is 'bought in' to the accounts of the project), 
which reduce the initial profit.
Those owning land can also use their property rights to delay regeneration, which 
in turn can have an inflationary effect on development costs. Delay might be larger 
when ownership is very dispersed because it might be more difficult to assemble all 
the needed land. However, it can also be that land is in hands of just one powerful 
actor, who can afford to delay more than a multitude of small landowners can. See 
below for how owners using their property rights can cause delay. Delay inflates 
development costs in different ways: first because delay might imply more studies, 
negotiations, reports, meetings, of public officers but also of developers; second be­
cause delay implies uncertainties and risks, which can translate into higher reserves 
for unforeseen expenses; third, delay might imply higher costs to finance investments 
that cannot be delayed, while the selling of the final real estate products might last 
longer. High development costs, together with high accounted land costs, jeopardize 
the initial profit and leave less money over to pay the public infrastructure and facili­
ties. This leads to higher public subsidizing and/or to lower quality and quantity of 
the public infrastructure and facilities.
D2.2) Negotiation position and delay
Since landowners do not feel threatened by other providers of land, they have a pow­
erful negotiation tool. They can wait, without this necessarily damaging their future 
negotiation position, as they will retain their monopolistic-oligopolistic position. The 
consequence is that delaying development processes becomes a real alternative in 
the negotiation strategy of landowners. But why would landowners delay? Because 
waiting to develop can be more profitable, as land also has an option value (Turnbull, 
2005). If the landowner expects that the price of land could increase in the future, 
and he is not in a hurry, it is economically rational to wait. For example, he might 
expect that the local public body will finally lower the requirements, or that with 
time the price of land will increase. It is very common that landowners profit from 
delay, as land prices often increase (at least during the period of data gathering in this 
research). Waiting might be therefore a favourable option (Quigg, 1993; Capozza 
and Li, 2002; Ball, 2003: 909).
Note that in this discussion about how landowners might use their property rights 
in a particular regeneration project, we are assuming that it is private bodies that 
own the land, or at least that the landowners seek economic profit when using their 
property rights. Public bodies owning land might choose to act in the same way 
as private landowners do, or not. W e are ignoring the possibility of a public body 
owning land, so the possibility that a public body acts as private landowners is not 
relevant here.
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D3) How the local public bodies use their formal powers for the procedure of 
approval of land use plans and planning permissions
We might expect that differences in the flexibility of the procedures can have an 
effect on regeneration projects. For example, if the local public body can approve 
the binding rules gradually, in case negotiations with the developers/landowners of 
a plan area do not finish all at the same time and there are still disagreements with 
some of them, the local public body would be able to approve first the binding rules 
for the plots where the agreements were already concluded, and wait until the other 
owners/developers agree. However, the relation between this variable with the final 
degree of captured value increase is not clear.
D4) How local public and private bodies interact informally
Informal rules, or what Ostrom called 'working rules' (1986: 466-467; see also Ver­
hage, 2002: 160), might govern the behaviour of actors, and thus influence many of 
the variables, and thereby influence in a direct way the capturing of value increase. 
For example, the special relationship between housing associations and municipali­
ties in the Netherlands largely influences the willingness of the associations to as­
sume the costs of public facilities. The same could be said about a possibly special 
relationship between a specific developer and a specific municipality. Another ex­
ample in the Netherlands is that local public bodies prefer to reach consensus about 
urban development with all the relevant involved parties. This might be partially a 
cultural factor, i.e. the importance of consensus in Dutch local decision-making. 
However, this might be also the consequence of the above-mentioned limited pos­
sibilities of local public bodies to oblige landowners to cooperate. In other words, 
the preference of local public to achieve an agreement with the landowners might be 
the consequence of how landowners use their property rights, and not (or not exclu­
sively) an ideological preference.
D5) Specific circumstances
There might be specific circumstances of the persons involved, or of any other kind, 
that can directly influence the final degree of captured value increase. For example 
the negotiation abilities of the involved public officers or developers, or specific un­
foreseen technical problems. Another example, possibly relevant for the tempo of 
implementation of realising the public goals, is whether or not public bodies use their 
powers to force developers to provide on time the public infrastructure and facilities. 
Nothing can be said in general about these specific circumstances, but when analys­
ing a specific case we should be aware that they might be present.
2.4.2.4 How the intermediary variables influence capturing value increase
The discussion above has been summarised in Figure 4. We have distinguished be­
tween four sets of variables (A, B, C, D) which in one way or another can affect the 
capturing of value increase. However, they do not usually do that directly but by 
influencing certain intermediary variables.
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Variables real estate markets (A1), plan and site features (A2), markets of workforce 
and building materials, and fiscal regimes (A3) and definition contents and geographi­
cal scope plan (C1) shape together the intermediary variable initial profit. Variables 
public bodies using power certainty (D1) and owners using property rights (D2) 
shape together intermediary variables accounted land costs, regular profit margins, 
inflated development costs, negotiation position and delay. The intermediary variable 
initial profit, together with intermediary variables accounted land costs, regular profit 
margins and inflated development costs (which in their turn are influenced by inter­
mediary variable delay) shape together the intermediary variable final profit. The final 
profit is crucial for the final degree of captured value increase because it determines 
the financial room that the developer has for contributing to public infrastructure and 
facilities. For example, if the developer who is negotiating with the municipality has 
paid too much for the land and existing properties, or has already internalized a high 
land price or regular profit margin into the accounts of the operation, or has already 
made too high development costs, whereby the returns are not large enough, he will 
not be able and/or willing to contribute much, and vice versa.
Regarding the intermediary variables negotiation position and delay, those are rel­
evant for intermediary variables accounted land costs and regular profit margins. If 
landowners do not face disadvantages from waiting, they might use this as a negotia­
tion tool and wait until the municipality lowers the requirements. If municipalities 
prescribe the building possibilities before negotiations start, landowners are already 
sure about the potential residual value of land and developers about the potential 
profit margins. Assuming that the residual value is indeed higher than the previous 
value, landowners can thus sell their land for a price higher than its minimum value, 
and/or developers can enlarge their regular profit margin, without necessarily hav­
ing to agree with the municipality. In short, the municipality has less to offer to the 
landowners and developers, and is thus in a weak position to require contributions. 
Regarding the intermediary variable delay, this is also relevant for intermediary vari­
able inflated development costs, as delay can have an inflationary effect on the costs 
of developing the site. In addition, delay is indirectly negative for capturing value 
increase because it implies delay in the realisation of the public infrastructure and 
facilities. That is the reason that in the formulation of the research questions of this 
research (see section 1.5) it was decided to include delay as one of the aspects to be 
taken into account when measuring de degree of captured value increase.
In sum, there are different ways that can lead to the size of the initial profit, to some 
or all of this profit leaking away, and thus to the size of the final profit. The conse­
quence of the initial profit leaking away is that public bodies might be forced to sub­
sidise more, or to accept fewer and worse public infrastructure and facilities.
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... < Phenom enon >
INTERACTION AM O NG PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ACTORS IN COMPREHESIVE URBAN REGENERATION DEVELOPMENTS
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2.4.3 Financial analysis of the cases
In the previous section 2.4.2 it has been made clear that although there might be an 
initial profit that would allow contributing to public infrastructure and facilities, in 
the course of development processes this initial profit might be distributed in such 
a way that finally there is no money left. The money might have 'leaked out' to in­
flated land prices or just to high regular and/or final profit margins of the developer. It 
might also be that the initial profit disappeared before the developer could gain from 
it, so he cannot contribute. As De Greef put it, in this way the whole development 
process can be regarded as a struggle between the various actors to gain more of the 
increased value (1997). In addition, we have also seen that as a result of this strug­
gle, land development costs might increase more than is necessary, diminishing even 
more the initial profit from which public infrastructure and facilities can be paid.
In sections 5.5, 6.4 and 7.4 it is explained, for respectively the region of Valencia, 
England and the Netherlands, how all the mentioned variables shape the final degree 
of captured value increase. The financial information about the studied cases, as 
far as available, has been analyzed. This financial analysis uses partially the model 
developed by Verhage & Needham (2003: 25-28). The following sections give an ex­
ample of a financial analysis of how the initial profit has leaked away to the involved 
actors in the Dutch case Kop van Oost8. For a financial analysis of the other cases, 
see Annexes 3, 4 and 7.
2.4.3.1 Definition of costs and returns
First we distinguish the following costs and returns:
LAND COSTS
1. 1a. Minimum land costs: the market value of the land in its current use; 
1b. Accounted land costs: the land price that the developer includes into the 
calculations9.
DEVELOPMENT COSTS
2. On-site infrastructure provision costs: this includes not only the on-site infra­
structure provision works, but also reserved amounts for unexpected expenses, 
the overhead costs, possible 'hidden' profit margins of the developer, etc. In the
8 The site in the Dutch case 'Kop van Oost' (5 ha, Groningen) was no longer in use, and 60% of the 
land was owned by the former user, a wood-processing company. In 2000 intermediary Hollestelle 
bought the land. After general development terms with the municipality had been negotiated, the 
land has been re-sold twice to commercial developers: in 2001 to IBC and in 2002 to Heijmans. 
Negotiations with Heijmans crystallised in 2005 in a Development Agreement. The plan was 
definitively approved in 2006, including 430 dwellings, most of them apartments, and about 4,000 
m2 commercial space. In October 2007 infrastructure provision was ongoing. For more detailed 
information see sections 7.3.3 and 7.4.
9 This is similar to the accounting term 'book value'.
Theoretical framework 55
Netherlands they comprise: Slopen, bouw en woonrijp maken, risico en onvoor­
zien. It should also include the financing costs (interest payments etc.).
3. Plan preparation costs: the costs of the preparation of plans, studies, etc (Planko­
sten, or Voorbereiding, toezicht en planontwikkeling).
4. Soil decontamination costs.
5. Compensation costs: this includes compensation to existing owners and inhab­
itants, for removal of activities and residence, demolition of constructions and 
buildings, etc.
6. Additional contributions of the developer: contributions of the developer, in 
cash (payments) or in kind (construction or building of public infrastructure and 
facilities) to public goals additional to his contributions to the on-site infrastruc­
ture provision costs (even if these might serve a wider area than the development 
in question), which are already included in (2).
7. Real Estate development costs: this includes the whole development of the real 
estate, thus not only the building costs, but also the preparation of plans (not for 
providing the infrastructure but for the building), overhead costs, possible 'hid­
den' profit margins of the developer, etc.
DEVELOPMENT RETURNS
8. Total returns: the total returns accruing from the selling of the real estate (offices, 
dwellings, etc).
2.4.3.2 Definition of the Initial and the Final profits 
INITIAL PROFIT
The value increase that accrued from the regeneration of the site and could have 
been initially available to pay public infrastructure and facilities:
8 - [ (1a + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7)not-inflated - (those costs of 2-7 subsidised by public 
bodies) ]
Here we assume costs 1 till 7 are not inflated.
FINAL PROFIT
The profits of the final developer:
8 - [ (1b + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7) - (those costs of 2-7 subsidised by public bodies) ]
To this final profit must be added the regular profit margin in case the final developer 
had included such in posting 7.
2.4.3.3 Financial analysis in case Kop van Oost
Let us first see in Table 4 the costs and returns in this case:
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Table 4. Costs and returns of Dutch case Kop van Oost
LAND COSTS
1) Land costs 1a. Minimum land costs: € 3.6m
At the time of data gathering (2008), the market price for the actual land use 
before regeneration (industrial land) in this part of the city was about € 60-70/ 
m2, and the best locations had a price of about € 80-90/m2. The developer had 
to buy about 4 ha. Thus, the market value of this industrial land in current use, 
i.e. the minimum land cost, could not be more than: 40,000 m2 X € 90 = € 
3,600,000.
1b. Accounted land costs: at least € 12m
€ 12m is the price paid by developer IBC to intermediary Hollestelle in 2001. 
Because the last developer Heijmans bought the land in 2002 (as part of IBC), 
the price paid by Heijmans was probably higher.
DEVELO PM ENT COSTS
2) Infrastructure 
provision costs
Ca. € 7m (€ 1.9 m if not inflated, paid by the developer) + public subsidies 
for infrastructure surrounding the new building (an unknown amount to us)
This € 7m is €368/m2 new public space10 (19,000 m2, 24% total plan area 
of the Land use Plan); or €148/m2 total redeveloped land (47,200 m2, 59% 
total plan area of the Land use Plan). Most probably, these costs include the 
financial costs of the investments. € 7m is much larger than the equivalent 
costs in the region of Valencia, which are of about €100/m2 new public space 
and would have resulted in € 1.9 million if translated to Kop van Oost, that is 
€ 5.1 million lower.
The contrast with the region of Valencia is even larger taking into account that 
the figures in Valencia include the costs of the infrastructure between and in 
the wide surroundings of the new buildings. On the contrary, in Kop van Oost 
this € 7m includes almost only that public infrastructure situated between the 
new buildings, or in the inmediate surrounding (the footpaths). The municipal­
ity had to subsidise heavily the wider infrastructure surrounding the new build­
ings, that is the refurbishing of the Sontweg and the Europaweg, the reparation 
of the quay along the canal (about € 0.6m), and about 4,000 m2 of new public 
space. Most of these works (except the Sontweg) benefit exclusively, or mostly, 
the new buildings. The works on the Sontweg also benefit other areas.
3) Plan preparation 
costs
4) Soil decontamination 
costs
€ 0.375 m paid by the developer, and € 0.125 m public subsidy of the central 
Dutch government.
5) Compensation costs € 162,500,- paid by the developer
Removal petrol station.
6) Additional contribu­
tions of the developer
None
7) Real estate develop­
ment costs
Ca. € 90m, paid by the developer
€90m is an estimation given by the final developer, Heijmans.
DEVELO PM ENT RETURNS
8) Total returns Ca. € 112m or ca. € 139m
The developer Heijmans estimated the total revenues for the selling of the real 
estate to be € 112m, inclusive VAT. Own estimations, based on the actual sell­
ing prices of real estate, produce higher figures, between € 139m and € 189m. 
Consulted about this, experts assessed the first estimation (€ 139m) as more 
realistic (Stauttener & Van Bladel, interview 2008).
10 New public space is the surface that becomes redeveloped and will be used for public uses. Most 
of land development costs relate to the construction of public infrastructure and facilities above or 
under this surface.
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How large was the Initial profit?
The initial profit in Kop van Oost was, according to the above formula 8 - [ (1a + 2 + 
3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7)not-inflated - (those costs of 2-7 subsidised by public bodies) ]:
• With the minimum returns (€ 112m) and assuming that costs 1 to 5 are not in­
flated and follow the average costs in Valencia, this is 112 - [ (3,6 + 1.9 + sub­
sidies municipality for infrastructure surrounding new buildings and of central +
0.5 + 0.1625 + 0 + 90) - (subsidies municipality + 0.125) ] = 112 - [ (96.1625 + 
subsidies municipality) - (subsidies municipality + 0.125) ] = € 15.9625 million.
• With the maximum returns (€ 139) and assuming that costs 1 to 5 are not in­
flated and follow the average in Valencia, this is 139 - [ (3,6 + 1.9 + subsidies 
municipality for infrastructure surrounding new buildings + 0.5 + 0.1625 + 0 + 
90) -(subsidies municipality + 0.125) ] = 139 - [ (96.1625 + subsidies munici­
pality) - (subsidies municipality + 0.125) ] = € 42.9625 million.
In this calculation, the Initial profit excludes those necessary investments made by 
the developer in public infrastructure and facilities. This was most of costs 2-3 (€ 
1.9m), of cost 4 (€ 0.375 m) and of cost 5 (€ 162,500,-), in total € 2.4375 m. Most of 
these € 2.4375 m could be considered as necessary for the realisation of what this re­
search defines as public infrastructure and facilities (see section 1). If the calculations 
were to include these investments in public infrastructure and facilities, the Initial 
profit would have been:
• € 15.9625m + € 2.4375m = € 18.5 million;
• € 42.9625m + € 2.4375m = € 45.4 million.
In other words, of this larger Initial profit, the developer has spent (assuming that costs 
1 to 5 are not inflated) € 2.4375m in necessary investments in public infrastructure 
and facilities. The rest of the Initial Profit has not been spent on public infrastructure 
and facilities, at least not on necessary investments.
What has leaked out of the Initial profit?
We conclude that in case Kop van Oost the Initial profit was large but most of it has 
leaked away. This leaked money (i.e. € 15.9625 to € 42.9625 million) has not been 
spent on investments necessary for the public infrastructure and facilities. Clearly, 
the subsidies of the municipality (an unknown amount for us) and the central govern­
ment (€ 0.125 million) would have not been necessary if a larger part of the Initial 
profit had not leaked away.
Where has the leaked Initial profit gone?
The leaked Initial profit has been consecutively been collected by the following pri­
vate parties:
• Inflated land costs: Accounted land costs - Minimum land costs = € 8.4 million 
+ extra paid by Heijmans to IBC for land (price last land transaction - € 12 m). 
The land was subjected to several resellings for a much higher price than the
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price of the use possibilities before regeneration, so the first owner, the inter­
mediary Hollestelle and first developer IBC have collected each a share of this 
leaked Initial profit. Let us see this more in detail:
° The wood-processing company who initially owned the land: it appropri­
ated a sum equal to the amount paid by intermediary Hollestelle (unknown 
to us) minus the minimum land costs (€ 3.6m), minus its development costs 
(its capital costs, probably not existing, as the company owned the land for 
a while, plus the costs of selling the land);
° Intermediary Hollestelle who bought the land in 2000: he appropriated a 
sum equal to the amount paid to him in 2001 by developer IBC (€ 12m), 
minus the price he paid to the wood-processing company (unknown to us), 
minus his development costs (his capital costs, probably small as he had 
an option to buy the land that allowed him to delay the payment of at least 
most of the price, plus the costs of negotiating with the municipality, plus 
the costs of selling the land);
° Developer IBC, who bought the land in 2001: it appropriated a sum equal 
to the amount paid in 2002 by developer Heijmans (unknown to us), minus 
the price it paid to Hollestelle (€ 12m), minus its development costs (its 
capital costs, plus the costs it could have made in preparing plans and ne­
gotiating with the municipality, plus the costs of selling the land);
Inflated land development costs: € 5.1 million
Development costs 2 and 3 might be inflated because of the delay in the devel­
opment process and the risks involved. This money has gone to all those four 
private parties involved in the regeneration process. This money went to costs 
that might have been avoided in the Spanish region of Valencia. It could also be 
that developer Heijmans has hidden here high regular profit margins.
Final profit of the last developer:
The Final profit of the last developer (Heijmans) is, according to the above 
formula 8 - [ (1b + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7) - (those costs of 2-7 subsidised 
by public bodies) ]:
° With the minimum returns (€ 112m) and assuming that costs 1 to 5 are in­
flated, this is:
112 - [ (12 + extra + 7 + subsidies municipality + 0.5 + 0.1625 + 0 + 90) - 
(subsidies municipality + 0.125)]
= 112 - [(109.6625 + extra + subsidies municipality) - (subsidies municipal­
ity + 0.125)]
= € 2.4625 million - extra paid to IBC for land (price last land transaction
- € 12 m).
° With the maximum returns (€ 139) and assuming that costs 1 to 5 are in­
flated, this is:
139 - [ (12 + extra + 7 + subsidies municipality + 0.5 + 0.1625 + 0 + 90) - 
(subsidies municipality + 0.125)]
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= 139 - [(109.6625 + extra + subsidies municipality) - (subsidies municipal­
ity + 0.125)]
= € 29.4625 million - extra paid to IBC for land (price last land transaction
- € 12 m)
2.5 The hypotheses
In section 2.1 we considered the power-relationship between public and private bod­
ies in urban regeneration, and said that public bodies need to work with private 
bodies in policy networks in order to achieve their goals (including capturing value 
increase). We saw also that public bodies might be able to gain a more powerful role 
in these policy networks in order to influence the other actors in the network and so 
to improve the capturing of value increase. This can happen through two network 
constitutions measures, which are formulated in this research as two hypotheses (in­
formed speculations; Bryman, 2004: 540) about how public bodies can use their 
formal powers on rules relevant to zoning for better capturing of value increase. 
Whether these hypothesised causalities are found in practice depends, however, not 
only on the correctness or otherwise of the hypotheses but also on the strength of all 
the other variables that affect the capturing of value increase and which are included 
in the model set out above.
2.5.1 The first network constitution measure: modifying the 
contents of property rights
The inspiration for the first network constitution measure is explained in section 2.2 
and concerns the formal contents of the right of property ownership. Splitting de­
velopment rights from land ownership is assumed to be relevant for capturing value 
increase. In an exploratory study in chapter 4 of nine Western European countries 
(besides the Netherlands, also England, Spain/Valencia, Germany, France, Italy, Flan­
ders, Denmark and Sweden), no country showed a full splitting, so it was not possible 
to do empirical research on such a splitting. However, the study also showed the 
singularity of the modifications in 1994 in the Valencian land readjustment, which 
could be considered as a light or indirect form of splitting: in Valencia, infrastructure 
provision is in practice separated from the property rights. The generalized applica­
tion of the model made it possible to collect abundant empirical data about the prac­
tical consequences for capturing value increase.
The speculation is that a modification of formal rules regarding land ownership could 
modify the distribution of resources and the behaviour of actors within policy net­
works, in such a way that this could shape the sort of dependence, and hence the 
power interactions between actors. In other words, temporarily taking over some
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property rights during a land readjustment procedure could improve capturing value 
increase. Within the model set out above, the hypothesis is that a modification of one 
of the context variables (formal rules on property rights, variable B1) could modify 
the actions of the involved actors (how private parties use their property rights, vari­
able D2). The first hypothesis speculates therefore that:
A specific form of splitting the property rights on land (separating infrastructure provi­
sion from property rights) can modify the power-relationships in the network of actors 
involved in urban regeneration, and this can improve capturing value increase.
2.5.2 The second network constitution measure: modifying the 
level of certainty about future development terms
The inspiration for the second network constitution measure is explained above in 
section 2.3 and concerns whether public bodies create certainty about the future 
development terms before the regeneration project starts. Should certainty be cre­
ated before or after negotiations take place? The degree of certainty depends on the 
moment at which it is created, but also on the contents of the plan documents that 
create certainty. Are they legally binding or only indicative? Do they regulate only the 
physical zoning, or also other socio-economic requirements as for example whether 
housing has to be social or free market? During data gathering an additional aspect 
became apparent: do binding rules regulate only a desired final physical picture 
without stating who is responsible for its implementation, or also the obligations and 
contributions that must be fulfilled by the developer?
Within the model set out above, the hypothesis is that a modification of one of the 
context variables (formal rules about certainty on development terms, variable B2) 
could modify the actions of the involved actors (how the local public bodies use 
their formal powers about certainty on development terms, variable D1). The second 
hypothesis speculates therefore that:
Creating uncertainty in early stages of development processes about future building 
possibilities, and certainty about future contributions, can influence capturing value 
increase in a positive way.


This research studies a 'phenomenon': the interaction between municipalities mak­
ing use of their competences regarding formal rules relevant to zoning1 and the de­
velopers/landowners regenerating a site. This is the same phenomenon in all the 
studied countries, although there are differences in the features of the phenomenon 
in each of the countries, and even in each case2.
We focus on several variables of our phenomenon, meaning by 'variable' an attribute 
on which our phenomenon varies (Bryman, 2004: 29). Our goal is to know whether 
the application of particular sorts of formal rules relevant to zoning (the independent 
variable, which includes the variables B of the causal model in section 2.4.2) could 
contribute to more effective capturing of value increase (the dependent variable). 
We also take account of side effects (or side dependent variables), to one of which 
special attention has been paid: the tempo of implementation. The reason for this is 
that there might be a conflict between on the one hand improving the capturing of 
value increase, and on the other a delay in the project (e.g. developers might not be 
willing to agree to more contributions). The goal is thus to find out which measures 
might be positive for capturing value increase without at the same time delaying the 
implementation. The final goal is to produce knowledge that supports the formula­
tion of recommendations for how Dutch practice could improve the recovery of costs 
made for public infrastructure and facilities.
1 'Formal rules relevant to zoning' are all those formal rules that rule both binding rules (included the 
implications for property rights in land) and not-legally binding policy documents (see section 1.3).
2 Swanborn makes a distinction between the 'phenomenon' and the 'carrier' who carries the 
phenomenon. In this research we use the term 'case' meaning what Swanborn actually names 
'carrier' of the phenomenon. Thus, the carrier or case in this research is a specific network of people 
and institutions that interact with each other in a specific site, and doing so produce or bear the 
phenomenon (1996: 17, 28-29).
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Taking into account these goals, and also the limitations of data gathering, we made 
several choices:
1. First, this research is mainly based on several cases, as it was not possible to 
gather data from a large enough sample of cases that would allow a statistical 
analysis that would isolate the relationship between the independent and the 
dependent variables (see section 3.1).
2. Second, this research needs to produce findings with a high validity and to avoid 
the risk, inherent to case-based research, of producing knowledge, so specific 
that it could not lead to general conclusions and recommendations (see section 
3.2). This meant introducing three groups of measures to increase both the inter­
nal and the external validity of the findings:
a) Using the hypothetical-deductive method to empirically test the hypotheses 
introduced in chapter 2 in such a way that, if they are found to be valid, they 
can be applied to the Netherlands (see section 3.2.1.1);
b) Using variants of the 'method of difference' to tackle the risk of third vari­
ables, a risk that, following the model in section 2.4, is very high: this meant 
for example choosing an international comparison of planning systems and 
selecting cases very carefully (see section 3.2.1.2);
c) Using some techniques specifically to strengthen the external validity of the 
findings, for example using data sources additional to the cases (see section 
3.2.2).
Once the method and data gathering have been explained, section 3.3 will focus on 
how each research question has been answered.
3.1 Why case research?
The findings in this research are based on the following sources of data: available 
literature, eleven project cases (three/four in each country) and many interviews with 
involved persons and relevant experts. Is was however not possible to study sufficient 
cases for a statistical analysis of the causal relationship between the independent 
variable 'formal rules relevant to zoning' and the dependent variable 'capturing value 
increase'. There are two main reasons for this:
1. Urban (re)development projects are not so easy to reproduce in a laboratory as 
for example physical, biological or even psychological phenomena. Our phe­
nomenon is an open social system and thus too complex to be "modulated" in 
an experiment (Swanborn, 1996: 22-24, 38-45);
2. The needed data are usually not fully available nor operational: there is not a list 
of all the urban (re)development projects in the country (total population) which 
would make possible a random selection of representative projects (sample). And 
even if this random selection was possible, there are not enough data available 
for all these projects and/or the data are not available in the needed form, be-
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cause the data are not quantifiable, because the projects are too old, or because 
very relevant information is not available to the public (this is specially the case 
in the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent, in England3), or because there are no 
good archives, etcetera. But even if that information had been available, we did 
not have the time to study a representative sample (Swanborn 1996, p. 59).
3.1.1 Multiple case design
Therefore, although available literature has been extensively used, this research can 
be considered as a case-based one. We applied what the literature calls a 'multiple 
case design' (N > 1), in Dutch 'meervoudige case-study's' (Yin, 1989; Van Hoesel, 
1985: 239; both quoted in Swanborn, 1996: 23), or a 'cross case display' design 
(Miles en Huberman, 1994: 172-177). Such a research design consists of studying 
several cases (four in Valencia, three in England and four in the Netherlands) and 
comparing them with each other.
We chose case research not only because of the data gathering limitations. Also, the 
case-study method was an appropriate complement to the available literature, which 
often does not include up-to-date information about the studied phenomenon. In par­
ticular, the answer to Preparatory Research Question 2 in the Netherlands has rested 
heavily on cases, as there is not much available data about the degree of captured val­
ue increase in Dutch practice. Also, the case-study method was necessary to get the 
detailed information about the studied phenomenon, for this required using different 
sources, paying attention to many aspects and measuring them at different moments. 
This is not possible with a one moment-survey, there was need to be involved more 
deeply in the phenomenon by studying some 'carriers' of it, i.e. some cases. We stud­
ied the development phase, which starts from the original situation and ends at the de­
livery and the beginning of the exploitation of the final real estate products. This went 
from the first plan documents up to at least the signing of the development agreement, 
using a variety of data sources (documents, interviews, visits to the site, etc). Finally, 
the case-study method was necessary because there was need to study the cases in 
their system, in their natural environment. It is not only that, as already mentioned, 
it is not possible to isolate the phenomenon from the context and reproduce it in the 
laboratory experiment. In addition, it is not desirable to do so for then we would have 
missed the interactions with the context (Swanborn, 1996: 22-24, 38-45).
However, cases have not been studied in a 'holistic' way. This research was not 
interested in the whole phenomenon, i.e. in a description of all the characteristics
3 An important part of data gathering was collected from the agreements between the involved public 
and private parties. W hile  in the Netherlands these agreements are not fully available for the public, 
in England and Spain they are. In England the available agreements regard the contributions made 
by the developers to the public. In Spain the available agreements have broader contents: besides 
the contributions, they also include a detailed calculation of all land development costs.
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of the phenomenon, but rather in isolating the relevant variables of the phenom­
enon from the rest of the infinite other aspects or variables that could characterize 
the phenomenon (Swanborn, 1996: 11-18, 22-24, 26-28). The relevant variables are 
the above-mentioned independent and dependent variables, which are subdivided 
into several sub-variables in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. Except for the Dutch case De 
Funen, all the cases have been studied following the same check lists that were used 
in the literature research (see Annex 1). So both literature research and case research 
have focussed on the same variables and sub-variables, complementing each other. 
De Funen diverges somewhat because it served as pilot study. The definitive approach 
and check-lists are based on the results of this pilot study (Swanborn, 1996: 100).
Cases have been selected as to strengthen the validity of the findings (see sections
3.2.1.2 and 3.2.2.2). In addition, some other, more practical selection criteria have 
been used: those projects have been selected that were available in terms of availability 
of archives, willingness of the involved persons to collaborate, visibility of the results, 
etc. The American literature speaks here of 'convenience sample' (Swanborn, 1996: 59).
3.1.2 Interviews
Interviews have been an important data source. There were of two different sorts: 
(1) Specific interviews, each one being different from the others, meant for finding 
specific knowledge to fill in the holes in literature and cases; (2) Generic interviews, 
meant for obtaining knowledge about the possible causal relationship between the 
independent variable and the dependent variable: this sort of interview was used for 
answering Preparatory research question 3. The construction of the questionnaire for 
the generic interviews has followed a meticulous method (Emans, 2002: 114-160). 
All those interviews have the same semi-structured form: all the relevant sub-varia­
bles of 'formal rules relevant to zoning' were listed that might influence any of the 
sub-variables of 'capturing value increase'.
3.1.3 Moment of data gathering
The data gathering took place before the international financial and economic crisis, 
which started in Summer/Autumn of 2008. For Spain, the data gathering took place 
before the start at the end of 2007 of the crisis in the Spanish real estate market. This 
means that one of the context variables that influence the size of the initial profit in 
urban regenerations projects (real estate markets, variable A1 in the causal model, 
see section 2.4.2.1) might be different nowadays (projects are nowadays confronted 
with substantially lower returns). For each country, data gathering took place at the 
following times (see, for more details, section 'Sources'):
• Exploratory study of the Netherlands, England, Spain, Germany, France, Italy, 
Flanders, Denmark and Sweden: desk research and most of the interviews in the
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Spring of 2006, rest of interviews during 2006, 2007 and beginning 2008.
• Region of Valencia: desk research in Summer and Autumn 2006, in situ research 
(the cases and most of the interviews) in November and December 2006, and 
several interviews during 2007 and 2008;
• England: desk research in Winter and Spring 2007, in situ research (the cases and 
some interviews) in June 2007, and most of the interviews during 2006 and 2007;
• The Netherlands: desk research in 2005, in Summer and Autumn 2007, and 
most recent literature in Autumn 2009 and winter 2009-2010; in situ research 
beginning of 2005 for case and interviews De Funen, and Winter of 2007-2008 
for the rest of cases including the interviews. Some additional interviews have 
been made in Autumn 2007 and the Spring and Summer of 2008.
• Last uptodate: for important data we have made a last round of data gathering at 
the end of 2009 and during 2010.
3.2 The validity of the findings
A fundamental question in case-based research is whether the findings are valid. 
How trustworthy are they? Central to this question are the concepts of 'internal va­
lidity', i.e. can the findings explain the studied cases?; and of 'external validity', i.e. 
are the findings generalizable to other cases? (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 278; León 
y Montero, 1997: 71-75, 122-124, 136-138; Polit et al., 2001: 192-195; Campbell 
& Stanley 1963: quoted in León & Montero: 122 and in Polit et alia: 193). There is 
neither a unanimous opinion about how to reach this trustworthiness, nor whether it 
is necessary or not to achieve it, and to which degree (Miles and Huberman, 1994; 
Myers, 2000; León & Montero, 1997; Swanborn, 1987: 82-83).
It has already been mentioned that the limitations of data gathering made it impos­
sible to produce findings with the validity that characterizes experimental and sta­
tistical research, i.e. that kind of research that has the possibility of totally isolating, 
through experiments or through statistical analysis, the studied variables (Swanborn, 
1996: 59). In spite of these limitations, this research needs to achieve a certain level 
of validity in order to produce good recommendations for the Dutch practice, i.e. to 
avoid recommendations that are too case specific. In this we agree with Miles and 
Huberman when they say, referring to this dilemma, that "Although we may acknowl­
edge that 'getting it all right' is an unworkable aim, we should (...) try to 'not get it 
all wrong'" (1994: 277).
3.2.1 Internal validity
Internal validity means that the findings can explain the case projects studied in this 
research. We need a reasonable level of internal validity in order to be able to claim,
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when answering Preparatory Research Question 3 (see section 3.3.3), that we can 
infer in the studied cases the causal nature of the relationship between the variable 
'formal rules relevant to zoning' and the variable 'capturing value increase'. Only by 
obtaining true knowledge about how the former does actually influence (or not) the 
latter in the studied cases is it possible to claim that the findings are internally valid. 
In order to increase the internal validity of the findings, two methodological strategies 
have been applied that reinforce each other: the hypotheses-deductive method and 
the method of difference.
3.2.1.1 The hypothetical-deductive method
The first methodological strategy is the hypothetical-deductive method (León & 
Montero, 1997: 8-21). Both the causal model set out in section 2.4 and the two hy­
potheses included in section 2.5 speculate about the possible relationship between 
variables 'formal rules relevant to zoning' and 'capturing value increase'. We checked 
empirically whether these speculations match the real world or not. That is, this re­
search is an empirical testing of the speculations. See chapter 8 for the confrontation 
between speculations and findings.
3.2.1.2 The method of difference
The second methodological strategy is a more classical method: see if differences in 
the variable 'formal rules relevant to zoning' correspond or not with differences in the 
variable 'capturing value increase' (León & Montero, 1997: 106-117). This is actually 
based on what Mill called in the XIX Century the 'method of difference': if a specific 
value of a first variable happens in one situation, but not in the other, and both situ­
ations are exactly the same except for a second variable, than the second variable is 
the cause or the consequence of the differences in the value of the first variable (Mill, 
1846: quoted in Swanborn, 1994: 239; 1996: 132).
a) The risk of third variables
The main problem to be dealt with when applying the method of difference is the 
possibility of third variables, also called 'alternative independent', 'confounding' or 
'extraneous' variables. The methodological risk is that the changes in the variable 
'capturing value increase' are not caused by changes in the variable 'formal rules 
relevant to zoning', but by another variable, for example any specificity of the con­
text of the cases (variables A in causal model, see section 2.4.2), or by the contingent 
behavior of those involved in the cases (variables C and D). It might look as if changes 
in the variable 'formal rules relevant to zoning' cause changes in the variable 'captur­
ing value increase', but actually both changes are caused by that third variable. In 
other words, the correlation between the variables 'formal rules relevant to zoning' 
and 'capturing value increase' is spurious, and the findings might not be relevant for 
elaborating recommendations.
b) Measure to assess the role of third variables: list o f possibly third variables
To avoid the problem of a 'spurious' correlation, this research should check every
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possible third variable, and assess if that can explain all the correlation between our 
variables. This project has pursued this by elaborating a list of possible third vari­
ables and assessing their role in each country and case. These possible third variables 
were: personal circumstances of the involved persons and political circumstances 
(variables D4 and D5), market price of housing (variable A1), and any other possible 
third variable named (at our invitation) by the interviewed persons (D5). This has led 
to substantial expansion of the initial conclusions about the inferred causal relations. 
For example, the cases in England and especially in the Netherlands showed that a 
third variable, the financial feasibility of the projects, influences very much the cap­
turing of value increase, which modified substantially our causal analysis. In addition 
this led us to research more deeply into the returns and costs of all the cases, and 
thus to include in the analysis the features of the site and the plan (variable A2), the 
situation in the markets for workforce and building materials, the fiscal regimes (A3), 
and the definition of the contents and boundaries of the plan (C1).
c) Measures to control third variables: limiting the total population of cases and 
applying cross-country comparative method
Other measures have been introduced to 'control' all or at least as many as possi­
ble alternative third variables (León & Montero, 1997: 110-117; Polit et alia, 2001: 
188-192). The general principle underlying these measures is to hold the context as 
constant as possible, introducing changes only in the variable 'formal rules relevant 
to zoning', and seeing what happens with the variable 'capturing value increase'. So 
several measures have been introduced to isolate both variables from possible third 
variables. These measures are of two sorts: a first group aims at holding the context 
as similar as possible, and a second group aims at selecting countries that show the 
broadest variance in the variable 'formal rules relevant to zoning'. This combination 
is a methodological strategy referred to as 'most similar systems design' and is appro­
priate to uncover causal relationships between two variables (Pierre, 2005: 454-455).
i) Maintaining the context as similar as possible
- Limiting the total population of cases: to minimize the potential variance of third 
variables, the total population of possibly cases is limited to those that fit within the 
formulation of the problem of this research (see section 1.5). Besides helping to keep 
the context constant, this assures also that the cases bear enough information. This is 
what Swanborn calls 'information-rich' cases (1996: 61), and Miles and Huberman 
the 'intensity' of cases (1994: 28). We have studied those cases that fit the following 
criteria:
° Urban regeneration schemes;
° Land is mostly in private hands, i.e. mostly not owned by public bodies;
° There are public infrastructure and facilities that cost money;
° Comprehensive development areas of a certain size that involve a notable value 
increase;
° Projects are finished or quite advanced (at least, the development agreement is 
already sealed), and results on captured value increase can already be measured.
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- Cross-country comparative method among relatively similar countries: to further 
minimize the potential variance of third variables, those countries have been studied 
in which the general political, economical and social context was somewhat similar. 
This led first to an explorative research of several countries that are likely to have a 
similar context to the Dutch. They are, besides the Netherlands, eight other West Eu­
ropean countries, all of them EU-members: England, Spain, Germany, France, Italy, 
Flanders, Denmark and Sweden. We are aware of the large differences between these 
countries, but we are at the same time convinced that these differences are less than 
if having chosen countries in other regions or continents.
ii) Cross-country comparative method among countries with broadest variance in independent 
variable
Of all these eight countries, those were selected for in-depth research that show the 
broadest variation in the variable 'formal rules relevant to zoning': these are England 
and the Spanish region of Valencia. Both countries could be considered in some 
relevant aspects as examples of opposite models (see chapter 4). This choice cor­
responds with the strategy 'heterogeneity in the independent variable' (Swanborn, 
1996: 62-64), which consists of maximizing the variation in the variable 'formal rules 
relevant to zoning'. This increased the chances that a possible causal relationship 
with the variable 'capturing value increase' becomes visible. This makes this research 
an international, comparative study that seeks inspiration in other countries in order 
to elaborate recommendations for the Dutch government.
d) Measures to control the third variables: selecting innovative cases
The strategy of 'heterogeneity in the independent variable', which led to a cross­
country comparative method (see above), has been continued by selecting cases that 
might include innovative practices in the way municipalities used the formal rules 
relevant to zoning. To find out which these cases were, local experts and directly 
involved persons have been asked. The innovative practices have been grouped fol­
lowing the same grouping of sub-variables as in Preparatory Research Question 3 
(see section 3.3.3).
i) Certainty beforehand about future development possibilities and contributions 
(sub-independent variables Where & When)
Cases were selected in which municipalities have used this aspect, whether it was 
creating flexibility about the future building possibilities (Valencia: Periodista, Cami­
no and, to a lesser extent, Benalúa; England: Megabowl and part of Temple Quay; 
The Netherlands: all cases); or creating certainty about the future contributions (Va­
lencia: all cases; England: Megabowl, Harbourside and part of Temple Quay; The 
Netherlands: Kruidenbuurt and Stationskwartier).
ii) Possibly contents of the relevant binding rules (sub-independent variable What)
There are two possibilities: i) In Valencia and England, binding rules can include 
affordable housing, and this actually happened in the Valencian cases Guillem and
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Periodista and in all the three English cases. In the Netherlands, in principle, binding 
rules, under the Physical Planning Act before 1 July 2008, cannot require affordable 
housing. However, in practice municipalities might try to find a way of doing this. 
In case De Funen the municipality included affordable housing in the Development 
Agreement, and in Kruidenbuurt affordable housing was included not only in the 
agreement, but also in the Explanation (Toelichting) of the Land use Plan. ii) In Valen­
cia and England, binding rules may include a wide range of contributions, including 
payments, implementation of public facilities, etc., and this is what happened in all 
studied cases. In the Netherlands, the possibilities to include contributions in the 
relevant binding rules were limited under the Physical Planning Act in force till 1 July 
2008. Two cases have been selected in which the municipality tried to include a wide 
range of contributions in the development agreement: Kruidenbuurt and Stationsk­
wartier. The Development contributions Plan, new since 1 July 2008, has introduced 
the possibility of including contributions in the binding rules (the Development con­
tributions Plan) also, but this came too late for the data gathering.
iii) Making the Land use Plan conditional on capturing value increase (sub-independent variables 
When and What)
In Valencia and England, municipalities can make the approval of the binding rules 
conditional on a development agreement that secures the capturing of value in­
crease, which is what actually happened in all the studied cases. Formally, Dutch 
municipalities cannot condition the Land use plans to a contractual commitment in 
a direct and open way. However, in practice this happens often, as was the case in 
all the four studied cases.
iv) Using the land readjustment regulation to oblige developers to compete with other 
developers (sub-independent variable Who)
Of the three countries, only in Valencia is there a land readjustment regulation. Al­
most all urban development there follows this regulation, and this was so in all four 
cases. The regulation makes it possible for developers not owning land to be selected 
as urbanizing agent. Municipalities can organize a public tender in which more than 
one proposal is evaluated. In all the cases there was such a tender, and in Guillem, 
Camino and Benalúa, more than one developer competed to be selected as urban­
izing agent.
v) Procedural guarantees for the initiative-holders (sub-independent variable How)
These are of three sorts: i) Those cases have been selected in which developers used 
legal guarantees to force the procedure of approval (Valencia: Periodista) or they did 
not but these guarantees might have been indirectly relevant by limiting the free­
dom of action of municipalities (Valencia: all the cases; England: Temple Quay and 
Harbourside). ii) Binding rules in all three countries can include global land use 
regulations that can be detailed afterwards. This could allow an operational use in 
the negotiations with landowners. Cases have been selected that included this provi­
sion (Valencia: all cases; England: Temple Quay and Harbourside; the Netherlands:
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Kruidenbuurt and part of Stationskwartier). iii) Ease of modifying the binding rules: 
binding rules in all the three countries can be modified. Cases have been selected 
where the binding rules were modified (Valencia: Periodista, Camino and Benalúa; 
England: Temple Quay and Harbourside; the Netherlands: Kruidenbuurt, Kop van 
Oost and Stationskwartier).
e) Measures to control third variables: repeated measurement
Another technique to control possible third variables is to study the phenomenon 
before and after a modification of only the independent variable 'formal rules rel­
evant to zoning', and see what happens with the dependent variable 'capturing value 
increase'. The phenomenon is thus measured at two different moments: before and 
after the modification of the independent variable, while the rest of the context (the 
potential third variables) remain the same, or almost the same. In the Spanish region 
of Valencia it was possible to apply this technique: here, in 1994 a new law intro­
duced very important changes in the land readjustment regulations (sub-independent 
variable Who), while possible third variables like culture, public policies, financial 
situation of the municipalities (variables D4 and D5 in causal model) and develop­
ments in the real estate markets (variable A1) remained the same. Because there 
were no dossiers available of suitable cases in the period before 1995, this research 
had to limit the data gathering for Spain for that period to literature and interviews. 
For the period after 1995, case-research also was used. In England also it has been 
possible to apply this technique: in cases Megabowl and part of Temple Quay, the 
Development Agreement was negotiated after the Bristol Local Council approved in 
2005 the policy document SPD4. This document created certainty about the future 
contributions (sub-independent variables Where and When). The introduction in the 
Netherlands of a new Physical Planning Act in 2008 offers in principle similar op­
portunities, but came too late, as the data gathering finished before the new Act has 
had consequences in practice.
f) Inferring causal relationships
Thanks to all mentioned measures it was possible for us to achieve valid knowledge 
about the studied cases. When formulating our conclusions about the causal rela­
tionship between the independent and the dependent variables however, we are 
however cautious. Instead of claiming that we prove a causal relationship, we claim 
that we infer the possibly causal nature of the relationship, i.e. we argue why it seems 
reasonable to us that there might be causality in a certain direction (Bryman, 2004: 
76, 230-1).
3.2.2 External validity
The other important aspect of the validity of the findings is the external validity. This 
refers to the generalizability of the research findings to other cases.
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3.2.2.1 How much external validity do we need in case-research?
There is much discussion about the minimum needed level of external validity in 
case-research. Is internal validity alone enough to understand how the real world 
works? Some authors consider that internal validity is good enough because it proves 
that something can happen (León & Montero, 1997: 123-124). Miles and Huber­
man talk here about 'analytic induction' (1994: 146), and Yin about 'analytic' or 
'theoretical generalization' (1989: 21, 44): instead of generalizing to populations or 
universes, it is possible to generalize to theoretical propositions, i.e. lending greater 
confidence to the hypothesis by testing it against the findings in the cases. Therefore, 
the goal is not to demonstrate the validity of a finding for the samples not studied, 
but to demonstrate that the theoretical assumptions/hypotheses actually work in the 
studied cases and are thus reasonably generalizable to the rest of the population of 
similar cases. Or, as Niederkofler stated it:
The case-study investigator's goal is not to demonstrate the validity of an 
argument for statistical populations or universes. Rather, he aims to cre­
ate and expand rich theoretical frameworks that should be useful in ana­
lysing similar cases' (Niederkofler, 1991: quoted in Swanborn, 1996: 67).
Actually, as Swanborn observes (ibidem), what Yin does is consider the studied case 
to be the same as a causal experiment in a laboratory. In experiments, the context 
of the studied variables (all possibly third variables) is perfectly controlled, so that 
there is no doubt that the findings are absolutely internally valid. Such findings al­
low theoretical statements: the theory is true or not true because the results of the 
experiment confirm or deny it, even if only one or several cases were involved. In 
other words, in experiments it is possible to control all the differences in the con­
text of all the cases of the total population, and therefore it is possible to reject any 
possibly alternative explanation to the findings. There is thus no need for any 'rep­
resentative' sample of cases because the studied cases are representative enough. 
The findings are thus externally valid, and are also transferable to all the cases in the 
total population.
We share the opinion of Swanborn (1996: 67) that cases in social science research 
in general, and thus also in this research, are not fully comparable to a laboratory 
experiment as Yin implicitly postulates. The application of the above-mentioned hy­
pothetical-deductive method and the measures for controlling all possible alternative 
third variables might offer some external validity: we can reasonably expect that 
other similar cases also would produce the same or similar results. However, this 
is not enough, as we still must face the risk of basing the findings upon too specific 
cases. What if the studied cases are rarities, extremes within the total population of 
cases? Too specific findings impede a ceteribus paribus reasoning, because there 
are not other similar cases, i.e. cases with comparable circumstances in which the 
conclusions would be valid. The findings would be interesting only for the studied 
cases, but neither for the rest of the population nor for the recommendations for the
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Dutch practice. In our opinion this research must be able to claim that what happens 
in the studied cases is not exceptional and is valid for other cases. Or, if our cases are 
exceptional, at least we need to identify the specific features that make them excep­
tional. Anyway, whether or not we want our findings to stand for other cases, or at 
least to explain why they are an exception, we need some knowledge about the other 
cases in the population, i.e. some knowledge of the context. In other words, there is 
need to strengthen the validity of the findings by means additional to those explained 
up to now. The goal is to be able to claim that it is reasonable to expect, or plausible, 
that the recommendations would be applicable in other cases.
Table 5. Selection of cases according to the main sorts of urban regeneration projects.
Valencia England The Netherlands
Multifunctional central 
areas
Guillem de Anglesola and 
Periodista G il Sumbiela
Temple Quay Stationskwartier
Monofunctional residential 
areas
Guillem de Anglesola and 
part of Benalúa Sur
(*) Kruidenbuurt
Old Brownfield sites Periodista G il Sumbiela, 
Camino Hondo  and part of 
Benalúa Sur
Megabowl and Har­
bourside
De Funen and 
Kop van Oost
• Multifunctional central areas consist of city/town central areas and sites around railway stations.
• Monofunctional residential areas consist of districts with a predominant residential use.
• Old brownfield sites are derelict sites: business and other sorts of economic-industrial activities; gas and 
electricity factories; harbor areas; railway infrastructure; and hospitals, government buildings and military 
sites.
(*) It was not possible to find a case in England that would fit within this category.
3.2.2.2 How to strengthen the external validity of the findings
a) Representative cases
A first attempt has been made to achieve some general knowledge by selecting cases 
that somehow stand for the main sorts of urban regeneration projects in that country. 
This leads to a selection of cases that span the range of sorts of urban regeneration 
projects that are common in the Netherlands (Kolpron, 2000: 8-31). See chapter 7.1 
for an extensive explanation of this categorization, and table 5 for how the studied 
cases fit within the categorization. Doing so we avoided the risk of focusing only on 
a specific sort of cases and ignoring other relevant sorts of regeneration schemes.
b) Supplementary sources
To further increase the external validity of the findings, other sources of more or less 
general knowledge have been analyzed:
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• Data has been sought about other cases. Sometimes there was quite generaliz- 
able data available, specially in Valencia and England;
• Interviews with experts, who gave information about other cases they know.
The case-based findings have been positioned within this more general knowledge. 
This has allowed assessing the external validity of the findings from the cases. This 
was particularly relevant for the findings about the third variable 'development costs' 
(initially a third variable that became part of the focus of this research and has been 
renamed an 'intermediary variable', see figure 4 in section 2.4.2.4). The first findings 
for the Netherlands (that suggested that development costs are much higher there 
than in England and, specially, in Valencia) were based on just three cases, as there 
were no other available relevant sources. In order to check the validity of these find­
ings, we approached two Dutch experts. They validated our initial findings by making 
a study of the equivalent development costs in three current Dutch cases and com­
paring their findings with the findings of our three cases.
3.2.2.3 Some examples
By applying these measures, it was possible to assess the specificity of the findings, 
and whether they could serve or not for the final conclusions. Here are several ex­
amples:
- In the Valencian cases Guillem and Periodista, the municipality had introduced 
social housing in the binding zoning plan, and we concluded that this was an 
important cause of the developer finally realizing social houses. However, af­
ter studying statistics about social housing production and interviewing several 
experts, it became clear that these cases are more an exception than the rule 
(see section 5.5.2.2). Valencian municipalities seem, until recently, not have in­
cluded much social housing in the binding zoning plans. Does this mean that 
the finding (including social housing in binding zoning plans leads to more real­
ized social housing) was not useful? Not at all, as the findings were clear that if 
municipalities include social housing in binding zoning plan (what is more and 
more the case the last couple of years), then this leads to mores social housing 
being built.
- In the English case Megabowl the local development plan (a non-legally binding 
zoning plan) foresaw no redevelopment of this former bowling alley (see section 
6.4.1.1). We concluded that this has had a positive effect for the captured value 
increase: due to the complete absence of any building prospective, developers 
were not interested in buying the site, which discouraged any price increase 
of the land, which in turn left more financial room for the owner to contribute 
more generously to public infrastructure and facilities, as he indeed did. How­
ever, during the interviews it became clear that this case was certainly special, 
as another variable was also relevant, of the sort A1 in causal model (see sec­
tion 2.4.2): the last years other bowling alleys were opened in the city, which 
damaged the profitability of the bowling alley in our site and thus lowered its 
market value. This played a role in the willingness of the owner to contribute so
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generously. Does this mean that the finding (low certainty about future building 
possibilities leads to high capturing value increase) is not valid? We concluded 
that the finding was valid because: 1) the low market value of the bowling alley 
might have influenced the willingness of the owner, but not the lack of interest 
of developers in buying the land; and 2) the financial outcomes of other urban 
regeneration cases (e.g. case Harbourside in England, but also other cases in 
Valencia and the Netherlands) also are affected by the fact that the former use in 
the site has a low market value (old deteriorated industrial areas, etc).
- In the Dutch cases Kruidenbuurt and Stationskwartier, the developer and the 
public administration agreed the contributions in early stages of the develop­
ment process, while in the cases De Funen and Kop van Oost they did not (see 
section 7.4.1.1). After consulting additional sources and interviewing several ex­
perts, we concluded that the first two cases are the exception, and the last two 
the rule. It became clear that both in Kruidenbuurt and Stationskwartier there 
was a specificity that explained why contributions were agreed in early stages: 
in Kruidenbuurt a special relation between the developer (a housing associa­
tion) and the municipality, and in Stationskwartier the specificity of the project 
(a semi-public railway company wanting a new railway station), both variables 
of the sort D4. Is the finding (early certainty about contributions is good for 
capturing value increase) valid? Yes, because it is clear that if there is certainty, 
whatever the reason might be for this, then it results in better capturing. Also, this 
led to additional data gathering that led us to conclude that in the Netherlands, 
housing associations contribute more to public infrastructure and facilities than 
commercial developers because associations always have a special relation with 
public bodies and the achievement of public goals, specially in the field of social 
housing.
- Supplementary sources have been very relevant for answering the Preparatory 
research question 2. In sections 5.6, 6.5 and 7.5 we explain the degree to which 
developers contribute to public infrastructure and facilities. In those sections the 
case-based data have been systematically placed against other available studies 
(abundant in Spain and England) and against the interviews with many experts 
that assessed whether the case-based findings were representative or not. For 
example, in the Netherlands the interviews and a small survey confirmed that 
commercial developers do not contribute at all to off-site public infrastructure 
and facilities. However, some experts pointed out that, sometimes, there are 
some contributions to local funds for off-site infrastructure (see section 7.5).
3.3 Answering the Research Questions
In chapters 5 to 7 (chapter 5 for Valencia, 6 for England and 7 for the Netherlands) 
first a general introduction is given to the studied countries and cases. This general 
introduction describes the allocation of competences on planning law and on the
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making and implementation of planning policy, and describes the different actors 
involved in urban development, the policies for urban regeneration, and the legal 
framework for capturing value increase. For each case there is given a separate intro­
duction to the development site, to the history of the development and to the current 
situation. Additionally, we studied for each case the amount of development costs 
and profits, distinguishing between land development costs (land price, infrastructure 
provision costs, soil decontamination and compensation costs), real estate develop­
ment costs and the final profits.
Then, we answer three Preparatory Research Questions for each country and case. 
These questions are:
• Preparatory research question 1: How can those formal rules relevant to zoning 
be used in comprehensive urban regeneration developments on privately owned 
land? This focuses on the independent variable 'formal rules relevant to zoning'.
• Preparatory research question 2: What is the extent of capturing value increase in 
comprehensive urban regeneration developments on privately owned land? This 
focuses on the dependent variable 'capturing value increase'.
• Preparatory research question 3: How does the way in which formal rules rel­
evant to zoning are used influence capturing value increase? This focuses on the 
causal relationship among the independent and the dependent variables.
We answered the research questions as follows. The theoretical framework served to 
formulate a causal model (see section 2.4.2) and, central to this causal model, two 
hypotheses (section 2.5):
1. Hypothesis 1: A specific form of splitting the property rights on land (separating 
infrastructure provision from property rights) can modify the power-relationships 
in the network of actors involved in urban regeneration, and this can improve 
capturing value increase.
2. Hypothesis 2: Creating uncertainty in early stages of development processes 
about future building possibilities, and certainty about future contributions can 
influence capturing value increase in a positive way.
Preparatory research question 1
Using variables B2 and D1 of the causal model and the second hypothesis we saw 
that in order to answer Preparatory Research Question 1 we needed information 
about three sub-variables (Where, When, What). In addition, using variables B1 and 
D2 of the causal model and the first hypothesis we saw that we needed a model 
of dependence analysis and information about a fourth sub-variable (Who). Finally, 
based on variables B3 and D3 of the causal model we realized that we needed infor­
mation about a fifth sub-variable (How).
Preparatory research question 2
We used a criterion of conformance (i.e. whether the actual spatial development is 
according to plan) to answer Preparatory research question 2. W e needed informa-
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tion about: 1) what are the goals for capturing value increase?; 2) who pays to achieve 
those goals?; and 3) is the implementation on time? Using this we defined all the sub­
variables (sorts of capturing value increase).
Figure 5. Inputs in the detailing and answering of the research questions.
Preparatory research question 3
In order to answer this question we needed to infer the sort of causal relationship 
between the independent and the dependent variables. We did so using the model of 
dependence analysis (that presupposes the possible causal relationship on the basis 
of the allocation of resources) and the method of difference.
Main Research Question
After each preparatory question had been answered for each country in chapters 5 
to 7, those answers were used to answer in chapter 9 the Main Research Question:
• Main research question: How could formal rules relevant to zoning be used in 
the Netherlands in order that the profitable parts finance as much as possible the
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unprofitable parts? This focus on elaborating recommendations for the Dutch 
practice.
See Figure 5 for an overview of how the different inputs have been used to operation­
alize the research questions.
3.3.1 Answering Preparatory Research Question 1
Preparatory Research Question 1 is:
How can those formal rules relevant to zoning be used in comprehensive urban 
regeneration developments on privately owned land?
To make this question operational for data gathering, the variable 'formal rules rel­
evant to zoning' has been divided into five sub-variables. Four of them are taken 
from the causal model (variables B1, B2, D1 and D2), two hypotheses and a model 
of dependence analysis. The fifth sub-variable is taken from the causal model alone 
(variables B3 and D3).
Causal model (variables B2, D l) + Hypotheses 2 sub-variables Where, When 
and What
The second hypothesis is: Creating uncertainty in early stages of development proc­
esses about future building possibilities, and certainty about future contributions can 
influence capturing value increase in a positive way.
This assumption has been translated into several researchable sub-variables of the in­
dependent variable. Based on these sub-variables it was possible to elucidate wheth­
er there is, or is not, certainty, which type of certainty (about building possibilities or 
about contributions), and when (early or later in development processes):
• Where (in which planning documents) are the relevant zoning regulations 
brought into force?
• When (in relation to the negotiations) are the relevant zoning regulations approved?
• What are the possibly contents of the relevant zoning regulations?
Causal model (variables B1, D2) + Hypothesis 1 sub-variable Who
The first hypothesis is: A specific form of splitting the property rights on land (separat­
ing infrastructure provision from property rights) can modify the power-relationships 
in the network of actors involved in urban regeneration, and this can improve captur­
ing value increase.
This assumption has been translated into one researchable sub-variable of the inde­
pendent variable. This sub-variable is meant to elucidate whether development rights 
belong to the landowner or to the public:
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• Who has the right to develop whatever the binding rules (excluding the not- 
legally binding zoning regulations) prescribe?
However, this sub-variable was not specific enough to allow data gathering. There­
fore, we made it more specific by investigating who controls the resources that are 
needed in each of the transactions in development processes. These transactions are 
(Alexander, 2001a; 2001b):
1. Land purchase and assembling;
2. Financing;
3. Land preparation and development;
4. Land disposition;
5. Construction;
6. Property transfer.
Steps 1-4 belong to the infrastructure provision, steps 5 and 6 to the building. Each 
of these steps implies transactions of some kind (land, money, property, etc). Urban 
regeneration, i.e. developing whatever is prescribed in the binding rules, can only 
happen after completing each of these transactions. By analysing who has the control 
over each of these transactions, it was possible to discern who has which develop­
ment right, and whether public law regulations (formal rules such as expropriation 
and the Valencian land readjustment regulation) might have restricted the use of 
property rights in land. The sub-variable becomes more specific:
• Who has the control over each of the six transactions in development processes?
Model o f dependence analysis sub-variable Who
However, we needed an analytical model that allowed us to discover who has the 
control over each of the six transactions. We therefore developed a dependence 
analysis model based on the concepts (explained in section 2.1.1.1) of power, rules, 
resources and dependence, and based on the ideas of Healey (1992: 35-38; see also 
Verhage 2002: 159) and, specially, Verhage (2002: 161). The model allowed us to 
analyse the influence of public law regulations on the control of resources and how 
this influences power-relationships within policy networks. These are the character­
istics of the model:
1. Resources are not only material resources (land and investment capacity), but 
also regulatory resources (Land use plan, building permits, etc);
2. Rules are what Ostrom (1986: 466-467) understood under 'formal rules': those 
formalised in laws and administrative arrangements;
3. Ideas and informal rules have not been included in this model as it was quite 
difficult to measure them in an objective way. However they were taken into ac­
count in an analysis made of the possible third variables D4 and D5, an analysis 
that complements the conclusions of this dependence model (see section 2.4.2).
4. To analyse the strength of the dependence, this research adds the concept of 
'avoidability' of the dependence. This idea is partly based on Scharpf's concept 
of 'substitutability' of the resource that causes the dependence. To us, depend­
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ence is avoidable when it is possible and feasible for the dependent actor to 
achieve his goals without being dependent on a particular actor. A dependence 
is not avoidable when it is not possible or, if possible, too costly or politically too 
risky to avoid it.
5. After analysing in each case the distribution of resources and the resulting de­
pendence patterns, the formal rules are analysed that explain why the resources 
are distributed as they are.
We used this model to further specify sub-variable Who into several sub-sub-variables:
• Which are the resources (material and regulatory resources) needed for each of 
the transactions?
• How are these resources distributed between the involved parties?
• What are the dependence patterns that result from the allocation of resources?
• Are these dependence patterns avoidable?
Causal model (variables B3 and D3) sub-variable How
Several practical considerations, related to the flexibility of the procedure for pre­
paring and approving binding rules, have helped to make operational the last sub­
variable in PRQ1:
• How flexible is the procedure of preparing and approving the binding rules (ex­
cluded the not-legally binding zoning regulations)?
This has been made more specific:
- Which guarantees have initiative-holders (the developers who wants to regener­
ate a site) that the municipality will seriously assess their application?
- How easy or difficult is it to modify the binding rules? Three sub-sub-variables 
have been researched: (1) what are the procedural requirements for modifying 
(wijziging in Dutch), (2) departing from (vrijstelling) and (3) detailing (uitwerking) 
the existing binding rules?
- Can the geographical scope of binding zoning plans be varied according to 
the negotiations with different landowners/developers? Three sub-variables have 
been researched: (1) the rules for the delimitation of geographical scope of the 
plans; (2) whether there is a maximum number of different binding zoning plans 
per area; (3) whether municipalities are free to approve as many binding zoning 
documents as they wish.
Description problem
Preparatory research question 1 has been answered as a description problem (Swan­
born, 1987: 68-70): introducing first each country and case, and describing then 
what each country and case look like in each of the mentioned sub-variables, i.e. 
measuring each sub-variable (see Table 6). For the detailed check-lists that were used 
in the data gathering, see Annex 1. The answer consists of statements describing how 
formal rules relevant to zoning in the different countries could be used following 
planning law, and how they are used in practice.
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Table 6. Structure of the answer to P.R.Q.1
Country/sub-variable Introduction 
to country
Introduction 
to cases
Where When What W ho How
England
Valencia
The Netherlands
3.3.2 Answering Preparatory Research Question 2
Preparatory research question 2 is:
What is the extent of capturing value increase in comprehensive urban regen­
eration developments on privately owned land?
To make this question operational, the dependent variable 'capturing value increase' 
has been divided into several sub-variables. They are based on the criterion of con­
formance, which refers to whether spatial development is according to plan (Korthals 
Altes, 2006: 97-99). If the goals for capturing value increase included in the zoning 
regulations are secured in terms of their financing and their realization within the 
established deadlines, we could consider that the conformance has been high, and 
vice versa. A list of possible goals for capturing value increase has been designed that 
covers all possible forms of contributions from developers and takes into account 
possible side effects, to one of which special attention has been paid: the tempo of 
implementation. That is, Preparatory research question 2 focuses not only on whether 
the goals for capturing value increase have been achieved, but also whether this hap­
pened on schedule. The sub-variables are:
• Who pays the following capturing value increase goals? [a list of possible contri­
butions from the developer to public infrastructure and facilities]
• Are the capturing value increase goals implemented on time?
However, during data gathering it became clear that it was very difficult to fully apply 
the criterion of conformance. The reason is that it was not always possible to discern 
what the goals for capturing value increase were, as during the development process, 
especially in the Netherlands, these goals changed. It was also not always possible 
to discern whether the goals were genuinely set at the beginning of the process, or 
were the result of self-censure of public bodies aware of the low chances of obtain­
ing contributions from developers. Nevertheless, when possible we have applied the 
criterion of conformance, comparing the results with the initial goals, and in addition 
we always measured the degree of captured value increase, following the same list 
for all cases and countries. So the measured degree of captured value increase was 
sometimes related to the specific goals of the public bodies, and was always related
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to the same list for all cases and countries. The differences of measured degree of 
captured value increase between cases and countries were large enough for suggest­
ing in Preparatory research question 3 a causal relationship with the independent 
variable.
Preparatory research question 2 is also answered as a description problem (Swan­
born, 1987: 68-70): describing what each country and case looks like in each of the 
mentioned sub-variables, i.e. measuring them (see Table 7). For the detailed check­
list, see Annex 1. The answer consists of statements describing which capturing value 
increase goals are paid or not by the market parties, and whether this happened on 
schedule.
Table 7. Structure of the answer to P.R.Q.2
Country/sub-variable Capturing value increase goals Implementation within schedule?
England
Valencia
The Netherlands
3.3.3 Answering Preparatory Research Question 3
Preparatory research question 3 is:
How does the way in which formal rules relevant to zoning are used influence 
capturing value increase?
This question links the answer to P.R.Q.1 (use of formal rules relevant to zoning) with 
the answer to P.R.Q.2 (degree of capturing value increase). The goal is to know if 
certain ways of using formal rules relevant to zoning in the studied countries could 
influence capturing value increase. Because the goal of this research is to elaborate 
recommendations for the Dutch practice, knowledge about this relationship must in­
clude knowledge about a possible causality. In other words, this research is interested 
in the possibly causal relationship between both variables (see Figure 6).
< independent variable > ? > < dependent variable >
'formal rules relevant to zoning' :  > 'capturing value increase'
Figure 6. This research is interested in nature of the relationship among variables 'formal rules relevant
to zoning' and 'capturing value increase'.
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Because P.R.Q.3 works with the answers given to P.R.Q.1 and P.R.Q.2, there is no 
need of specific data gathering, except for the generic interviews in which involved 
persons were asked about the possible causal relationship (see section 3.1.2). The 
answer to P.R.Q.3 argues why the sub-variables of P.R.Q.1 can or cannot influence 
the sub-variables of P.R.Q.2. The sub-variables have been grouped, due to narrative 
purposes, into the following:
a) Certainty beforehand about future building possibilities and contributions 
(Where and When)
Zoning regulations can create certainty about future use possibilities and contribu­
tions before, during or after negotiations with developers take place. Certainty can 
be very hard, when it consists of binding rules; less hard, when consisting of non- 
legally binding zoning regulations; or not even existing if there is no kind of policy 
document.
b) Possibly contents of the relevant binding rules (W hat)
Binding rules (excluding the not-legally binding zoning regulations) might be useful 
in negotiations if local public bodies can include there not only the physical zoning, 
but also aspects related to the financing and implementation of public infrastructure 
and facilities. Do binding rules regulate only a desired final picture without stating 
who is responsible for its implementation, or also the obligations that must be ful­
filled by the developer? How far can binding rules go in enumerating obligations? 
Can they include off-site infrastructure? Social housing?
c) Making the relevant binding rules conditional on the developer securing the 
capturing of value increase (When and What)
Binding rules (excluding the not-legally binding zoning regulations) might be useful 
in negotiations if local public bodies can make them conditional on the developer 
financing and implementing the public infrastructure and facilities. The approval of 
binding rules containing these schedules does not automatically mean that develop­
ers are committed to develop whatever is foreseen in them. Additionally, the commit­
ment of the developer to secure them is needed.
d) Modulating property rights in land (Who)
The negotiation position of local public bodies may depend on the contents of prop­
erty rights, more specifically on the degree to which landowners control all transac­
tions in development processes, and the degree to which public bodies may restrict 
the exercise of property rights through public law regulations.
e) Procedure for the preparation and approval of relevant binding rules (How)
Three aspects related to the procedure of binding rules (excluding not-legally binding 
zoning regulations) might be relevant for capturing value increase:
• Guarantees to the initiative-holders: when developers undertake the initiative, 
there are many uncertainties about the decision of the local public body. Is it go­
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ing to assess seriously the application, or not even consider it? This might affect 
the negotiation position of developers and local public bodies, and therefore in­
fluence the capturing of value increase. Also, this might affect the risks and costs 
that market parties have to deal with, which might also affect the keenness of 
market parties to undertake the initiative and contribute to the unprofitable parts.
• Flexibility to modify existing binding rules: easy and short procedures for modi­
fying the existing binding rules could improve the usability of binding rules in 
the negotiations.
• Flexibility to determine the plan area of the binding rules accordingly to negotia­
tions with landowners: another important aspect could be whether the size or 
geographical scope to which the binding rules apply (i.e. the plan area) could be 
adapted in a way that favours negotiating with each individual landowner, with­
out delaying the rest of the process. Can the local public body first approve the 
binding rules for the plots where the agreements have already been concluded, 
and wait until the other owners/developers agree?
The answers to this Preparatory research question 3 are in fact the tested hypotheses, 
for example: "if municipalities establish in early stages of development processes 
which contributions developers will have to pay/realize, capturing value increase 
will improve". These tested hypotheses (see chapter 8) are the fundaments for an­
swering the Main Research Question in chapter 9.
3.3.4 Answering the Main Research Question
The Main research question is:
How could formal rules relevant to zoning be used in the Netherlands in order 
that the profitable parts finance as much as possible the unprofitable parts?
The answer will follow the same grouping of sub-variables as in Preparatory research 
question 3 (groups of sub-variables a-e). Based on the findings of Preparatory re­
search question 3, the Main research question designs specific recommendations 
for the Dutch situation. These recommendations are based on the tested hypotheses, 
but incorporating specific knowledge of the Dutch situation, e.g. legislation, political 
and cultural considerations. This results in statements of the type: "if Dutch munici­
palities want to increase cost recovery in similar urban projects, they should in early 
stages specify in Structure Visions (Structuurvisie) their requirements on cost recov­
ery". Recommendations are divided between those that fit within the actual legal 
framework, and those that require a legislative modification.

a  Quick scan: formal rules < relevant to zoning in 
W estern European countries
As argued in chapter 3.2.1.2, methodological considerations require that this re­
search investigates the situation in several countries. The first step is exploratory re­
search in countries that have a similar context to the Netherlands, because studying 
countries with a similar context reduces the influence of third variables. The second 
step is to select for in-depth research those countries that show the broadest variation 
in the independent variable 'formal rules relevant to zoning'. The reason is that this 
increases the possibilities of producing significant findings.
The exploratory research is of the situation in the Netherlands and eight other West­
ern European countries: Germany, England (part of the UK), Flanders (part of Bel­
gium), France, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, and Spain (focusing mainly on the region of 
Valencia). Special attention has been paid to a limited number of variables namely 
the five sub-variables of the independent variable 'formal rules relevant to zoning': 
Where, When, What, Who and How (see section 3.3.1). The difference between the 
exploratory research and the in-depth research lies in the sources (in the exploratory 
research only literature and interviews, in the in-depth research also cases), the time 
spent, the level of detail, and the number of interviews1.
The sources in the exploratory research have been literature (Acosta & Renard, 1993; Ave, 1996; 
Bassols, 2002, Betancor & García-Bellido, 2001; Booth, 2003; De Wolff, 2000; Dieterich et al., 
1993; Stig, 2002; European commission, 1997 and 1999; García-Bellido, 1993 and 1994; Kalbro & 
Mattsson, 1995; Kalbro, 2002; Milj0ministeriet, 2002, Moore, 2005; Muñoz & Korthals Altes, 2007, 
Needham et al., 1993; ODPM, 2004b, Oliva, 2006; Ratcliffe et al., 2002; Rodríguez, 2001; Ruiz de 
Lobera, 1996; Williams & Wood, 1994) and interviews with relevant experts of each country (Crow, 
Davy, Renard, Oliva, Kalbro, De Wolff, Wouters and Enemark, interviews in 2006, 2007 and 2008).
1
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Sections 4.1-4 present the results of the exploratory research: a cross-national survey 
of the main aspects of the formal rules relevant to zoning, summarized in table 8. 
Based on the findings of this exploratory research, in section 4.5 two countries have 
been selected that show the broadest variation in the ways formal rules relevant to 
zoning are used: these are England and the Spanish region of Valencia. These two 
countries and the Netherlands are the subject of in-depth research in chapters 5-7.
4.1 Zoning regulations in the negotiation processes
The position of municipalities in the negotiations with landowners and developers 
may vary depending on whether there already exist binding rules or indicative zoning 
regulations concerning the development in question.
4.1.1 A re zoning regulations (binding and not-binding) approved 
in early stages of development processes?
In several countries, before negotiations start, there are already binding rules con­
cerning the intended development. In Spain and France for example, as a rule, mu­
nicipalities are obliged to approve binding land-use plans that have to cover the 
whole municipal territory (Plan General de Ordenación Urbana respectively Plan Lo­
cal dUrbanisme. PLU). However, in France, most of the municipalities have not yet 
(January 2007) approved PLUs. Although the old Plan d'Occupation des Sols (POS) 
still applies in these cases, there seems to be flexibility regarding projects that do not 
fit into it. In Italy also, until recently, municipalities were obliged to approve such a 
binding land use plan for the whole municipal territory (Piano regolatore generale 
comunale), but this plan is becoming gradually replaced by a new sort of plan, the 
Piano Operativo, which usually covers only part of the developable land. In Flanders, 
based on legislation of the 60's, Regional Plans (Gewestplannen) were enacted that 
cover most of the territory of Flanders, both built and not-built areas.
These already approved outline land-use plans include land-use regulations with 
statutory consequences for the use of the land: they zone land into different uses, 
and often also define the building density (not very common however in the Flem­
ish Gewestplannen). As a rule, these plans do not take account of specific projects, 
they are approved only occasionally, every many so years (except Italy, where the 
Piano Operativo is approved more or less each five years), and they constitute the 
existing planning frame before development processes start. Although these plans are 
supposed to create legal certainty about the future building possibilities, in practice, 
this certainty is often not so strong, at least in France, Italy and Flanders. The reason 
is that, when development is near, (1) in France the planning framework might not 
always be clear; (2) in Italy the new Piano Operativo no longer covers the whole
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municipal territory, and (3) in those four countries, these plans very often need to be 
detailed, complemented or modified.
In the other countries, the only planning documents that might say, in the early stag­
es, something about the possible future developments are non-binding zoning plans. 
The English Structure/Local/Development plans or the new Local Planning Frame­
works, and the Dutch Structuurplan or the new Structuurvisie are good examples of 
this. Because these regulations are only indicative, they give no legal certainty about 
the future use and building possibilities. Other countries also have similar indicative 
plans: the German Flächennutzungsplan, the Swedish översiktsplan and the Danish 
Kommuneplan.
4.1.2 Approval of detailed binding rules at the development 
moment
When negotiations have been successfully converted into development agreements, 
binding land-use plans for specific areas and in detail are approved. It is possible to 
differentiate between the countries according to whether this happens at one time or 
in different steps.
In several countries, municipalities approve the detailed legally binding rules in one 
step, in one planning document (English Planning Permission, Dutch Bestemming­
splan and Danish Lokalplan). However, in those countries it is possible to approve 
first an outline version (Outline Planning Permission, Globaal Bestemmingsplan and 
'framework' Lokalplan), and afterwards approve a detailed version (Full Planning Per­
mission, uitwerking and detailed Lokalplan). Sweden is a case in-between: in the case 
of private developments which do not fall within any joint development statutory 
formula (see under), municipalities usually approve the detailed binding rules in one 
step, the omra°desbestämmelser or the detaljplan. However, in case of joint develop­
ment formula, binding rules are approved in two steps.
In other countries, binding rules are usually approved in two steps and in two differ­
ent sorts of planning documents: (1) a binding land-use plan, and (2) a detailed and/ 
or implementation-oriented planning documents, i.e. a document including not only 
the physical zoning, but also or exclusively the arrangements that are necessary for 
the implementation. They are the German (1) Bebauungsplan and (2) Umlegungplan 
(in case of land readjustment); and the Swedish (1) omra°desbestämmelser/detaljp- 
lan, and (2) anläggningsbesluit/exploateringsbeslut (in case of a joint development 
statutory formula). Though formally both sorts of documents have to be approved at 
different moments, in practice it is not infrequent that the approval takes place simul­
taneously or close after each other. In this sense, they are similar to the English, Dutch 
and Danish binding rules, which are usually approved in just one step. The Nether­
lands introduced in 2008 the Exploitatieplan, an implementation-oriented document 
that in some cases must be approved together with the Bestemmingsplan.
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Finally, in those countries where there are binding rules before negotiations start (Va­
lencia and all other Spanish regions, France, Italy and Flanders), the phasing seems 
to be clearer: the general binding land use plans are already approved in an early 
stage, and when the development moment nears it remains only to detail or modify 
the general plans for specific areas, and/or to approve implementation-oriented plans 
(the Valencian Programa para el desarrollo de una Actuación Integrada and Proyecto 
de Reparcelación, the Italian Piani attuativi/Programma Complesso; the French Plan 
d'Lotissement; the Flemish Ruimtelijk Uitvoeringsplan and Verkavelingsplan/vergun- 
ning).
4.1.3 Conclusions regarding the place of binding rules in the 
negotiation process: Plan-led versus Development-led
In section 2.3.1, a distinction was made, based on Faludi's categorization of proto­
planning theories A and B (Faludi, 1987: 185-192), between plan-led and develop­
ment-led planning systems. The plan-led system is supposed to characterize planning 
systems in most of the countries, and the development-led system the British system. 
Summarizing, plan-led systems differ from development-led systems in two aspects: 
(1) there is in plan-led systems a legally binding land use plan and (2) this plan ac­
quires legal status at an early stage, at the 'plan production moment'.
This research supports that categorization in one respect: among the studied coun­
tries, only England and all other British constituent countries have no kind of legally 
binding land use plan, and in the other countries this is usual. In the UK there is 
only one binding land-use document, the Planning Permission. However, regarding 
whether the land use plan is approved at an early stage or not (i.e. previous to the 
development moment) the results of this study diverge from the categorization. Of the 
studied countries, only Spain, France, Italy, and Flanders could be called plan-led, 
for only in these countries are there general binding land-use rules approved in early 
stages, at the 'plan production moment' (this is the moment in which the first projec­
tions are made for development, and it is indicated with the star on the left side in 
Figure 7), before the 'development moment' nears (this is the moment in which local 
authorities and developers face a specific proposal for development, star on the right 
side in Figure 7). However, as mentioned above, the legal certainty that might be 
created by these early zoning plans is in practice not as strong as could be expected, 
especially in France, Italy and Flanders.
In the other countries that might appear to have a 'plan-led' system, the actual use 
of binding land-use plans seems to differ from how it should be according to the 
plan-led principle. As a rule, in the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, and Denmark, 
binding land-use rules (whether this is a new land-use plan or a modification of it to 
include the new building possibilities) are approved only and for the first time when 
negotiations with developers/landowners have already taken place or, at least, when
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ENGLAND
THE NETHERLANDS / GERMANY / SWEDEN / DENMARK
SPAIN / ITALY? / FRANCE? / FLANDERS?
Figure 7. Actual place of zoning regulations (binding and not-binding) in development processes
in several Western European countries.
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there is enough certainty about the successful conclusion of those negotiations. In the 
Netherlands, the studied cases and several other studies confirm this, and it seems 
that this has been the case for a long time. At the beginning of the 1980s, departures 
from land use plans were very common, and since then things have not changed 
much (Thomas et al., 1983: quoted in Faludi 1987: 116, 185; Bröcking & Geest, 
1982; Bosch & Hanemaayer, 1992: both quoted in Buitelaar et al., 2007: 54). So the 
binding land-use rules that make new developments possible are approved only after 
intending developers have negotiated a content that the municipality wants to ap­
prove. In other words, binding land-use rules are in practice approved at, or shortly 
before, the 'development moment', the same as in the UK. A comparative study of 
the European Commission agrees with these findings. In the 1990's, when this study 
was carried out, most of the countries belonging to the plan-led system showed in 
practice similar deviations as in our nine countries (European Commission, 1997: 
45-46)
4.2 Contents of binding rules
The utility of binding rules in negotiations might depend on whether they can for­
mally prescribe implemented-oriented requirements, e.g. obligations and deadlines 
for the implementation. Further, it might be important whether they can formally 
prescribe unprofitable uses, e.g. social/affordable housing. Finally, it might be also 
important whether municipalities, formally and directly, can make the approval of 
the binding plan conditional on a contractual commitment that secures the im­
plementation. Regarding these three aspects, it is possible to make the following 
distinctions.
4.2.1 Zoning plans vs. implementation-oriented plans, both 
binding
Almost all the countries have legally binding planning documents that are intended to 
apply to the implementation. That is, documents that prescribe aspects directly related 
with the practical development of an area: temporal regulations (when to start/finish 
development), financial regulation or other kind of regulations (who pays what, who 
does what). These binding planning documents are the English Planning permission, 
the Valencian Programa, the German Umlegungplan, the French Plan d'Lotissement, 
the Italian Piani attuativi/Programma Complesso, the Flemish Verkavelingsplan/ver- 
gunning and the Swedish anläggningsbeslut and exploateringsbeslut. The English 
Planning Permission includes, besides the implementation-oriented regulations, also 
the legally binding physical zoning. In Valencia, Germany, France, Italy, Flanders 
and Sweden, there is a distinction between these implementation-oriented planning 
documents and the land-use plans.
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In contrast, the Netherlands (until 2008) and Denmark have almost no implemen­
tation-oriented binding planning documents. The exception is the building permit, 
which can include temporal regulations (it expires if the landowner/developer does 
not build on time). This means that up to the granting of the building permit, imple­
mentation-oriented aspects are as a rule not included in any public law binding plan­
ning document; if they are included anywhere, it is only in indicative zoning plans 
or in private contracts. In the Netherlands, a legal modification in 2008 has changed 
this situation, introducing a legally binding implementation-oriented plan, the Devel­
opment contributions plan (Exploitatieplan).
In summary, most of the countries have not only binding plans that include the physi­
cal zoning, but also implementation-oriented binding documents. The Netherlands 
(up to 2008) and Denmark could be considered as an exception to this.
4.2.2 Limited vs. broad contents binding rules
Concerning the scope of the possible contents of binding plans, in England the equiv­
alent of the land use plan prescribes the broadest. The Planning Permission includes, 
besides the physical zoning, also temporal deadlines, financial contributions or other 
kind of contributions. The rest of the countries have binding land use plans with a 
more limited scope. Land-use plans can include only delimitations of zoning cat­
egories, of building envelopes, of social housing as a zoning category, and they can 
state, within certain limits, temporal deadlines. In short, in those other countries, 
land use plans can include not much more than the physical zoning. The most re­
stricted seem to be the Dutch Bestemmingsplan (up to 2008) and the Danish Lokalp­
lan: both include binding regulations concerning zoning categories and the building 
envelope, but exclude all other aspects (e.g. deadlines). In the other countries (and 
in the Netherlands from 2008 onwards) there are, besides the land use plan, other 
implementation-oriented binding planning documents that 'catch' the missing as­
pects, such as obligations, deadlines, etc. In conclusion, England has binding rules 
with the broadest contents, and the Netherlands (up to 2008) and Denmark with the 
narrowest contents.
4.2.3 Conditioning the approval of binding rules to securing 
implementation
Another important difference between the studied countries is that in some of them 
it is possible to condition, in a formal, open and direct way, the approval of the bind­
ing rules (the binding document that includes the physical zoning) to a development 
agreement between the municipality and the developer/landowner. That is, the bind­
ing plan sets out the requirements that must be afterwards agreed, and the definite 
approval of this binding plan is conditional on such an agreement; i.e. the binding
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plan only becomes legally valid after this agreement is signed. This is meant to guar­
antee the implementation of the binding rules. Such formal and direct conditioning 
exists at least in England and Valencia, and Italy shows similar features. In the other 
countries this seems not to be possible, formally speaking, although this does not 
mean that conditioning does not happen, indirectly and/or informally.
In England and Valencia, a first version of the binding rules (Planning permission 
respectively Programa) includes the requirements (planning obligations in England, 
cargas urbanísticas in Valencia) that must be secured with a Development Agreement 
(Planning Agreement respectively Convenio Urbanístico). Only when this agreement 
is signed do the binding rules become legally valid. In Italy, a Development Agree­
ment (convenzione) must be signed before the Piano di lottizzazione and the new 
Programma Complesso become valid. At least in England and Valencia, the agree­
ments are accessible for the public. Recently, English cities started to allow direct 
on-line access to those documents.
In the rest of the countries, it seems not to be possible, formally, to condition plan­
ning consent (the approval of binding rules) in a direct and formal way to a contrac­
tual commitment to implement the binding rules. Some of them (France, Sweden, 
Flanders, and, since 2008, the Netherlands) might be allowed to condition the grant­
ing of the building permit or similar to free cession of (some) land or to a contribution 
to (some of) the costs. This means that the obligation comes into play only after the 
landowner applies for a building permit and accepts the obligations attached to it. 
However, this does not imply a contractual obligation to do so, so not fulfilling this 
obligation can result in the building permit being annulled, but nothing more.
In sum, in England, Valencia and Italy the legally binding land use plan is directly 
and formally made conditional on the formalization of a development agreement. 
This contract commits the developer to provide the infrastructure, to cede land for 
free, to contribute to the infrastructure provision costs, etc. In the other countries, this 
conditioning is not possible, at least not in a direct and open way.
4.3 Procedure for the approval of binding rules
The utility of binding rules in negotiations might depend on whether municipalities 
are allowed to modify existing binding plans, and whether this requires a simple or 
a heavy procedure.
In several countries, when the development moment nears, instead of making a new 
land-use plan, it is also possible to follow, for minor modifications of/departures 
from the land-use plans, a much simplified procedure. A good example of this was 
the Dutch vrijstelling under the Physical Planning Act previous to 2008. The German
Quick scan 95
Baudispens, the French Modification, minor deviations in Sweden, the afwijking/ 
anticipatie in Flanders and departures in Denmark are also similar. In all the studied 
countries, if the modifications of the land-use plan are major, they follow procedures 
that are simpler (but still heavy) than the procedure for the approval of a new land 
use plan.
In England, a modification, however small, of the Planning Permission itself (the bind­
ing physical zoning regulations) always needs a new permission. However, the pro­
cedure for the modification or removal of planning conditions is slightly simpler, and 
a modification of the planning obligations (implementation terms and contributions), 
if voluntarily agreed with the developer, does not require an extensive procedure at 
all. In Valencia and in Italy, a modification of the General Land use Plan (Plan Ge­
neral de Ordenación Urbana respectively Piano regolatore generale comunale/Piano 
Operativo), however small, can only be through processing and approving a detailed 
land use plan (Programa respectively piani attuativi/Programma Complessi). A modi­
fication of these detailed land use plans, however small, can only take place through 
processing and approving a new plan, which requires the same procedure.
In many countries, major modifications of the land use plan, whether this happens 
through the simplified procedure or not, seem to be very common. This is certainly 
the case in the Netherlands and France. Spain might form an exception to this. Here, 
major modifications (of the General Land use Plan through detailed land use plans), 
such as rezoning non-urban land into urban, do certainly take place but seem not to 
be as common in practice as in other countries.
To conclude, minor modifications through a very simple procedure are possible in 
almost all the studied countries. The exceptions are Valencia and in Italy, where even 
a minor modification of the binding rules requires a heavy procedure: the processing 
of a new planning document equivalent to the one that has to be modified. Regard­
ing major modifications, in all countries, except in England, such a modification of 
the binding rules is possible only through a simpler (simpler than the making of a 
new Land use Plan), but still heavy, procedure. In England, major modification of 
planning obligations (realization terms and financial regulations), if there is agree­
ment between the developer and the municipality, does not require a heavy proce­
dure at all.
4.4 Binding rules in relation to  property rights
The utility of binding rules in the negotiations might depend on the contents of prop­
erty rights. More specifically, the degree of control that landowners have over the 
transactions in development processes might influence their negotiating position, 
and therefore the feasibility of the municipalities' value capturing goals.
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4.4.1 Is infrastructure provision separated from development 
rights?
In all the studied countries, ownership rights include the right to build. There is no 
case where property rights are fully separated from the right to develop the land. 
That is, landowners are the only ones entitled to build on their land, and they can 
exclude others from doing so. However, this right acquires a concrete form only after 
the law and the binding land-use rules allow the possibility of building on the plot in 
question. In other words, binding rules limit the building rights and landowners have 
no right to a "minimum" amount of building rights. For example, the owner of land 
that is zoned as agricultural has no right to transform his land into an urban area. 
He acquires the right to do so only if the legally binding land-use regulations state 
it, and he is also obliged to exercise his right according to the law and after applying 
and obtaining the needed permits. An example of the wide scope that governments 
in Europe have for limiting the owner's right to develop his land is the fact that there 
is no room in legal systems for a generous (with respect to the landowner) concept of 
'regulatory takings', at least as generous as in the United States of America. 'Regula­
tory takings' is the American legal concept that limits governmental regulation on 
private property that is deemed to be too onerous (Jacobs, 2008: 52, 67-68, 71-72; 
Needham, 2006: 47).
Although it became clear to us that building rights (more or less limited by bind­
ing rules) belong to the landowner in all the studied countries, it became also clear 
that there are important differences regarding infrastructure provision. These differ­
ences made us conclude that in some countries we could speak of a splitting of 
infrastructure provision from property rights. W e look first at the differences in the 
formal responsibility for infrastructure provision, i.e. at the question who is formally 
responsible for it. In some countries, the law explicitly refers to the infrastructure 
provision as something differentiated from the rest of development rights, and labels 
it as a "responsibility" or a "task" of the public bodies, but not of the landowner or 
the developer. This happens in Valencia, Germany, France and Sweden. It could be 
said that in these countries, the right to provide infrastructure formally belongs to the 
municipality. In the other countries, there is neither an explicit mention in the law of 
infrastructure provision being a particular component of development rights, nor of 
any kind of public priority in this.
4.4.2 Control of transactions in infrastructure provision
Besides the formal responsibility for infrastructure provision, there is the question 
of the actual powers of public bodies for the provision of infrastructure. Here also 
there are important differences between the studied countries that led us to conclude 
that in some of them infrastructure provision is actually split off from property rights. 
More specifically, the question is: who has the development rights in each of the
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different steps in development processes? We applied here the model described in 
section 3.3.1 to analyse the power/dependency relationships between the involved 
actors (municipality, developer, landowners) in each step of the development proc­
ess. The steps are grouped into those related to infrastructure provision, and those re­
lated to building on the serviced plots namely: (1) land purchase and assembling, (2) 
financing, (3) land preparation and development, (4) land disposition, (5) construc­
tion, and (6) property transfer. Steps 1-3 belong to the infrastructure provision, steps
5 and 6 to the building. Each of these steps implies transactions of some kind (land, 
money, property, etc). Developing whatever the binding rules prescribe can only 
happen after the first five transactions have been completed. By analysing who has 
the control over each of these transactions, it was possible to discern who has which 
development right. There are no relevant differences between the studied countries in 
the building (steps 4 to 6). However, regarding the position of the actors in the trans­
actions involved in infrastructure provision, it is possible to distinguish two groups 
of countries:
Dependence on agreement with landowner
In some countries, transactions 1-3 are quite dependent on agreement between the 
municipality and the landowners. This seems to be the case in the Netherlands, Eng­
land, France, Italy, Sweden (for the larger schemes), Flanders and Denmark. As a 
rule, if there is no agreement about the purchase and assembly of land and about the 
financing of the infrastructure provision, municipalities that want things to happen, 
have to apply pre-emption, expropriation and/or an a posteriori special tax formula. 
In other words, the only way of avoiding dependence on the landowner in steps 1-3 
is public land development, or at least public infrastructure provision for private de­
velopment. By doing this, municipalities get financially involved in the development: 
they have to lead the process, advance the money to purchase the land and provide 
the infrastructure, bear the risks of eventual delay, and possibly not recover all the 
costs made. Neither expropriation, nor special taxes are commonly used instruments.
Compulsory land readjustment as alternative to agreement
Besides voluntary agreement (or, in case of disagreement, pre-emption, expropriation 
and/or special taxes), Valencian and German municipalities have an alternative that 
allows them to obtain all or part of the land and the money needed for the infrastruc­
ture provision, namely land readjustment. In this way, and possibly a compulsory 
variant of it, Valencian and German municipalities can provide the infrastructure 
without depending on the passive or active collaboration of the landowner.
Sweden is an in-between case: Swedish land readjustment is dependent on the collab­
oration of at least a majority of the landowners, and can be compulsory for a minority 
of non-collaborating landowners. Also, land readjustment is meant only for local and 
minor facilities in minor greenfield residential schemes. In Flanders a land readjust­
ment instrument is available, but it is not used at all. France also has a land readjust­
ment regulation, but although it is quoted as being applied very often (Karki, 2003:
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69; Turk, 2008: 234), a consulted expert considered it as not really relevant in practice 
(Renard, interviews 2006 and 2007). In Italy there is a land readjustment formula 
based on civil law that is used very often. In the winter of 2007 a draft of the new Ital­
ian national planning act included a statutory, public law version. However, it is based 
on the agreement of all the landowners. It is noteworthy that those countries, where 
planning law refers to infrastructure provision as a public responsibility or task (Spain, 
Germany, Sweden, France), also have a public law land readjustment regulation. It 
seems that only in the first three of them is the regulation also relevant in practice.
There are important differences between the Valencian, German and Swedish land 
readjustment:
1. Public involvement: in the Valencian Reparcelación and the Swedish joint de­
velopment/land readjustment, the municipality can place on others the task of 
providing the infrastructure. In Valencia, municipalities can place this task on 
the landowners or on a commercial developer without land, or with only a little 
land. In practice these developers, called urbanizing agents, usually own a part 
of the land, or act on behalf of landowners, but it is not rare to find urbanizing 
agents with just a little or even no land. In Sweden, the municipality can place 
this task only on the landowners. On the contrary, in the German Umlegung it 
is the municipality that provides the infrastructure, advancing the finance. Only 
afterwards do landowners contribute to the costs. Therefore, German munici­
palities bear the financial risks, also of delay;
2. Cost recovery: in the Valencian Reparcelación all the involved costs and needed 
land are paid/ceded by the landowners, including money and land for off-site 
infrastructure. The German and Swedish municipalities can demand land and 
contributions only for the local facilities within the plan, but not for facilities that 
serve a wider area. In Germany, the compulsory variant implies that the munici­
pality becomes more involved in the management and can recover a smaller 
part of the infrastructure provision costs. German municipalities often do not 
recover all the costs made. Swedish municipalities usually recover all the costs 
of local facilities.
3. Application: the Valencian readjustment is applied in practically all develop­
ments, whether they are greenfield, brownfield, redevelopment, low/high den­
sity, small/large areas, etc. The German Umlegung is a widely used (but not 
predominant) instrument, especially in city extensions, but also in regeneration 
projects in the existing built up areas (Larsson, 1997: 143; Karki, 2003: 69; Turk, 
2008: 234). Of the two ways of Swedish joint development/land readjustment, 
only the 1973 Joint Facilities Act is applied in practice, and then only in minor 
residential schemes in greenfield areas. The 1987 Land Readjustment formula 
has not been used very much.
Conclusions
To conclude, there are clear differences in the position of public and private actors in 
the transactions that relate to infrastructure provision. As a rule, in the Netherlands,
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England, France, Italy, Sweden (for the larger schemes), Flanders and Denmark, the 
transactions that are needed for infrastructure provision are dependent on agreement 
between the municipality and the landowners. To avoid this dependence, munici­
palities have in practice the alternative of pre-emption, expropriation and special a 
posteriori tax formulae. Thus, they have to get directly involved in the infrastructure 
provision, in financial and organizational terms. In Valencia and Germany, besides 
pre-emption and expropriation, municipalities can choose land readjustment, even­
tually compulsory readjustment. In Valencia, municipalities do not need to get di­
rectly involved in the development, can place the task on the landowners or on 
a commercial developer without land, and do not need to subsidise. In Germany, 
municipalities have to get directly involved in the development. In Sweden, in small 
residential schemes in greenfield areas, municipalities can apply joint development/ 
readjustment and place the task on the landowners, but they need agreement with at 
least the majority of the landowners.
4.5 Selection of countries
The zoning regulations (binding and not-binding) in nine Western European coun­
tries have been compared in order to select those countries which, between them­
selves and in comparison with the Netherlands, show the broadest variation in the 
independent variable 'formal rules relevant to zoning' (for the methodological rea­
son, see section 3.2.1.2).
The selected countries are the Spanish region of Valencia and England, countries that 
stand somewhat for opposite models. On each sub-variable of the independent vari­
able 'formal rules relevant to zoning', the differences were remarkable. (1) Regarding 
the place of binding rules in the negotiation processes (Where and When), England 
represents the 'development-led' planning system model, and Valencia (together 
with France, Italy and Flanders) the 'plan-led'. The Netherlands fall in the middle, for 
it is in theory plan-led but does not work as such in practice. (2) Regarding the con­
tents of binding rules (What), the Netherlands (up to 2008), together with Denmark, 
have almost no development-oriented binding rules, while England and Valencia do. 
Further, the Dutch binding rules, together with the Danish, have the narrowest con­
tents, while England has the broadest. Finally, the approval of the Dutch binding rules 
(planning consent) cannot be made, formally and openly, conditional on securing the 
implementation, while in England and Valencia this is possible and constitutes the 
standard procedure. (3) Regarding the procedure for approval of the binding rules, 
in England certain major modifications are possible with a very simple procedure, 
while in the Netherlands and Valencia a heavy procedure is needed. (4) Regarding 
the relation between binding rules and property rights, in Valencia the infrastructure 
provision is in the planning law explicitly identified as a public task, while in the 
Netherlands and England it is not. Further, in Valencia infrastructure provision can
Table 8. Summary of main aspects of formal rules relevant to zoning.
NL England Valencia
(Spain)
Germany France Italy Sweden Flanders Denmark
Formal rules relevant to zoning in the negotiation processes
Early stages in 
development 
process, be­
fore negotia­
tions
No binding 
Land use plan
N o binding 
Land use plan
General bind­
ing land use 
plan
No binding 
Land use plan
General bind­
ing land use 
plan, but in 
transition to 
new sort of 
plan
General 
binding land 
use plan, but 
in transition 
to indica­
tive structure 
plans
No binding 
Land use plan
Regional 
binding Plan
No binding 
Land use plan
Development 
moment, after 
negotiations
Binding rules 
approved for 
the first time, 
and in one 
document/ 
step
Binding rules 
approved for 
the first time, 
and in one 
document/ 
step
General 
binding plan 
becomes 
detailed in 
another plan 
document.
Binding rules 
approved for 
the first time, 
but in more 
than one 
document, 
although 
often simulta­
neously
General 
binding plan 
becomes 
detailed in 
another plan 
document.
General 
binding plan 
becomes 
detailed in 
another plan 
document.
Binding rules 
approved for 
the first time, 
but in more 
than one 
document, 
although 
often simulta­
neously
Regional 
binding Plan 
becomes 
detailed/ 
modified in 
another plan 
document.
Binding rules 
approved for 
the first time, 
and in one 
document/ 
step
Plan-led or
Development-
led?
Not really 
plan-led
Development-
led
Plan-led Not really 
plan-led
Plan-led Plan-led, in 
transition
Not really 
plan-led
Plan-led Not really 
plan-led
Contents binding rules
Implementa-
tion-oriented
binding
plans?
No until
2008, yes 
after, in sepa­
rate document
Yes, together 
with bind­
ing land use 
document
Yes, together 
with detailed 
land-use plan
Yes, in sepa­
rate docu­
ment.
Yes, in sepa­
rate document
Yes, in sepa­
rate document
Yes, in sepa­
rate document
Yes, in sepa­
rate document
No
Limited vs. 
broad con­
tents binding 
Land-use plan
Limited Broad Broad Limited,
somewhat
Limited,
somewhat
Limited,
somewhat
In-between Limited,
somewhat
Limited
NL England Valencia
(Spain)
Germany France Italy Sweden Flanders Denmark
Planning 
consent 
conditioned 
to contractual 
obligation?
No Yes Yes No No Yes No No No
Procedure approval binding rules
Heavy/light 
procedure 
for major 
modification 
binding rules?
Heavy proce­
dure
Light pro­
cedure for 
certain major 
aspects
Heavy proce­
dure
Heavy proce­
dure
Heavy proce­
dure
Heavy proce­
dure
Heavy proce­
dure
Heavy proce­
dure
Heavy proce­
dure
Heavy/light 
procedure for 
minor modifi­
cation?
Light proce­
dure
Light proce­
dure
Heavy proce­
dure
Light proce­
dure
Light proce­
dure
Heavy proce­
dure
Light proce­
dure
Light proce­
dure
Light proce­
dure
Binding rules in relation to property rights
W ho has the 
responsibility 
to provide in­
frastructure?
It is not made 
explicit in law
It is not made 
explicit in law
To the public 
bodies
To the public 
bodies
To the public 
bodies
??? To the public 
bodies
It is not made 
explicit in law
It is not made 
explicit in law
Dependence 
on agree­
ment with 
landowner to 
obtain land 
and contri­
butions for 
infrastructure 
provision
O n ly  avoid­
able through 
land acqui­
sition or 
through a 
posteriori 
special tax
O n ly  avoid­
able through 
land acquisi­
tion.
Avoidable 
through land 
acquisition 
and Land Re­
adjustment.
Avoidable 
through land 
acqui, Land 
Readjustment 
and a poste­
riori special 
tax.
O n ly  avoid­
able through 
land acquisi­
tion.
O n ly  avoid­
able through 
land acquisi­
tion.
O n ly  avoid­
able through 
land acqui, 
land readjust­
ment if agree­
ment majority 
landowners 
and special 
tax.
O n ly  avoid­
able through 
land acquisi­
tion.
O n ly  avoid­
able through 
land acquisi­
tion.
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be implemented without need of agreement with the landowner, as there is the pos­
sibility of compulsory land readjustment. On the contrary, in the Netherlands and 
England, infrastructure provision in mainly dependent on agreement with the land­
owners, and this dependence can only be avoided through major public involvement 
(pre-emption, expropriation or a posteriori special tax formulae).
Valencia and England, together with the Netherlands, have become thus the focus of 
this research. They will be the subjects of in-depth research in chapters 5-7.


h region of Valencia
Traditionally, public bodies have aimed in Valencia to finance the unprofitable parts 
in urban regeneration with the profitable parts. This aim has been central in the evo­
lution of the Spanish planning system, and has led to conscious efforts to give respon­
sibility to private parties for financing and implementing the public infrastructure 
and facilities. The first successful effort led to the introduction in 1956 by the central 
government in Madrid of a land readjustment regulation, meant to oblige landowners 
to do that. In 1994 the Valencian regional government introduced important innova­
tions to resolve the serious shortcomings of the 1956 regulation.
Frame 5a
The institutional context: Spain, the region of Valencia, provinces and municipalities
Spain is a decentralized state, with a system of constitutional parliamentary monarchy. 
Since the Constitution (Constitución Española) of 1978, seventeen Autonomous Com­
munities (Comunidades Autónomas, from now on 'regions') came into being, each of 
them with its own parliament and executive power. The decentralization of compe­
tences to the regions is such that Spain became de facto a federal state.
The Autonomous Community of Valencia (Comunidad Autónoma de Valencia, CAM, 
from now on 'region of Valencia') became in 1982 one of the seventeen regions. It 
occupies an area of 23,255 Km2 (5% of Spain) and had in 2005 4.7m inhabitants 
(11% of the Spanish population, at an average density of 200 inhab/Km2). In eco­
nomic terms is nowadays one of the most dynamic Spanish regions. In the last years, 
the tourism industry has experienced a big rise. The region includes three provinces 
(Castellón, Valencia and Alicante) and 541 municipalities. The governmental layers (re­
gional government - Generalitat, provincial government - Diputación Provincial, and
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municipality-Ayuntamiento) are organized hierarchically: the planning policies and 
plans of provinces and municipalities are subordinated to the law, policies and plans of 
the regional government. Of these three governmental levels, provinces have the least 
competence and weight.
The distribution of competences between Madrid and each of the regions is based on 
the principle of symmetrical division of competences. Both the central and the regional 
governments produce 'formal legislation' (laws) and 'legislation in a material sense' 
(decrees and regulations). There are exhaustive lists of competences, some of them 
reserved exclusively for the central government, some of them exclusively for the re­
gional government. But there are also policy fields in which the central government has 
the competence for making 'basic' legislation, and the regional government that for de­
veloping and detailing this basic legislation. In complex policy fields such as planning, 
central and regional competences are intimately related to each other. Within the plan­
ning field, Madrid has the exclusive competence for property law, and the competence 
to issue basic legislation on common administrative proceedings and environmental 
protection. Regions can, within limits, detail and develop this basic legislation. As a 
result, Madrid has, for example, important competences for national infrastructure and 
the exclusive competence for expropriation law. The region of Valencia has exclusive 
competences for practically the rest of planning law (Betancor & García-Bellido, 2001: 
88, 90, 92). For a list of legislation, relative to planning, see Annex 2.
Sections 5.1 to 5.3 introduce the context of how public bodies capture the value 
increase in urban regeneration in the region of Valencia. Section 5.4 introduces the 
studied cases. Section 5.5 describes the working of the formal rules relevant to zon­
ing within the value capturing mechanisms. This is the answer to Preparatory re­
search question 3: how can formal rules relevant to zoning influence the capturing of 
value increase in Valencia? The question has been divided into several sub-questions 
that correspond to the sub-variables a-e (for more details about these sub-variables, 
see section 3.3.3). Each of the answers to the sub-questions consists of an assessment 
of whether the sub-variable can influence the capturing of value increase. There is 
therefore not one single conclusion, but as many conclusions as sub-questions. All 
these conclusions have provided the ingredients for the final conclusions in chapter 
8 and the recommendations for the Dutch practice in chapter 9. Section 5.6 assesses 
the degree of actually captured value increase, taking account of the side effects 
on the tempo of implementation. Finally, section 5.7 summarizes and makes some 
statements about the inferred causalities between formal rules and capturing value 
increase. This includes an assessment of the role of third variables.
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5.1 Urban regeneration in the region ofValencia
It is possible to differentiate two different urban regeneration policies, or groups of pol­
icies, in the region of Valencia. First there are those policies designed at the regional/ 
national level, oriented basically to the revitalization of historic areas and some other 
deteriorated neighborhoods. In the second place, there are those policies designed at 
the local level that focus on facilitating the redevelopment of old industrial and office 
sites into residential areas (Blanc, interview in 2005; Sanchis, interview in 2008).
5.1.1 Revitalization of historic centers and deteriorated 
neighborhoods
What characterizes these urban regeneration areas is that landownership is usually 
fragmented. Regeneration often has to deal with many landowners, who usually stay 
in the regenerated area. Since 1992, the Ministry of Housing of the central govern­
ment in Madrid, together with the regional Valencian government and the cities of 
Valencia and Alicante, have set up in total three revitalization programmes for his­
toric neighborhoods (Áreas de rehabilitación integrada y concertada): one for the 
historic center of the City of Valencia (since 1992), the second for the XIXth Century's 
Cabanyal district (since 2004), also in the City of Valencia, and the third for the 
historic center of the City of Alicante (since 1993). At the middle of 2008, a fourth 
programme was being set up for the XIXth Century's Ruzafa district in the City of 
Valencia. These programmes include two sorts of public investment. The central and 
the regional governments give subsidies to the owners for the rehabilitation of their 
properties. Alongside these subsidies, the regional government and the municipal­
ity intervene directly through refurbishing public infrastructure and facilities. These 
programmes could be considered as the most intensive and complete direct public 
interventions in urban regeneration in the region of Valencia.
Alongside these, other more modest and numerous programmes have been set up in 
the last years (Áreas de rehabilitación). They are meant for the regeneration of other 
historic neighborhoods and also of peripheral 1960's and 1970's social housing dis­
tricts. These programmes (about 200 of them) include a combined subsidization: 
national and regional subsidies to landowners, and a modest direct municipal public 
intervention in refurbishing public infrastructure. Finally, the central and the regional 
governments are nowadays setting up new programmes for the demolition and re­
building of several seriously deteriorated districts.
5.1.2 Rezoning old industrial and office sites into residential
Some municipalities, generally at their own initiative, have developed since the end 
of the 1990s local policies to facilitate the rezoning (recalificación) of old industrial
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and offices sites located within the existing urban areas. Due to urban growth and 
economic changes, these sites have often become surrounded by residential and 
office functions. Rezoning seems a logical step and attracts the interest of property 
investors because these sites are located at the heart of large and active markets for 
multi-family housing and office space. Confronted with numerous proposals from 
market parties, some municipalities decided to allow rezoning and regulate it with ad 
hoc policy. An important difference between these schemes and those mentioned in 
5.1.1, is that these rest exclusively on private initiatives and do not imply any public 
expenditure. Here, profits have to pay all the unprofitable parts. This research focuses 
on this sort of projects, thus the studied cases belong to this sort. For an introduction 
to the cases see section 5.4
It seems that at least in larger cities, rezoning has become common in the last years 
(Rubio, Montiel, Sanchis, interviews 2006 and 2008). For example, in the city of 
Valencia, more than 90% of all locations zoned in the 1988 General land use plan 
as industry have been re-zoned into housing and office (see Figures 8). And between 
50 and 80% of all locations zoned as commercial and recreational (offices) have 
been re-zoned too (Raga, Rubio, interviews in 2006). Three of the four studied cases 
correspond to this sort of rezoning: Camino, Periodista and Benalúa1. Regeneration 
in these sorts of sites has to deal with many landowners, who tend afterwards to sell 
their land to private developers. Municipalities do not usually buy land. However, 
landowners do not usually sell immediately, but choose most of the time to partici­
pate in the land readjustment (Modrego, 2000).
Frame 5 b
General Land Use Plans and Detailed Plans
Municipalities have the competence for making the binding rules at their level. There 
are two sorts of relevant binding rules documents at this level: General Municipal 
Planning (Planeamiento General Municipal) and Detailed Planning (Planeamiento 
de desarrollo) (Parejo & Blanc, 1999: 111-113, 264-286, 317). The General Land­
use Plan (Plan General de Ordenación Urbana, PGOU) belongs to the first sort and 
covers the whole municipal territory. Each municipality must approve one of these 
plans, which to be (re-)approved each 5-20 years. The small municipalities have a 
simpler form (Normas Subsidiarias). The region approves them definitively. Detailed 
Planning documents are meant for detailing afterwards the approved General Plans 
for specific sites, and they can modify their contents (Betancor & García-Bellido, 
2001: 108).
General Plans have a legally binding character, i.e. they have statutory consequences 
for the use possibilities of land. Planning law prescribes the contents of General Plans.
1 The fourth case, Guillem, consists of rezoning old deteriorated housing.
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For the whole municipal territory, they must set out the most important zoning rules, 
labelled 'structural binding rules' (ordenación structural, Parejo & Blanc, 1999: 274­
277, 287-305):
• Strategic choices: possible building typologies, maximal number of dwellings and 
sometimes a maximum floor space index;
• The 'classification' or zoning (clasificación) of the entire territory into: (i) Existing 
Urban land (suelo urbano); (ii) Land to be developed in the future, soon or in the 
longer term (suelo urbanizable); and (iii) Non-developable land or rural area (suelo 
no urbanizable);
• The logical phasing of development;
• Land use designations for the Non-developable land;
• Zoning of land into Building regulation zones (e.g. historic city, urban extension, 
area of scattered buildings, etc). The 1999 Standard Building Regulation Order de­
fines these zones, although municipalities are allowed to modify them or even to 
adopt a completely different version;
• Delimitation of sectors (sectores), development sites that have to be detailed after­
wards;
• Main public infrastructure and facilities: important leisure centres and the 'Primary 
Network of public facilities' (Red Primaria de dotaciones públicas: road network, 
public facilities and green areas);
• Delimitation of the 'Redistribution Areas' (Áreas de reparto) and for each area a 
'Reference Development Allowance' (Aprovechamiento tipo), a kind of floor space 
index, which forms the basis for the calculation of the building rights of each land­
owner, see under;
• Regulations regarding public infrastructure and facilities not belonging to the mu­
nicipality (e.g. highways, railways).
Planning law also prescribes that for Existing Urban land and for Land to be developed 
soon, General Plans must also state the complementary zoning rules, labelled 'detailed 
binding rules' (ordenación pormenorizada, Parejo & Blanc, 1999: 287; Romero, 2002: 
234-239, 353-354):
• The alignment of the buildings;
• The ground level of the street (rasante);
• Local public infrastructure and facilities: delimitation of the 'Secondary Network of 
public facilities' (RedSecundaria de dotaciones públicas);
• What is called the 'qualification' of land (calificación), the zoning of the land into 
different land use categories: free market housing, affordable/social housing, com­
mercial space (office, shops,...), industrial, etc;
• The building volumes;
• Delimitation of the 'Development Units' (Unidades de Ejecución), the sites to be 
developed in an integrated way.
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For all the studied cases, the General Plan had prescribed not only structural, but also 
detailed binding rules: the 1988 General Land use Plan of the City of Valencia for cases 
Guillem, Periodista and Camino, and the 1987 General Land use Plan of the City of 
Alicante for case Benalúa.
Detailed Plans (Special Plans -Plan Especial, Partial Plans -Plan Parcial, and Urban 
Renewal Plans -Plan de Reforma Interior) are meant for specific sites, and can modify 
and must anyway detail, if they are not detailed already, the structural binding rules 
contained in the General Planning. The contents of the Urban Renewal Plan are very 
similar to those of a Partial Plan. It is not only public agencies who can submit a Partial 
Plan and an Urban Renewal Plan, commercial developers can do so also (Betancor & 
García-Bellido, 2001: 108).
Municipalities and other public bodies with competences for policy fields with plan­
ning implications (e.g. regional agencies for industry and social housing) can make and 
approve provisionally a Special Plan. However, whatever public agency approves the 
Special Plan, the region must approve it definitively. These plans can cover small areas, 
all the municipal territory or more than one municipality. They tackle a specific field: 
landscape, nature and cultural protection, protection of infrastructure, public facilities, 
industrial areas, and affordable and social housing.
Figures 8. 1988 General Land-use Plan of the City of Valencia, sites zoned to be developed 
in the future (soon left, in the longer term right).
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5.2 Capturing value increase through the land 
readjustm ent regulation
Urban regeneration is implemented almost always through the Land readjustment 
regulation (Reparcelación), which organizes not only the property readjustment, 
but also the allocation of costs and profits between the landowners. All the studied 
projects apply the readjustment regulation. All the profitable and unprofitable parts 
are distributed between the landowners. As mentioned, the regulation was intro­
duced in 1956, and in 1994 the region of Valencia introduced some important modi­
fications.
5.2.1 Landowners lead land readjustment: 1956-1994
Together with the Planning Acts of 1975-6, 1990-92, 1998 and 2007, the planning 
act of 1956, issued by the Franco regime, articulates the foundations of the present 
Spanish planning system, including that of Valencia nowadays. This system reinforces 
the certainty which landowners have about the development possibilities of their 
land, through the legally binding General Land Use Plan. This plan zones the entire 
municipal territory into urban, developable and non-developable land. Also, this 
plan and, in some cases, the Detailed Plan, establishes the exact amount of building 
rights that belong to each landowner, giving a very high certainty about the future 
building possibilities. Banks accept these building rights as collateral for loans and 
mortgages. In market transactions, the price of land tends to incorporate the residual 
value of these building rights.
Frame 5 c
Calculation of building rights of landowners
The building rights of the landowners are established as follows: the General Plan 
delimitates the Redistribution Areas (Áreas de Reparto). Landowners included in a Re­
distribution Area share the building rights. Also, the General Land Use Plan and, in 
some cases, the Detailed Plan, establish a Reference Development Allowance (Aprove­
chamiento tipo) for each Redistribution Area. This Allowance is a kind of weighted 
floor space index. 'Weighted' means that the economic value of land is weighted, 
depending on its use (affordable housing, free-market housing, office space, shops, 
etc) and on its location (along the main road or in a more tranquil and isolated area). 
Therefore, the Reference Development Allowance is expressed in units of 'modal use' 
(unidad de aprovechamiento). The weighting is made in two steps: first the differences 
in value are weighted due to differences in use. Second, in the Land Readjustment 
Project (see under), the differences due to the location are weighted.
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The Reference Development Allowance is calculated as follows (Parejo & Blanc, 1999: 
296-304; Romero, 2002: 206-219): the total units of modal use (in m2 floor space mo­
dal use) are divided by the total area of the Redistribution Area minus the area of exist­
ing public infrastructure and facilities that public bodies obtained in the past through 
free cession (but not through buying or expropriation). Therefore, the Reference Devel­
opment Allowance is calculated as follows:
• Building volume expressed in units of 'modal use' : (area Redistribution Area - area 
of existing public facilities that public bodies obtained previously through free ces­
sion) = x m2 floor space modal use / m2 land
Example of calculation of the Reference Development Allowance in a Redistribution 
Area of 1,000 m2 of land of which 100 m2 public infrastructure were previously ob­
tained through free cession, and where the General Plan and/or Detailed Plan foresee 
a total building volume of 2,000 m2 floor space modal use:
• Reference Development Allowance: 2,000 : (1,000 - 100) = 2.2 m2 floor space 
modal use/m2 land.
• Example of calculation of building rights of an owner of a parcel of 100 m2: 100 x
2.2 = he has right to 220 m2 floor space modal use.
The Reference Development Allowance was in case Guillem 1.367, in Periodista 1.87, 
in Camino 1.6537 and in Benalúa 0.6.
Although the infrastructure provision, also called 'urbanization' (urbanización) in 
Spain, is still considered a public task, its implementation has become since 1956 
both a duty and a right of landowners through the principle of 'equitable redistribu­
tion of benefits, costs and duties' (redistribución equitativa de beneficios y cargas) 
of urban development. Value increase and costs of development are proportionally 
distributed between all landowners according to the area of their original property. 
Value increase thus serves to compensate landowners for taking responsibility for the 
unprofitable parts of urban development, i.e. for providing the public infrastructure 
and facilities and ceding the needed land.
The planning system specified several instruments for operationalising this system of 
redistributing betterment and costs. The underlying idea was that the readjustment of 
the property boundaries and the infrastructure provision had to be organised by all 
the landowners themselves, not necessarily giving primacy to an intermediary agent 
(e.g. one public or commercial developer owning part/most of the land). The Land 
readjustment regulation made this transformation possible without depriving land­
owners of their ownership. Landowners were obliged to form a joint development or­
ganisation (Junta de Compensación), which organised and financed the infrastructure 
provision through voluntary land readjustment (Sistema de Compensación). After mu­
nicipal approval was obtained, the Junta arranged the engineering works, provided 
the site with the needed public infrastructure, redistributed the resulting parcels and
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infrastructure and, finally, dissolved itself. The planning system included in addition 
two major instruments with which municipalities could intervene directly. First, the 
municipality could overrule the landowners and take the lead by providing the infra­
structure and applying compulsory land readjustment (Sistema de Cooperación). In 
this case, the landowners were obliged to pay the total costs six months in advance 
to the municipality. The second instrument was expropriation and implementation of 
the plan (Sistema de Expropiación).
Another important component of the system was the introduction in the 1978 Plan­
ning Regulation of a set of legal minimal standards for public infrastructure and facili­
ties (Estándares urbanísticos). These legal standards, together with the prescriptions 
included in the General Land Use Plan, created certainty about the public infrastruc­
ture and facilities to be paid/realized by the landowners. The 1990-92 Act raised 
these standards considerably.
The results of the planning system were ambiguous. On the one hand, it succeeded 
in one of the main goals of the 1956 Act, which was to organise and finance the 
private implementation of public infrastructure and facilities. On the other hand, 
the system clearly failed to assure an efficient (quantitative and qualitative) imple­
mentation. As a rule, landowners did not proceed quickly and processes were slow. 
The transaction costs associated with organising landowners and developing a plan 
could be high (see intermediary variable inflated development costs in causal mod­
el section 2.4.2). In addition, buying land and waiting was very common, and 
speculation in the land market was said to have achieved critical levels. Some have 
argued that this is clearly related to the high certainty about future building pos­
sibilities that arises after the approval of the General Plans. High accounted land 
costs (see intermediary variable accounted land costs) and the costs of organising 
landowners and infrastructure provision made development feasible only when 
high housing prices allowed high final profits or when the quantity and the qual­
ity of infrastructure and public facilities (variable A.2) were low. It is argued that 
this delayed development processes (intermediary variable delay) and resulted in 
poorly serviced building sites, with inferior public infrastructure and facilities and 
huge building volumes. Confronted with this failure, public bodies had not used 
their legal instruments adequately to intervene directly through compulsory land 
readjustment or through expropriation. Compulsory land readjustment entails more 
involvement of the municipalities, which had to prepare the plans, organize the 
land readjustment, possibly expropriate some owners, and advance some financ­
ing, bear some financial risks, etc. In case of expropriation, compensation includes 
part of the market value of the use possibilities of the new land-use plan: this makes 
expropriation expensive. Also, compulsory land readjustment and expropriation 
remains a politically sensitive matter, especially at the local level (Parejo & Blanc, 
1999: 479-480).
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5.2.2 The urbanizing agent leads the land readjustment: 
1994 - onwards
Since the 1980s, critics such as García-Bellido (1989; 1991b; 1993, 1994) and Parejo 
Alfonso (1993) advocated reform of the 1956's land readjustment regulation. In 1994, 
the social-democratic regional government of Valencia, influenced by this criticism, 
approved the Valencian Planning Act (Ley Reguladora de la Actividad Urbanística, 
LRAU). The 1994 Act made feasible some novelties previously introduced in 1976. 
The 1975-6 Land use and Urban Planning Act introduced an innovation that was 
derived from the idea of urbanisme concerté in the French legal reform of 1973. The 
innovation consisted of introducing a third party, in addition to the municipality and 
the landowner/developer: the urbanising agent (agente urbanizador). This third party 
is not required to own land and can be directly appointed by the municipality (public 
land development company) or be chosen in a public tender (commercial builder or 
developer). After being assigned as concession holder, the urbanising agent assumes 
responsibility for the infrastructure provision and for the proportional redistribution 
of betterments and costs between the landowners. In theory, therefore, this innova­
tion assigned the task of redistribution and infrastructure provision to the urbanising 
agent alone; it was no longer a right and duty of landowners, as had been specified 
in the 1956 Act.
The innovation in the 1975-6 Act did not work. After being appointed by the mu­
nicipality, urbanising agents needed the voluntary consent of the landowners and 
had no guarantee that the municipality would apply compulsory land readjustment 
if the landowners did not collaborate. In such cases, urbanising agents would be 
obliged to ask the municipality to expropriate, and they would be required to pay 
the full market value of the landowner's building rights. In short, urbanising agents 
had to commit themselves to the implementation of a plan without knowing for sure 
whether possible difficulties with landowners could be resolved within the sched­
ule. Furthermore, agents were likely to be faced with paying high compensation to 
landowners. This situation impeded the success of the innovation of 1975-6 (García- 
Bellido, 1993; 1994). Moreover, the possibility of appointing an urbanisation agent 
was limited to that part of the land classified as developable in the future and to those 
cases in which the municipality explicitly had decided to follow this formula. It did 
open a door, however, by introducing the possibility of public bodies deciding in a 
public tender where to place development rights and the possibility of involving a 
third party (who is, in principle, not linked at all with landownership) to be responsi­
ble for infrastructure provision.
The Valencian 1994 Act made the 1975-6's innovation feasible. First, the 1994 Act 
specified land readjustment and, if necessary, compulsory land readjustment, as the 
default procedure. Urbanising agents therefore knew beforehand that the possible 
resistance of landowners could be overruled after proper proceedings. Second, the 
Act subjected all developable land (both regeneration in urban land and greenfield
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sites) to this new formula for development. What the 1994 Act actually did was to 
generalize the compulsory land readjustment formula, adding the possibility of ap­
pointing a third party as implementor. A third important novelty of the 1994 Act is 
that it gave guarantees to the initiating parties about the handling of their propos­
als. This was meant to prevent municipalities from being too discretionary in their 
decisions. These three modifications allowed initiating parties to have a reasonable 
idea of their risks and costs, before entering into a public tender. A fourth novelty 
was to link the legally binding physical zoning (the Detailed Plan) to the scheduling 
of its implementation: Detailed Plans are now accompanied by a new sort of plan, 
the Joint Development Programme, which includes all the development-oriented 
aspects: calculation of costs, obligations of all parties, and a Development Agree­
ment to secure the financing and implementation of the public infrastructure and 
facilities.
The 1994 Act was originally an initiative of the social democratic PSOE (Partido So­
cialista Obrero Español), and the conservative Partido Popular voted against it at the 
time of the parliamentary approval in 1994. However, the Partido Popular, after win­
ning the regional elections in 1995, decided to maintain the law. Since then, most 
of the other seventeen Spanish regions, although parties with a variety of political 
opinions administer them, have introduced the Valencian innovation into their own 
planning legislation (Burriel, 2008). In December 2005, the regional government of 
Valencia approved, in reaction to criticisms of the 1994 Act, the 2005 Planning Act 
(Ley Urbanística Valenciana, LUV)2. This revision modifies some important aspects 
of the 1994 Act, which can be summarized in two aspects. First, it reinforces the 
procedural guarantees and relieves the obligations on owners in semi-consolidated 
areas. Second, it introduces a double-tender procedure: the first public tender is for 
choosing the urbanising agent. Once selected, the urbanising agent is obliged to 
organise a second tender for the public works. The first tender follows part of the 
European public procurement regulation3; the second follows the entire regulation. 
The European Commission did however not agree and has submitted in the summer 
of 2008 an appeal to the Court of Justice of the European Union4. In September 2010 
the Advocate General of the EU advised to dismiss the Commission's case (Advocate 
General of the European Union, 2010). It is expected that the Court of Justice will 
pass judgement at the end of 2010.
2 The European Parliament has played a central role in this criticism by criticizing the urban policy of 
the regional Valencian government (Burriel, 2009).
3 Directive 93/37/EC and Directive 2004/18/EC, concerning the coordination of procedures for the 
award of public works contracts.
4 Action brought on 9 July 2008 - Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain, 
(Case C-306/08), (2008/C 223/58).
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Frame 5d
Joint Development Programmes
Under the 1994 Act, where the implementation of a Detailed Plan implies the need 
to construct new public infrastructure and facilities, or to refurbish the existing ones, 
the plan must be accompanied by a Joint Development Programme (Programa para el 
desarrollo de una Actuación Integrada, PAI, also translated sometimes as 'Integrated 
Action Programmes'). The initiating party that submits the Detailed Plan (whether this 
is a public or a private party), must also submit the Programme. Municipalities can 
choose whether to approve first the Detailed Plan and, afterwards, the Programme, or 
to approve both documents at the same time. In practice they proceed and approve 
both documents at the same time, as part of the same development initiative that has to 
be evaluated as a whole. This was the case with all the studied cases, except for a small 
part of the plan area in Benalúa. A Programme has also, the same as a Detailed Plan, 
a legally binding character. Planning law prescribes its contents, which are divided in 
two groups of documents (Parejo & Blanc, 1999: 329-333):
1) Technical Alternative (Alternativa Técnica), that includes the documents with the 
physical zoning: (1a) The Detailed Plan that modifies, completes or details the General 
Plan; it can also include a Land Readjustment Project (Proyecto de Reparcelación, see 
under); (1b) A Provisional or Definitive Infrastructure Provision Project (Anteproyecto/ 
Proyecto de Urbanización), which includes a scheme for the public infrastructure, with 
a description of those elements that determine the total costs, such as the quality of the 
public space, a scheme of the sewerage network, a scheme of the road network and the 
other facilities, a description of existing networks (sewerage, water, roads, electricity, 
cables), and the feasibility and the costs of connection to the new development (Merlo
& Ribes, 2004: 53-54).
2) Juridical-economic Proposal (Proposición Jurídico-Económica), which includes the 
documents with the financing and implementation schedules: (2a) The Economic-fi­
nancial Proposal (Proposición Económico-Financiera); (2b) A proposal of Development 
Agreement (Convenio Urbanístico). Financing and implementation schedules consist 
of the following:
• Infrastructure provision costs: a provisional estimation of these costs, and the allo­
cation of these costs to each landowner, as well the form of payment (in money or 
in kind, in building rights);
• Land to be ceded freely;
• Additional contributions: e.g. extra financial contributions, building of public facili­
ties, extra contributions for social/affordable housing;
• Deadlines for the submission of the Land Readjustment Project: in the studied cases 
within 3 to 5 months after the definitive approval of the Programme;
• Deadlines for the commencement and completion of the infrastructure provision: 
within the legal maximum of 5 years for the completion of the works (three cases),
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or 3 years in case the landowners, organized in an association, become selected as 
urbanizing agent (case Camino);
• Deadlines for the building works: of the four studied cases, only one, Camino, includ­
ed a deadline for the building, in this case for the commencement of the building.
The municipality approves both documents, Alternative and Proposal, and the regional 
government intervenes only to approve definitively the Detailed Plan in case it modifies 
the structural binding rules of the General Plan. In practice, the regional government 
uses this competence very often, and it is not exceptional that it rejects or requires the 
modifications of the plans. In exceptional situations, the regional government can also 
suspend the municipal plan and approve a new plan in its place. Such a measure has 
always a temporary character (Parejo & Blanc, 1999: 111-112, 256, 311), and is not 
very common in practice.
Anyone can submit a Programme, including a Detailed Plan, to the municipality, 
as landownership is not required. The proposal usually follows the provisions of the 
General Land Use Plan. If the General Plan is not yet detailed, the Detailed Plan 
details it. However, for Existing Urban land, the General Plan is always detailed: i.e. 
the General Plan establishes already whether land is meant for residential, industry 
or offices, the maximal building volume, which sites should be redeveloped, build­
ing alignments, etc. So in these cases there is no need for Detailed Plans, unless it is 
necessary to modify the General Plan.
The municipality can reject the Programme, including the Detailed Plan, or initiate a 
formal public tender procedure. After a Programme has been published, anyone can 
submit objections or alternative programmes. Candidates negotiate with landowners 
to obtain support; they may publish their offers in newspapers and invite landown­
ers to join them. After evaluation and negotiations with the candidates, the Local 
Council decides on a definitive Programme and selects the urbanising agent. Selec­
tion criteria are the total infrastructure provision costs, the quality of the plan and 
the public infrastructure and facilities, the advantages offered to the municipality, the 
price offered to the landowners for their building rights, the support of landowners, 
the implementation schedules, and the amount of the bank guarantees. The tender 
can be declared void if none of the proposals satisfies the municipality, but such de­
cisions must be justified (Blanc, 2003; Muñoz et al., 2004). Municipalities can grant 
concessions to public agencies without public tender. About 30% of all schemes in 
the region are developed by public companies, which are dependent on national, 
regional or municipal public bodies (figures from 1994 till 1998, Modrego, 2000). 
However, most (from 1994 until 1998: 72%) of the urbanisation projects have been 
the result of private initiatives (Modrego, 2000).
After the approval of the Programme, landowners can decide whether they want to 
be expropriated or to continue in the development process. If they choose for ex-
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propriation, the municipality is responsible for the expropriation, and the urbanising 
agent is obliged to pay the compensation. The urbanising agent (a public agency, 
or a private developer selected in the public tender) makes and submits to the mu­
nicipality an Infrastructure Provision Project and a Land Readjustment Project. These 
documents must fit within whatever is prescribed in the General Plan, Detailed Plan 
and Programme. After the period of public consultation, the municipality may reject, 
amend or approve the documents.
Frame 5e
Procedure for the compulsory land readjustment
Planning law prescribes the following procedure for compulsory land readjustment
(Parejo & Blanc 1999: 454-460):
• Public consultation of the Land Readjustment Project: it is announced generally in 
newspapers, and announced individually only to the registered titleholders, that is 
those owners that are registered in the Property Register (Registro de la Propiedad).
• Application to the Property Register of a note that certifies who are the titleholders 
and which charges exist on the property (certificado de dominio y cargas). At the 
same time, the Register notes the initiation of the readjustment procedure.
• Additional hearing of 10 days in case there turn out to be titleholders that have not 
been formally addressed because they were not inscribed in the Property Register. 
Also, an additional hearing of 10 days for the affected persons in case of modifica­
tion of the Project.
• During the Public consultation, affected persons can claim compensation from 
each other. The owner of the freehold of the land has to compensate the titleholders 
of other rights on his property that have to disappear. This may delay the procedure.
• During the Public consultation, owners can also offer to, or demand from, each oth­
er shortages and surpluses of building rights (defectos y excesos de aprovechami­
ento adjudicado). It is not always possible to allocate all the building rights of each 
landowner onto a particular building plot. When there are shortages or surpluses, 
and it is not possible to divide the new plot between several owners (pro indiviso), 
owners have to buy or to sell the remaining rights. The Project proposes a unitary 
price for the building rights. If the owners and urbanizing agent do not agree with 
this price, the landowners can propose another price.
• Definitive approval: the Local Council (Pleno del Ayuntamiento) approves definitively 
the Land Readjustment Project. Other public authorities also can approve it defini­
tively, should they have the competence for expropriating land on the site in question.
• Publication, individual announcement to the affected persons and registration of 
the approved Project in the Property Register.
Procedure for the voluntary land readjustment
The procedure for voluntary land readjustment is simpler. The proposal of readjustment
has to be endorsed by all the affected persons (landowners and other titleholders).
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Once the proposal has been submitted, the municipality decides right away: there is no 
period of public consultation (Parejo & Blanc, 1999: 461). Most of landowners usually 
prefer the voluntary way.
The approval of the Land Readjustment Project and its registration in the Property
Register has important consequences:
• Allocation to each new plot, in accordance with the Detailed Plan, of the build­
ing possibilities (volume and use typology) and of the public facilities and infra­
structure;
• Automatic modification of the property boundaries, with: i) assignment (sub­
rogación) of the old private plots into the new private serviced building plots, 
proportionally to the area of the former property and if possible on or nearby the 
former property; ii) and transfer to the public domain of the public infrastructure 
and facilities and possibly of some serviced building plots. The urbanizing agent, 
as concessionaire for the public task of urbanisation, is allowed to occupy the 
plots (also the new private plots) to provide the infrastructure.
• The new serviced building plots are charged with the obligation of paying the 
corresponding contribution to the infrastructure provision costs, according to 
the share in the building rights. Landowners usually pay in instalments during 
infrastructure provision. In 2000, more than half of all landowners paid their 
contributions in cash (Generalitat Valenciana 2000), although landowners may 
also pay in kind (i.e. in building rights). If the landowner does not cooperate, a 
part of the building plot, equivalent to the building rights that are necessary to 
pay the contribution, is transferred to the urbanizing agent. The remaining build­
ing plot goes, free of charge, to the landowner.
• Old rights and charges on the old plots are transferred to the new plots provided 
that they are compatible with the new plan. However, when the new plot is 
transferred to the urbanizing agent as payment in kind (finca de garantía), the 
land has to be transferred free of old rights and charges. Old rights and charges 
that have to disappear have to be compensated by the former landowner.
Finally, the owners of the serviced building plots submit building applications and
the municipality issues as-of-right building permits, according to the General and
Detailed Plans and the building regulations.
5.3 The legal limits for capturing value increase in the 
region ofValencia
How far can the required contributions of landowners and developers go? The legal 
principles that delimit the scope of the contributions that can be obtained through 
land readjustment are described below.
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5.3.1 Public share of value increase
Following the Spanish Constitution of 1978, 'The community shall have a share in 
the benefits accruing from the town-planning policies of public bodies' (section 
47). This constitutional principle authorizes municipalities to capture part of the 
betterment, on top of the development costs and other charges mentioned below. 
In developable areas (e.g. case Benalúa), municipalities had until 2007 the right to 
10% of the building rights, and from 2007 onwards between 5 and 15%. Landown­
ers are obliged to cede without any charge to the municipality the serviced building 
parcels that are needed to make up this percentage. Note that they are ceding land, 
but not building rights, because following planning law these building rights never 
belonged to the landowners, but to the municipality. It is also important to note that 
the ceded plots do not necessary turn out to be the same percentage, as building 
rights refer to the economic value of the new buildings, and not to their land area. 
The ceded land may become part of the Municipal Patrimony of Land (Patrimonio 
M unicipal de Suelo), which is intended for affordable housing and other social pur­
poses.
5.3.2 Value increase as compensation for taking responsibility 
for public infrastructure and facilities
As mentioned, the principle of 'equitable redistribution of benefits, costs and duties' 
rules that landowners, in exchange for the building rights, are obliged to pay the in­
frastructure provision costs and to provide the needed land to the urbanizing agent. 
The infrastructure provision costs are called 'urbanization charges' (Parejo & Blanc, 
1999: 329-333, 409-415, 474-475).
Frame 5f
Infrastructure provision costs, i.e. Urbanization charges (cargas de urbanización)
consist of:
• 'Urbanization costs' (costes de urbanización), the costs of preparing plans and tech­
nical projects, of damage compensation, and of the civil works for streets, path­
ways, electricity, public light, planted trees on path and gardens, water and sewage, 
gas, telephone, cables, etc;
• 'Urbanization canon' (canon de urbanización), a contribution to the costs of off-site 
public infrastructure that serves the scheme in question, but has been previously 
realized in other schemes;
• Profit margin of the urbanizing agent, which usually charges around 10% of the 
'urbanization costs';
• Overhead costs, the organizational costs made by the urbanizing agent.
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Besides a contribution to the Urbanization charges, landowners have also to cede free 
of charge the land that is needed for public infrastructure and facilities. This includes 
not only the civil works, but also other public facilities (such as public schools, sport 
installations, kindergartens, parks, municipal offices, police station) the building and 
exploitation costs of which must in principle be paid by the respective public body. 
Additionally, on developable land it is also possible to oblige landowners to cede 
land situated elsewhere that is needed for off-site infrastructure. In case Benalúa (plan 
area 8.2 ha), the landowners had to cede 5.4 ha of land located off-site and meant 
for a highway. The building rights of the Redistribution Area of the development site 
have to be shared with the 'off-site' owners of the land on which this road is located. 
These owners receive the same (proportional) share of the building rights as the on­
site landowners.
Municipalities are free to agree additional obligations with the urbanizing agent, as 
for example the building and exploitation of public facilities, additional contributions 
to the municipality, or additional compensation for damages. However, the urban­
izing agent cannot charge landowners for this, but must pay from his own resources. 
Usually urbanizing agents own an important part of the land, so they are able to pay 
these extras from the profits from the development of the real estate. Municipalities 
can also agree additional contributions for social housing: this can be in addition, or 
not, to the land zoned for social/affordable housing, see under.
5.3.3 Social/affordable housing
Spanish municipalities can, since the 1990 Land Use and Urban Planning Act and its 
Refunded Text (definitive version, after integrating its determinations with other still 
ruling regulations) of 1992, zone land for social/affordable housing. The possibility of 
zoning land for this was, at that time, a very important novelty in Spanish planning 
law, and became the subject of discussion. The Supreme Court of Spain and the juris­
prudence considered it very disputable to zone land for affordable housing without 
compensating the landowners. Since 1997, the regions have taken over the compe­
tences on this matter, by-passing the discussion at the national level. Valencia and 
other regions have included this 1992's novelty in their regional planning legislation 
(Burón, 2006: 87). Social/affordable housing is called in Valencia by different names, 
depending on whether it is based on the national or the regional social housing leg­
islation: Vivienda con Protección Pública respectively Vivienda Protegida (Fernández 
et al, 2003: 91).
Frame 5g
The amount of social/affordable housing built
The building of affordable housing in Spain and Valencia has decreased in the last years
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In 1996, 30% of all new housing in Spain was affordable housing. During the govern­
ment of the right-wing Partido Popular in the national government (1996-2004), this 
figure dropped significantly, to less than 10%. Since 2004, the new social democratic 
government of Zapatero and most of the regions have declared affordable housing as 
a priority of their planning policy. The Regional Government of Valencia introduced 
recently the obligation to build a minimum percentage of 25% affordable housing in 
urban land, and 40% in urbanizable areas. Including a legal quota is a recent gen­
eral trend in Spain, with almost all the regions fixing such minimum percentages. The 
Basque Country was the first region to do so. In 1994, it included, in municipalities 
with more than 7,000 inhabitants, the legal minimum of 20% of affordable housing in 
urbanized land and 65% in extension areas. In 2006, it lowered the criterion to munic­
ipalities of more than 2,000 inhabitants and increased the quota to 40% respectively 
75% (Burón, 2006: 85). In 2007 the government in Madrid approved a new Land Act, 
which established a minimum of 20% for the whole country.
Periodista Gil Sumbiela / 0.6 ha
\
Guillem de Anglesola / 1.2 ha 
\
Camino Hondo del Grao / 5.7 ha
1
Figure 9. Location of the cases in the city of Valencia.
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The effect of zoning land for affordable housing in the zoning plan is that, later on, 
once land readjustment takes place, the serviced building plots are inscribed in the 
Property Register as affordable housing. As a consequence, the actual and the future 
owners can only develop affordable housing on it. Affordable housing in Spain and 
in Valencia receives a subject subsidy from central and regional government in the 
form of a subsidy to the mortgage interest and sometimes of a lump-sum subsidy to 
the buyer. The price of land for affordable housing is regulated (about € 100-150/m2 
floor space in 2006), much lower than for free-market housing (€ 300-1,100/m2 floor 
space, depending on the location). This difference in land price between affordable 
and free-market housing is shared between all the landowners through the land re­
adjustment.
Thanks to the regulated low price of land, developing social/affordable housing is a 
profitable activity. Profit rates from developing social/affordable might be not large, 
but it is a very safe product, for the demand is guaranteed since selling prices of af­
fordable housing are at least 50% and lower than prices for free-market housing. 
Both commercial developers and housing cooperatives develop social/affordable 
housing. Housing cooperatives (Cooperativas de vivienda) arose as cooperatives of 
individual citizens meant for commissioning their own dwelling. In time they be­
came more professionalized and independent from the future occupiers of the af­
fordable dwellings.
5.4 Introduction to  the studied cases in the region of 
Valencia
In all cases, there was a General Land-use Plan that included binding rules that 
prescribed the future development possibilities (see figures 9 and 10). Before being 
allowed to redevelop the site, a Detailed Plan had to be approved. In cases Camino 
and Benalúa, the Detailed Plan modified the structural binding rules in the General 
Plan, thus it also had to be approved by the regional government. In Guillem and in 
Periodista, the Detailed Plan only detailed and modified the detailed binding rules of 
the General Plan, so in principle there was no need for regional approval. However, 
because the General Plans were made before the 1994 Planning Act, regional ap­
proval was in any case necessary.
In all the studied cases, new public infrastructure and facilities were needed, so a 
Joint Development Programme had to accompany the Detailed Plan and an urban­
izing agent had to be selected. In all the cases, the urbanizing agent is a private 
party selected in a public tender. Urbanizing agents are most of the time professional 
developers, as in Guillem and Periodista. However, sometimes landowners join to­
gether and become the urbanizing agent, as in Camino and Benalúa.
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Since the introduction in 1994 of the urbanizing agent, the number of urbanizing 
agents without land has increased. They can charge around 10% of the infrastructure 
provision costs as profit margin. However, as the cases show, most of the time ur­
banizing agents not only develop serviced building parcels, but also buy some land 
and become developer of the buildings. In Periodista, most landowners sold their 
property relatively quickly to the urbanizing agent, before the approval of the Joint 
Development Programme. In Guillem, they waited a while and most of them sold at 
the time of the land readjustment procedure. In Camino and Benalúa, the land was 
already the property of the urbanizing agent (as landowners themselves became the 
urbanizing agent).
Figure 10. Location of case 'Benalúa Sur' (8 ha) in the city of Alicante.
Here follows a brief introduction to the cases. The rest of the case-based information 
has been included in the rest of the chapter.
5.4.1 Guillem de Anglesola, C ity ofValencia
Urban Regeneration project 'Guillem de Anglesola' (1.2 ha, about 125 apartments, 
104 units/ha, plus some retail, see figure 11) is located in the east of the city of Va-
Valencia 125
lencia. It concerns the demolishing of about 50 old and deteriorated housing build­
ings. The 1988 General Plan foresaw the redevelopment of this old residential area, 
located in a densely built up area. The General Plan proposed the construction of a 
main road through the site and multi store buildings along that road, with a total 
building volume of 15,706 m2 floor space (1, 6 and 7 floors). In 1999 a commer­
cial developer (Proara Promotores Aragoneses SA) submitted a Joint Development 
Programme, including an Urban Renewal Plan. After a public tender in which other 
three developers submitted an alternative plan, Proara's proposal was provisionally 
approved in 2003. In 2005, after the signing of the Development Agreement, Proara 
was definitely selected as the urbanizing agent. The Urban Renewal Plan included 
in the Programme detailed outline provisions and modified marginally the already 
detailed provisions of the 1988 General Plan. The procedure for land readjustment 
began in 2006. In May 2008 works had yet not started. It was expected that the infra­
structure provision would be ready no later than 2010.
Figure 11. 2005 Joint Development Program.
There are 49 small parcels in the plan area. Almost all these parcels are owned pro 
indiviso by several owners, each of them owner of a flat, so the total number of own­
ers was much higher than 49. The smallest parcel has 26 m2, the largest 548 m2, and 
the average size is 100-200 m2. Alongside the plan process, the urbanizing agent 
negotiated with the individual owners and acquired land. When the urbanizing agent 
submitted the Land Readjustment Project in March 2006, he already owned about 
30% of the land.
5.4.2 Periodista Gil Sumbiela, C ity of Valencia
Urban Regeneration project 'Periodista Gil Sumbiela' (0.6 ha, about 100 apartments, 
166 units/ha, plus some retail, see figure 12) is located in the north of the City of
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Valencia. It is located in a densely built up area, and was previously occupied by 
a warehouse, some office space, some industry and an empty plot. The 1988 Gen­
eral Plan foresaw redevelopment into some residential use, some commercial/recre­
ational, in total 5,556 m2 floor space (1-2 floors), and some public infrastructure. In 
2005, a commercial developer, Prodaemi S.L., with the support of a majority of the 
landowners, submitted a Joint Development Programme, including an Urban Re­
newal Plan. This plan proposed an increase of the building possibilities (from 5,556 
to 11,000 m2 floor space; 1-2 to 6 floors) and rezoning to residential, of which the 
majority should be affordable housing. After evaluation and several modifications, 
Prodaemi's proposal were approved provisionally in 2006, and definitely in 2007. In 
November 2006 it was expected that the infrastructure provision would be finished 
not later than 1012.
Figure 12. 2007 Joint Development Programme.
Property was originally divided among several landowners. The owners of 65% of the 
land supported the proposal of Prodaemi. Once the Programme became provision­
ally approved in July 2006, Prodaemi bought all the land.
5.4.3 Camino Hondo del Grao, C ity ofValencia
Urban Regeneration project 'Camino Hondo del Grao' (5.7 ha, about 465 apart­
ments, 82 units/ha, plus a considerable amount of building space for offices and 
retail, see figure 13) is located in the east of the City of Valencia. Before redevelop­
ment, the site was used for industry. It includes several old industrial buildings with 
a historic-monumental value. The 1988 General Plan foresaw the continuation of 
these uses. In 2000, a commercial developer submitted a Joint Development Pro­
gramme proposing the redevelopment of the location into a residential area. Some 
other parties, among them the owners of the majority of the land, organized into an
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Association of Urbanistic Interest (Agrupación de Interés Urbanistico, AIU), and sub­
mitted alternative Programmes. Finally, the municipality rejected all the proposals. In 
2003 another commercial developer tried again, and two others (among them, again, 
the landowners), submitted alternatives. Finally, in 2004, the municipality decided 
to choose the Programme of the owners, which became the urbanizing agent. The 
Urban Renewal Plan included in the Programme rezones the existing industrial use 
into residential and public facilities, and increases the building volume. The regional 
government approved it definitely in 2005, and the Development Contract was for­
mally signed in 2006.
Figure 13. 2005 Joint Development Programme.
The property was initially divided into 18 parcels, owned by seven private landown­
ers, most of them (81% plan area) members of the Association that won the public 
tender. The rest of the land belongs to an electric company (0,08%), the railway 
company (8%), and the Municipality of Valencia (5%). The municipality owned also 
the existing roads and the land that is reserved for the school. Inmuebles Barrera S.A. 
was the private landowner with the largest ownership: 32% of the plan area. In 2005 
Vallehermoso, one of the national leading commercial developers, bought 59% of 
the urbanizing agent (almost 50% of the plan area). In April 2008 another developer, 
Coperfil Inmobiliaria, has bought most of the land and is in charge of the infrastruc­
ture provision, for which the demolition phase had already started at that time.
5.4.4 Benalúa Sur, C ity of Alicante
Urban Regeneration project 'Benalúa Sur' (8 ha, about 600 apartments, 75 units/ha, 
plus a considerable amount of building space for offices and retail, see figure 14) 
is located in the southwest of the City of Alicante. Before redevelopment, the site 
included some undeveloped plots, some old and deteriorated housing and several 
industrial firms, of which some were still active. The 1987 General Plan foresaw the
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redevelopment of the site into a new residential area for 735 dwellings, some com­
mercial space and public facilities. In addition, a piece of land located at the outskirts 
of the city (5.4 ha) was ascribed to the site. This land is necessary for a new highway 
surrounding the city, and its landowners participate in the land readjustment together 
with the rest of the landowners. In 1997, the municipality modified slightly the regu­
lations of the 1987 General plan for this site, reducing the plan area and the number 
of dwellings.
Figure 14. 2003 Joint Development Program.
In 1998, Nuevo Sector P.P. 1.2 Benalúa Sur S.L. submitted a Joint Development Pro­
gramme for the redevelopment of the site that included a Partial Plan. Nuevo Sec­
tor was a development company founded by the owners of about 60% of the land. 
These owners founded an Association of Urbanistic Interest also. The initiative and 
the lead was taken by one of the owners, Urban Programas Urbanos, a consultancy 
that had bought about 15% of the land (situated in the ascribed piece of off-site land). 
In 2002 Urban Programa Urbanos sold its land and its participation in Nuevo Sec­
tor to a developer, Grupo P.R.A.S.A., who became the leading party. After a public 
tender in which three other proposals were evaluated, in 2003 the Programme was 
provisionally and then definitely approved. The Development Contract was formally 
signed in 2004. The municipality approved the Land Readjustment Project in 2006. 
The infrastructure provision works started in 2007.
5.5 How formal rules relevant to  zoning in Valencia 
can be used
This section describes the working of formal rules relevant to zoning within the value 
capturing mechanisms. There are different ways (or sub-variables) in which these rules
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in Valencia can be used in an operational way to improve capturing value increase:
• Creating certainty or uncertainty beforehand about future building possibilities 
and contributions;
• Choosing the contents of the relevant binding rules;
• Conditioning the relevant binding rules to securing the capturing of value in­
crease;
• Modulating property rights;
• Using the procedure for the preparation and approval of the relevant binding 
rules.
Here follows an assessment of whether each of these sub-variables can affect the 
capturing of value increase.
5.5.1 Creating certainty beforehand about future building 
possibilities and contributions
Summary o f the findings
It is remarkable about the Valencian planning system that it provides beforehand a 
relatively high degree of legal certainty, certainly when compared with England, The 
Netherlands and other Western European countries (see section 4.1 for an interna­
tional comparison). This is mainly due first to a wide set of legal minimal standards 
for public infrastructure and facilities, established in planning law; second to the 
legal duty for municipalities to approve a legally binding General Land-use Plan that 
must cover the whole municipal territory; and third to local policy for the modifica­
tion of the General Plan.
Because of these three measures, the main determinants of the economic value of 
land are already fixed when the development initiatives take place. There is a very 
high level of certainty about both building possibilities and the contributions. Nev­
ertheless, there is some room for flexibility that municipalities can use purposefully, 
mainly related to capturing value increase. This flexibility does not diminish the cer­
tainty about the minimal building possibilities and contributions, which are already 
stated in the legal standards and the General Plan, and which cannot be relaxed. 
What happens is that there is some flexibility to augment the building possibilities, 
that is, there is some uncertainty about the maximum possibilities. If municipalities 
augment the building possibilities, they create at the same time certainty about the 
additional contributions. In other words: (1) there is legal certainty about a mini­
mum, both of building possibilities and of contributions; (2) there is some uncertainty 
about the possibility of augmenting building possibilities; (3) there is certainty about 
additional contributions, in case of augmenting. Table 9 summarizes the level of 
certainty, before definitive negotiations take place, about building possibilities and 
contributions.
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Table 9. Level of certainty in the Valencian cases
Certainty about future 
building possibilities
Certainty about future 
contributions
Guillem, City Valencia Very high Very high
Periodista, City Valencia Very high about min, less about max Very high
Camino, City Valencia Very high about min, less about max Very high
Benalúa, City Alicante Very high about min, less about max Very high
The findings from the studied cases and other sources strongly suggest that uncer­
tainty about the future building possibilities, together with certainty about the future 
contributions, might be positive for capturing value increase. Let us now see in detail 
whether municipalities create certainty or uncertainty and about what, in what sort 
of documents: then we infer the consequences for capturing value increase. Here a 
distinction is made between certainty through legal minimal standards and the Gen­
eral Land Use Plan, and certainty through indicative local policy documents meant 
for the case that the General Plans are modified.
5.5.1.1 Creating certainty through the minimal legal standards and the 
General Plan
Since 1978, planning law prescribes a wide set of legal minimal standard contribu­
tions (Estándares urbanísticos). The 1998 Planning Regulation, which was in force for 
the studied cases, differentiates between standards and prescriptive determinations 
for residential, commercial/recreational and industrial developments. Also, it differ­
entiates between standards that must be included in the General Land use Plan and 
those that must be included in the Detailed Plans, whether in the form of structural 
or detailed binding rules.
Frame 5h
Examples of legal minimal standards for residential schemes in the 1998 Regulation
• Minimal public space: depending on the floor space index of the scheme, different 
percentages of minimal public space are given for roads, green areas and public 
facilities. E.g. with an f.s.i. of 1 m2 floor space per m2 land, at least 63% of the plan 
area must be used for public space: 15% for green areas, 20% for public facilities 
and 28% for roads. Also, the area for public facilities must be at least 35 m2 per 100 
m2 floor space.
• Minimal number of plots for public facilities: schemes with more than 8,000 m2 
floor space of residential use must provide at least one plot for public facilities, 
which must be situated in the most appropriate location and within an urban con­
text that fits with its function.
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• Minimal parking places: per dwelling, at least one parking place must be provided, 
and in case of schemes of more than 10 dwellings, per 10 dwellings an additional 
parking place must be provided. At least 50% of these parking places must be situ­
ated in or under the buildings, not in the public space.
Example of prescriptive determination for residential schemes in the 1998 Regulation
Municipalities must establish in their General Land use Plan a minimal amount of com­
mercial/recreational uses in residential developments.
When a development initiative takes place, there is almost always an approved Gen­
eral Land Use Plan. This was also the situation in all the studied cases: the 1987 Plan 
in the city of Alicante (case Benalúa) and the 1988 Plan in the city of Valencia (the 
other three cases). A General plan sets out for the whole municipal territory the struc­
tural binding rules and, in urban development areas, usually the detailed binding 
rules also. That is, the General Plan establishes whether land is meant for residential, 
industry or offices, the maximal building volume, which sites should be redeveloped, 
building alignments, and also details of the public infrastructure and facilities which 
must be realized, etc. This was also the case in the four studied cases. The 1988 
General Plan of the city of Valencia prescribed detailed regulations for the three stud­
ied cases in that city. In Guillem  and Periodista, the 1988 document prescribed for 
example the alignments of the public streets and the apartment buildings (including 
the height), and the maximal building volume, 15,468 respectively 5,556 m2 floor 
space. In Camino, it prescribed the continuation of the industrial use, added some 
commercial use, prescribed a maximal building volume of 72,663 m2 floor space 
and delimitated the buildings and public infrastructure. The 1987 General Plan of the 
city of Alicante, and its later modification in 1997, prescribed detailed regulations 
for the case Benalúa, such as the detailed alignments of public infrastructure and 
the apartment buildings, and a maximal building volume of 103,670 m2 floor space, 
maximal 742 dwellings.
What is the effect of this certainty on capturing value increase? It has not been pos­
sible to measure in our cases those effects, because this was the situation in all the 
cases and there was no example of the contrary to compare with. However, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that municipalities might lose some negotiation room when 
creating absolute certainty about the future building possibilities. Also, certainty 
about building possibilities might inflate the accounted land costs and the regular 
and final profit margins of the developer (see causal model in section 2.4.2). On the 
contrary, uncertainty about future building possibilities might be positive for cap­
turing value increase. This conclusion is based on the fact that the captured value 
increase improved in those cases in which municipalities made use of their statutory 
potential to deviate from the General Land-use Plan, that is, in cases where munici­
palities created some uncertainty about additional building possibilities (see below). 
After all, the General Plans had already 'given away' their treasure (the allocation
132 Valencia
of building possibilities), so landowners and developers were already secure and 
able to internalize part of the value increase in the accounted land costs and profit 
margins. The municipalities had less to offer, unless additional building was possible.
5.5.1.2 Effects of modifying the General Plan on capturing value increase
The legal framework in Valencia offers the possibility to modify the General Plan. 
Detailed Plans can modify the General Plan in different ways: they can rezone one 
urban use into another (industrial to housing, industrial to office, office to housing, 
etc - called recalificación); increase the building volume (aumento de edificación); or 
rezone land from non-developable to developable (agricultural to housing, agricul­
tural to industrial, etc - reclasificación).
In green-field sites municipalities usually follow the provisions of the General Plan 
strictly. Re-zoning land from agricultural into an urban use (reclasificación) was not 
a common practice. Up to 1998, statistics show that Detailed Plans re-zoned almost 
no agricultural land into land to be developed (Modrego, 2000). That is, whether 
land may be developed or not is mainly and firmly established in the General plans. 
From 1998 onwards, there are neither published nor other available figures. Based on 
interviews with several relevant experts, it seems that the situation has not changed 
significantly (Rubio, Munoz & Canellas, Blanc, Escribano, interviews in 2006 and 
2007), although other sources do not agree (Burriel, 2008). The general picture that 
arises from the mentioned interviews is that, since 2004, there have been many pro­
posals to re-zone agricultural land into golf courses annex residential schemes, but 
most of them seem to have been rejected or are still being processed. This picture 
might be compatible with the existence of some well-known examples of approved 
re-zonings (Blanc, Escribano, interviews in 2006 and 2007), and the political and so­
cial repercussion of these re-zonings might be anyway much higher than the figures 
could justify (cfr. Burriel, 2008). None of the studied cases included such a re-zoning. 
In the city of Valencia there seems to be only one case of reclasificación, in Barrio de 
la Torre. Anyway, cases of reclasificación, if they exist, are irrelevant for urban regen­
eration because they almost always concern green-field developments.
On the contrary, in urban regeneration it seems clear that municipalities often use 
this possibility to re-zone one urban use into another and/or to increase the build­
ing volume (recalificación and aumento, Rubio, Montiel, interviews in 2006). In ex­
change, they ask for more contributions, additional to the legal minimum standards 
mentioned above. Modifications mostly involve the re-zoning of industrial and com­
mercial/recreational space (offices, shops, etc) into housing. For example, in the city 
of Valencia, more than 90% of all locations zoned in the 1988 General plan as in­
dustry have been re-zoned into housing and office space. Between 50% and 80% of 
all locations zoned as commercial/recreational areas have been re-zoned too (Raga, 
Rubio, interviews in 2006). In three of the four cases - Periodista, Camino and Be­
nalúa - the Detailed Plan indeed increased the building volume and/or re-zoned the 
use of land from one urban use into a more profitable one.
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The uncertainty that this regulatory power to modify the General plan might create 
has however been limited: Valencian municipalities usually specify which sorts of 
modifications are possible, and approve criteria about additional contributions, in 
case of modification. This happens in indicative documents, approved by the Local 
Council. The example of the Municipality of Valencia could be representative. At the 
end of the 90s, more and more market actors took the initiative to ask for re-zoning. 
However, up to 2000 the Municipality of Valencia did not accept them (Raga, inter­
view 2006). In 2000, the municipality decided to make it possible to modify the Gen­
eral Plan so as to rezone land from one urban use to another. In addition, it elabo­
rated several criteria, most of them related to capturing value increase (see Frame 5i).
Frame 5i
Criteria for the modification of the General Plan in the Municipality of Valencia
The Municipal Council of Valencia approved on 28 July 2000 several criteria for the
rezoning of one urban use into another (recalificación), and modified these criteria in
new resolutions on 22 May 2002 and 30 April 2004:
• Rezoning is only possible in case of old industrial areas or office buildings to be 
redeveloped into residential areas.
• The rezoning has to improve the urban quality: reducing the total building volume; 
or the new residential use must fit better in the neighbourhood; or introducing any 
other objective improvement.
• 20% of the total building volume has to be used for commercial/recreational uses, 
or for affordable housing.
• Compensation: for each new m2 floor space, landowners have to cede 1 m2 land 
for public facilities (additional to the minimal obligations already established in the 
legal standards and in the General Plan), or 0.5 if the urbanizing agent uses at least 
20% of the building volume for affordable housing (before the municipal resolu­
tion of 22 May 2002, this was 50%). These m2 of land may also be ceded outside 
the plan area, or paid in money. Therefore, appraisal of the value of the new floor 
space is based on cadastral values. In Periodista and Camino, the municipality in­
troduced instead an independent appraisal made by the Polytechnic University of 
Valencia. The University increased in both cases the value of the new floor space, 
when compared with the cadastral values. As a consequence, the compensation 
sum increased notably.
• The resulting housing density in the plan area cannot exceed 75 dwellings/ha.
• If the new dwellings add more than 1,000 inhabitants to the area, landowners have 
to cede at least 5,000 m2 land for a park (additional to the legal minimal cessions).
In Benalúa, in the City of Alicante, the municipality did something similar. The 1987 
General Plan established structural binding rules for this site. However, in 1997 the 
Local Council, after a legal judgement against the 1987 Plan, approved the Mu­
nicipal Criteria, a document that detailed how exactly a future Detailed Plan should
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modify the 1987 General Plan: for example, the exact amount of building volume 
and the detailed binding rules. So in fact, although the latter Detailed Plan modified 
the 1987 Plan, actually there was already in 1997 certainty about the modification 
possibilities.
Neither the 2000 resolution of the Municipality of Valencia, nor the 1997 Municipal 
Criteria of Alicante were legally binding for the use of land (the municipality retained 
fully discretional powers to decide). However, in both cases the municipality decided 
publicly to handle those rules very strictly as evaluation criteria. The cases confirm 
this.
Besides those sorts of modifications that are foreseen in local policy documents, 
there are other sorts of modifications that are less regulated. For example, in the City 
of Valencia the second possibility of modification (increasing the building volume) 
is not covered by formal policy. Asked about this, a public officer (Raga, interview 
2006) confirmed that there are 'informal' criteria for this. 'Informal' because they are 
not formulated explicitly by the Local Council. In very specific cases, the public of­
ficer states, it is possible to increase the building volume.
Frame 5j
The 'informal' criteria for increasing the building volume laid down in the General 
Plan in the Municipality of Valencia, handled in case Periodista, were these:
• The same as for recalificación (see frame 5i).
• The urbanizing agent proposed to use 80% of the building volume for affordable 
housing;
• The urbanizing agent proposed a building envelope that fits within the surrounding 
buildings.
What are the effects on capturing the value increase? The cases confirm the idea that 
the possibility of modifying the General Plan (rezoning the land and augmenting 
the building volume) may increase the negotiation strength of the municipality. In 
addition, it is plausible to conclude that the certainty created about the additional 
contributions in case of modification influences the accounted land costs and profit 
margins, similar to the effect of the certainty mentioned in the previous section (the 
certainty created by the General Plan and the minimal legal standards). In Periodista, 
both (possibility of modification + certainty about additional contributions) led to 
a share of 80% affordable housing in the building, an enlargement of public space 
from 1,805 up to 2,597 m2, and the payment of a substantial amount to the munici­
pality. In Camino it led to an enlargement of public space and facilities from 16,186 
to 38,720 m2, the rehabilitation and free cession to the municipality of four old in­
dustrial buildings, and the payment of an important amount to the municipality. All 
these contributions were additional to the contributions prescribed initially in the
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General Plan and in the legal minimal standards (for a comparison of contributions 
in all four cases see section 5.6). It is very plausible that similar effects took place in 
other modifications of the 1988 General Plan of the city of Valencia.
5.5.2 Possible contents of the binding rules
The Spanish 1978 Constitution gives a broad definition of the goals of public activi­
ties in planning: to pursue an adequate environment for the development of the indi­
vidual, to protect historical and cultural heritage, to fight against speculation in order 
to guarantee decent and adequate housing for each Spaniard, and to share a part of 
the benefits accruing from public planning. Planning law operationalizes these broad 
constitutional goals by allocating many competences to public authorities (Parejo & 
Blanc, 1999: 133-138). This might be the reason for the broad range of prescriptions 
that can be included in the Valencian binding rules, both prescriptions related to the 
physical zoning (Planeamiento Físico), and prescriptions related to the organization 
of the implementation (Planeamiento Programático).
Summary o f the findings
There are two sorts of physical zoning prescriptions that seem clearly to have, or 
potentially to have, a positive effect on capturing value increase: (1) Planning law 
defines much broader obligations for landowners under the category 'Land to be 
developed' than under the category 'Existing Urban Land'. In Land to be developed, 
binding rules can include the broadest range of obligations: such as more public 
facilities, off-site infrastructure, and a public share of 10% in the building rights. It 
seems clear that this leads to higher captured value increase. (2) Planning law opens 
the possibility of including in the binding rules prescriptions regarding social/afford­
able housing. These are of two sorts: first, since 1992 municipalities can zone land for 
social/affordable housing; second, municipalities and developers can reach agree­
ments about additional social/affordable housing. For the present, these measures 
seem not to have been systematically applied. However, the findings suggest that 
they are potentially useful for getting more social/affordable housing built.
Regarding the organization of the implementation, there are three sorts of prescrip­
tions that seem also clearly to have a positive effect on the capturing of value in­
crease: (3) Planning law defines the possibility of ascribing off-site infrastructure to 
the development site in question. Landowners of the off-site land share the building 
rights with the owners of the development site, and cede their land freely. Thanks 
to this measure, Valencian municipalities have obtained in the last years a very im­
portant part of the land needed for main public infrastructure and facilities. (4) Plan­
ning law allows municipalities to agree contributions additional to the minimal legal 
package. This has clearly provided a significant benefit for the public, also for social/ 
affordable housing. (5) The 1994 Act rearranged the contents of the General and De­
tailed Plans. The Act included the financing and implementation schedules (included
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previously in the General and Detailed Plans), and the agreed additional contribu­
tions (included previously in external agreements) into a new sort of document, the 
Joint Development Programme. The positive effects of this 1994's reorganization on 
capturing value increase are however unclear, because there seems to be a more 
relevant independent sub-variable: this is that the 1994 Act introduced the obligation 
of always achieving a Development Agreement to secure the investments and sched­
ules. This was previously an option, not an obligation (see under in section 5.5.3).
The following sections include a detailed assessment of these five sorts of prescrip­
tions, and how they work within the value capturing mechanisms.
5.5.2.1 Prescriptions related to physical zoning: Zoning land into the class 
‘Land to be developed’
Probably the most important function of the General and Detailed Plans is to catego­
rize land into three sorts or 'classes': 'Existing Urban land', 'Land to be developed 
in the future', and 'Non-developable land or rural area'. It seems that municipalities 
sometimes categorize as much land as possible into Land to be developed, with the 
intention of improving capturing value increase. Owners of Land to be developed 
are obliged to pay/realize higher contributions than owners of Existing Urban land: 
for example more public facilities, off-site infrastructure and a public share of 10% in 
the building rights. The legal criteria for categorizing land are very strict: land that is 
already provided with the needed public infrastructure must be classified as Existing 
Urban Land; land that is not yet provided with such infrastructure, and is meant to be, 
must be classified as Land to be developed. However, although these criteria seem 
clear, in practice there is some room to draw the line some meters to the right or to 
the left. For example, the 1988 General Plan of the city of Valencia classified as much 
land as possible as Land to be developed. This led often, in the periphery of the city, 
to drawing the border between Existing Urban land and Land to be developed along 
the party walls of existing buildings. The same happened in the 1987 General Plan of 
the city of Alicante, for example in case Benalúa.
What was the effect of zoning as much land as possible as Land to be developed? 
That there is certainty about more contributions, thus plausibly a lowering influence 
on the accounted land costs and the profit margins of the developer, and a strength­
ening of the negotiation position of municipalities. In general, developments on Land 
to be developed provide higher captured value increase than on Existing Urban land. 
That was clearly the case in Benalúa, the only case where land was classified as Land 
to be developed. In Benalúa the municipality receive 17% of all building rights and a 
large piece of land for off-site infrastructure. Both advantages are the direct result of 
the fact that the site falls under the class Land to be developed.
The strategy of delimiting very strictly the line between Existing Urban land and 
Land to be developed might have been more successful in the City of Valencia than 
in Alicante. In the City of Valencia, this strategy has been systematically applied in
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the 1988 General Plan, and this has resulted in an improvement of the public space 
situated in the urban periphery. All around the city, the new schemes on Land to be 
developed of the 1988 General Plan have paid, in the urban periphery existing at 
that time, for the green space and other public space in-between the existing build­
ings (Blanc, interview in 2006, see also figures 15). However, in the City of Alicante, 
where the 1987 General Plan had also drawn the line very strictly, the municipality 
seems to have made legally risky delimitations, which has led to delay. For example, 
in Benalúa the municipality zoned several parcels as Land to be developed that could 
also be considered as Existing Urban land. Landowners took the 1987 municipal 
delimitation to the courts, both in case Benalúa and in Playa de San Juan, another 
scheme in the city of Alicante. The courts have granted some of the appeals, e.g. in 
Benalúa part of the land became an own development site subjected to the lower 
contributions regime of Existing Urban land, reducing the area of our development 
site from 98,000 to 82,451 m2.
5.5.2.2 Prescriptions related to physical zoning: Zoning land for Social/ 
affordable housing
Before 1992, planning legislation did not allow the zoning of land for social/afford­
able housing. This changed with the 1992 Refunded Act. Since then, General and 
Detailed Plans can establish a minimum percentage of social/affordable housing, 
of the total number of dwellings in the plan area. Also, they can establish on which 
parcels that housing to be built.
In practice, many General Plans did not zone land for social/affordable housing, be­
cause most of them were made before 1992. This is the case in the cities of Valencia 
(1988 General Plan) and Alicante (1987). From 1992 onwards, there are no data 
available about whether General and Detailed Plans include affordable housing or 
not, but following some experts, municipalities, in general, have not done this. This 
lack of political will has led to discussion. A widely shared opinion among experts is 
that municipalities are not reliable in fulfilling the function of guaranteeing enough 
social/affordable housing. The only solution, they argue, is to introduce minimal quo­
ta in regional planning legislation. This discussion has had consequences in practice. 
It seems that in the last years, when housing prices have risen spectacularly and when 
the affordability of houses has become a main political issue, municipalities have 
begun to zone land for affordable housing. For example, the General Plan of the city 
of Castellón de la Plana (2000) has done so (Roger, Blanc, Rubio, Montiel, Muñoz & 
Cañellas, Escribano, interviews 2006). One of the four studied projects (Periodista) 
included affordable housing in the Detailed Plan (80% of the scheme).
Municipalities can also require contributions for social/affordable housing and in­
clude them in the Programmes, contributions that are additional and complementary 
to the mentioned legal minimal package and specially zoned land. Additional contri­
butions might include extra cession of land, or a minimum percentage, or the obliga­
tion for the landowners to pay their contribution to the infrastructure provision costs
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in building rights, and the obligation for the urbanizing agent to use these building 
rights for affordable housing. It seems that municipalities have only recently begun 
to do so. Case Guillem  included affordable housing in the Programme but not in the 
Detailed Plan, and Periodista both in the Programme and in the Detailed Plan.
Figures 15. (1-2) Nou Campanar/Jorge Comín; (3) San Pau; (4-6) Beniferri. These are examples of older 
buildings in the former northern urban periphery of the City of Valencia. The green space has been 
paid by the new developments on Land to be developed (Copyright Demetrio Muñoz, nov 2006).
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What are the effects for the building of social/affordable housing? Two measures are 
evaluated here: (1) the fact that, since 1992, binding rules can zone land for social/ 
affordable housing; (2) and the fact that municipalities can agree additional contribu­
tions regarding social/affordable housing and include them in the Programmes. The 
conclusion is that both measures can have a positive effect on the actual realization 
of social/affordable houses because they can create certainty about more contribu­
tions. Up to recently, municipalities did not use these measures, thus building rates 
were influenced mainly by the housing market: in times of low housing prices, de­
velopers seek safer products such as affordable housing. Because from 1998 till circa 
2007, housing prices rose spectacularly, the building of social/affordable housing 
dropped very significantly (see Table 10).
Table 10. Percentage affordable housing of total new houses.
Valencia city Alicante city Region Valencia
1992 6 % 12% 18%
1993 22% 28% 32%
1994 27% 45% 43%
1995 35% 65% 52%
1996
1997 45% 47% 50%
1998 33% 38%
1999 22% 16% 37%
2000 7% 11% 22%
2001 3 % 8 % 14%
2002 4 % 2 %
2003 0 % 0 %
Sources:
- Cities of Valencia and Alicante: Generalitat Valenciana, Informe de oferta de vivienda nueva en la Comunidad 
Valenciana, on-line site Generalitat Valenciana, visited on 9 Febr 2007, http://www.cth.gva.es/ovv/ovv.htm (Es- 
tadísticas:.../Estadísticas../BD Municipal/Valencia 1991-2006 and Alacant 1991-2006).
- Region Valencia: Generalitat Valenciana, Informe de oferta de vivienda nueva en la Comunidad Valenciana, 
on-line, visited on 10 Febr 2007, http://www.cth.gva.es/ovv/ovv.htm/(Estadísticas:.../Estadísticas../Coyuntura/Grá- 
ficos: Precio medio del metro cuadrado de la vivienda/Informe de oferta de vivienda nueva...: Participación de la 
vivienda protegida: Evolución anual).
As mentioned, municipalities have now changed their policies and are including 
more affordable housing in the binding rules: both by zoning land as affordable hous­
ing, and by agreeing additional contributions and including them in the Programmes. 
Whether this has been a success is not possible to evaluate here. There are no avail­
able statistics about building rates from 2003 onwards. Based on the interviews and 
the studied cases, it is possible to conclude however that building of affordable hous­
ing is indeed rising. Of the studied cases, only those that included affordable housing
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in the binding rules (Guillem  and Periodista) will indeed provide affordable housing. It 
seems plausible thus that including affordable housing in binding rules could indeed 
lead to more being built (Roger, Blanc, Rubio, Montiel, Escribano, interviews 2006).
K
L ; Vía Parque (off-site infrastructureV/'
Benalúa Sur / 8 ha '
Figure 16. Piece of off-site infrastructure ascribed to the Redistribution Area of Benalúa Sur. The Gen­
eral Land use Plan of 1987 allocated the building rights as follows (the Program modified these figures 
slightly, e.g. reduced the area of the development site from 98,000 to 82,451 m2 of land):
• Area development site: 98,000 m2 of land
• Area off-site infrastructure to be included: 54,398 m2 of land
• Total Redistribution Area: 98,000 + 54,398 = 152,398 m2 of land
• Building volume Redistribution Area/site: 103,950 m2 floor space modal use
• Reference Development Allowance: 103,950 : 152,398 = 0,6 m2 floor space modal use/m2 land
• Building right of owner parcel of 100 m2 land, whether situated in development site or under 
the off-site infrastructure: (100 x 0,6) x 0,9 [10% belongs to the Municipality] = 54 m2 floor 
space modal use.
5.5.2.3 Prescriptions related to the organization of the implementation: 
Ascribing off-site infrastructure to development sites
In Land to be developed, General Plans can charge infrastructure and facilities with 
an off-site function into the development site (sector) in which they are located. Also,
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the General Plan can ascribe a piece of land situated off-site to a particular develop­
ment site. The owners of the land under the infrastructure or facility (whether situated 
or not on the development site) belong to the same Redistribution Area, i.e. they 
share the building rights of the development site and, in exchange, cede their land 
freely. This seems to be a very common practice. Benalúa, the only case situated on 
Land to be developed, does so. The 1987 General Plan of Alicante attached 5.4 ha 
of off-site infrastructure (Via Parque) to the Redistribution Area/sector of Benalúa (8.3 
ha, see figure 16). This was part of a wide strategy of ascribing off-site infrastructure 
all around the city to those sites to be developed. The 1987 General Plan foresaw an 
urban extension area of about 200 ha, and ascribed 37 off-site ha to the land to be 
developed in the period 1987-1991 (Benalúa was part of it). For the period 1991­
1994, the General Plan ascribed 15 ha. Similarly, the 1988 General Plan of the city 
of Valencia, that foresaw an urban extension of about 700 ha, ascribed to it about 2/3 
of all new off-site infrastructure in the city (230 of 350 ha). This led to an average of 
about 0.3 m2 of off-site land per m2 of urban extension area (Roger, Blanc, Escribano, 
interviews 2006). When ascribing off-site infrastructure, municipalities take account 
of the profitability of the development site (i.e. of the residual value of each scheme). 
The goal was that each scheme should bear a proportional part of the off-site infra­
structure without compromising its economic feasibility.
What has been the effect of ascribing off-site infrastructure? Probably positive be­
cause it creates certainty about more contributions. It seems that Valencian munici­
palities manage in this way to obtain free most of the land needed for new main pub­
lic infrastructure and facilities. In general, the interviewed experts and public officers 
consider that this works well. Case Benalúa and general information about the cities 
of Alicante and Valencia confirm this. In case Benalúa, the municipality will receive 
for free 5.4 ha of off-site infrastructure. In the city of Valencia, about 230 ha have 
been obtained for free since the approval of the 1988 General Plan, for example the 
land under the new Cortes Valencianas Avenue and under the new Football stadium 
of C.F. Valencia (Roger, Blanc, Escribano, Muñoz & Cañellas, Baño, Raga, interviews
2006).
5.5.2.4 Prescriptions related to the organization of the implementation: 
Agreeing additional contributions
Planning law, both before and after the 1994 Act, prescribes the formal possibil­
ity of negotiating additional contributions in a Development Agreement: e.g. extra 
financial contributions, building of public facilities. They are additional to the legal 
minimal package of contributions. Extra contributions can include, besides those just 
mentioned, contributions for social/affordable housing (see above).
Has the possibility of agreeing additional contributions improved capturing value 
increase? It is common that municipalities manage to obtain additional contributions 
in this way. Additional contributions are in practice the following (Blanc, Muñoz & 
Cañellas, interviews 2006):
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• Building of public facilities (swimming pools, public buildings, etc): this hap­
pens, following one expert (Blanc, interview 2006), almost only in the larger 
schemes, where these costs do not exceed 8%-12% of the total infrastructure 
provision costs. It seems that urbanizing agents often manage to make land­
owners pay for it. A main difficulty with this sort of contribution is that it is not 
regulated properly and might therefore disturb the necessary conditions for free 
competition (Blanc, Escribano, Baño, interviews 2006). Municipalities often re­
ject additional contributions if it seems difficult to objectively compare different 
proposals, and this happens often with the building of public facilities, because 
the characteristics of the public buildings to be constructed are not specified pre­
viously. An example is Camino, where the winning urbanizing agent proposed 
the rehabilitation and free cession of several historic industrial buildings, but the 
municipality had not established a priori any specification about this. Another 
aspect that might disturb free competition is that urbanizing agents in principle 
cannot charge these costs to the landowners. Thus, only those agents that also 
own much land, or can manage to charge the landowners anyway, can afford to 
make such proposals, and the others cannot compete.
• Developing less profitable products: more frequent seems to be that the urban­
izing agent commits itself to develop on its land less profitable products with a 
high social profitability. For example, a hotel or recreational building, instead of 
residential, in a tourist residential scheme.
• Financial payments to the municipality, or other kind of extras: this seems also to 
happen, e.g. in cases Periodista (€ 1.6m) and Camino (€ 4m).
• Additional contributions for social/affordable housing: see above.
In the studied cases, additional contributions were very frequent. In Camino, the ur­
banizing agent undertook important additional investments for the removal of exist­
ing industries, and for the rehabilitation and free cession of several historic industrial 
buildings. Also, the municipality will receive almost € 4 million, which is included 
in the infrastructure provision costs and will therefore be paid by the landowners. In 
Guillem, the urbanizing agent assumed an important part of the infrastructure pro­
vision costs, costs that, following planning law, should be paid by the landowners. 
Also, the urbanizing agent will pay additional compensation to the existing house 
owners. In Periodista, the urbanizing agent will provide some infrastructure outside 
the plan area and will pay € 1.6m to the municipality.
This sub-variable (Municipalities can negotiate additional contributions) is a direct 
consequence of planning law: planning law prescribed, before and after the 1994 Act, 
the formal possibility of negotiating such contributions in a Development Agreement. 
Before 1994 these agreements were common, but there were also many zoning plans 
approved without an agreement backing them. The 1994 Act has reinforced this sub­
variable by introducing another sub-variable: Programmes must now include a Devel­
opment Agreement (see section 5.5.3), which has generalized the use of development 
agreements, and increased the total number and amount of additional contributions.
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5.5.2.5 Prescriptions related to the organization of the implementation:
Investment and implementation schedules (before 1994 in General 
and Detailed Plans, after 1994 in Joint Development Programme) 
and Development Agreements (before 1994 in extern documents, 
after 1994 in Programme)
Before the 1994 Act, General Plans included schedules for the public investments. 
This occurred in an 'Action Programme' (Programa de Actuación) and an 'Economic- 
Financial Study' (Estudio Económico-Financiero). These documents were exhaustive 
studies that foresaw the investments of public bodies (local, provincial, regional and 
national public bodies) in the public infrastructure and facilities needed for the im­
plementation of the General plans. For example, the 1988 General Plan of Valencia 
foresaw € 1,160m of public investments for the period 1989-19965. The municipal­
ity of Valencia would pay € 364m and the other public administrations the rest. The 
Economic-Financial Study foresaw a public investment of € 925,558 in case Guil­
lem to construct a broad road, and € 135,227 in Periodista to build a public facility. 
In addition to the public investments, General Plans included the schedules within 
which landowners were obliged to implement the public infrastructure and facilities 
following the voluntary land readjustment procedure.
The 1994 Act introduced some modifications to this. Since 1994, General Plans can 
only contain the ex lege prescription that General Plans foresee the urban expansion of 
the municipality for approximately 10 years, and a brief description of the needed pub­
lic facilities and infrastructure for a longer period. However, this includes neither com­
pulsory implementation schedules, nor does it result in concrete deadlines, although 
the validity of the General Plan is indefinite (Parejo & Blanc, 1999: 265-266; Romero, 
2002: 340). There might be one exception: in some areas, General Plans can include 
rules regarding the logical order of developments (condiciones objetivas de urban­
ización): detailed objective and technical criteria that have to be fulfilled before each 
site can be developed. These criteria may result in a logical order of developments, and 
are compulsory for the subsequent Joint Development Programmes (Parejo & Blanc, 
1999: 267). Regarding financial aspects, General Plans no longer include the exhaus­
tive public investment schemes. Only municipalities of more than 50,000 inhabitants 
are obliged to include a brief and very general socio-economic assessment of the plan. 
Also, General Plans no longer include the implementation schedules for landowners.
Something similar has happened with the Detailed Plans. Before the 1994 Act, De­
tailed Plans included a 'Plan of Phases' (Plan de Etapas) and a 'Economic-Financial 
Study', which included deadlines for the implementation of the Plan and an assess­
ment of the needed investments and financial resources, including the obligatory 
schedules for the landowners. Since 1994, Detailed Plans no longer include dead­
lines or time schedules for their implementation, nor any calculation of investments 
or similar items (Romero, 2002: 341-342).
5 Change rate: 166.386 pesetas = 1 euro.
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The 1994 Act created a new sort of plan, the Joint Development Programme, which 
includes more or less the same investment and implementation schedules as in the 
old General and Detailed plans. This means that since 1994 detailed investment and 
implementation schedules appear only after a Programme has been approved, not 
before. Another novelty of the 1994 Act is that the Programmes also include, in the 
Juridical-economic Proposal, a Development Agreement. Agreements were common 
before the 1994 Act, but they were external documents, formally speaking not in­
cluded in the binding rules. Has the fact that the Programme now includes the sched­
ules and the agreements had any effect on capturing value increase? All available 
data, including the cases, suggest that the financing and implementation schedules 
of the old General and Detailed plans suffered much delay, and that after 1994 this 
speeded up greatly. The question, however, is whether the creation of a new sort of 
plan document, the Programme, could in it self be the cause of these improvements. 
It seems plausible that not the creation of this document as such might be the relevant 
variable. Other sub-variables could be relevant here: this is that the 1994 Act intro­
duced the obligation of always achieving a Development Agreement to secure the 
investments and schedules (see next section).
5.5.3 Conditioning binding rules on securing capturing value 
increase
Summary of the findings
Before 1994 municipalities could not make the approval of binding rules conditional 
on securing the minimal legal package of obligations, but only on securing additional 
contributions. Since 1994, municipalities can and must condition the approval of 
binding rules on securing all the contributions, both the minimal legal package and 
possible additional contributions. This novelty has improved the capturing of value 
increase and the tempo of implementation of the public infrastructure and facilities 
(cfr. Blanc, interviews in 2008). However, another novelty too has played an impor­
tant role in this improvement: the introduction of the land readjustment procedure 
with the urbanizing agent as leading party (see section 5.5.4).
5.5.3.1 No obligatory Development Agreement before the 1994 Act
Before the 1994 Act, Valencian public bodies were not allowed to openly condi­
tion planning consent on a commitment of the developer/landowner to effectively 
implement and pay that part of the public infrastructure and facilities that, following 
planning law, must be charged to developers/landowners, i.e. the 'minimal' legal 
package of obligations. Planning consent refers to the approval of a new General 
Plan that modifies the previous one, or the approval of a Detailed Plan that modifies 
the General Plan, or the approval of a Detailed Plan that just details the General Plan. 
However, public bodies were allowed to openly condition planning consent on the 
effective implementation and payment of other additional contributions, additional 
to the minimal legal package. For example, the legal minimal package included the
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obligation to cede land for primary schools, so agreements could include the obliga­
tion to cede land for high schools and universities also. Another common example 
was the free cession of historic buildings for their conversion into public facilities. 
In practice, Development Agreements were very common, especially in the 1980s, 
when many municipalities made General Plans. Alongside the preparation of and 
procedures for, for example, the 1987 Plan of Alicante and the 1988 Plan of Valencia, 
municipalities required many developers owning land to sign these agreements. Usu­
ally, the agreements concerned small plan areas, owned by one developer. After the 
approval of these General Plans, the number of these agreements diminished.
5.5.3.2 Obligatory Development Agreement after the 1994 A ct
The 1994 Act introduced some important modifications. First, municipalities were 
allowed to condition planning consent not only on securing additional contribu­
tions, but also on securing the minimal legal package of obligations. Second, this 
was not an option, but a must: municipalities were obliged to ask for a Development 
Agreement; otherwise the binding rules are not valid. All the cases illustrate this: the 
Development Agreement secured indeed all the public infrastructure and facilities in 
all the cases, both the minimal legal package and the additional contributions. Third, 
municipalities can now ask for a Development Agreement not only when planning 
consent is necessary, but also in those cases in which the binding rules are already 
detailed and approved, and provided there is need of investments in public infra­
structure and facilities. For example, in case Guillem  the 1988 General Plan already 
included all the detailed binding rules, and there was in principle no need to approve 
new binding rules. However, investment in public infrastructure was necessary, so a 
Joint Development Programme annex a Development Agreement were sine qua non 
condition before development could start.
In other words, after the 1994 all the public infrastructure and facilities (minimal legal 
package and additional contributions) of all developments (those that require plan­
ning consent, and those that do not) must be secured through a Development Agree­
ment. The procedure is as follows: the submitted Programme includes a proposed 
Development Agreement; once the local council has possibly introduced modifica­
tions and approves the Programme, the municipality asks the selected party to sign 
the Agreement. If the local council introduced modifications (either additional con­
tributions or the result of detailing the provisionally approved Programme), and if as 
result of these modifications the selected Programme becomes substantially modified 
(which in theory cannot happen but is not rare in practice), the winning party can 
refuse to sign the Development Agreement and withdraw from the development. 
However, refusing is not frequent in practice. In case Camino, the Development 
Agreement doubled the initial infrastructure provision costs from € 5 million to € 10 
million, and in Periodista it diminished the building volume from 15,757 m2 floor 
space to 11,000, without in either case the developer refusing to sign. The rise of 
housing prices in the meantime (variable A1 in causal model section 2.4.2) might 
explain why developers agreed to the extra requirements. Once the Agreement is
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signed, the municipality publicises the approval of the Programme, which becomes 
at that moment, and not before, legally into force.
These modifications in 1994 have had important consequences for capturing value 
increase. This might have not happen in a direct way, but by influencing sub-variables 
b. The idea is that, not the fact of being able to include contributions in binding rules 
seems to be effective, but the fact of being obliged by law to condition planning 
consent to securing all contributions. In other words, i) being obliged to condition 
binding rules to securing all the contributions reinforces ii) the positive effect of being 
able to include certain contributions in binding rules on iii) the negotiation position 
of municipalities, the accounted land costs and the profit margins of the developer; 
i) might also have a direct positive effect on the speed of the implementation. Before 
1995, not all the binding rules were accompanied by a development agreement. If 
they existed, such agreements secured only the additional contributions, obligations 
that came into force once the developer/landowners had implemented the minimal 
legal package. It seems that such agreements augmented the additional contribu­
tions, such as providing land for secondary schools and university and historic build­
ings (Blanc, interviews in 2008). However, what seems clear is that the minimal 
legal package of public infrastructure and facilities was not implemented on time: 
after all, there was no agreement that secured their financing and implementation. 
This is the reason that in general the financing and implementation schedules made 
before the 1994 Planning Act were not effective in practice. In other words, sched­
uling investments in the General and Detailed Plans without a real engagement of 
the investing party may have disadvantages for the speed of implementation of the 
public infrastructure and facilities (Romero, 2002: 336, 339; Muñoz & Korthals Altes, 
2007). Since the 1994 Act, there is always an agreement that secures all the public 
infrastructure and facilities, both the minimal package and the additional obligations. 
This may explain the improved effectiveness of the schedules.
This sub-variable (there is since 1994 always a Development Agreement that secures 
all the public infrastructure and facilities) is a direct consequence of the 1994 Act. 
The act prescribes the formal obligation of adding an Agreement to the Programme, 
and broadens the coverage of this agreement to include also the minimal legal pack­
age. However, this sub-variable operates together with another sub-variable: the 
1994 Act also introduced a new form of land readjustment, with a third party, the 
urbanizing agent, as provider of the public infrastructure and facilities (see next 
section). This modified substantially the power relationships because municipalities 
have now the power of obliging landowners to cooperate. In sum, both sub-varia­
bles ('formal obligation to secure public infrastructure and facilities' and 'modulat­
ing property rights') are likely together to have caused the generalization of the use 
of Development Agreements for all schemes and for all public infrastructure and 
facilities.
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5.5.4 Modulating Property rights
Summary o f the findings
Building rights belong to the landowner, in the region of Valencia and in the rest 
of Spain. It has already been explained that infrastructure provision (urbanización) 
is considered a public task, and that landowners are obliged since 1956 to imple­
ment it, assuming all the unprofitable parts. The 1956 Land Readjustment regulation 
helped in this, but there was a strong interdependency: local authorities and devel­
opers/landowners were mutually dependent because of the distribution of resources. 
Authorities have the statutory powers for planning permissions, and developers/land­
owners have the financial means and the land. Looking it from the point of view of 
capturing value increase, this interdependency was disadvantageous. It gave to the 
developers/landowners the option to wait, and as waiting might bear advantages, the 
negotiation space of municipalities deteriorated. The result was that often munici­
palities lowered the public requirements for infrastructure and facilities, or that often 
development processes were delayed, or both. The introduction of the 1994 Act has 
had important consequences here. The Act introduced some important modifications 
in the land readjustment regulation that divested landowners from the possibility of 
using the option to wait. The modifications gave Valencian municipalities relatively 
large powers for infrastructure provision, compared with England, The Netherlands 
and other Western European Countries (for an international comparison, see chapter 
4.4). Municipalities are no longer dependent on the landowners to provide the in­
frastructure, and the consequence has been that municipalities have increased their 
requirements. Another consequence has been a significant increase of private invest­
ments and an acceleration of urban development. Let us see this in more detail.
5.5.4.1 W h o  owns development rights in Valencia?
There is a distinction between infrastructure provision and the building. As men­
tioned, the infrastructure provision is a public task. The landowner (before the 1994 
Planning Act), or the urbanizing agent (after the 1994 Act), bears as concessionaire 
the responsibility to provide the public infrastructure and facilities, and to redistribute 
betterment and costs between the landowners. Following national planning law for 
the whole of Spain, the right to build belongs to the 'essence' of the contents of prop­
erty rights, and thus belongs to the landowner (see section 2.2.4.2). But this is not an 
unlimited right. The law and the binding rules limit these building rights. Landowners 
have no right to any kind of 'minimum', and they are obliged to apply and obtain the 
needed permits. Also, other legislation might even lead to the removal of the building 
rights (e.g. expropriation). Once the landowner is authorized to develop on his plot, 
and provided that the land has not been expropriated, he is the only one entitled to 
build on that plot and he can exclude others from doing so. So we must differentiate 
between the right to provide the infrastructure, which belongs to the public, and the 
right to build, which remains under the dominium of the landowner.
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Nevertheless, the fact that infrastructure provision is defined as a public task does 
not automatically mean that public bodies have all the powers to exercise it. Neither 
does it automatically mean that landowners have lost some of the powers over their 
property. By analysing who has the control over each of the transactions in infra­
structure provision, it has been possible to discern who has which development right 
in the infrastructure provision. The steps are: 1) land purchase and assembling, 2) 
financing and 3) land preparation and development.
5.5.4.2 Mutual dependence of municipalities and landowners before 1994
To analyse the consequences of steps 1-3 in the power-relationship between mu­
nicipalities and landowners, this research developed and applied a model of de­
pendence analysis (see table 11; for more details of the model, see chapter 3.1.1). 
Before the 1994 Act, municipalities depended heavily on the passive consent or ac­
tive collaboration of the developer/landowner to gather the land (step 1), gather the 
financial resources (step 2) and develop the land to produce serviced plots (step 3). 
The dependence was because the landowner/developer controlled two important 
resources: land and investment capacity. Moreover, this dependence was not easily 
avoidable. The land readjustment regulation relied on the support and active col­
laboration of a majority of the landowners: land readjustment took place only when 
the owners of at least 60% of the land constituted a joint development organisation, 
responsible for the infrastructure provision and redistributing betterment and costs. 
If a minority of landowners did not want to collaborate, the joint organisation was 
allowed to apply, after municipal approval, compulsory land readjustment. If the 
owners of 60% of the land were not even willing to take the initiative, municipalities 
could overrule all the landowners and take the lead, applying compulsory land read­
justment. Municipalities had the option also to acquire the land, through amicable 
agreement, through applying the pre-emption right (derecho de tanteo y retracto), or 
through expropriation. Public authorities are allowed in Spain and also in Valencia to 
expropriate land not only for the public infrastructure and facilities, but also for pri­
vate uses, i.e. for housing, office space, etc. There is no kind of 'self-realisation' right 
of the landowner6, who can prevent public authorities from expropriating the land. 
In Spain, municipalities are free to choose between land readjustment and expro­
priation; there is in planning and expropriation law no hierarchy that privileges one 
formula before the other. Expropriation was and still is a common way for sectorial 
regional and national public bodies to implement their policies (e.g. social housing, 
industrial areas). In theory thus, municipalities could avoid the dependence. Howev­
er, in practice municipalities usually applied neither compulsory land readjustment 
nor expropriation, because both meant a direct public involvement, including the 
corresponding risks, and were a sensitive matter politically.
On the other hand, the landowner depended on the municipality because of its regu­
latory powers of approving the binding rules and granting the building permit. This
6 'Self-realisation' is a common term in the Netherlands, see section 7.4.4.
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dependence also can be labelled as strong because it is not avoidable, as public bod­
ies are the only actors who can exercise these regulatory powers.
Table 11. Dependence analysis Valencia before 1994 Planning Act.
Dependence because 
of land
Dependence because 
of investment capacity
Dependence because 
of regulatory resources
M unicipality depends 
on the landowner/ 
developer
Dependence.
Developers/landown­
ers own most of the 
land. Dependence is 
only avoidable through 
public leading in land 
readjustment or expro­
priation. However, both 
options were not easy 
for municipalities.
Dependence.
Municipalities had in 
general not much finan­
cial resources to invest 
in public development, 
so the landowners/de­
velopers were the only 
ones who could invest.
Landowner/developer 
depends on 
m unicipality
Dependence.
The municipality ap­
proves the binding 
rules. Dependence is 
not avoidable.
The consequences in practice of this strong mutual dependency were significant. 
Landowners had the option of not agreeing with the contributions package or other 
requirements of the municipality. Since waiting can bear advantages, it was a favour­
able option to wait (see variable D2.2 in causal model section 2.4.2). As developers 
may not control all the land, and thus depend on other landowners, it took some 
time to reach an agreement with all the landowners about the desirable price of land. 
Land readjustment was an option only when the owners of more than sixty percent 
of the land support the plan. In practice, this was a high threshold. Success depended 
on the expectation that, by delaying negotiations, development profits would in­
crease in the future. Municipalities were confronted with developers that were not 
willing, and maybe not able, to agree to the required financing and implementation 
schedules. This affected the negotiating position of the local authorities and thus 
capturing value increase, as municipalities were forced to lower the contributions 
package if they wanted to reach an agreement. And anyway, this affected the speed of 
implementation, as under those circumstances landowners did not proceed quickly 
and the development was delayed.
Regarding the effects on the quality of the public infrastructure and facilities, con­
sulted about this, all the interviewed experts, public officers, developers and repre­
sentatives agreed that the 'old' land readjustment indeed did not function properly 
(Blanc, Roger, Rubio, Montiel, Muñoz, Cañellas, Escribano and Baño, interviews in
2006 and 2007):
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• Small development sites: sites were too narrow and small, just large enough to 
provide infrastructure for a few plots;
• Deficient public infrastructure and facilities: schemes included very minimal 
packages of public infrastructure; just the least needed to service the plots;
• Not real readjustment: most of the time, readjustment followed very much the 
will of landowners to receive building plots on their former property. Instead of 
following the most suitable parceling, readjustment adapted very much to the 
landowners' interests.
The result, all interviewed agreed, was an irregular, unordered, neither systematic 
nor logical urban growth of low quality and with scarce public infrastructure and 
facilities. For example, in the city of Valencia, it resulted in the 1980's in an urban 
periphery of low urban quality. It received the name 'buildings in the onion field' 
{edificios en campos de cebolla, see figures 17): buildings in the middle of deterio­
rated agricultural land, without proper public infrastructure.
Figures 17. Examples of the periphery of the City of Valencia in the 80s: (1) Nou Benicalap; 
(2) Beniferri; (3-4) Orriols; (5) Torrefiel {Copyright Demetrio Munoz, Nov 2006).
The consequences for the speed of implementation seem also to have been signif­
icant. In the 1980's, with the first democratically chosen local governments after 
Franco's dictatorship, many municipalities made General Plans that included high 
standards of public facilities and infrastructure. The goal was to reduce the scarcity
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of public facilities and infrastructure that was the inheritance of the previous, pre- 
democratic political regime and the inefficient application of the land readjustment 
regulation. The General Plans included large contributions from the landowners of 
those areas to be developed, and ambitious deadlines for the implementation. How­
ever, the implementation of these ambitious plans stagnated. It is clear that the reason 
for stagnation was the lack of will of a big enough majority of landowners to develop 
their land under the high level of contributions prescribed in the General Plans, re­
gardless of the quality of the plans. A consulted expert considered that these plans, 
although ambitious, were financially feasible, and that the attitude of the landown­
ers could not be excused by the fact that contributions were impossibly high (Blanc, 
interview 2006).
5.5.4.3 No mutual dependence of municipalities and landowners after 1994
After the introduction of the 1994 Act, there is no longer a mutual dependency, as 
the possibilities to take the steps 1-3 do not depend anymore on the landowner's pas­
sive consent or active collaboration, nor do municipalities need anymore to take the 
lead in land readjustment or to expropriate the land (see table 12). The landowner 
still controls two important resources: land and investment capacity. However, the 
municipalities now have the possibility of appointing a third party as urbanizing 
agent, and do not need to get financially involved in order to oblige landowners 
to collaborate with land readjustment. Neither are municipalities dependent on the 
urbanizing agent, as they can select him in a public tender, or select another one, or 
a public company. What remains is that landowners still depend on the municipal­
ity, because of its regulatory powers of approving the binding rules and granting the 
building permit.
All the studied cases demonstrated in this. The only exception seemed to be case Be­
nalúa, where the municipality seemed to depend very much on the collaboration of 
the owners of two flour-mill factories for the development of a small part of the site. 
This dependence seems to be of political nature, i.e. the Municipality of Alicante had 
in theory legal instruments to override these owners, but this seemed to be politically 
not feasible.
The consequences in practice of the modifications to the land readjustment regula­
tion have strengthened the negotiation position of the municipality, lowered the price 
of the land and the profit margins of landowners and developers, and quickened the 
tempo of implementation. Positive thus for the capturing of value increase: the avail­
able data provide generalizable knowledge about this (Blanc, 1997, 2003; Modrego 
2000; Muñoz & Korthals Altes, 2007: 69-73). The Valencian 1994 Act breaks through 
the previous pattern of landowners having the option of not sharing in the infrastruc­
ture provision and of speculating on better market conditions, by divesting landown­
ers of the option of waiting. Landowners can no longer service the plots whenever 
they consider it best. When a developer submits a proposal and the municipality 
approves it, the landowners must follow. The consequence was an extraordinary
Table 12. Dependence analysis Valencia after 1994 Planning Act. Un
K >
Dependence because of land Dependence because of investment and 
management capacity
Dependence because of regulatory resources
Municipality depends 
on the landowners
Dependence, avoidable.
Landowners have most of the land. However, 
dependence is avoidable without much difficulty 
because of the possibility of applying compulsory 
land readjustment, if necessary.
No dependence.
There is no municipal dependence on the 
landowners in this matter. The municipality can 
appoint a third party, the urbanizing agent, as the 
one who invest and provides the infrastructure.
Landowner depends 
on municipality
Dependence, not avoidable.
Landowners cannot develop without being select­
ed as urbanizing agent or without the Municipal­
ity selecting a third party as urb. agent.
Also, the municipality approves the binding rules. 
Dependence is not avoidable.
Municipality depends 
on urbanizing agent
No dependence.
There is no municipal dependence on the 
urbanizing agent in this matter. The municipality 
can appoint in a public tender another party as 
urbanizing agent, or select right away a public 
company as urbanizing agent.
Urbanizing agent 
depends on 
municipality
Dependence, not avoidable
Urbanizing agents depend on the municipality to 
apply compulsory land readjustment, if necessary.
Dependence, not avoidable.
Urbanizing agents cannot provide the infrastruc­
ture without being selected as urbanizing agent. 
Also, the municipality approves the relevant bind­
ing rules. Dependence is not avoidable.
Landowner depends 
on Urbanizing agent
Dependence, avoidable.
Landowners cannot invest and develop without 
the urbanizing agent first providing the infrastruc­
ture. Dependence is avoidable since landowners 
may submit an own plan and became them selves 
urbanizing agent.
Urbanizing agent 
depends on 
landowner
Dependence, avoidable.
Landowners control the land. However, depend­
ence is avoidable because of the possibility 
of applying compulsory land readjustment, if 
necessary.
No dependence.
There is no dependence on the landowners in this 
matter. If the municipality selects him as urban­
izing agent, he will be able to invest and provide 
the infrastructure, while the landowner is obliged 
to pay the costs.
V
alen
cia
Valencia 153
increase of public and especially private initiatives, and an acceleration of urban 
development. The improvement has not only been quantitative, but affected also the 
quality of the public infrastructure and facilities: the hitherto common subdivisions 
with a poor quality of infrastructure ceased.
Each of the four studied cases was the result of a private initiative, and the selected 
urbanizing agent was also a private party. In three cases a public tender took place 
between different proposals (four in Guillem, three in Camino and four in Benalúa). 
In three cases (Guillem , Benalúa and Periodista), the private party who first took the 
initiative (who submitted the first Programme) became the selected urbanizing agent. 
In all the cases the initiating party had no land or just part of the land, but once se­
lected, often bought land progressively.
The cases confirm that the possibility of selecting as urbanizing agent an 'external' 
developer, not linked to the landownership in the area, was a crucial factor. In Guil­
lem the plan area was owned by hundreds of persons. Also, many of these own­
ers were residents, or rented their property to tenants. It seems impossible that all 
these actors would have agreed a voluntary land readjustment. As one interviewed 
public officer states, the 'local' actors were not interested at all in redeveloping the 
area (Raga, interview 2006). It seems thus plausible to conclude that the possibil­
ity of 'by-passing' the landowners has been crucial for this project. Proara bought 
land once it had been selected, and when this developer submitted the Land Re­
adjustment Project to the municipality it owned already 30% of the land. Competi­
tion seems also to have stimulated the payment of additional contributions: dur­
ing the tender procedure Proara assumed an important part of the infrastructure 
provision costs, while following planning law these costs are for the landown­
ers. Also, Proara will pay additional compensation to the existing house owners.
In Periodista the situation was similar. It seems clear that here also the selection of 
an 'external' developer (Prodaemi), initially not linked to the landownership in the 
area, has been a crucial factor. Several private persons and companies owned the site, 
with economic activity in some of the buildings (a printing office). Landowners seem 
not to have been interested in redeveloping the area themselves, but only in selling 
their plots. The whole project came into being only after Prodaemi took the initiative. 
Asked about this, the developer stated that before the 1994 Act, developers in the 
same position as Prodaemi were regularly confronted with landowners asking very 
high prices, higher than the residual value of their plot. Their position was strong be­
cause the developer needed a voluntary agreement with all the owners. The 1994 Act 
gave developers such as Prodaemi the possibility of avoiding such situations. Compe­
tition seems also here to have stimulated additional contributions: Prodaemi will pro­
vide some infrastructure outside the plan area and will pay € 1.6m to the municipality.
In Camino the landowners of a majority of the land (about 10 landowners) became 
themselves urbanizing agent. However, the first initiative was from an external de-
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veloper, not linked to the landownership in the area, who submitted the first Pro­
gramme. Then, other parties, among them the owners, submitted alternative Pro­
grammes. Finally, the municipality, after considering in total four proposals, selected 
the Programme of the landowners. It seems clear that the possibility of appointing 
an external developer, with no land in the area, has been a crucial factor: landown­
ers would never have undertaken such an initiative, or at least this would have been 
delayed, if the external developer had not taken the initiative. Competition seems 
here also to have stimulated additional contributions: the urbanizing agent assumed 
important additional investments in the removal of existing industries, and the reha­
bilitation and free cession of several historic industrial buildings. Also, the municipal­
ity will receive almost € 4 million.
In Benalúa the situation is less clear. On the one hand, the owners of about 60% of 
the land joined together and submitted the first initiative, and were finally selected 
as urbanizing agent. Thus, in theory the old voluntary land readjustment regulation 
would have been enough. On the other hand, the fact is that the development proc­
ess started only after a small consultancy company, which had only about 15% of 
the land, undertook the initiative in early stages. The fact that it could do so without 
formally having the support of the other owners may have stimulated these other 
owners to join the initiative. The owners might have supported the initiative of the 
small consultancy company once they realized that the municipality could 'by-pass' 
them and appoint this small company as urbanizing agent.
5.5.5 Procedure for the preparation and approval of the binding 
rules
Summary of the findings
Municipalities must since 1994 make careful decisions about the development pro­
posals of market parties, and this seems to have stimulated private initiatives and 
accelerated urban development. However, the consequences for capturing value in­
crease might have been less favorable. Regarding the 'procedural' flexibility of the 
binding rules, i.e. the possibilities to modify the binding rules, and to freely deter­
mine the geographical scope (the plan area) of the binding rules, the findings are 
less conclusive. The relative difficulty in Valencia to modify and determine the geo­
graphical scope of the binding rules seems not to be relevant for the degree of private 
contributions to the unprofitable parts. That is, there seems not to be a clear causality 
between this sort of flexibility of the procedures and capturing value increase.
5.5.5.1 Guarantees for the initiative takers
Before the 1994 Act, developers were allowed to submit proposals of Detailed Plans, 
and municipalities could in theory not ignore that. To reject the proposal, the local 
council had to take a formal decision, otherwise the initiating party could appeal to 
the courts. However, it seems that in practice municipalities systematically did not
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fulfil these legal prescriptions, and developers went regularly to the judge. Judges 
often sentenced against municipalities, but the inconvenience for the developers to 
initiate long judicial processes did not compensate the benefits of doing so.
The 1994 Act has given to developers the possibility of initiating the procedure them­
selves, without having to wait for municipal consent: the developer submits the Pro­
gramme to the municipality and to an office of notary, publishes it, announces it, and 
deposits the Programme in that office. Anyone can submit objections or alternatives, 
but to the office of notary and not to the municipality. The procedure is fully organ­
ized and paid for by the private initiator. When the public consultation finishes, the 
developer submits the Programme and all the submitted objections and alternatives 
to the municipality, which further organizes the procedure and finally decides about 
the proposals. This possibility of 'private' public consultation through an office of 
notary has become a relatively frequent phenomenon: from 1995 until 1998, 25% of 
the Programmes followed this procedure (Modrego, 2000: 18, 22). Consulted about 
this, a relevant expert considered that, from 1998 onwards, this percentage may have 
increased very much (Blanc, interview 2007). 'Private' public consultation takes 
place more often in large cities than in small ones. Of the four studied cases, only in 
Periodista did the developer do this.
How has this novelty of the 1994 Act affected capturing value increase? The inter­
viewed expert considers that the possibility of 'private' public consultation has stimu­
lated private parties to undertake initiatives. The reason, the expert insisted, is that the 
discretional room of municipalities in the situation previous to the 1994 Planning Act 
created many uncertainties that developers had to deal with. Being able to force a 
formal procedure has allowed developers to reduce some uncertainties. Municipali­
ties are now obliged to evaluate formally and with publicity whether proposals are 
good or not, and to give elaborated arguments. This has increased the transparency 
of the municipal decisions and has reduced municipal discretion (Blanc, interview 
2007). This might have reduced the development costs, as uncertainty can translate 
into higher risks and risks into costs. Also it might have accelerated development 
processes, stimulating private parties to submit proposals, and avoiding municipal 
hesitation. However, it can have also a negative effect for capturing value increase: 
municipalities have now less elbowroom in the negotiations, and this might reduce 
contributions additional to the minimal legal package.
5.5.5.2 Inflexibility in modifying the existing binding rules
The only way of modifying, departing from or detailing existing binding rules in Va­
lencia is by approving new ones to replace them. There is no simplified procedure for 
this. Departing from the General Land use Plan, no matter how small the departure, 
requires the preparation of a new Detailed Plan. For example, in Guillem  the General 
Plan zoned a small plot for one floor, while this was technically speaking impossible. 
An Urban Renewal Plan covering the whole plan area was necessary to rezone that 
small plot into five floors. One might argue that this inflexibility can worsen the ne-
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gotiation position of municipalities. However, there are no indications that the rela­
tive inflexibility in modifying binding rules in Valencia has worsened public value 
capturing.
5.5.5.3 Inflexibility in determining, according to negotiations with land­
owners, the geographical scope (the plan area) of the binding rules
There are in Valencia rigid legal criteria for the delimitation of plan areas, and these 
make it very difficult to negotiate separately with each owner about the conditions for 
rezoning. As a result, plan areas have to be of certain dimensions, covering at least 
several plots. It is not impossible for a binding plan to cover just one plot. However, 
then we are talking about plots of at least 2,000-3,000 m2, which fulfil detailed legal 
criteria. In practice, it seems that municipalities follow the legal criteria very strictly. 
There is clearly not much room to negotiate individually with each landowner, al­
though we do not deny that this happens for very specific cases (although this was 
not the case in any of the studied cases). The smallest of the studied cases was Perio­
dista, with a plan area of 0.6 ha and more than ten initial parcels.
This remarkable inflexibility of the Valencian binding rules, when compared with 
England and The Netherlands, seems however not to have weakened the negotiation 
position of the municipality. There is no indication that this sub-variable has influ­
enced capturing value increase. The reason is that another sub-variable, the modifi­
cations in 1994 to the land readjustment regulation, actually eliminates the need for 
an agreement with each individual landowner (see chapter 5.5.4). In other words, 
due to the modifications in 1994 of the land readjustment regulation, this sub-varia­
ble (inflexibility to size the plan area) has apparently become irrelevant.
5.6 The actual degree of captured value increase in 
Valencia
This section focuses on whether the goals for capturing value increase are achieved. 
Also, it looks at the actual distribution of costs between the involved parties: who has 
paid which public infrastructure and facilities, and possibly some extras? We look 
also at whether the capturing value increase goals have been achieved on time. The 
main sources of information are the four cases, complemented with other written 
sources and interviews with relevant experts. The conclusions are set out in Table 13.
On-site infrastructure provision costs
A basic principle of the Spanish planning system is that urban development can take 
place only if the landowners (whether or not they are also the urbanizing agent) 
assume all the on-site infrastructure provision costs. Also, the full ownership of the 
resulting infrastructure must be ceded free of charge to the municipality. Based on the
Table 13. Comparison table results on captured value increase in Valencia.
On-site land development costs Land for on-site 
public infrastructure
Land for on-site 
public buildings
On-site public buildings Affordable housing Contributions 
off-site public 
infrastructure 
and facilities
Cream off value 
added
Landowners Public body Landowners Public body Landowners Public body Urbanizing
agent
Public body Landowners Public body
General 
knowledge 
region Valencia
All or almost ail 
these costs
No
(only if 
receiving 
building rights)
Almost all 
the land
That land 
that was al­
ready public 
infrastructure
Almost 
all the land
That land that 
was already 
public infra
Sometimes Al most 
always
Almost all Subject
subsidies
Landowners 
cede signifi­
cant quantities 
of land, and 
sometimes pay 
construction.
10% building 
volume in De­
velopable land, 
often money
Guillem de 
Anglesola
(total value build­
ing plots €9.4m)6
€2.7m
(30% total value 
building plots)
No. 45% 29% was al­
ready public 
infra
No No No No 30% total 
housing units
80% total 
housing units
Subject
subsidies
Subject
subsidies
Landowners 
cede much 
land for main 
road and pay 
construction 
together with 
developer (incl 
in On-site land 
dev costs)
Nothing
Periodista Gil
(total value build­
ing plots €3m)
€4m (125% 
total value 
building plots)
No. 44%
About 70%  
About 79%
No.
A  small part 
was already 
public infra
No.
No No No No Nothing € 1.6m (53% 
total value 
building plots)
Camino Hondo
(total value build­
ing plots €95m)
€10.6m (11 %  
total value 
building plots)
€0.6m
(1 %  total value 
building plots)
No No Rehabilitation/ 
free cession 
buildings, 
ca. € 1 5m.
Extension
existing
school
No No Landowners 
pay € 1 68.01 0 
for construction 
road alongside 
dev site
Landowners 
cede 54.398 m2 
of land and pay 
about € 400,000 
for pipelines 
and other under, 
infra.
€ 4m (4% total 
value building 
plots)
Benalúa Sur
(total value build­
ing plots €92.5m)
€7.7m (8.3% 
total value 
building plots)
€0.25 
(0.2% total 
value building 
plots)
20%
(including a 
school)
No No New school No No 17% total build­
ing volume
Grey: case in which the developer/landowner contributes the most of the four cases.
Light Grey: case in which the developer/landowner contributes the second/third of the four cases. 
White: case in which the developer/landowner contributes the less of the four cases.
7 'Total value building plots' are the total returns accruing from selling serviced building plots (thus excludes the posterior selling of the new buildings).
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studied cases and on the interviews with experts, it is possible to conclude that this 
is also the case in practice. Only when the municipalities receive building rights they 
do contribute to these costs, as any other landowner would. If municipalities must 
contribute, they do not usually pay in money but in building rights. In Guillem  and in 
Periodista, the municipality will not receive building rights, so it does not contribute. 
In Camino, the municipality owns about 5%  of the land (excl. public infrastructure), 
so will contribute 5%  of the costs. In Benalúa the municipality does not own land 
but receives some of the building rights thanks to legal prerogatives, and thus pays a 
contribution. These findings are generalizable to all comprehensive urban regenera­
tion and greenfield projects on private owned land in the region of Valencia, but not 
to projects where public bodies intervene directly (through expropriation, a minority) 
nor to very specific strategic interventions (airports, motorways, railways, etc).
Land needed for on-site public infrastructure and facilities
The mentioned basic principle prescribes also that urban development can take 
place only if the landowners provide freely all the land needed for on-site public 
infrastructure and facilities. The exception is land that was already on-site public 
infrastructure (i.e., if the land is already public, landowners do not have to buy it 
and cede it freely). Landowners must cede land not only for roads and public space, 
but also for other public facilities, such as schools, sport installations, kindergartens, 
parks, municipal offices, police station, although the building costs of these are, in 
principle, paid by the respective public body (see below). The full ownership of the 
land is ceded freely to the municipality. Public infrastructure and facilities are stand­
ardized in planning law, and between fifty and eighty-five percent of the total plan 
area is used for public infrastructure and facilities. In general these figures are higher 
in greenfield developments than in urban regeneration. In the cases studied this was 
between 44% and 79%. These conclusions have the same external validity (general- 
izability) as the above-mentioned infrastructure provision costs.
On-site public facilities (the buildings)
As mentioned, landowners cede freely the land needed for public facilities, also for 
public buildings. The development of these public buildings has, in principle, to be 
paid by the respective public body. However, based on the interviews, it seems that 
in practice sometimes private parties also pay for the public buildings. All the inter­
viewed experts and representatives of interest groups agree in this. However, precise 
figures are not available. It is also not clear whether the costs are borne mainly by 
the landowners or by the urbanizing agent/landowner. Of the cases we studies, only 
in Camino will private parties pay for public buildings: the urbanizing agent will 
cede freely and rehabilitate several historic industrial buildings which will be used 
for public functions.
Land and money for on-site and off-site social/affordable housing
The costs of developing social/affordable housing are mostly borne by the landown­
ers. These landowners bear the costs by providing cheap land, for a regulated price
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of about € 120-150/m2 floor space (figures of 2006). Because the market price of 
serviced building plots for free-market housing is much higher (€ 300-1,100/m2 floor 
space, depending on the location) we could speak of a form of subsidizing the land 
price, borne by all landowners together. Thanks to this cheap price, commercial or 
non-profit developers can develop affordable housing and profit from it. The cen­
tral and regional governments also finance a little, through a subject subsidy (to the 
buyer) in the form of a subsidy to the mortgage interest and sometimes a lump sum.
In two cases there was affordable housing: in Guillem  about 1/3 of the dwellings, in 
Periodista most of them. The following figures show that developing social/afford­
able housing actually involves a financial charge for the landowners. In Guillem  the 
infrastructure provision costs of the affordable units amount to about € 0.97 million, 
and the regulated value of the plots € 0.69 million. The balance of the project will 
thus not only bear the difference between the regulated value and the free-market 
value, but also a shortage of about € 0.28 million (this is the regulated value minus 
the costs). In Periodista infrastructure provision costs amount to about € 3.2 million, 
and the regulated price of the plots € 1 million (shortage of about € 2.2 million). The 
landowners must in both cases bear these costs, plus their land costs (the price they 
paid for the land plus the financial costs).
It seems that cases Guillem  and Periodista are not representative for practice in the 
last decennium. It is clear that since the end of the 90's, the building of affordable 
housing has decreased in Valencia and in the rest of Spain also. In the first years of 
the 21th Century, less than 10% of all new dwellings were affordable housing (see 
section 5.5.2.2). However, in the last years, there is a tendency for this to increase. 
Cases Guillem  and Periodista could be representative of this tendency.
Land and money for off-site public infrastructure and facilities
Regarding public infrastructure and facilities situated outside the plan area, these 
are the findings. All development sites situated on land classified as 'Land to be 
developed' have, since the end of the 80's, been ascribed a piece of off-site public 
infrastructure and facilities situated somewhere else in the municipal territory. The 
owners of the land thus ascribed shared the building rights of the development sites 
and, in exchange, ceded freely their land. In general, the respective public body 
(municipality, provincial, regional or national government) pays the construction of 
these off-site public infrastructure and facilities. In case Benalúa, the municipality 
obtained thanks to this measure 5.5 ha of land situated far away from the develop­
ment site. Although there are not available figures for the whole region, interviews 
and some specific figures seem to support the generalizability of the findings in Be­
nalúa. In the cities of Valencia and Alicante, since the end of the 80's, almost all the 
land needed for new main public infrastructure and facilities has been ceded freely. 
In Valencia, in total about 230 ha have been ceded freely to the municipality. For 
example, the land for the extension of the cemetery and a part of the land for the 
new University of Valencia. In the city of Alicante, about 52 ha of land have been
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ceded freely to the municipality through the same system. The examples of these 
cities seem to be representative (Roger, Blanc, Raga, Escribano, Muñoz & Cañellas, 
Baño, interviews 2006).
There are also cases of public infrastructure and facilities situated within the develop­
ment site but serving a wider area. Case Guillem  includes within the development 
site a main road that we consider off-site infrastructure because it serves a much wid­
er area than the development site itself. The landowners will cede freely the land for 
this main road. Also, the landowners and the urbanizing agent will pay the construc­
tion costs of this road (these costs are included above in the on-site land development 
costs). In Camino, landowners contribute to the costs of a road situated alongside the 
development site that serves a wider area. Another developer constructed this road 
several years ago and claimed a contribution from our development site. In Benalúa 
landowners will pay most of the costs of several new pipelines and underground in­
frastructure that belong to the general system of the city.
Consulted about this, interviewed experts considered that these cases are not unu­
sual: land for main infrastructure serving an area wider but situated within the de­
velopment site is often ceded freely, and landowners/urbanizing agents often pay 
the construction costs also (Roger, Blanc, Rubio, Escribano, interviews 2006). It is 
however not clear whether the landowners or the urbanizing agent pay most of the 
construction costs in general.
Creaming off plus value
The constitutional principle, that allows municipalities to capture part of the surplus 
that arises in urban development (for more details about this principle, see section 
5.3.1), materializes in two ways:
First, where there is 'Land to be developed', municipalities have the right to 10% 
of the building rights. Landowners are obliged to cede freely to the municipality the 
serviced building parcels that are needed to build 10% of the total building rights. 
Urban regeneration usually takes place on 'Existing Urban Land', rather than on 
'Land to be developed', which means that in urban regeneration municipalities do 
not usually profit from this provision. The cases seem to confirm this general picture: 
of the four cases, only Benalúa includes 'Land to be developed'. In general, on 'Land 
to be developed', it seems that municipalities receive indeed about 10% of the total 
building rights. However, although 10% of building rights can in theory turn out to be 
more than 10% of the real building volume, this does not seem to happen often. Case 
Benalúa, where the municipality has right to the 17% of the building rights, seems 
to be an exception. In general, it seems that municipalities often use these building 
rights to pay for public infrastructure and public buildings, instead of depositing the 
building rights in the Municipal Patrimony of Land, as they in theory should. Case 
Benalúa confirms this; here the municipality will use at least an important part of its 
17% to pay its share of the infrastructure provision costs.
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Second, sometimes landowners/urbanizing agents pay extra financial contributions 
to the municipality. There are no available figures about how often this happens. In 
cases Camino and Periodista, the municipality received important contributions in 
money.
Tempo of implementation of the capturing value increase goals
Sections 5.5 and 5.6 (so far) have analyzed the working of binding rules and the re­
sults on capturing value increase. What are the possible side effects, in particular the 
tempo of implementation of the capturing value increase goals? A certain measure 
might be good to increase the contribution of developers to public infrastructure 
and facilities, but might also delay negotiations. Or vice versa: a certain measure 
might not directly increase contributions, but accelerate negotiations and thus help 
to realize sooner the public infrastructure and facilities. A distinction has been made 
between the situation before and after the introduction of the 1994 Planning Act.
In general, it seems that before the 1994 Act the goals for capturing value increase 
aimed at in the binding rules (the public infrastructure and facilities and some cream­
ing off added value) were indeed implemented, but with considerable delay. For 
example, the deadlines included in General Plans turned out to be systematically 
neglected in practice (Romero, 2002: 336, 339; Muñoz & Korthals Altes, 2007). The 
1988 General Plan of the city of Valencia foresaw a total expansion area of 700 ha, 
all to be developed within the period 1989-1996. However, in practice, only one 
site (Avenida de Francia) was actually developed before 1995. In the city of Alicante, 
the 1987 General Plan foresaw a total expansion area of almost 200 ha, all to be 
developed within the period 1988-1995. However, in practice, only few sites were 
actually developed before 1995 (Gascó, 2006). The same happened with the finan­
cial schedules prescribed in the General Plan for all the cases, and with the deadlines 
prescribed, also in the General Plan, for case Benalúa.
The 1994 Act has had important consequences in practice. General figures show that 
development processes have accelerated very much, both in greenfield and urban re­
generation. For example, the process of approving the Detailed Plan (from submitting 
the first proposal up to the municipal decision) decreased from between three to five 
years before 1994, to between three and seven months in the period between 1994 
and 1998. The process from municipal approval to the delivery of serviced building 
parcels took an average of 33 months in 1998 (Modrego Caballero, 2000), which was 
much longer before. Unfortunately, the regional government stopped collecting data 
in 1998. All the indications, however, suggest that development processes between 
1998 and 2006 have continued to be very fast (see Gascó 2006 for recent figures in 
the municipality of Alicante).
It seems that the investment and implementation schedules are implemented on time. 
These schedules are no longer included in the General Plans, but in the Joint Devel­
opment Programmes, and they are now always secured in a Development Agree-
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ment. General figures up to 1998 suggest that the schedules contained in the Pro­
grammes are most of the time achieved, without delay (Modrego Caballero, 2000). 
These general figures refer to the definitive approval of Programmes, not to their 
actual implementation. However, it is very plausible that approval of Programmes 
implies also their actual implementation. This is because Programmes must include a 
Development Agreement that secures the financing and investment schedules. Also, 
the Agreement must include economic sanctions in case of not fulfilling the sched­
ules.
Investments also have increased very much since 1994. A combined effect of ac­
celeration and increase of investments has been an increase in the number of de­
velopment sites: from an average of forty each year between 1990 and 1994, to 59 
in 1995, 135 in 1996, 221 in 1997, and 242 in 19988 (Modrego, 2000; Muñoz & 
Korthals Altes, 2007). Although the figures show an increase in public initiatives (i.e. 
public bodies acting as urbanizing agents), most of this increase has been due to pri­
vate investments (i.e. private parties acting as urbanizing agents). There is no indica­
tion that the trend has changed between 1998 and 2006 (see Gascó 2006 for recent 
figures in the municipality of Alicante). The stagnation of urban development that 
followed the approval of the ambitious General Plans of the 1980's has disappeared. 
The cities of Valencia and Alicante are good examples: the General Plans of 1988 
respectively 1987 have almost all been implemented with high standards of public 
facilities and infrastructure. Based on interviews (Raga, Rubio, interviews in 2006), it 
is also possible to conclude for at least the city of Valencia that there has been a sig­
nificant increase of private initiatives and an acceleration also in urban regeneration, 
mainly concentrated on rezoning former industrial sites into housing.
However, the information collected in January 2010 suggests that, since about 2008, 
implementation schedules might be suffering delay:
• In Benalúa infrastructure provision commenced on time, and in January 2010 it 
was not yet finished. The deadline for completion is the summer of 2010. It is 
uncertain whether a small part of the plan area, which includes two active indus­
tries, will be finally redeveloped.
• Camino has commenced the infrastructure provision on time: the demolition 
of existing buildings started in 2007 and in January 2010 the historic industrial 
buildings are being refurbished. However, it is uncertain whether infrastructure 
will be finished before the deadline of Augustus 2011 because the urbanizing 
agent (a commercial developer who bought most of the land after the plan was 
definitively approved and the Development Agreement already sealed) went 
bankrupt and a bank has taken over the property.
• In Guillem  and Periodista, although the urbanizing agents initiated the land re­
adjustment procedure, there are serious delays in the definitive approval of the
8 The figure for 1998 is an extrapolation based on real figures for the 1st trimester, so possible increases 
in the 2nd, 3rd and 4th trimesters have not been considered.
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land readjustment. This makes uncertain the achievement of the deadlines for 
the completion of infrastructure provision (November 2010 respectively May 
2013), especially for Guillem.
These case-base findings (that since 2008 in some of the cases the infrastructure 
provision is being delayed) might be generalizable to other schemes in the region of 
Valencia (cfr. Interview with Raga, 2010).
5.7 Causal relationships between formal rules relevant 
to zoning and capturing value increase in Valencia
Section 5.5 answered Preparatory research question 3: it inferred the possible causal 
relations between the independent variable 'formal rules relevant to zoning' and the 
dependent variable 'capturing value increase'. This section summarizes the inferred 
causalities. Then it assesses the influence of possible third variables.
5.7.1 The inferred causalities
The findings suggest that the following sub-variables can influence positively or nega­
tively the degree of capturing value increase (see also the causal model in section
2.4.2 and figure 18):
• Sub-variable a, Uncertainty about the future building possibilities, together 
with Certainty about the future contributions: this seems to lower intermediary 
variables accounted land costs, regular profit margins (of the developer) and 
strengthen the negotiation position (of the municipality), i.e. positive for captur­
ing value increase;
• Sub-variable b, Contents of the binding rules: (1) Zoning land as Land to be 
developed-class; (2) Zoning land for social/affordable housing; (3) Ascribing off­
site infrastructure to the development site; all three seem to have been positive 
for capturing value increase, probably because they have lowered intermediary 
variables accounted land costs, regular profit margins (of the developer) and 
strengthened negotiation position (of the municipality);
• Sub-variable b, Contents of the binding rules: (4) Agreeing additional contribu­
tions; it seems to be positive for intermediary variable negotiation position (of 
the municipality);
• Sub-variable c, Conditioning binding rules to agreement: the 1994's novelty of 
introducing a formal obligation to make the approval of binding rules condition­
al on securing the public infrastructure and facilities and other possible contri­
butions: this seems to have been positive for capturing value increase, plausibly
Actions influencing distribution initial profit (D):
1. Public bodies using powers certainly:
- Sub-variable a: uncertainty-certainty -----
—^> - Sub-variable b/ contents binding rules: 1-3
—^> - Sub-variable b / contents binding rules: 4,
additional contributions ----------------
->
- Sub-variable b/ contents binding rules: 5, 
ad hoc document
- Sub-variable c: conditioning binding rules -------
2. Owners using property rights (sub-variable d) -----
3. Public bodies using powers procedure
- Sub-variable e: guarantees for those taking initiative
- Sub-variable e: inflexibility 
modification/departing/detailment binding rules
- Sub-variable e: inflexibility sizing plan area
Final profit
A
Accounted land costs 
Regular profit margins 
->> Inflated development costs
A
-^> Négociation position 
->> Delay
Independent variable > < Intermediary variable :
-> CAPTURINGVALUE INCREASE
< Dependent variable >
Figure 18. Scheme of the inferred causal relations in Valencia between independent variable 'formal rules relevant to zoning', the intermediary
variables and the dependent variable 'capturing value increase'.
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through reinforcing the positive effects of sub-variables b on intermediary vari­
ables accounted land costs, regular profit margins (of the developer) and nego­
tiation position (of the municipality); and a direct positive effect on intermediary 
variable delay;
• Sub-variable d, Property rights: the 1994's modifications of the land readjust­
ment regulation: this seems to have been positive for both capturing value in­
crease and the tempo of implementation. The causal links works plausibly by 
being positive for intermediary variables delay, negotiation position (of the mu­
nicipality), accounted land costs and regular profit margins (of the developer);
• Sub-variable e, Guarantees for those taking initiative: the 1994's novelty of al­
lowing initiating parties to initiate the procedure: this seems to have been posi­
tive for intermediary variables delay and inflated development costs, but nega­
tive for intermediary variable negotiation position (of the municipality).
The findings also suggest that the following sub-variables might not affect the degree 
of capturing value increase:
• Sub-variable b/Contents of the binding rules: (5) the 1994's novelty of including 
the financing and implementation schedules of public infrastructure and facili­
ties in an ad hoc plan document: this seems not to be relevant;
• Sub-variable e, Inflexibility in the modification/departure/detailing of binding 
rules: this seems not to be relevant;
• Sub-variable e, Inflexibility in adapting the size of the plan area of the binding 
rules according to negotiations with each landowner: this seems not to be relevant.
Sub-variables b/1-4 (contents binding rules), c (Conditioning binding rules to agree­
ment) and d (Property rights) are intimately related to each other. It seems that they 
are consecutively and causally related to each other, in an inverse order. The modi­
fications to property rights introduced in the 1994 Act (sub-variable d) have gener­
alized the use of development agreements (sub-variable c). And this seems to have 
stimulated the effectiveness of the contributions included in the binding rules (sub­
variable b/1-4). See the respective sections for more detail.
5.7.2 Possible third variables
Here the effect of other, possible third, variables is assessed, related first to the spe­
cific circumstances in the studied cases (variables D4 and D5 of the causal model in 
section 2.4.2), and second to market circumstances (variable A1). The goal is to ex­
amine the possibility that the inferred causal relationships turn out to be spurious cor­
relations (see section 3.2.1.2 for more detail about this methodological approach).
Specific circumstances in the studied cases
In Periodista the developer considers that the quality of the plan has accelerated 
implementation because nobody has submitted objections, but this does not seem
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to be a strong argument. Also, the developer says that since the municipality added 
extra requirements to the original Programme, he will have to fill the gap with his 
own resources. This third variable (having access to own resources to cover an even­
tual financial deficit) might explain part of the success of this project. In Camino the 
interviewed developer mentioned a third variable that can delay development. In 
the southern part of the plan area, railway wires have to be dismantled. The railway 
company belongs to the central government in Madrid, so it could take a long time 
to get the needed permits. In Benalúa the developers consider that the slow function­
ing of the Municipality of Alicante has delayed the process greatly. The interviewed 
public officer agreed with some of these criticisms, but stated that some delay has 
been caused by the developers themselves. It seems also that in Benalúa, appeals to 
the courts against the Land Readjustment Project might delay the infrastructure provi­
sion. In Guillem  the large number of owners, tenants and inhabitants of the houses to 
be demolished has delayed the public participation processes of both the Programme 
and later on of the Land readjustment Project.
In short, except maybe in Periodista, in none of the cases did the interviewed per­
sons or our analysis of the facts support the idea that specific aspects (regarding the 
involved local politicians, public officers or developers, or regarding any other as­
pect) might have influenced significantly the positive outcomes on the actual degree 
of captured value increase. On the other hand, specific circumstances might have 
delayed three of the cases.
Market circumstances
In section 5.5 several causalities have been inferred between some modifications in 
the 1994 Act and the improvement of capturing value increase and the acceleration 
of development that has been experienced from 1995 onwards. Some argue that the 
changes after 1995 might be more related to the rise in housing prices than to the 
1994 Act itself. This third variable, housing prices (variable A1 in causal model sec­
tion 2.4.2), can affect capturing value increase (because it influences intermediary 
variable 'Initial profits' and might thus influence also 'Final profit', in other words, 
it creates financial room for more contributions) and the speed of implementation 
(more profits attract more investments, and remove obstacles). This research con­
cludes however that the influence of housing prices has not been so significant as 
to make the inferred causal relationships spurious. In other words, housing prices 
might have been relevant third variables, but have not caused all the changes after
1995. Let us see first the available general knowledge and second the case-based 
findings.
In the whole region of Valencia, prices of all housing (new & existing stock) and 
of new housing decreased in real terms between 1990 and 1997. Only in 1999 
did prices begin to increase significantly. These figures are similar in the cities of 
Alicante and Valencia (see figure 19). This recession in housing markets (1990-99)
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coincided with the increase in urban development. So, at least between 1995 and 
1998, development processes accelerated and investments grew while real hous­
ing prices decreased or increased very modestly, i.e. when the expectations of land 
value increases were modest. It is possible to conclude that there is not a direct 
causal relationship between changing housing prices and the general acceleration of 
development processes and growth of investments, at least in the first years after the 
introduction of the 1994 Act (Blanc, 1997: 265).
Figure 19. Growth real prices (minus general monetary inflation) dwellings Region of Valencia
and cities of Valencia and Alicante.
The findings of the cases fit within this general conclusion. The procedure (sub­
mission Programme) of Camino started in 2003, and of Periodista in 2005, when 
housing markets in the city of Valencia were already expanding (7% price rise all 
housing, above general monetary inflation in 1999 and 2000, 9%  in 2001, 14% in 
2002 and 16% in 2003). However, the procedures for the other two cases started 
under less positive expectations. The procedure of Guillem  started in May 1999, 
the first year of significant price rise of new housing (7%). The preparation of the 
Programme started earlier, in times of a 'bad' housing market (1 %  rise in 1997 and 
4%  in 1998), and it is not clear whether the developer in Guillem  was aware of the 
promising future. In the city of Alicante, Benalúa started the procedure in 1998, 
when prices of new housing decreased in real terms by 0.4% and prices of all hous­
ing increased in real terms by only 2%. Programmes include detailed and quasi­
definitive investment and implementation schedules, also a draft of Development 
Contract, so financial feasibility must be clear before submission. The interviewed
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developers insisted that profits at that time were large enough to cover infrastruc­
ture provision costs9.
In all four cases, both the interviewed developer and public officer agreed that the 
projects would have been financially feasible also in times of decreasing or modestly 
rising housing prices. Moreover, development seems less sensitive to market circum­
stances since the modification in 1994 of the Valencian land readjustment. For the 
new regulation has lowered the risks for developers:
• No need to own land: the Valencian formula allows developers to develop with­
out the need of buying (all) the land. Indeed, the initiating developers owned 
initially (before municipal approval of the Programme) no land in Periodista and 
none in Camino. In Guillem  the developer had just a little land, and in Benalúa 
the developer consisted of several existing firms that had owned the land for 
a long time and a consultancy company that had bought some land for a low 
price. In Camino the selected developer consisted of several existing firms that 
had owned the land for a long time. Thus, initially, the initiating parties had al­
most no need to invest in acquiring land, only in preparing the Programme.
• Landowners are obliged to contribute to the infrastructure provision costs: thus, 
in case of poor market conditions, developers were assured of the financing of 
the infrastructure provision. Payment of contributions in building rights seems to 
follow prudent market appraisals, and in case of expropriation the compensation 
is based on the former use of the land, not of the future one: thus, if landown­
ers chose for payment in kind or for expropriation, developers were assured of 
building rights for a relatively low price. In case of good market conditions, as 
actually happened since 1999 onwards, developers were in a privileged posi­
tion to buy land and building rights in the area. This is what actually happened, 
and in Nov 2006 the four urbanizing agents owned already almost all the land/ 
building rights.
• The initiating developer commits himself to provide the infrastructure within 
the estimated budget, and the landowners pay for it. So he bears the risks only 
of exceeding the budget. The costs of plans preparation and of infrastructure 
provision are quite predictable, and price rises are around the general monetary 
inflation.
• In Guillem  and Periodista the Programme included 50% respectively 80% af­
fordable housing. Affordable housing is a profitable product and the risk is low, 
provided that the developer can acquire the land for an affordable housing-price
9 At the time of data gathering, end of 2006, the prices of new housing in the free market in the City 
of Valencia varied from about € 2,000 to 3,000 per m2 floor space, depending on the location. 
The average price per m2 floor space in the city of Valencia was in the last trimester of 2006 for 
new housing € 2,561 and for second hand housing € 1,932, and the average price for both new 
and second hand € 2,058 (Ministerio Vivienda, Base general, consulted at on line site Generalitat 
Valenciana, visited on 24 January 2010, http://www.cma.gva.es/ovv_estadisticas). In another source 
the average price new and second hand is € 2,003 (Source Colegio de Registradores, in Observatorio 
Valenciano de la Vivienda, Informe annual de coyuntura del sistema de indicadores 2008, Informe 
nr. 5, April 2009, p. 22).
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(about € 125-150/m2 floor space), which was guaranteed here through the land 
readjustment.
In almost all the cases, developers assumed contributions in the course of the plan­
ning process, additional to those additional contributions already included in the 
Programme as initially submitted. It is likely that this third variable (rising housing 
prices) has stimulated the negotiation of these extra contributions after the submis­
sion of the Programme and before the sealing of the Development Agreement. For 
example, in Benalúa the municipality and the regional government made several 
important extra requirements during the long process of approving the Programme. 
First the regional government demanded the conservation and rehabilitation of two 
old industrial chimneys, which required extra costs and the modification of the plan. 
Second, the municipality demanded a contribution towards the plan preparation and 
off-site infrastructure costs, which initially it was going to pay itself. In Guillem  the 
municipality introduced after the initial approval of the Programme an extra require­
ment: the developer had to pay part of the infrastructure provision costs, costs that 
following planning law should be paid by the landowners. In Periodista the mu­
nicipality reduced the building volume and in Camino the municipality doubled the 
infrastructure provision costs.
In sum, the increase in housing prices cannot explain on its own why the developers 
submitted the Programmes. It might have been an important stimulant, especially in 
Periodista and Camino, but the financial feasibility of the proposals did not depend 
on expanding market circumstances. Furthermore, the increase in housing prices can 
explain on their own part of the additional contributions: those extra contributions not 
included in the submitted versions of the Programmes and agreed afterwards, during 
the procedure and before the sealing of the Development Agreements. Also, the in­
crease in housing prices explains why in Periodista and Camino the developer decided 
not to refuse to sign the Development Agreement, despite the fact that the municipal­
ity introduced costly modifications long after the initial approval of the Programme.
Last developments since 2008
It seems however that the bad circumstances in the housing markets since the end of
2007 are stimulating and often forcing developers to delay many urban development 
schemes. Many developers have gone into bankruptcy or had no choice other than 
to pass over the property to the banks, as case Camino shows. This is a third variable 
of the type A1 in causal model section 2.4.2. It seems that many urbanizing agents, 
confronted with the bad market circumstances, are trying to delay the implementa­
tion (i.e. the achievement of the deadlines included in the Development Agreements) 
through delaying the administrative procedure of land readjustment. Although mu­
nicipalities have powers to force implementation (including a bank guarantee of at 
least 7%  of the infrastructure provision costs, a guarantee that following planning law 
must be included in the Development Agreement), it seems that municipalities are 
not fully using them (cfr. interview Raga, 2010). This is third variable D5.

In the last decennia, public bodies in England have been seeking a larger involve­
ment from commercial developers in the financing of the unprofitable parts of com­
prehensive urban regeneration schemes. An old statutory provision gives, since 1932, 
local planning authorities the power to require private contributions towards public 
infrastructure and facilities. Since the 1970's, this provision has been enlarged and 
can include nowadays a wide variety of private contributions. Stimulated by the cen­
tral government, local authorities are developing systematic policy for these contri­
butions.
Frame 6a
The institutional context: United Kingdom, England, the regions and the local public 
bodies
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (from now on UK) is a 
country made up of four constituent countries: England (50.7m inhabitants), Scotland 
(5m), Wales (3m) -the three of which form together Great Britain- and Northern Ireland 
(1.7m). The UK is a unitary state with a system of constitutional parliamentary monar­
chy. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland each has its own parliament or assembly. 
England does not, and is ruled directly by the UK government.
England is subdivided into nine regions. Regions are subdivided into metropolitan 
counties (including Greater London), and non-metropolitan counties. Counties are of­
ten subdivided into districts or boroughs. This leads sometimes to a double tier of local 
government, with a County Council and a District Council (Cullingworth & Nadin, 
2006: 64-65). In this case, both the county and the district are Local Planning Authori­
ties (LPA). Other 'sectoral' or ad hoc organizations can be Local Planning Authorities
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also, such as National Park authorities, Urban Development Corporations and the Ur­
ban Regeneration Agency. The City of Bristol, where the studied cases come from, is a 
unitary authority, a county with a single-tier governmental structure (a district council), 
and therefore only one LPA (Moore, 2005: 26-27, 31-32).
The planning policies of regional and local governmental bodies are subordinated to 
the law and policies of the UK government. Subordination of planning legislation is 
guaranteed through the 'parent acts': the laws of the UK Parliament that delegate leg­
islative powers to other bodies and set out the principles, rules and procedures under 
which delegated legislative powers can be exercised. Almost all the UK legislation on 
any field is made under delegated powers: regulations, orders, directions, rules and 
by-laws, all collectively known as 'Statutory Instruments' (Williams & Wood, 1994: 
67-68).
Subordination of planning policies is guaranteed by the obligation of local and re­
gional authorities to comply with policy guidance of the UK government. Policy guid­
ance consists of policy statements that cannot be considered as legislation: they have 
no statutory consequences. However, they are very important in defining and detailing 
the way in which planning legislation has to be applied. They reflect how the UK gov­
ernment considers that planning legislation should be interpreted and implemented. 
Since the UK government plays a quasi-judicial role of arbitration in conflicts between 
local planning authorities and developers, national policy guidance has a quasi-leg­
islative function. It plays a very important role in practice, and may be referred to in 
any judicial review. Also, the policy guidance documents include the results of judicial 
scrutiny. There are two sorts of policy guidance documents (Williams & Wood, 1994: 
68; Evans & Davoudi, 2005: 25): 'Circulars' or 'Policy Guidance notes', related to 
planning control decisions; and 'Planning Policy Guidance notes' (PPGs) and 'Miner­
als Policy Guidance notes' (MPGs), related to the preparation and contents of zoning 
plans. Since 2004, PPGs are being gradually replaced by Planning Policy Statements 
(PPS).
For a list of relevant legislation and policy guidance, related to planning, see Annex 3.
Sections 6.1 and 6.2 introduce the context in which value increase is captured 
in urban regeneration. Section 6.3 introduces the studied cases. Section 6.4 de­
scribes the working of formal rules relevant to zoning within the value capturing 
mechanisms. This is the answer to Preparatory research question 3: how can formal 
rules relevant to zoning influence the capturing of value increase in England? The 
question has been divided into several sub-questions that correspond to the sub­
variables a-e (for more details about these sub-variables, see section 3.3.3). Each 
of the answers to these sub-questions consists of an assessment of whether the sub­
variable can influence capturing value increase. There is therefore not a unique 
conclusion, but as many conclusions as sub-questions. All these conclusions have
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provided the evidence for the final conclusions in chapter 8 and the recommenda­
tions for the Dutch practice in chapter 9. Section 6.5 assesses the degree of value 
increase actually captured, taking account of the side effects on the tempo of imple­
mentation. Finally, section 6.6 summarizes the inferred causalities between formal 
rules relevant to zoning and capturing value increase: this includes an assessment of 
the role of third variables.
6.1 Urban Regeneration in England
There is not a single urban regeneration policy or a set of policies, but different 
policy initiatives that have not been designed and implemented in a coherent and 
connected way. Instead, the field can be characterized as an "...endless experimen­
tation with new and often disconnected initiatives" (Cullingworth & Nadin, 2006: 
350). These initiatives are the result of the interaction between central, regional and 
local public bodies (op. cit.: 350-392), and can be subdivided into regeneration 
policies meant for inadequate housing, and those focusing on the regeneration of 
the inner cities.
There is a long tradition of regeneration policies for inadequate housing. The low 
quality of a large stock of old housing has been the subject of public intervention 
since the nineteenth century, an intervention that has not ceased since then. In the 
first instance, before and after the 2nd W W  it led to clearance (demolishing) and re­
development of old housing areas. Soon clearance gave way to 'renewal', a move 
that was characterized by: (1) a gradual shift from individual house improvements to 
the improvement of wider areas; and (2) a redefinition of the problem, from build­
ing-technical considerations to a broader set of socio-economic and environmental 
considerations. In the 1970s these comprehensive area-based and socio-economic 
strategies of renewal were reinforced. In the 1980s, while the comprehensive area- 
based approach was retained, a shift took place to economic considerations, in the 
sense of seeking more involvement of private investment (including e.g. the selling of 
some affordable housing to its tenants) and bringing implementation considerations 
to the fore such as enhancing the role of private parties in investing in regeneration. 
Since the end of the 1990s, more attention is being given to improving the building- 
technical quality of 'non-decent' dwellings.
While policy specifically oriented to improvement of inadequate housing has a long 
tradition, specific policy for inner cities appeared for the first time in the 1970s. At 
that time, 'Urban programmes' funded regeneration interventions. In the 1990s the 
'City Challenge' and the 'English Partnerships' programmes also funded regenera­
tion interventions. For example, in one of the studied cases in this research, case 
Harbourside, English Partnership supports the infrastructure provision and soil de­
contamination works through a cheap loan. Since 1995, Urban and City Challenge
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programmes have been taken over by the 'Single Regeneration Budget' (SRB), which 
brought together twenty previously separate funding programmes and has been far 
more widely applied than previous ones (Booth, 2005: 262).
During the Conservative Government in the 1980s and 1990s, emphasis was given to 
the stimulation of private investment, instead of relying exclusively on public fund­
ing (Booth, 2005: 259; Verhage, 2005: 220-221). Since the 1990s, emphasis on sus­
tainability considerations is growing. The 1980s saw the introduction of the Urban 
Development Corporations (UDC), UK Government agencies with large powers for 
plan implementation (through land acquisition) that usurped the local authority's de­
velopment control functions (granting of planning permissions). These corporations 
have spent most of the public resources available for urban regeneration and have 
restructured many degraded old industrial sites in the inner cities. At the end of the 
80s criticism arose about these corporations (Booth, 2005: 261), in spite of which the 
Labour government has continued them with no structural modifications but fewer 
in number. For example, in case Temple Quay, an UDC and its successor, a regional 
regeneration public agency, bought part of the land and played a role in stimulating 
the regeneration of this derelict site. Labour created Urban Regeneration Companies 
(URC), which operate at the local level but are still dependent on the UK Govern­
ment. An important difference with the UDCs is that local authorities are heavily 
involved in the URCs. The Labour Government that came to power in 1997 brought 
forward a raft of new initiatives to attack social exclusion, improve the quality of the 
public housing stock and redirect funding through local authorities. One important 
novelty in Labour's approach was the emphasis on more community involvement. 
The Single Regeneration Budget (SRB), already existing, and the New Deal for Com­
munities (NDC) programme, created in 1998, became the main instruments for this 
enhanced regeneration policy (op. cit.: 262-3; Verhage, 2005: 224).
Urban regeneration in city centres is often confronted with many small private own­
ers, while in brownfield sites, land is often owned by public or private institutions 
(Ministry of Defence, health authorities, ex-public companies, private developers, 
property investors, etc). Land ownership in Britain is usually freehold ownership, 
where the rights in land are held in perpetuity (Williams & Wood, 1994: 122). Private 
landowners, if present at early stages, are not often directly involved in the rest of the 
development. They do not usually share risks nor participate in the whole operation. 
Most of the time they disappear before the start of the project, and their role is limited 
to that of provider of the land. Urban regeneration is in general an institutionalized 
phenomenon, being the task of public bodies, housing associations and commer­
cial developers rather than private landowners. Regeneration initiatives usually take 
place within the framework of the specific local urban regeneration policy. Local 
authorities prescribe their regeneration policies in indicative zoning plans. Once a 
planning application has been evaluated within that framework, local authorities is­
sue planning permissions.
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Frame 6b
Indicative and binding plans
At the local level, Local Planning Authorities (LPA) have the competences to prepare 
and approve zoning documents, both of an indicative character and with legally bind­
ing consequences (Cullingworth & Nadin, 2006: 47, 49, 134, 113-124, 150-151).
Regarding the indicative plans, these can be ad hoc documents, site-specific, not regu­
lated in planning law. Or they can cover wider areas and be regulated in planning law: 
before the 2004 Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act there were 'Structure plans', 
'Local plans' and 'Unitary development plans', depending on the sort of LPA. Bristol, 
as a unitary authority, approved in 1997 the Bristol Local Plan. Since 2004, these plans 
are being gradually replaced by 'Local development frameworks', which are made by 
the LPA of the lowest tier, i.e. the District Council only instead of both the District and 
the County councils. Therefore, counties with a two-tier governmental structure no 
longer have two plans, but just one. Local development framework is a non-statutory 
term that comprises different documents (Moore, 2005: 31-32): (1) Development plan 
documents: Local development scheme, Statement of community involvement, and 
Annual monitoring report; (2) Supplementary documents. None of these documents is 
legally binding, in the sense that it has direct statutory consequences for the use of land 
and real estate. This does not mean, however, that they cannot play an important role 
in development control. The Planning Inspectorate, a central public body, approves 
definitively the local development frameworks.
The LPA of the lowest tier has the competences of preparing and approving 'Planning 
Permissions'. Planning permissions include the legally binding land use rules for a 
specific site. They are the only relevant binding rules, following the definition used in 
this research. A planning permission can be detailed or outline. An outline permission 
leaves several matters open (mostly design and external appearance aspects) and re­
serves approval to a later moment.
After a developer submits an application for a planning permission, LPAs have to de­
cide on it within eight weeks (Moore, 2005: 199-213). Applicant and LPA can also 
agree another term. LPAs decide whether to grant a planning permission, to impose 
planning conditions on it, or to refuse it. In practice, most of the applications are de­
termined within the statutory eight-week period (percentages vary from 65% to 80% of 
all applications, Moore, 2005: 201, Williams & Wood, 1994: 73-78).
However, instead of determining a planning application within this period of eight 
weeks, LPAs can also decide to negotiate with the developer what the law calls 'plan­
ning obligations' (and in the literature is also called 'planning gains', or 'planning 
contributions'). It is also possible that the developer assumes unilaterally an obliga­
tion (an undertaking) (Ratcliffe et alia, 2002: 154). Planning obligations may include 
a broader scope of contributions than planning conditions and are therefore more
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relevant for capturing value increase (see, for the possibly scope nowadays, and the 
differences between planning conditions and obligations, Frame 6c). In case of ne­
gotiations, the granting of planning permissions is made conditional on the signing 
of a Planning Agreement that secures the planning obligations. These are the section 
106-agreements, so called because the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act included 
this statutory provision in section 106: in the 1991 Planning and Compensation Act, 
which rules nowadays, this is the new sections 106, 106A and 106B.
The procedure is as follows: the Council approves the permission provisionally includ­
ing the contributions that it expects from the developer. The approval is made condi­
tional on achieving a Planning Agreement, which secures the planning obligations 
included in the provisionally approved document. Then, LPA and developer enter into 
negotiations, for which there is no legal maximum time period because we are speak­
ing here of a voluntary negotiation. In a survey of a sample of local authorities taken 
between 1987 and 1990, in 80% of such applications it took around one year to seal 
the legal agreement (DoE 1992, in Ratcliffe et alia, 2002: 155). Of our cases, Mega­
bowl, the smallest, fell within this average, while in Harbourside and Temple Quay, the 
largest cases, the procedure took about two years.
The Secretary of State (SoS) of the central government sanctions planning permissions 
definitively in case they should depart from Development Plans (part of Local Develop­
ment Framework). The Planning Inspectorate resolves appeals against the decision of 
the LPA's to refuse or impose conditions on planning permissions.
6.2 The legal limits to  capturing value increase in 
England
In England, the financing of the unprofitable parts in comprehensive urban regenera­
tion schemes is largely by contributions from developers. These contributions might 
be in kind or in money, and they are included in planning permissions as planning 
conditions and obligations. This was the case in all the studied projects. How far can 
the contributions from landowners and developers go? Here we give the legal princi­
ples that rule and delimit those contributions.
6.2.1 Taxing betterment
We already saw in section 2.2.2 that the nationalization of development rights intro­
duced in the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act did not actually affect to the right 
of the landowner to develop his land. In other words, the landowner remained the
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only one entitled to develop his land, after of course having obtained all the needed 
permits. However, the nationalization had important consequences for capturing 
value increase. The landowner lost the right to the increase in value caused by that 
development. That right belonged to the state. Therefore, any landowner developing 
his land had to pay the state for the use of that right. The consequence was that bet­
terment (any increase in the value of land) was the subject of a betterment charge, 
and no development could take place without the payment of a betterment charge 
to the Central Land Board. The 1947 Act foresaw in a 100% tax on the betterment. 
From that time onwards, taxing development gains has been short-lived because of 
a lack of political consensus and because it was often seen as over-complex and not 
yielding enough revenue. In 1953, a new Conservative government abolished the 
1947's tax. Similarly, a 40% levy introduced by Labour in 1967 was abandoned by 
a Conservative government in 1971. The last major attempt to tax development gains 
was the Development Land Tax Act 1976, introduced by a Labour government, a 
betterment tax to be levied on increases in land values due to the granting of plan­
ning permission. It would apply where land in private ownership was sold to private 
development companies. The betterment tax was severely modified by a Conserva­
tive administration that came into power in 1979 and eventually scrapped in 1985 
(García-Bellido, 1975; Spaans et alia, 1996: 302-304; Oxley, 2006: 104; Clusa & 
Mur, 2007: 124-127; Alterman, 2009: 8, 15-17).
Nowadays there is no betterment tax in the UK. The Barker Review recommended in
2004 the introduction of a 'Planning-gain Supplement'. The recommendation was that 
the two roles fulfilled by planning obligations (mitigating the direct impact of develop­
ment, and sharing part of the windfall gain that accrues from development) should be 
separated. The first part, planning obligations should be scaled back and restricted to 
dealing with the direct impacts of developments. The second part, Planning-gain Sup­
plement, would be used to extract some of the windfall gain to help local authorities 
to finance the facilities currently funded by developers (see Oxley, 2006). The supple­
ment consists of adding to the existing negotiated obligations a charge calculated in 
accordance with previously set criteria, whether these criteria are in a development 
plan or some other document. The 2004 Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act fore­
saw the introduction of the Planning-gain Supplement, when its provisions are fully 
implemented. This had however not happened yet in the winter of 2009-2010.
6.2.2 Capturing value increase through section 106-agreements
Capturing value increase in practice takes place through negotiation of planning 
obligations and conditions (for the contents nowadays of planning obligations and 
conditions, and the differences between both, see under Frame 6c). It was the 1932 
Town and Country Planning Act that for the first time gave to LPAs the power to enter 
into planning agreements with landowners for regulating the development or use of 
their land. Initially, this provision was not used very much. As Moore stated, "...in
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the 25 years up until 1968, no more than 500 agreements were made. In the 1970s 
the situation began to change dramatically, when LPAs saw the statutory provision as 
an opportunity for obtaining a 'planning gain' for their community (...). In return for 
the grant of planning permission, the developer would be expected to enter into an 
agreement to provide some public benefit,.." (Moore 2005: 346). The use of section 
106-agreements has continued to grow in the last years. The proportion of planning 
permissions accompanied by planning agreements, including unilateral undertak­
ings, has risen from 1,5% of all permissions and 26% for major developments in 
1997/98, to 6,9% respectively 40% in 2003/04. Major developments are residential 
schemes of more than 10 units or carried out on a site having an area of 0.5 ha or 
more; or commercial schemes with more than 1,000 m2 floor space or carried out 
on a site having an area of one ha or more. Major developments, and the southern 
areas of England, usually collect more obligations than minor developments and the 
northern part of the country. The proportion of contributions in money has grown in 
relation to contributions in kind (Campbell et al., 2001; Department for Communities 
and Local Government, 2006: 3-4, 17, 41-42).
Over time, the scope of planning conditions and obligations has increased to in­
clude, besides physical infrastructure provision, also environmental, community and 
social infrastructure. The use of obligations has evolved from removing physical con­
straints on development and mitigating direct impacts, to the ameliorating of more 
diffuse social, economic and environmental impacts, the provision of community 
benefits, and the support of wider policy objectives. In short, there has been a shift 
from 'hard' to 'soft' infrastructure provision: from on-site infrastructure and connec­
tions with off-site infrastructure, towards contributions to affordable housing, to off­
site public infrastructure and to off-site facilities and other public policy programmes 
(Ennis, 1997: 1935-6). This increase is said to be related to the austere financial envi­
ronment within which local authorities must operate (Campbell et al., 2000: 767). It 
is expected that in the next years, the planning obligations mechanisms will play an 
important role in capturing some of the development profit and using it for investing 
back into essential infrastructure (Gallent & Tewdwr-Jones, 2007: 211-213, 257).
Controversy has risen the last years because agreements seem to have enabled local 
authorities to agree significant contributions from developers that go beyond matters 
strictly related to the development in question. This is for example the position of 
the Home Building Federation, the representative of the British housing developers 
(Whithaker, interview in 2007). Other institutions and experts seem to share this view 
to some extent, and much literature and even relevant governmental studies and 
reports are influenced by it (Department for Communities and Local Government, 
2006: 6; Barker, 2004: 66; Corkindale, 2004: 13-14). Because of some legally doubt­
ful use, the statutory provision raised both moral and legal issues. A small number 
of judgments have been very important in constraining the discretionary freedom 
of local planning authorities. In turn, this case law has been 'repatriated' into the 
planning system through new policy guidance, which focused on preventing abuse.
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Conditions and obligations will be legitimate and lawful only if they are correctly 
applied (Booth, 2003: 113-115; Ratcliffe et alia, 2002: 140-159). As Booth states it, 
'the apparently unfettered freedoms contained in sections of the Town and Country 
Planning Act have in practice been subject to judicial scrutiny and the limits to dis­
cretionary behaviour have been set' (2003: 4).
Limits to planning conditions
Case law (House of Lords, Newbury DC versus Secretary o f State for the Environ­
ment, 1981) developed criteria to which planning conditions must comply (Moore, 
2005: 286-287):
• They must be imposed for a planning purpose and not for an ulterior one;
• They must fairly and reasonably relate to the development permitted;
• They must not be so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have im­
posed them.
Circular 11/95 amplified and slightly reordered these criteria. Following this Circular, 
conditions should be:
• Necessary;
• Relevant to planning;
• Relevant to the development to be permitted;
• Enforceable;
• Precise and reasonable in all other respects 
Limits to planning obligations
The 1991 Planning and Compensation Act (Section 106.1) states that obligations can 
be agreed:
a) Restricting the development or use of the land in any specified way;
b) Requiring specified operations or activities to be carried out in, on, under or over 
the land;
c) Requiring the land to be used in any specified way; or
d) Requiring a sum or sums to be paid to the authority on a specified date or dates 
or periodically.
Circular 05/2005 (Annex B.5) states that Planning Obligations must be:
1. Relevant to planning;
2. Necessary to make the proposed development acceptable in planning terms;
3. Directly related to the proposed development;
4. Fairly and reasonably related in scale and kind to the proposed development; 
and
5. Reasonable in all other aspects.
There is discrepancy in the jurisprudence about prerequisites 2 and 3, prerequisites 
that were first introduced in 1991 (Circular 16/91), and continued in Circulars 1/97 
and 05/2005. Several important judgments in the 1980s and 1990s have considered
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it acceptable to lay down obligations that are not necessary to make the proposed 
development acceptable in planning terms (prerequisite 2), and obligations that are 
not directly related to the development in question (prerequisite 3), as long as pre­
requisites 1, 4 and 5 are satisfied (Moore, 2005: 345-349, 354-357). This leaves the 
door open for a wider range of contributions, often located off-site. These contribu­
tions could be classified under the following: training and recruitment initiatives in 
the construction sector and possibly other sectors, town centre improvement, pub­
lic art, countryside management, community forests, contributions to cultural plans, 
theatres, museums, etc. (ODPM, 2004b: 16). It is clear that these obligations (neither 
necessary to make the development acceptable, nor directly related to the develop­
ment in question) may be sought or offered. However, the question remains whether 
LPAs may impose them.
There are other limits to the scope of obligations. Circular 05/2005 clearly disap­
proves the use of planning obligations so far as they are only used for collecting the 
betterment that results from development: ".p lann ing obligations should never be 
used purely as a means of securing for the local community a share in the profits of 
development, i.e. as a means of securing a 'betterment levy'." (Circular 05/2005, 
Planning Obligations, Annex B.7). It is important, however, to remember that gov­
ernmental Circulars and other policy guidance are not directly legally binding. Their 
importance derives from the fact that they incorporate previous case law and that 
they serve as evaluation criteria when government resolves appeals against decisions 
of LPAs. This means that practice might deviate from the criteria set out here, without 
this deviation been necessarily considered as illegal (Moore, 2005: 357). This hap­
pens often, as the mentioned example with prerequisites 2 and 3 shows.
6.2.3 Social/affordable housing
Traditionally, social/affordable housing was provided directly by local authorities and 
housing associations, and funded by the tenants (through rents) and public subsidies. 
Encouraged by the central government, with for examples its Circulars 1991/7 and 
1998/6, since the end of the 1980s a shift has taken place. Nowadays developers 
are being asked to provide affordable housing within private housing schemes. This 
means that developers are being asked to subsidize social/affordable housing with 
the profits accruing from the free market housing in the schemes in question (Crook 
&Whitehead, 2002: 1259-60). Planning obligations can establish a minimum per­
centage of affordable housing, or a specific number of affordable units. Also, plan­
ning obligations can determine on which parcels affordable housing has to be built. 
It is also possible to include the obligation to make payments for off-site affordable 
housing, to be developed elsewhere by somebody else; or to include the obligation 
for the developer to provide off-site land; or to himself provide off-site social/afford­
able housing (Circular 05/2005).
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Frame 6c
Contents of Planning obligations and Planning conditions
As mentioned before, planning obligations go further than planning conditions, and 
are the result of negotiations. If a LPA wishes to obtain contributions that go further
than what planning conditions can be, it must enter voluntary negotiations with the 
developer. The then agreed contributions are called planning obligations. Planning 
conditions and obligations can thus overlap and coexist. Planning obligations can in­
clude a broad range of contributions:
1. Contributions in kind, i.e. the obligation for the developer to transfer land free and 
to undertake a broad range of investments: provision of services, building of public 
buildings, social/affordable housing, bus or railway stations, provision of infrastruc­
ture above (roads, surfacing materials, furniture, lighting, etc) and below ground 
(sewerage, drainage, cables, pipelines, etc), decontamination of soil, construction 
of play areas, demolishing of buildings and constructions, management and main­
tenance of public open space after its delivery, etc (Moore, 2005: 289, 346, 351­
2, 359-360; Circular 11/95: Appendix A.23-25, 31, 32, 38-40, 58, 59; Circular 
05/2005: Annex B.18).
2. Planning obligations can also include payments in cash to the LPA: e.g. contribu­
tions to educational and healthcare facilities, for public transport, for affordable 
housing, for training and recruitment programmes, for town centre improvements, 
for library facilities, for social and community facilities and payments of compensa­
tions (Moore, 2005: 349, 351, 359-360; Circular 05/2005; ODPM, 2004b: Appen­
dices, p. 16, 19).
3. Planning obligations can also include meeting deadlines for the completion of de­
velopment and the realization/payment of the obligations.
The contents of planning conditions are narrower than planning obligations. Planning 
conditions may include the requirement to undertake also investments/contributions 
in kind, provided that these actions are not considered as a public function. The con­
struction of sewerage under the site to connect it to the public sewerage system, for 
example, is not considered as a public function and may therefore be included in a 
planning permission as a planning condition (Moore, 2005: 290-291, 294). Conditions 
cannot include payments in cash, but can include deadlines for the completion and for 
the commencement of development.
6.3 Introduction to  the studied cases in England
The 1997 Bristol Local Plan gave, for all the studied cases, indicative prescriptions. 
However, before redevelopment is allowed, one or more planning permissions have 
to be granted, and these include the legally binding land use regulations. The plan-
182 England
ning permission has a physical zoning function but can also include implementation 
and aspects for capturing value increase. Because in all the cases there was a need 
for new or refurbished public infrastructure and facilities, the City of Bristol included 
planning conditions in the planning permission and decided in addition to negotiate 
planning obligations with the developers. Here follows a brief introduction to the 
cases (see figure 20 for an overview of the cases). The rest of the case-based informa­
tion has been included in the rest of the sections.
Harbourside / 7.8 ha
Megabowl / 1.3 ha
.  !
/ \  .  Temple Quay / 7.4 ha
I s ' .T  v
Figure 20. Location of the cases in the city of Bristol.
6.3.1 Harbourside (Canon’s Marsh), C ity of Bristol
Urban regeneration project 'Harbourside/Canon's Marsh' (7.8 ha, 45,000 m2 apart­
ments, 700 units, 44,000 m2 office, 30,000 m2 leisure and facilities, see figure 21) is 
located in the city centre of Bristol. It forms the last and largest part of the redevelop­
ment of a wider area, also called 'Harbourside', which comprises 27 ha of former 
dockland and industrial areas. Before redevelopment, the site was largely flat and 
contained a number of almost disused industrial installations. The site is one of the 
Council's main priorities for regeneration, and plan preparation has a long history
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(Askew, 1996; Buitelaar, 2007: 89-92). The 1997 Bristol Local Plan and the 1998 Plan­
ning Brief Implementation Phase for the Harbourside regeneration (a supplementary 
document to the Local Plan) foresaw the redevelopment of the site into a mixed used 
area with office space, housing and retail. In 1999 a developer (Crest Nicholson PLC) 
submitted a first application. Both this application and a second one were rejected. 
Finally, in 2001, a third application for outline planning permission succeeded. The 
permission came definitively into force in 2003, after negotiations under section 106 
ended with the sealing of a Development Agreement. Afterwards, the developer and 
the Council negotiated some minor modifications to the outline planning permission. 
The central government regeneration agency English Partnerships supports the rede­
velopment of the site through cheap loans for the infrastructure.
Figure 21. Plan area development site 'Harbourside/Canon's Marsh' (source: Report Head Bristol 
Planning Services to Bristol Local Council Committee 17 October 2001).
At the moment of the signing of the Planning Agreement in 2003, the land was owned 
by Secondsite LTD (39% of the site), Transco PLX (9%), Lloyds TSB Bank PLC (9%), 
and the City Council of Bristol (several plots and the existing streets, in total 43% of 
the site). The infrastructure works commenced in 2004. In June 2007 more than the 
half of the development was already completed or under construction, and the first 
dwellings, office space, a hotel and a casino were already occupied and in use. At 
that time, Crest Nicholson, the developer, had already bought all the land.
6.3.2 Temple Quay North, C ity of Bristol
Urban regeneration project 'Temple Quay' (7.4 ha, 45,000 m2 apartments, 495 units, 
61,000 m2 office, and 7,000 m2 leisure and facilities, see figure 22) is located to the 
east of the city centre of Bristol. This area had been for the last years the subject of 
redevelopment, most of the time to develop office buildings. The site covers former 
railway sidings and industry, and is largely flattened and vacant at the moment of
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redevelopment. Only a couple of small buildings and a school remained at that time. 
The school has been integrated into the regeneration. The site is one of the Council's 
main priorities for regeneration. The 1997 Bristol Local Plan and the City Centre 
Strategy (a supplementary document to the Local Plan) foresaw the redevelopment 
of most of the site into a mixed used area with office space, housing and retail. Dur­
ing the 1990s, various planning applications have been granted for redevelopment 
of the site. However, at least four of these permissions have expired without having 
been implemented. The central UK government appointed an Urban Development 
Corporation (UDC) for this area. This UDC took over the local competences and 
bought part of the land. After the UDC wound down in 1996, The South West of 
England Regional Development Agency (SWRDA), a regional public body, took over 
that land. In 2001, the SWRDA, together with the developer (Castlemore Securities 
Ltd), submitted a planning application to redevelop the site. The planning permission 
came definitively into force in 2003, after negotiations under section 106 ended with 
the sealing of a Development Agreement. The infrastructure works commenced in 
2004. In June 2007 about one quarter of all building was completed, other plots were 
under construction and the infrastructure works for the rest of the site were going on.
At the moment of the submission of the planning application, the land was owned by 
Castlemore (47% of the site), another developer (Verclutt, 8%), the SWRDA (25%), 
and the City Council of Bristol (the existing school, that has been maintained, 12%; 
and the existing streets, 8%).
Figure 22. Plan area development site 'Temple Quay' (source: Report Head Bristol Planning Services 
to Bristol Local Council Committee 5 June 2002).
6.3.3 Megabowl, C ity of Bristol
Urban regeneration 'Megabowl' (1.3 ha, 13,500 m2 apartments, 184 units, 142 units/ 
ha, see figure 23) is located in the west of the City of Bristol. The site is within the city, 
but is relatively isolated from it by a busy highway. It has been used in the past as a 
tram terminus, military barracks, cold store, and for light industrial purposes. Since
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the 1990s up to the start of the redevelopment, it was used as a bowling alley. The 
1997 Bristol Local Plan and the 2003 Proposed Alterations to the Bristol Local Plan (a 
supplementary document to the Local Plan) foresaw no redevelopment of the site. In 
2006, the owner (Tenpin Limited) submitted an application for planning permission 
to redevelop the site. The Council granted provisionally the permission at the end of 
the same year. Then, Tenpin Limited sold the site to George Wimpey, a commercial 
developer. The planning permission came definitively into force in 2007, after nego­
tiations under section 106 between the Council and George Wimpey ended with the 
sealing of a Development Agreement. The demolition works started in June 2007. At 
that time the infrastructure provision was expected to start at the end of 2007, and the 
building to be completed one year later. The infrastructure provision started indeed 
in that year but the works have delayed largely, and in April 2010 the building was 
still not completed.
6.4 How formal rules relevant to zoning in England 
can be used
This chapter describes the working of formal rules relevant to zoning within the value 
capturing mechanisms. There are different ways (or sub-variables) in which these 
rules in England can be used in an operational way to improve the capturing of value 
increase:
• Creating certainty or uncertainty beforehand about future building possibilities 
and contributions;
• Choosing the contents of the relevant binding rules (the planning permission);
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• Conditioning the relevant binding rules (the planning permission) to securing the 
capturing of value increase;
• Modulating property rights;
• Using the procedure for the preparation and approval of the relevant binding 
rules (the planning permission).
Here follows an assessment of whether each of these sub-variables can affect the 
capturing of value increase.
6.4.1 Creating certainty beforehand about future building pos­
sibilities and contributions
Summary of the findings
The British planning system is not designed to provide certainty beforehand, neither 
about future building possibilities, nor about future contributions. However, zoning 
plans and supplementary planning guidance often create some certainty, although 
this is limited: those two instruments are usually vague, not detailed, and anyway 
LPAs can and usually do depart from them, as they are not legally binding.
The general trend is that LPAs are increasing the certainty about future building pos­
sibilities given by indicative zoning plans and site-specific supplementary policy 
guidance. In the studied cases, there was some certainty. In cases Harbourside and 
about half of Temple Quay, the 1997 Bristol Local Plan created a strong expectation 
of being able to redevelop these sites. In the rest of Temple Quay and in the whole 
of Megabowl there was no such expectation. Of the three, only in Harbourside did a 
site-specific supplementary planning guidance (the 1998 Planning Brief) create some 
detailed certainty about the development possibilities.
Table 14. Level of certainty in the English cases.
Certainty about future building 
possibilities
Certainty about future contributions
Harbourside some high
Temple Quay low Low for 2/3 site, high for renegotiation 1/3 site
Megabowl none high
Regarding the obligations to be met, the trend to give more certainty seems clearer. 
LPAs are increasingly elaborating obligations policy that acquires the status of sup­
plementary guidance. This was the case in Bristol after the approval in 2005 of SPD4, 
a generic policy document about capturing value increase. Thanks to this document, 
certainty was high in part of case Temple (the renegotiation in 2007 of the modifica­
tion of the planning permission for about one third of the site) and in case Megabowl. 
The 1998 Planning Brief, a site-specific document, created certainty for Harbourside.
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The uncertainty was the largest in the first planning permission for Temple Quay, 
which was processed and negotiated in 2001-2003, before the introduction of SPD4. 
Table 14 summarizes the level of certainty, before definitive negotiations took place, 
about building possibilities and contributions.
The findings suggest that uncertainty about the future building possibilities and cer­
tainty about future contributions might both be positive for capturing value increase. 
This is because they reinforced the negotiating position of the municipality, and be­
cause they might have lowered the land price. Let us see in detail what it is that local 
authorities create certainty or uncertainty about, in which sort of documents, and 
what are the inferred consequences for the captured value increase.
6.4.1.1 Intrinsic uncertainty of the British system, and the recent trend of 
creating some certainty through indicative zoning plans and supple­
mentary policy guidance
Before development initiatives appear, there are usually in England non-site specific 
zoning plans with various names: 'Structure plans', 'Local plans', 'Unitary develop­
ment plans' and, since 2004, 'Local development frameworks'. In addition, local 
authorities can make ad hoc, often site-specific planning documents that might not 
be defined in planning legislation, but receive the status of supplementary policy 
guidance. Local authorities have tended in the last years to develop many informal 
and formal policy documents and zoning plans that make clearer to themselves and 
to applicants how the LPA's intend to act (Booth, 2003: 12-13).
When considering applications for a planning permission, the 1990 Town and Coun­
try Planning Act gives the local authorities broad competences to evaluate them. 
When considering applications, authorities 'shall have regard to the provisions of the 
zoning plan (and supplementary planning guidance, red.), so far as material to the 
application, and to any other material considerations' (section 70.2). The courts have 
held that the expression 'shall have regard to the provisions of the zoning plan' does 
not require that the plan should be slavishly adhered to (Moore, 2005: 223, §12.32). 
The possibility of considering the zoning plan and the supplementary planning guid­
ance as not determining, and the possibility of having regard to 'any other material 
considerations', give LPAs much discretion to decide about applications. LPAs have 
a certain amount of room to decide each case on its own merits. By refusing applica­
tions or by submitting them to planning conditions and obligations, municipalities 
may refer to broad principles and ambiguous concepts like 'amenity'. It is this that 
distinguisheds the British planning system from other Western European countries: 
it is the genuine representative of the 'development-led' planning system, which is 
not required to approve beforehand legally binding zoning plans (see, for an interna­
tional comparison, section 4.1).
LPAs often use this provision to depart from the zoning plans and supplementary 
planning guidance (Whitaker, interview 2007). The cases confirm this general state-
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ment. Bristol made use in all three cases of the possibility of departing, although this 
happened in different degrees: in Harbourside and Temple the departure was large, 
and in Megabowl the departure was the largest. In addition, the cases show that zon­
ing plans and supplementary planning guidance are not always detailed. The 1997 
Bristol Local Plan is not a detailed plan: it includes neither the maximal building 
volume, nor the amount of each land use, nor the building envelope and alignments, 
etc. In Harbourside the 1998 Planning Brief provided additional certainty by specify­
ing the development possibilities and the obligations to be paid; however, this did not 
result in detailed prescriptions. It might be that this case-based finding (zoning plans 
and site-specific supplementary planning guidance are often not detailed) is not an 
exception in England. It is clear anyway that planning law does not prescribe that 
indicative zoning plans should be detailed.
Thus, there is in the British planning system an intrinsic uncertainty, but local au­
thorities usually create some certainty through indicative zoning plans. Additionally, 
there is a clear trend of local authorities increasing the certainty about the future 
contributions. It seems that, at least since the late 1990s, English local authorities are 
increasingly elaborating policies on planning obligations, policy that has the status 
of complementary planning guidance. These policies have clarified the likely obliga­
tions that developments have to face, and are in two different forms:
1. Generic non-site specific policy for all the territory or parts of it, e.g. Bristol's 
Supplementary Planning Document Number 4, SPD4 ('Achieving Positive Plan­
ning through the use of Planning Obligations'), adopted in 2005. This document 
was important in case Megabowl and part of Temple Quay.
2. Site-specific documents for important development sites, e.g. Bristol's 1998 
Planning Brief. This document was important in case Harbourside.
Central government advice has encouraged this trend, and it seems that these moves 
are, in part, a response to criticism. The development sector has objected strongly 
to the delays associated with negotiating planning agreements, and there is a wide 
concern about the lack of accountability of the negotiation process. Nowadays, a 
majority of local authorities have enacted, in different ways, formal policy about 
planning obligations (Campbell et alii, 2000: 760, 763-764; Department., 2006: 
19-20).
In the studied cases, the situation was varied. In Harbourside there was some cer­
tainty at the time of the application procedure and negotiations (March 2001-Febru- 
ary 2003). The 1997 Bristol Local Plan zoned the whole site as 'Major regeneration 
area', with offices (no specific building volume), leisure/tourist activities, and hous­
ing (about 200 dwellings). In addition, the Council had approved in 1998 a Planning 
Brief that specified the building possibilities (augmenting the number of dwellings to 
400) and prescribed the obligations likely to be paid (see frame 6d).
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Frame 6d
The obligations in the 1998 Planning Brief for Harbourside
The 1998 Planning Brief has its first version in 1994. The City Council of Bristol ap­
proved in that year a Development Framework, and in 1995 a Planning Brief Imple­
mentation Phase for the Harbourside regeneration that amended and integrated the
contents of the 1994 document. The 1998 document reviewed and amended the 1995 
version, and included for example the following contributions:
• The 1998 document reaffirmed the previous requirement, broadly and openly stat­
ed by the Council in a first planning brief in 1992, following which profits should 
'cross-subsidise the achievement of the essential infrastructure and the Council's 
leisure (...) objectives.' (p. 13, see also p. 51). 'Leisure objectives' include in any 
case a financial contribution to the construction of a non-commercial leisure facil­
ity, situated nearby but outside the plan area in question;
• The 1998 document includes the requirement to comply with local policy docu­
ments on affordable housing, making clear that the scheme will have to include 
affordable housing, of which a part must be social rented (p. 21).
• The 1998 document makes clear that the developer must provide directly related 
infrastructure (the roads and public space within the plan area, p. 51). Further on, 
it specifies that e.g. the 'remediation of contaminated land' (Appendix I: i) will also 
be the responsibility of the developer. It also establishes which development sites 
will assume the costs of which infrastructure, and establishes a realization schedule 
(Appendix I: ii-viii).
Although the 1998 document did not set down quantities, it seems that it created 
enough clarity for the developer to assess, within a certain margin, the financial 
feasibility of the scheme. Asked whether this choice was related to capturing value 
increase, an involved planning officer insisted that the goal was indeed to create be­
forehand enough certainty about the development value and costs. By doing so, the 
officer said, the chance that developers buy the land for too high a price is reduced 
(see sections 2.3.3 and 2.4.2 for more details about the working of the residual land 
price mechanisms) So it seems that Bristol created some certainty, about both future 
building possibilities and contributions, with the goal of improving capturing value 
increase. Nevertheless, this certainty was flexible. As said, the Council could deviate 
from both documents, as actually happened several times. For example, during the 
negotiations, the Council first added the requirement of 30% of affordable housing 
and augmented the total number of dwellings from 400 to 700; afterwards it lowered 
the requirement of affordable housing.
In Temple Quay the Council chose not to detail the vague determinations of the 1997 
Local Plan. No other site-specific supplementary planning guidance was enacted for 
this site at the time of the application procedure and negotiations (May 2001-May 
2003). The 1997 Plan established a variety of uses for the site. More than the half
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of the site was designated as 'regeneration area', 'mixed commercial area', and on 
several plots as both 'new housing site' and new 'industrial and warehousing' at the 
same time. However, the rest of the site (something less than the half) was zoned 
as 'Primarily Industrial and warehousing', or had no designation. This means that 
something less than half of the site was not foreseen as being regenerated into resi­
dential and offices. Thus, the certainty about the building possibilities was very low, 
both because of the lack of detail in the 1997 Plan, and because this Plan foresaw 
regeneration for only half of the site. The same could be said about the certainty 
about obligations, because the 1997 Plan said nothing about future contributions. It 
could be that the collaboration between the Council and the developer in making a 
Masterplan (2000-2003) for the site had created some informal certainty beforehand. 
However, the local authority did not formally adopt this document.
There is an exception to the lack of certainty in Temple Quay. In 2007 the developer 
decided to apply for a modification of part of the planning permission, regarding 
blocks ND1-5 (about one third of the site). He applied for an increase in the office 
space and in the number of dwellings. Modification means that planning obligations 
will be renegotiated. The Council approved in 2005 the Supplementary Planning 
Document Number 4 (SPD4, see frame 6e). This document, that has the status of 
supplementary planning guidance, details the obligations to be paid/fulfilled in all 
schemes in the City of Bristol, most of the time in the form of standard charges. Thus, 
since 2005, the SPD4 forms an evaluation criterion for all planning applications in 
the city. Thanks to this document, when the developer decided in 2007 to apply for a 
modification of the planning permission in blocks ND1-5, he had certainty about the 
obligations likely to be required. Nevertheless, this certainty is flexible. As said, the 
Council can deviate from this document.
Frame 6e
Bristol's 2005 SPD4 document
The Supplementary Planning Document Number 4 of the City of Bristol ('Achieving 
Positive Planning through the use of Planning Obligations') establishes standard con­
tributions of the following sorts: affordable housing, educational and recreational fa­
cilities, landscape schemes, travel plan initiatives, park and ride facilities, highway 
infrastructure works, site specific measures, economic contribution from new develop­
ment, areas of public realm, public art, community forest initiative and library facili­
ties. Examples of these standard contributions are:
• Affordable housing: this applies to residential developments of 25 or more dwell­
ings or one hectare or more in size; the developer is required to provide on-site 
a percentage of the total number of units, according to local affordable housing 
policy (30% in 2007, red.), or exceptionally to pay a sum for off-site provision of 
affordable housing;
• Educational facilities: this applies to residential developments of 40 or more dwell
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ings if they generate additional pupil numbers in excess of the capacity of local 
schools; the developer is usually required to pay a sum for the provision of off-site fa­
cilities, or exceptionally to provide on-site these facilities. Per additional pupil in ex­
cess of the local capacity, the developer has to pay a sum: £ 9,136 per school place 
in a Nursery or Primary School, £ 14,346 per school place in a Secondary School;
• Landscape schemes: this applies to any development sort; the developer is required 
to submit a Landscape Scheme to, and receive written approval from, a compe­
tent public body, before commencing development, and to implement it, pay the 
maintenance costs during a period of 12 months, and finally transfer the land to the 
municipality free of charge.
In Megabowl the uncertainty about the future building possibilities was very high, 
as the Council had never considered regeneration. The 1997 Bristol Local Plan and 
the 2003 Proposed Modifications did not foresee at all the regeneration of the site. 
This is called a 'windfall site'. This uncertainty was reinforced by site-specific circum­
stances: the site is isolated by a highway and was in principle not very suitable for 
residential use. However, regarding future contributions, the certainty was very high. 
This is thanks to the fact that at the time of the application procedure and negotia­
tions (April 2006-April 2007), the SPD4 document already established the obliga­
tions to be fulfilled. Nevertheless, this certainty was flexible: for example, during 
the negotiations, the Council lowered the requirements for social/affordable housing 
from 30% to 25%.
The question is now, what have been the results of the level of certainty/uncertainty 
for the captured value increase. Here, a distinction is made between certainty about 
building possibilities, and certainty about contributions.
6.4.1.2 Effects for capturing value increase of Uncertainty about building 
possibilities
In general, it seems that uncertainty about the future building possibilities has im­
proved the capturing of value increase (Claydon and Smith, 1997; Campbell et alii, 
2001: 18-19; Whitaker, interview 207). The cases seem to confirm this general con­
clusion. Case Megabowl provides interesting conclusions. Here, the uncertainty 
about the building possibilities was the largest of the three cases, as regeneration of 
the site was not foreseen at all. The Council required and obtained what could be 
considered a high level of obligations (see section 6.5 for a comparison between the 
degree of captured value increase in the three cases). Almost all possible contribu­
tions stated in SPD4 that are relevant to this site, were achieved here. This case is 
considered within the Council's planning department as a good example of obtaining 
section 106 obligations.
There are two possible explanations for this effect of uncertainty about building pos­
sibilities. First, uncertainty may reinforce the negotiation position of LPAs. Both the
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involved planning officer and the developer's agent in Megabowl agree that this un­
certainty gave much negotiation room to the Council. This case-based finding fits 
within a general idea, already formulated in variable D1.1 of the causal model of 
section 2.4.2: if certainty is high about future building possibilities, LPAs have less to 
offer in the negotiations.
Second, uncertainty about building possibilities might have improved capturing val­
ue increase for another reason too. For low building expectations might lower the 
land price (variable D1.1). In Megabowl, as a consequence of the uncertainty, the 
site had not been the subject of speculation: no developer had yet been seriously 
interested in buying the land. It was the former owner and user that negotiated the 
planning permission and the obligations. This might have been one of the stimuli to 
the owner-developer to consider initially a lower land price, that is the residual value 
of the land taking into account only the actual use as bowling alley - the minimum 
land cost, about 3-4.5 € million - but not including any expectation of urban use. 
Thanks to this, the Final profit of the developer was large, giving him much room to 
pay (in money and in kind) more contributions than usual. The total development 
costs (postings 1-7 in Annex 3), taking into account the minimum land cost, amount­
ed to circa € 20 million, and the total estimated returns about €37m. After agreeing 
the contributions, the landowner sold his land to a developer for about € 11 million. 
In a scenario in which the expectations for the site are clear beforehand, developers 
would most probably have paid a high sum for the land, and this would have reduced 
the financial room available for contributions. Both in Temple Quay and Harbour­
side, developers bought land from the former owners for a price presumably higher 
than the existing market value of these sites. However, it has not been possible to 
say what the price of land there was, for developers were not willing to provide the 
needed information.
6.4.1.3 Effects for capturing value increase of Certainty about contributions
In general for England, there is evidence that those local authorities that have stand­
ard charges, known beforehand, are able to gain more obligations (in number and 
in terms of their economic value). This suggests that standard charges have a positive 
effect on the number and economic value of obligations (Department., 2006: 19, 
22, 27-28, 54). The findings in the cases agree with this general opinion. Capturing 
value increase was higher in those cases in which certainty was higher: thus higher 
in Megabowl and Harbourside, and lower in the former permission for Temple Quay. 
For Temple Quay it seems that the renegotiation in 2007, once the SPD4 document 
had been approved, of the planning permission for one third of the site will provide 
more obligations than the first permission.
There are two possibly explanations for this apparent positive effect of certainty about 
contributions: it may first reinforce the negotiating position of LPAs, and second lower 
the acquisition cost of the land. Regarding the negotiating position: making explicit 
policy for obligations means that obligations become material to the determination of
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planning permission. This allows local authorities to successfully refuse those appli­
cations that do not fulfil the required contributions, and allows them also to subject 
the applications to conditions and obligations (Campbell et al., 2000: 773; 2001). 
A representative of the English developers considered that local authorities create 
strong arguments for possible refusal, and that this provides them with a strong start­
ing point in the negotiations (Whitaker, interview 2007). The cases seem to confirm 
this general conclusion: in all three cases, the public officers in charge considered 
that a strong policy base for requiring planning obligations was very important for 
capturing value increase. In Temple Quay, at the time of the negotiations there was 
no such strong policy base, and the planning officer considered this lack as a crucial 
factor that influenced negatively the obligations. During the renegotiation of part of 
the planning permission in August 2007, both the former planning officer and the 
developer considered that obligations would turn out higher due to the approval in
2005 of SPD4. For example, contributions for library services and for funding car 
clubs (intended to lower the need of parking places on street level) were not pos­
sible before the approval of SPD4. Also, affordable housing will benefit from SPD4. 
The findings in our cases agree with the findings of other studies. In a case study in 
Newbury, Berkshire, the lack of such an obligations policy seems to have influenced 
capturing value increase negatively (Campbell et al., 2001: 24). In another study of 
three projects in London, Weymouth and Liverpool, the researchers came to similar 
conclusions (Claydon & Smith, 1997: 2017).
Regarding helping to lower land prices: the cases seem to confirm the positive role of 
certainty about contributions. In Megabowl, certainty about a high degree of contri­
butions might have been relevant for lowering the Accounted land costs in two ways. 
First in combination with the uncertainty about the building possibilities explained 
above: initially the first landowner accepted a low 'book value' for his land not only 
because developers where not interested in buying his land, but probably also be­
cause he was aware of the high level of contributions stated in the SPD4-document. 
Second, once at the end of 2006 the planning permission was provisionally ap­
proved, together with a list of contributions that had to be detailed in a Development 
Agreement, the first landowner sold his land to a developer. The Development Agree­
ment was not yet sealed, so there still was, in theory, negotiation room. However, the 
developer knew he had no choice than to secure in a Development Agreement all 
these contributions. The certainty created with the provisional approval of a list of 
contributions, based on the SPD4 document, must have played a role here. It seems 
very plausible that the price paid for the land (€ 11m) has taken into account the con­
tributions. The fact that this price left financial room for all the contributions seems 
to confirm this (see Annex 3). In Harbourside, certainty has probably also lowered 
the price that the developer had to pay for the land, as developer and landowners 
agreed that this price depended on the final profit margins. In Temple Quay, it seems 
plausible that the lack of certainty has inflated the land price. In general, it seems that 
once the price paid for land has internalized part of the future urban expectations, it 
is difficult to reduce those expectations. Harbourside provides an example: when the
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Council added afterwards the requirement of 30% affordable housing, the developer 
argued that he had no more financial room to accommodate this contribution in his 
budget. The developer was not willing to provide information about the land price, 
information that is crucial to accurately evaluate his arguments. However, our own 
estimations about the development value and costs in Harbourside show a large dif­
ference between the estimated development costs (excluding land price) and returns 
(see Annex 3 for a comparison of development costs and profits in the English cases). 
This suggests that there may have been enough financial room to pay 30% affordable 
housing. The problem could have been that the 30%-requirement came too late, in 
the sense that the developer and the landowners had already incorporated the full 
development surplus in the land price. It was finally decided that the developer will 
build 9%  of affordable housing.
6.4.2 Choosing the contents of the binding rules (the planning 
permission)
In England, planning law, planning guidance and the jurisprudence make it pos­
sible to include a wide range of determinations in planning permissions: not only 
physical zoning aspects, but also aspects related to the implementation. For more 
details about the possibly contents of planning conditions and obligations see sec­
tion 6.2.
Summary of the findings
One of the possibilities is to include the obligation to contribute in kind or in money 
social/affordable housing and off-site public infrastructure and facilities. This seems 
to have a positive influence on capturing value increase, especially for the con­
struction and implementation by the developer himself of social/affordable housing 
on-site, and of public infrastructure and facilities off-site, but not so much for the 
developer constructing or transferring land for social/affordable housing off-site. An­
other possibility is to include deadlines, but here there are differences in their effec­
tiveness. It is only possible to include in Development Agreements deadlines for the 
completion o f contributions, but these deadlines are only in force once development 
commences. Since it is not possible to include deadlines for the commencement 
of development in Development Agreements, when planning permissions include 
commencement deadlines, these seem not to be very effective. The consequence is 
that many planning permissions are never implemented. However, if development 
does start, deadlines for the completion of contributions come into force and seem 
to be effective in stable market circumstances. The consequence is that once com­
menced, and provided market circumstances remain stable, developments and the 
related contributions are usually implemented within deadlines. The difference in 
effectiveness of commencement and completion deadlines suggests that another 
sub-variable and a third variables might be influential here: the sub-variable is the 
possibility of conditioning planning consent to securing the deadlines and contribu­
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tions (see next section 6.4.3), and the third variable are the market circumstances 
(variable A2, see causal model in section 2.4.2). Let us see in detail what are the 
possible contents of planning permissions, and what are the consequences for cap­
turing value increase.
6.4.2.1 Including social/affordable housing
Planning permissions can include contributions for social/affordable housing, both 
on-site and off-site. Circular 06/98 prescribes thresholds for seeking contributions: 
usually 25 or more dwellings, or a site larger than one ha, above which there is in 
principle the obligation for the developer to provide affordable housing. In Inner 
London this is 15 dwellings/0.5 ha (Gurran et al., 2007: 40). It seems clear that in 
England, in general, planning obligations are increasingly being used to provide af­
fordable housing. For example, in a survey in 1999 it was found that 78% of LPAs 
had specific affordable housing policies in development plans (Holmans et al, 2000; 
quoted in Crook & Whitehead, 2002: 1274). It is possible to conclude that this gen­
eral trend is also present in Bristol, where the threshold is 25 dwellings, or a site 
larger than one hectare rules. Many of the interviewed public officers and developers 
considered this to be so, and the cases confirm this. The more recent the project is, 
the higher the proportion of affordable housing. In cases Temple Quay and Harbour­
side (planning permissions definitively valid in 2003), planning agreements stated the 
parcels where social/affordable housing has to be built and a minimum percentage 
of units: 14% respectively 9%, that are expected to result in about 71 respectively 
63 units. In Megabowl (planning permission definitively valid in 2007), the planning 
agreement established the number of affordable units (25%, 46 units). It seems that 
other recent applications are negotiating similar requirements as in Megabowl. None 
of the studied cases included contributions in money or contributions to off-site af­
fordable housing.
What have been the consequences of the fact that LPAs can include social/affordable 
housing in planning permissions? Presumably this statutory power, together with hav­
ing created certainty about this sort of contribution (see previous section), is helping 
to strengthen the LPA's negotiation position. Also, it must influence the Accounted 
land costs because once such a contribution is included in a planning permission, 
developers know it cannot be avoided. The fact is that LPAs are increasingly includ­
ing social/affordable housing in planning permissions and that the amount of social/ 
affordable housing being built in England has been increasing since 2004. The stud­
ied cases show the positive effect in Bristol too, where the building rates of social/ 
affordable housing are higher than in the rest of England (see for a comparison of the 
results in each case, and figures for Bristol and England, section 6.5). However, the 
minimal threshold (25 dwellings/larger than 1 ha in Bristol) seems to have disadvan­
tages: according to many of the interviewed (public parties and developers) many 
developers remain under the threshold, although they could develop more than 25 
dwellings. The City of Bristol is currently studying the possibility of lowering this 
threshold to about 4-6 dwellings.
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6.4.2.2 Including off-site public infrastructure and facilities
Planning permissions can also include contributions for off-site public infrastructure 
and facilities. This might include contributions for off-site social/affordable housing 
(just handled above). Presumably this statutory power, together with having created 
certainty about this sort of contribution (see previous section), is helping to strength­
en both the negotiation position of LPA's and to lower the accounted land costs.
Regarding contributions in land, it seems not to be very common to include such a 
requirement in planning permissions. The findings in the cases support this: in none 
of the three cases did the planning permission include the obligation or the condi­
tion to provide land outside the plan area. Regarding contributions for the construc­
tion and implementation of public facilities and infrastructure, it seems that in the 
last years LPAs are increasingly asking for this sort of obligation. This seems to have 
a positive effect in practice, and in the cases the results were varied. Contributions 
were larger in Harbourside than in Megabowl and Temple Quay. This seems to be 
the result of the decision of the Council in Harbourside to focus on a large monetary 
contribution for a leisure facility located outside the development site in question.
6.4.2.3 Including implementation schedules
Planning permissions can also include, as planning conditions or obligations, dead­
lines for the implementation of public infrastructure and facilities, or for the pay­
ment of contributions. Presumably this statutory power is helping, with differing 
success, to reinforce the negotiation position of LPA's and accelerate the realization 
of the contributions. There is a distinction between deadlines for the commence­
ment of the development, and deadlines for the completion of development and 
contributions.
Deadlines for the commencement of development cannot be included in Planning 
Agreements. Since 1968, power has been given to LPAs to impose deadlines within 
which the development must start. However, these deadlines can be included only 
as planning condition, but not as planning obligations, which means that these dead­
lines cannot be included in the Planning Agreement. This is because Circular 05/2005 
rules that obligations are only meant for mitigation of undesirable aspects of develop­
ment. And if development has not commenced, there can be no undesirable aspects 
to mitigate. In cases Temple Quay and Harbourside (permissions granted in 2003), 
planning conditions included a deadline of five years, and in Megabowl (permission 
granted in 2007) three years. If the holder of the planning permission does not start 
the development within the deadline, the permission will expire (Moore, 2005: 304­
305). What are the consequences of not being able to include commencement dead­
lines in the Planning Agreement? It seems that, in England, commencement deadlines 
are not always achieved. Many granted permissions are not used. It is estimated that 
in 2003/04, 80% of full planning permissions and 75% of outline planning permis­
sions were actually implemented, and the rest not (Department., 2006: 43). Asked 
about this, two experts considered that this happened more frequently some time
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ago, in the 90's, and less in recent years (Lyons and Henneberry, interviews in 2007). 
The case Temple Quay seems to support the general conclusion that commencement 
deadlines are not always fulfilled: during the 90's, various planning applications have 
been granted for redevelopment of the site. At least four of these permissions have ex­
pired without having been implemented. In cases Temple Quay and Harbourside, the 
commencement deadlines for the planning permissions were achieved. At the time of 
data gathering in June 2007, in Megabowl development has not yet commenced, but 
the deadline had not yet passed. Because not commencing on time would imply the 
expiration of the planning application only, there was at that time no certainty about 
whether the agreed contributions would finally be achieved or not.
Deadlines about when parts of the development and the contributions must be com­
pleted can be included in Planning Agreements. This is because LPAs can include 
these deadlines not only as planning conditions, but also as planning obligations. 
However, these deadlines become in force only if and when development com­
mences. Thus, these deadlines are irrelevant until development begins. They were at 
the time of data gathering in June 2007 relevant in Temple Quay and Harbourside, 
but not in Megabowl (development commenced only later in 2007). It is uncertain 
whether, in general, those planning permissions that are commenced are also com­
pleted within the deadlines. There are no general figures to support whether these 
deadlines, once activated, are effective or not, but asked about this, two experts 
interviewed in 2007 considered that these deadlines are indeed effective. Their argu­
ment was that commencement of development involves investments, so once they 
are made developers cannot afford to delay (Lyons and Henneberry, interviews in
2007). Our cases however show a more nuanced picture. In two of them, Temple 
Quay and Harbourside, development has commenced indeed, and deadlines for 
the completion had been so far, in June 2007, achieved. However, the economic 
crisis in 2009 seems to affect seriously the building schedules. In at least Megabowl 
the completion of the building is having serious delays. The infrastructure provision 
stopped at the end of 2007 and in April 2010 the building was not yet completed. At 
the beginning of 2010 it is unknown to us whether the building in the other cases has 
been completed or not.
Thus, the effectiveness of the deadlines seems to depend not on the fact that they 
are included in planning permissions, but partially on the fact that they are secured 
in a Planning Agreement, and partially on market circumstances. This suggests that 
this sub-variable (possible contents planning permission) influences only partially the 
variable 'capturing value increase'. That is, there is some risk that the inferred causal 
relationship is, partly, spurious. The sub-variable 'conditioning permission to secur­
ing deadlines' (see next section) and market circumstances (variable A1, see causal 
model in section 2.4.2) seem to play the role of third variables because deadlines 
are effective only if they are secured and provided that market circumstances do not 
change dramatically.
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6.4.3 Conditioning binding rules (the planning permission) on 
securing capturing value increase
The English planning permission can be made conditional on a contractual agree­
ment (Planning Agreement) with the developer. Initially, the Council approves the 
permission provisionally, including the planning conditions and obligations that it 
expects from the developer. The definitive approval of the planning permission hap­
pens only after the planning obligations (but not the planning conditions) are secured 
in a Planning Agreement. What are the consequences of being allowed to make plan­
ning consent conditional on securing the planning obligations, but not on securing 
the planning conditions and thus commencement deadlines? The cases (see previous 
section) and some interviews suggest that because commencement deadlines cannot 
be secured, contributions are often implemented with delay, or not at all. In con­
clusion, not the fact of being able to include contributions in planning permissions 
seems to be effective, but the fact of being able to condition planning consent to se­
curing contributions. With other words, i) being able to condition planning consent 
to securing the contributions reinforces ii) the positive effect of being able to include 
certain contributions in planning permissions on iii) the negotiation position of LPA's, 
on the Accounted land costs and on the speed of the implementation.
6.4.4 Modulating property rights
Summary of the findings
The right to develop (i.e. the exclusive right to develop land, once permission has 
been granted) belongs in England to the landowner. This, together with the distribu­
tion of the other necessary resources in urban regeneration (planning permissions 
and financial means), creates a strong interdependency between local authorities 
and landowners. This interdependency gives to the landowners the option to wait, 
which it is often used to contravene local authorities' requirements, and often leads 
to delaying the development.
6.4.4.1 W h o  owns development rights in England?
The nationalization of development rights might have had consequences for the legal 
limits to capturing value increase, as we saw in section 6.2.1. However, this has not 
altered the principle that landowners are the only ones that can develop their land. 
It is therefore clear that the right to develop belongs exclusively to the landowner. 
Planning permission attaches to the land, and not to the developer. Before being 
entitled to develop, developers have to acquire the land (Williams & Wood, 1994: 
78, Ratcliffe, 2001: 152-153; Cullingworth & Nadin, 2006: 195-197). However, the 
landowner is limited in his right to develop, he has no right to any kind of 'minimum' 
and must apply for and obtain the needed permits. Other legislation (e.g. compulsory 
purchase) might even lead to removal of his right.
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Infrastructure provision requires several transactions: 1) land purchase and assem­
bling, 2) financing, and 3) land preparation and development. By analyzing who has 
the control over each of these transactions, it has been possible to discern the extent 
to which development rights belong to the landowners.
6.4.4.2 Mutual dependence of local authorities and landowners in England
To analyse the consequences for the power-relationship between municipalities and 
landowners of the practical possibilities for controlling transactions 1-3, this research 
developed and applied a model of dependence (see table 15; for more details of the 
model, see section 3.1.1). In England there is a strong mutual dependence between 
municipalities and developers/landowners, so the possibilities in practice for gath­
ering the land (1), gathering the financial resources (2), and developing the land to 
produce serviced plots (3) depend heavily on the landowner's passive consent or 
active collaboration. This strong mutual dependence is caused by the fact that none 
of the actors control all the needed resources, and because the dependence is not 
easily avoidable. The landowner controls two important resources - land and invest­
ment capacity - and local authorities depend on the landowner because of this. As 
a rule, without agreement about the purchase and assembly of land and about the 
financing of the infrastructure provision, municipalities that want things to happen, 
have to compulsorily purchase the land. In other words, the only way of avoiding 
dependence on the landowner is public land development, or at least public in­
frastructure provision. But doing that is not easy: compulsory purchase and public 
land development mean a direct public involvement and the assumption of the cor­
responding financial costs and risks. Furthermore, compulsory purchase is a sensitive
Table 15. Dependence analysis England.
Dependence because 
of land
Dependence because of 
investment capacity
Dependence because of 
regulatory resources
LPA depends on the
landowner/
developer
Dependence.
Developer/Landowner 
owns all the land. De­
pendence is only avoid­
able through compulsory 
purchase, but this is only 
used in exceptional cir­
cumstances. Expropria­
tion is considered slow, 
expensive and risky.
Dependence.
The developer was able 
to invest in buying the 
land and developing 
it. Dependence is thus 
avoidable only if Bristol 
has enough financial 
means. However, Bristol 
did not have the finan­
cial means.
Landowner/ 
developer depends 
on LPA
Dependence.
The LPA grants the 
required permissions. 
Dependence is not 
avoidable.
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matter, politically. On the other hand, the landowner depends on the local authority 
because of its regulatory powers to grant the planning permission. This dependence 
can also be labelled as strong because it is not avoidable: public bodies are the only 
actors who can exercise these regulatory powers.
In all the studied cases, all or most of the land was in private hands. The City of Bris­
tol could have avoided mutual dependence by applying compulsory purchase and 
developing the site itself. However, in practice, this instrument is used only in ex­
ceptional circumstances in Bristol; only when there is no agreement with a minority 
of the landowners and the majority of the landowners support the measure and are 
willing to pay the costs of it. An interviewed public officer considered compulsory 
purchase a slow instrument, expensive and fraught with risk. Besides, Bristol did not 
have the financial means to develop the sites.
The consequences in practice of this strong mutual dependency were significant. 
Landowners had the option of not agreeing with the contributions package or other re­
quirements of the municipality. Since waiting can bear advantages, it was a favourable 
option to wait (see variable D2.2 in causal model section 2.4.2). As developers may 
not control all the land, and thus depend on various landowners, it might take some 
time to reach an agreement with all the landowners about the desired price of land. 
Success depends on the expectation that, by delaying negotiations, development prof­
its could increase in the future. LPAs might be confronted with landowners/developers 
that are not willing to agree with the required financing and implementation sched­
ules. This might affect the negotiating position of the local authorities, the accounted 
land costs and the profit margins of the developer, and thus capturing value increase. 
Authorities might be forced to lower the contributions package if they want to reach 
an agreement, allowing landowners to ask a higher price for their land and developers 
to enlarge their profit margins. And anyway, this affects the speed of implementation, 
as landowners/developers do not proceed quickly and development is delayed.
In at least the cases Harbourside and Temple Quay, the developers were not willing 
to agree to the requirements, arguing that they threatened the financial feasibility of 
the operations. For example, in Harbourside the developer was not willing to agree 
to the requirement of 30% social/affordable housing. Finally the developer included 
9%. According to a representative of housing developers, in general about 50% of 
negotiations do not succeed because LPAs ask too large a contributions package 
(Whitaker, interview 2007). Several of the interviewed public officers in Bristol ar­
gued that contribution packages are determined taking into consideration the finan­
cial feasibility of schemes; in their view, the delay is caused by the price that the 
landowner expects the developer pay for his land, and whether it incorporates the 
development value or not. In other words, whether LPAs 'ask too much' or not, de­
pends not only on the expected profit margins and the development costs, but also 
on the accounted land costs.
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The cases offer some information that suggests that Bristol did not 'ask too much', 
thus confirming that resistance or acceptance of requirements might have been based 
more on the expected land price than on the true feasibility of the operation. In ad­
dition, the cases suggest that the expected profit margin (of the developer) might also 
have been relevant (see posting 8 in Annex 3 for a calculation of development costs 
and profits in the English cases). In Megabowl, the price of the land at the moment of 
the planning application was relatively low, about 3-4.5 € million1. This was thanks 
to uncertainty about the building possibilities, which had discouraged developers 
from buying the land previously. This gave the owner-applicant room to contribute 
much more than usual. The total development costs, which included this low land 
price and the contributions package, amounted circa € 20 million, and the expected 
returns circa € 37 million. In other words, thanks to a minimum land price, a large 
package of contributions has not threatened the financial feasibility of the scheme. 
These figures suggest that profit margins have been large and an even larger contri­
bution package would have been financially feasible (37 - 20 = 17); at least, before 
the landowner sold his land to a developer for about € 11 million. In Harbourside 
and Temple Quay, developers were reluctant to provide information. Based on own 
estimations, it is possible to conclude that there was a significant margin between 
development costs (excluding the accounted land price, postings 2-7 in Annex 3: € 
183m in Harbourside and € 133m in Temple) and the total returns (posting 8: € 404m 
respectively € 409m)2. For Harbourside, there is some more evidence that seems to 
confirm the idea that Bristol did actually not ask too much and that landowners and 
developers might have profited from it. Here the definitive land price was calculated 
once planning permission was secured, i.e. after negotiating the contributions. Both 
the interviewed developer and public officer confirmed that landowners have finally 
received a higher price for the land than the initially agreed basic price. This means 
that the developer was actually able to contribute more than he did, because he 
would have been able to pass the costs on to the landowners in the form of a lower 
land price. More recently, the City of Bristol has introduced several measures to im­
prove the insights into the financial feasibility of operations; (1) the City is hiring spe­
cialist consultants; and (2) developers are required now to submit a viability appraisal 
to the Housing Department instead of the Planning Department: this avoids the duty 
of publication of such commercially sensitive information. The Housing Department 
estimates the suitable percentage of affordable housing.
1 This is about € 200-350 per m2 of land, for in total 13.104 m2 with a bowling alley on it.
2 A very approximate rough calculation is for Harbourside ca. € 2,800 per m2 of land (€ 220 : 78,900 
m2); and for Temple Quay ca. € 4,180 per m2 of land (€ 276m : 66,000 m2).
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6.4.5 Procedure for the preparation and approval of the binding 
rules (the planning permission)
Summary of the findings
It seems that procedural guarantees in England offer developers some valuable tools 
to reduce the discretion that LPAs have in determining planning permissions. The 
consequences for capturing value increase might have been negative, and the conse­
quences for the speed of implementation are unclear. The relative flexibility to mod­
ify planning permissions seems to have positive effects for capturing value increase, 
while the possibility of approving first outline permissions and afterwards detailed 
ones does not. Finally, the flexibility in England to determine the size of the develop­
ment area seems not to be relevant for capturing value increase.
6.4.5.1 Guarantees for those taking the initiative
In the English planning system there are several legal guarantees for the applicants 
of planning permissions. First, local authorities are obliged to decide about planning 
applications in a proper fashion. This implies the obligation of publicizing the ap­
plication and starting the formal procedure. Second, there are strict deadlines within 
which local authorities have to determine the applications, deadlines that are moreo­
ver usually met in practice. And third, applicants can appeal against a non-determi­
nation, or against an unfavorable determination of the LPA, to the Planning Inspec­
torate, which evaluates the planning merits of LPA's decisions. Appeals regarding the 
legality of the procedures are decided by the courts of law (Williams & Wood, 1994: 
67). The effects of these guarantees can be divided into consequences for capturing 
value increase, and side effects for the tempo of implementation.
Regarding the consequences for capturing value increase, these may be negative. A 
representative of the development industry considered that the right to a proper de­
termination of planning applications, and the right to appeal, might have influenced 
negatively the negotiation position of local authorities because those authorities that 
require too many obligations are confronted with the risk of an appeal (Whitaker, 
interview 2007). The right to appeal seems to be an important way for developers to 
counter those local authorities that are requiring larger contributions. Asked about 
this, an expert supported partly this conclusion. Indeed, public officers seem to keep 
the right to appeal in mind when determining obligations and they seem to follow 
the obligations policy guidance strictly in order not to risk losing an appeal. It seems 
that the threat of appeals might come not only from the applicant. In competitive situ­
ations, especially in retail developments, developers might want to ensure that any 
obligation is perfectly respectable and legitimate in order to avoid appeal by other 
frustrated competitors. Other developers might seek to appeal against the legitimacy 
of the planning gains as a means of trying to frustrate the development (Claydon & 
Smith, 1997: 2018). In polemical applications, it may be other parties (civic society, 
neighbours,.) that use the argument of illegitimate obligations to impede develop­
ment (Campbell et alii, 2001: 22-23). However, the expert put the weight of the right
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to appeal into perspective: appeals are expensive and time-consuming, which dimin­
ishes their usability for developers (Lyons, interview 2007).
The studied cases seem to support the above-mentioned generalization that the threat 
of appeal stimulates local authorities, and possibly developers also, to strictly follow 
policy guidance. Local authorities in the studied cases did not risk requiring more 
obligations than those strictly based on local policy. In Harbourside the application 
in question was the third one, after the Council had already rejected two other ap­
plications. An involved public officer considered that if this third application were 
refused, the applicant would have had a big chance to win an appeal. The developer 
confirmed that refusal would definitely have led to appeal, and that he probably 
would have won it. In Temple Quay, Bristol seemed to have already required much 
(the transfer of some land for a school), taking account of the poor policy guidance 
at the time of the negotiations. Both the public officer and the developer considered 
that an appeal against a refusal of the application would have had a good chance 
of success. In Megabowl the situation was different. Here, the specific features of 
this site (isolated, not foreseen in the 1997 Local Plan) seemingly gave good reasons 
for refusing the application, if Bristol had wished to do so. As a consequence, the 
Council seemed to have a good negotiation position, as it did not fear an appeal by 
the applicant. Also, the Council had a more generous planning guidance (the SPD4 
document).
Regarding the consequences for the tempo of implementation, these are not clear. 
On the one hand, the representative of the development industry considered that 
the right to a proper determination of planning applications, and the right to appeal, 
have stimulated developers to submit applications, since they reduce the uncer­
tainties (Whitaker, interview 2007). A consulted expert agreed with this conclusion 
(Henneberry, interview 2007). On the other hand, an increasing emphasis by local 
authorities on meeting the strict determination deadlines seems to have led since 
2001 to an increase in refusals. Some local authorities seem not to be able to evalu­
ate all applications properly within the deadlines. To achieve the legal deadlines, it 
appears that some authorities refuse applications that are difficult to evaluate and 
can thus lead to not achieving the deadlines. In turn, the increase of refusals seems 
to be one of the causes of the increase of appeals (Office of the Deputy Prime Min­
ister, 2004a: 5-6, 50). The interviewed representative of the development industry 
was in favour of more flexible deadlines, especially for larger applications of more 
than 200 dwellings. Instead of the current deadlines, the local authority and the ap­
plicant should be obliged to agree an ad hoc schedule that allows a proper assess­
ment of the application. The consulted expert considered that the current legislation 
already gives many possibilities for making deadlines more flexible. For example, 
developers and councils usually get involved in pre-application consultations that 
allow afterwards, once the application has been submitted, a smooth handling of 
the application.
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6.4.5.2 Flexibility in modifying the granted planning permission 
Modification
A modification of the planning permission, however minor it might be, requires a 
new application, and the full procedure has to be completed again. However, if the 
modification regards only planning conditions, there is no need to publicize the ap­
plication. Further, if the modification regards only planning obligations, the LPA and 
the developer can agree to the modification, without extended procedure (Moore, 
2005: §§ 11.33-35, 15.80; Circular 05/2005: §A15). The cases suggest that modifi­
cation of the planning permission, conditions and obligations is a relatively flexible 
instrument, which can improve the negotiation position of LPAs and thus influence 
positively capturing value increase. In Harbourside the developer submitted in 2003 
an application to modify, for several plots, the main aspects of the planning permis­
sion granted in that same year. The modifications followed the full procedure, which 
lasted for about one year. These modifications had positive consequences for captur­
ing value increase, as the Council added some more contributions in money. In 2007 
the developer of Temple Quay and the Council entered into negotiations to modify 
for one third of the site the planning permission granted in 2003. It seems that rene­
gotiation will lead to some additional contributions.
Detailment
Developers can apply for Outline Planning Permission and detail it afterwards. An 
outline permission leaves several matters open (mostly design and external appear­
ance) and reserves approval about them to a later moment. It seems that, up to re­
cently, the subsequent approval of the full planning permission could have conse­
quences for the negotiation position of LPAs and thus for capturing value increase: 
LPAs seemed to be able to add new contributions under certain circumstances. How­
ever, recent changes in legislation (2004 Act) and in policy guidance seem to have 
diminished the discretionary power of local authorities. Applications for outline per­
missions must now be more detailed than before (Moore, 2005: §10.11, §10.13). The 
studied cases seem to support the idea that reserved matters do not significantly effect 
anymore the negotiation position of LPAs. In Temple Quay and Harbourside, quite 
elaborated outline permissions were granted in 2003. Their detailing concerned only 
the external appearance of the buildings, landscaping (including detailed design and 
layout of public space) and detailed design of routes within the site. These detailed 
permissions did not entail any additional contribution.
6.4.5.3 Flexibility to determine the geographical scope (the plan area) of 
planning permission according to negotiations with landowners
There is in England much freedom for the applicant to delimit the plan area of plan­
ning permissions. In principle it is the applicant that proposes a certain delimitation 
of the development area. The applicant can follow, if he wishes, the property bound­
aries of his plot. In principle this means that the system allows scoping planning 
permissions according to the negotiations with each landowners. However, it is the
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applicant that has this freedom, and LPAs have not much freedom here. When con­
sidering the application, local authorities can ask applicants to modify the plan area, 
but if the applicant does not agree, it might be not easy to refuse the application. 
Authorities need then good arguments: e.g. a local zoning plan or planning guidance 
that includes a proposal to delimit, or at least enough arguments and criteria for the 
new delimitation; or when it is clear that the applicant is submitting small applica­
tions in order to develop his land bit by bit, for example to avoid reaching the legal 
threshold of 25 dwellings per scheme; or when the proposed plan area jeopardizes 
the use of an adjacent plot. Most of the interviewed public officers and one of the 
interviewed developers considered it difficult, in practice, to refuse planning applica­
tions on the ground that the plan area is not appropriately delimited.
Asked about this, an expert considered that, in general, on allocated sites (sites that 
are foreseen for regeneration in local planning guidance) local authorities usually de­
limit the development area beforehand, while on 'windfall' sites it is the developers 
who usually delimit the development area (Henneberry, interview 2007). The cases 
suggest that it is the developer that has in practice the most powers to delimit the 
plan area, both on allocated and on windfall sites. In Harbourside (7.9 ha) the 1998 
Planning Brief had previously delimited two development areas, but it was the appli­
cant who decided to submit an application for both areas together. In Temple Quay 
(7.4 ha) the applicant followed his own criteria to delimit the development areas, in 
which property boundaries played a central role. In Megabowl (1.3 ha) it was the ap­
plicant who delimited the plan area following his property boundaries.
It seems plausible that this flexibility has helped in the negotiation processes, in 
the sense that proposals included only those landowners who are willing to devel­
op. However, since local authorities seem not to have much freedom to decide the 
boundaries of the development area, there is no evidence of positive effects for cap­
turing value increase, nor does this seem likely.
6.5 The actual degree of captured value increase in 
England
This section is about whether the goals for capturing value increase have been achieved 
or not, and about the actual distribution of costs between the involved parties: who has 
paid which public infrastructure and facilities, and possibly some extras? We assess 
also whether the capturing value increase goals have been achieved on time. The main 
sources of information are the studied cases, complemented with other written sources 
and interviews with relevant experts. The conclusions are summarized in table 16.
Table 16. Comparison table results for capturing value increase in England.
On-site land 
development costs
Land for on-site 
public infrastructure
Land for on-site 
public buildings
On-site public buildings Affordable housing Contributions 
off-site public 
infrastructure 
and facilities
Cream off 
betterment
Developer/
landowner
Public body Developer/
landowner
Public
body
Developer/
landowner
Public body Developer/
landowner
Public body Developer/
landowner
Public bodies
General
knowledge
England
(Al most) al I 
the costs
Indirect 
through land/ 
cheap 
financing
Most of the 
land
Part of the 
land
Part of the land Part of the 
land
Not very often Almost
always
Increasing 
number 
affordable/ 
social houses
Part of Important 
contributions, 
which are 
increasing the 
last years.
In principle not.
Harbourside
(total value real 
estate € 404 m)3
€ 28m 
(7% total 
value real 
estate)
Council paid 
share, Eng 
Partner issued 
cheap loan
30% total 
plan area
20% total 
plan area
0.3% total 
plan area
Developer 
builds small 
public building
4 %  rent, 
5 %  shared 
ownership
€ 32.5m 
(8% total value 
real estate)
Temple Quay
(total value real 
estate € 409 m)
€ 13.2m 
(3% total 
value real 
estate)
Probably in­
direct subsidy 
SWRDA
27% total 
plan area
27% total 
plan area
3 %  total plan 
area
12% total 
plan area
School
(already
existing)
4 %  rent, 
10% shared 
ownership
€ 5.9m 
(1.5% total 
value real 
estate)
Megabowl
(total value real 
estate € 3 7 m)
€ 1.2m 
(3% total 
val ue real 
estate)
65% total 
plan area
20% rent, 
5 %  shared 
ownership
€ 1.6m
(4% total value 
real estate)
Grey: case in which the developer/landowner contributes the most of the three cases.
Light Grey: case in which the developer/landowner contributes the second of the three cases. 
White: case in which the developer/landowner contributes the less of the three cases.
3 'Total value real estate' are the total returns accruing from the selling of the final real estate (thus includes the selling of the new buildings).
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On-site infrastructure provision costs
It seems that, in general, all the costs of on-site infrastructure provision are paid by 
the developer/landowner. This includes, in principle, compensation costs that might 
be payable to existing users. Sometimes the developer does not transfer the legal 
ownership of the resulting infrastructure to the local authority, but keeps the legal 
ownership for himself. This infrastructure usually has however to remain accessible 
for the general public. The system of planning obligations has succeeded in general 
in financing the on-site infrastructure provision costs (Campbell et alia, 2000 and 
2001; Department for Communities and Local Government, 2006). It seems that de­
velopers prefer payment in kind to payment in money, because this might be cheaper 
for them and because they have more certainty about the delivery of the public facili­
ties. The studied cases support this conclusion: in the three cases, the developer paid 
all on-site infrastructure provision costs, almost all in kind.
However, in regeneration schemes, there might be exceptions to the general con­
clusion. In one of the studied cases, Harbourside, the local authority, which sold to 
the developer part of the land, had to pay part of the costs. Furthermore, the central 
government regeneration agency English Partnerships issued a cheap loan for the 
infrastructure works. In Temple Quay the SWRDA, a regional public development 
agency owning about 25% of the land, might have sold its land to the developer 
for a low price, a kind of indirect subsidy. Consulted about this, a relevant expert 
confirmed that it is not an exception that regeneration schemes encounter additional 
land development costs, and that many LPAs and other public bodies still have sub­
stantial properties on these sites. It is very common that public bodies use their land 
to facilitate development (Henneberry, interview 2007).
Land needed for on-site public infrastructure and facilities
Regarding the land needed for on-site infrastructure provision (excluding the land un­
der the public buildings) the available literature supports the idea that, in general, the 
system of planning obligations has succeeded in providing this land free of charge 
(Campbell et alia, 2000 and 2001; Department for Communities and Local Govern­
ment, 2006). However, the cases confirm this general statement only partly. Here the 
developer/landowner provides most of the land needed for on-site public infrastruc­
ture and facilities, but public bodies provide also an important part of it. Only in 
Megabowl did the developer provide all the land. Regarding the legal ownership of 
the land, sometimes the developer retains the legal ownership (all the public space 
in Megabowl, one fifth of the public space in Harbourside), and sometimes the local 
authority receives it free (four fifths of the public space in Harbourside, all the public 
space in Temple Quay). Consulted about this, an expert confirmed that it is common 
in urban regeneration schemes that public bodies provide part of the needed land 
(Henneberry, interview 2007).
Regarding the land needed for public buildings: in Harbourside, the only public 
building was a small pavilion occupying 0,3% of the total plan area, and situated
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on council land. In Temple Quay, there was just one public building: a school oc­
cupying about 15% of the plan area, of which 15% only one fifth has been ceded 
for free by the developer. In Megabowl there were no public buildings in the plan 
area. It seems therefore that, at least in the studied cases, developers usually do not 
contribute with land for public buildings. Two case studies in the 90's (Newbury, 
Berkshire, 50,000 m2 office space, planning permission granted in 1999; and Shep- 
ton Mallet, Somerset, 360 dwellings, planning permission granted in 1994) show 
the same differentiated picture as in our cases: the office scheme did not include 
contributions in land for on-site public buildings, whereas the housing scheme in­
cluded a contribution in land meant for a primary school within the site in question. 
However, these cases were of greenfield schemes, not regeneration (Campbell et 
alii, 2001: 21-33).
On-site public facilities (the buildings)
Only in Harbourside and Temple Quay were there some public buildings. In Har­
bourside the developer himself will build a small public building. The developer in 
Temple Quay has not contributed, either in kind (except some land, see above) or 
in money, to the re-building of the existing school. Asked about this, an expert con­
sidered that this finding could be generalized. Usually, neither the developer nor the 
respective public departments seem to favour giving to developers the responsibility 
for developing the public buildings. Developers usually concentrate on the products 
familiar to them. And the public departments responsible for the public buildings 
prefer to remain in charge of developing them (Lyons, interview 2007).
Land and money for on-site and off-site social/affordable housing
In 1999/2000, 9,244 affordable units were delivered through planning agreements 
in England. In 2000/01 this was 9,227 units, in 2001/02 10,303 units, in 2002/03 
12,700 units, and in 2003/04 16,380 units. It is estimated that this would be 15,000/ 
year by 2005/2006 (ODPM, 2005: 9, 32; Department for Communities and Local 
Government, 2006: 33). The proportion of affordable units secured through plan­
ning agreement, in relation to the total new affordable units was in 1999/00 21%, 
in 2000/01 21%, in 2001/02 32% and in 2002/03 44% (Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister, 2005: 9). In general, provision of social/affordable units through planning 
obligations seems to work better in greenfield than in regeneration sites, and also 
better in the south of the country than in the north. A source however suggests that 
affordable units obtained through planning agreements often profit from social hous­
ing grants (Crook et al., 2001: in Crook & Whitehead, 2002: 1274-5). The interviews 
with public officers and developers and the cases suggest that in Bristol in the last 
few years, the number of social/affordable housing obtained through planning agree­
ment is increasing, which could explain the relatively good results in this city. The 
percentages of new affordable dwellings (whether obtained through planning agree­
ment or not) of the total completed new units are in Bristol higher than the average in 
England: in 2003 15% in Bristol and 9%  in England, in 2004 23% and 11%, in 2005 
5.6% and 11%, and in 2006 22% and 13% (see table 17).
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None of the studied cases included contributions in money for affordable housing; 
in all of them, the developer himself developed the affordable units within the site in 
question. The more recent the project, the higher the proportion of affordable hous­
ing. In cases Temple Quay and Harbourside (planning permissions definitively valid 
in 2003) the proportion was 14% respectively 9%. In Megabowl (2007) 25%. The 
following figures are meant to make clear that developing social/affordable housing 
actually involves a financial charge to the developers. In Harbourside, the develop­
ment costs of the affordable units (the costs of serving the land and constructing the 
building, excluding the price of land and excluding the planning obligations) amount 
to about € 5.5m, and the agreed selling price (to the Registered Social Landlord) 
will be about € 4.7m. The developer thus bears not only the difference between the 
price for the social landlord and the free-market price of the houses, but also a short­
age (returns less costs) of about € 800,000. In Temple Quay this shortage was about 
€ 270,000, and in Megabowl about € 650,000. The developers must thus bear these 
costs, plus the corresponding accounted land costs and contributions.
Table 17. Completed affordable housing in England and the City of Bristol (all new affordable units, 
those obtained through planning agreement and through other ways).
England City of Bristol
Registered Social 
Landlord's units 
(%  of total completed 
new units)
Local Authority's units 
(%  of total completed 
new units)
Registered Social 
Landlord's units 
(%  total completed 
new units)
Local Authority's 
units
(%  total completed 
new units)
1999 17,775 (12.6%) 54 (0.0%)
2000 16,681 (12.3%) 87 (0.1%)
2001 14,502 (11.2%) 160 (0.1%)
2002 13,309 (9.7%) 177 (0.1%)
2003 12,822 (8.9%) 177 (0.1%) 72 (14.8%) 0.0%
2004 16,604 (10.8%) 131 (0.1%) 140 (22.9%) 0.0%
2005 17,535 (11.0%) 182 (0.1%) 99 (5.6%) 0.0%
2006 20,752 (12.9%) 277 (0.2%) 143 (22.3%) 0.0%
Definitions:
- Affordable housing: those units that are provided to rent (or on shared ownership bases) by Local Authorities or 
Registered Social Landlords.
Sources:
- England: Own elaboration, based on P2m/P2Q returns from local authorities, National Housebuilding Council 
(NHBC), available on-line on http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1156032, live table 244 'Permanent 
dwellings completed, by tenure, England, historical calendar year series', visited on 15 Augustus 2007.
- City of Bristol: Own elaboration, based on P2m returns from local authorities, returns from National Housebuild­
ing Council (NHBC), available on-line on http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1156032, live table 253 
'Starts and completions by district', visited on 1 5 Augustus 2007. The available data refer to 2002-2003, 2003­
2004, 2004-2005 and 2005-2006, and are referred in this table respectively as 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006.
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Land and money for off-site public infrastructure and facilities
It seems that developers do not usually contribute land for off-site infrastructure and 
facilities, i.e. they do not usually cede land situated outside the development in ques­
tion (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2006: 9-10). The findings 
in the cases support this: in none of the three cases has the developer provided land 
outside the plan area. The situation is different with contributions, both in kind and 
in money, for the construction or implementation of off-site public infrastructure and 
facilities. These seem to have increased very much in the last years (Campbell et alia, 
2000, 2001; Department for Communities and Local Government, 2006). At the end 
of the 90's, obligations regarding off-site infrastructure and facilities were already 
very common in England. There is a strong geographical differentiation depending 
on the economic prosperity of local authorities: the stronger the economy, the more 
the contributions. Thus more in London and the South East than in the North (Camp­
bell et alia, 2000: 764-765, 772; Department., 2006: 17-18). The cases confirm the 
general idea that obligations include nowadays contributions in money for off-site 
public infrastructure and facilities. In Harbourside the developer will pay in money a 
considerable contribution for a leisure facility, about 8%  of the total value of the final 
real estate. In Temple Quay this will be about 1.5% (for off-site highways, pedestrian 
and cycle facilities, educational, social and community facilities and a labour initia­
tive), and in Megabowl about 4%  (for off-site pedestrian, cycle and public transport 
facilities, training/apprenticeship programme, education, recreational and library fa­
cilities).
Creaming off plus value
Insofar as the above mentioned payments for off-site public infrastructure and fa­
cilities are not related to the development in question, they might be considered as 
creaming off plus value. But, in principle, the English system of planning obligations 
is not meant for the local authorities to share the economic rent generated by the 
granting of planning permission.
Tempo of implementation of the capturing value increase goals
Sections 6.5 and 6.6 (so far) have analyzed the working of binding rules within the 
mechanisms for capturing value increase and the results in practice. Now, possible 
side effects are assessed, with special attention given to the tempo of implementation 
of the capturing value increase goals.
In section 6.4.2.3 it has been pointed out that planning permissions, in general for 
England, do not always succeed in being realised within deadlines. Many planning 
permissions are never built, not even commenced. However, until the moment of 
data gathering in June 2007, those planning permissions of which the implementa­
tion is commenced seem to be completed on time. Since then, probably fuelled by 
unstable market circumstances, it seems that building schedules are experiencing 
large delays, even if development already commenced. In other words, once and if 
development commences, and provided that market circumstances remain stable,
England 211
developers seem to complete the public infrastructure and facilities, including pos­
sible payments in money, within time.
6.6 Causal relationships between formal rules relevant 
to zoning and capturing value increase in England
Section 6.4 gave an answer to Preparatory research question 3: it inferred the pos­
sible causal relations between the independent variable 'formal rules relevant to 
zoning' and the dependent variable 'capturing value increase'. This section sum­
marizes first the inferred causalities and assesses then the effect of possible third 
variables.
6.6.1 The inferred causalities
The findings suggest that the following sub-variables can influence positively and/or 
negatively the degree of captured value increase (see also the causal model in section
2.4.2 and Figure 24):
• Sub-variable a, Uncertainty about the future building possibilities, together with 
Certainty about the future contributions
This seems to have been positive for intermediary variables negotiation position 
(of the municipality) and accounted land costs, i.e. positive for capturing value 
increase;
• Sub-variable b, Contents planning permissions
(1) Zoning and agreeing social/affordable housing; (2) Including contributions 
for off-site public infrastructure and facilities; (3) Including financing and imple­
mentation schedules; the first two seem to have been positive for capturing value 
increase, probably because they have been positive for intermediary variables 
negotiation position (of the municipality) and Accounted land costs. The third 
sub-variable (schedules) seem to be sometimes positive, but sometimes not so 
effective, for intermediary variables negotiation position (of the LPAs) and delay;
• Sub-variable c, Conditioning permission to agreement
The possibility of making the approval of planning permission conditional on 
securing the public infrastructure and facilities and other possible contributions: 
this seems to have been positive for capturing value increase, plausibly through 
reinforcing the positive effects of sub-variables b on intermediary variables ac­
counted land costs, regular profit margins (of the developer) the negotiation posi­
tion (of the municipality) and delay;
• Sub-variable d, property rights
The high interdependency between LPAs and landowners seems to have a 
negative effect on intermediary variables negotiation position (of the LPA's),
Actions influencing distribution initial profit (D):
1. Public bodies using powers certainly:
- Sub-variable a: uncertainty-certainty ---------------
- Sub-variable b/ 1-2: contents binding rules ---------
—^> - Sub-variable b/3: contents binding rules/schedules —  
— - Sub-variable c: conditioning binding rules
2. Owners using property rights (sub-variable d) --------
3. Public bodies using powers procedure
- Sub-variable e: guarantees for those taking initiative —
- Sub-variable e: flexibility
modification planning permission ------------------
- Sub-variable e: flexibility detailing planning permission
- Sub-variable e: flexibility sizing plan area
Final profit
A
->> Accounted land costs 
Regular profit margins 
Inflated development costs
A
—]> Négociation position 
->> Delay
< Independent variable > < Intermediary variable >
-> CAPTURING VALUE INCREASE
< Dependent variable >
Figure 24. Scheme of the inferred causal relations in England between independent variable 'formal rules relevant to zoning', the intermediary variables and
the dependent variable 'capturing value increase'.
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accounted land costs, regular profit margins (of the developer) and delay, and 
thus a negative effect on capturing value increase;
• Sub-variable e, Guarantees for those taking initiative
The right to appeal against the determination or non-determination of planning 
applications might be positive or negative for accelerating the tempo of imple­
mentation (thus for intermediary variable delay), but anyway negative for inter­
mediary variable negotiation position (of the developer), and thus negative for 
capturing value increase;
• Sub-variable e, Flexibility in modifying granted planning permissions
The relatively flexibility to modify planning permissions might be positive for 
intermediary variable negotiation position (of LPAs) and thus for capturing value 
increase.
The findings also suggest that the following sub-variables might have no effect on any 
intermediary variable and/or the degree of captured value increase:
• Sub-variable e, Flexibility in detailing 'a posteriori'
This seems not to be relevant anymore;
• Sub-variable e, Flexibility to scope the size of the plan area of permissions ac­
cording to negotiations with each landowner
This seems not to be relevant.
Part of sub-variable b (those contents of permissions that can be secured through an 
agreement), and sub-variable c (conditioning permission to agreement) are causally 
related to each other, in an inverse order as expressed. Sub-variable c seems to be an 
important cause of the effectiveness of those contributions that can be secured in the 
agreement (part of sub-variable b).
6.6.2 Possible third variables
Here, possible third variables are assessed, related first to the specific circumstances 
in the studied cases (variables D4 and D5 of the causal model in section 2.4.2), and 
second to market circumstances (variable A1). The goal is to examine the possibility 
that the inferred causal relationships turn out to be spurious (see for more detail sec­
tion 3.2.1.2).
Specific circumstances in the studied cases
In Harbourside and Temple Quay two specific circumstances might have favoured the 
capturing of value increase: the size and skills of the teams of public officers in charge, 
and the intervention of supra local public agencies. Regarding the first, in both cases 
the interviewed public officers were happy about the team of officers that had han­
dled the applications. These were large applications, which allowed the constitution 
of larger teams with more resources. It seems plausible that this might have influenced 
positively capturing value increase, especially in Temple Quay, where there was no
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good policy base for obligations. In Harbourside, the interviewed developer did not 
mention this factor, but another one: in his opinion, the lack of vigorous political 
leadership in the Council at that time delayed development. In Megabowl the public 
officer in charge complained about the lack of resources to handle the application.
Regarding the intervention of supra local public agencies, in Harbourside and Temple 
Quay it seems that this intervention has influenced capturing value increase, by help­
ing to make both projects more profitable. In Harbourside, English Partnership, a cen­
tral government regeneration agency, supported the regeneration of the site through 
a cheap loan for the infrastructure provision. In Temple Quay, the South West of Eng­
land Regional Development Agency (SWRDA), a regional public body, took over the 
land from a Development Corporation in 1996, and since then has stimulated regen­
eration and might have given an indirect subsidy by selling the land for a low price.
Market circumstances
Another possibly third variable, housing prices, can also affect capturing value in­
crease (variable A1, see causal model in section 2.4.2) and the speed of implementa­
tion (because more profits attract more investments, and remove obstacles). This re­
search concludes that the influence of housing prices has been relevant, influencing 
capturing value increase in a positive way.
Since 1997 housing prices have risen very much (often above 10% each year) above 
the general monetary inflation. This increase took place in England in general, and 
also in the South-West of England and in the City of Bristol, and continued till 2005. 
In 2005 and 2006 prices grew more moderately (0% to 5%) above the general mon­
etary inflation (see figure 25). This means that cases Harbourside (application proce­
dure and negotiations: March 2001-February 2003) and Temple Quay (May 2001- 
May 2003) started in a time of splendid expectations about market prices in general, 
and specifically in Bristol: 13% increase above inflation in 2000, 17% in 2001, 20% 
in 2002 and 13% in 2003. In Megabowl (April 2006-April 2007) the expectations 
might have been different, although not necessarily pessimistic: 1,5% increase above 
inflation in 2005 and 6%  in 2 0 064.
4 In 2007 prices in Bristol for new apartments were between € 3,000 to 5,000 per m2 floor space, or 
even more. Because of the unavailability of general statistics of housing prices per square meter floor 
space, we had to support on alternative sources:
• In case M egabow l the developer estimated roughly the total price of the 138 free-market 
apartments in about € 34 million. As these 138 units were about 10,000 m2 floor space, the 
average is about € 3,400/m2 floor space. The prices in M egabow l must be considered how­
ever as belonging to a cheaper segment, as this site is relatively isolated and located outside 
the City Centre of Bristol. Cases Harbourside and Temple Q uay  are located in top-locations 
near by the City Centre. Therefore, another sources are necessary to give an approximate idea 
of prices of new apartments in these two cases:
• In housing scheme Crescent Harbourside Anchor Road, located besides case Harbourside/Can- 
non's Marsh, prices of new apartments vary from € 5,000/ m2 floor space to more than € 7,000/ 
m2 floor space. Source: own elaboration, based on current selling prices, http://www.smartne- 
whomes.com/development/Harbourside/506690/11/gallery.aspx, visited on 22 augustus 2007.
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Figure 25. Growth of real prices (minus general monetary inflation) dwellings in England, 
the South-West and the City of Bristol.
In general it seems clear that the increase in housing prices has played a very im­
portant role in all the cases. Almost all the involved persons who were interviewed 
considered that price rises in the last years have been of capital importance for the 
financial feasibility of both cases. In Harbourside high market prices seems to have 
created a large surplus between the land price of the previous use (former docks and 
industrial area, largely vacant, public parking) and of the future use (housing, office 
and some others). The developer did not provide information about the land price, 
but own estimations suggest that the difference between the development costs (ex­
cluding the accounted land price, postings 2-7 in Annex 3), and the returns are very 
large 5. In Temple Quay the public officer considered that the poor market circum­
stances in the 90's were the reason that the four previously granted planning per­
missions expired without being used. Also, he assessed that the current high prices 
created a large surplus between the land price of the previous use (former railway 
sidings and industries, largely flattened and vacant) and of the future use (housing, 
office and some others). Here also, the developer did not provide information about 
the land price, but own estimations suggest that the difference between the develop­
ment costs, and the returns is very large6. In Megabowl the surplus was also large 
between the land price of the previous use (the bowling alley) and of the future use 
(housing). Here the difference between the development costs and the returns is also 
very large.7
5 A very approximate and rough calculation is for Harbourside ca. € 2,800 per m2 of land (€ 220m : 
78,900 m2).
6 A very approximate rough calculation is for Temple Q uay  ca. € 4,180 per m2 of land (€ 276m : 
66,000 m2).
7 A very approximate rough calculation is for Megabowl ca. € 1,600 per m2 of land (€ 21m : 13,104 m2)
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These large surpluses suggest that the cases would have been feasible with lower 
housing prices also. The interviewed developer of Harbourside confirmed that Har­
bourside was already feasible ten years ago, and that the price rises have provided 
the landowners and the developer with profits additional to the initially calculated 
profits. The surplus might in any case have stimulated developers to contribute more 
generously. A public officer considered that the last years many other difficult regen­
eration sites in Bristol have come up, thanks to the favourable market circumstances. 
An interviewed expert also considered, in general terms for England, that price rises 
have been one important factor for the financial feasibility of many projects. Accord­
ing to this expert, expired planning permissions have diminished in the last years 
partly because of this (Henneberry, interview in 2007).
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erlands
Chapters 5 and 6 have been about the working of the formal rules relevant to zon­
ing and the results for capturing value increase in urban regeneration in the Span­
ish region of Valencia and in England. The findings are meant for some theoretical 
reflections in chapter 8 and especially for formulating recommendations for the 
Dutch practice in chapter 9. But before the reflections and recommendations can 
be made, it is necessary to examine the working of formal rules in the Netherlands 
also. After all, the main goal is to formulate recommendations inspired by the ex­
perience in other countries, but taking account of the Dutch planning system and 
legislation.
In the Netherlands, at the end of the 1980s important changes took place in land and 
housing policies, changes that have modified the mechanisms for capturing value 
increase. Besides the traditional forms of active land policy, public bodies are pursu­
ing nowadays new forms of public-private partnerships to reduce the financial risks 
involved in urban regeneration. Also, local public bodies are looking for less active 
methods of land policy, in which private parties assume the responsibility for im­
plementing the plans and for the corresponding risks. In general it can be said that 
public bodies nowadays aim for a larger private involvement in the financing of the 
unprofitable parts in urban regeneration. In 2008 the legislative framework that gov­
erns this private involvement was modified (for more details about these changes in 
the Netherlands, see sections 1.1 and 1.2).
Frame 7a
The institutional context: national government, provinces and municipalities
The Netherlands occupies an area of 33.929 km2 and has more than 16 million
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inhabitants. It is a decentralized, unitary state, with a system of constitutional parlia­
mentary monarchy. There are twelve provinces (provincies) and 431 municipalities
(gemeenten).
The legislative powers on planning law lie primarily with the central government and 
parliament. They produce the 'formal legislation'. Formal legislation can, within cer­
tain limits, transfer authority to issue 'legislation in a material sense' (decrees and regu­
lations) to the provinces and to the municipalities. Planning and property law and poli­
cies of each governmental body are subordinated to the law and policies of the higher 
governmental bodies (Needham et al., 1993: 3-7). In practice, however, the autonomy 
of provinces and municipalities is important. For a list of relevant legislation, relative 
to planning, see Annex 2.
Sections 7.1 and 7.2 introduce the context of how value increase is captured in urban 
regeneration. Section 7.3 introduces the studied cases, and section 7.4 the working 
of the formal rules relevant to zoning within the value capturing mechanisms. This is 
the answer to Preparatory research question 3: how can formal rules relevant to zon­
ing influence capturing value increase? The question has been divided into several 
sub-questions that correspond to the sub-variables a-e (for more details about these 
sub-variables, see section 3.3.3). Each of the answers to these sub-questions consists 
of an assessment of whether the sub-variable can influence capturing value increase. 
There is therefore not one conclusion, but as many conclusions as sub-questions. All 
these conclusions, together with the findings in Valencia and England, have provided 
the ingredients for the final conclusions in chapters 8 and 9. Section 7.5 assesses the 
results of the actual degree of captured value increase, taking account of the side ef­
fects for the tempo of implementation. Finally, section 7.6 summarizes the inferred 
causalities between the formal rules relevant to zoning and capturing value increase, 
and assesses the role of third variables.
7.1 Urban Regeneration in the Netherlands
Urban regeneration in the Netherlands is an important topic in national and local 
planning policies. In general, there is preoccupation that the relative advantages of 
urban development on greenfield sites might threaten existing urban areas. Strength­
ening of existing cities and towns is therefore the goal (Kolpron, 2000: 1-2; Korthals 
Altes, 2007: 1498). This has translated into policies for the regeneration of urban 
areas and for the stimulation of new building within the boundaries of existing cit­
ies, making use of old deteriorated urban sites. The central government has the goal 
that 40% of the new housing should be built within the existing cities (Vrom, 2004; 
2008). Recently this goal has been lowered to between 25 and 40%: between 20,000 
and 40,000 dwellings per year (AZ, 2007: 35; Buitelaar et al., 2008: 12, 34-40).
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There are different sorts of urban regeneration sites, each of them with different fea­
tures and each of them being the subject of specific urban regeneration policies (Kol- 
pron, 2000: 8-31): multifunctional central areas, monofunctional residential districts 
and old brownfield sites.
Multifunctional central areas
Multifunctional central areas consist of central areas and of sites around railway sta­
tions. Local urban regeneration policies for both sorts of sites usually focus on im­
proving public and private facilities to better serve the local and regional population 
and to attract residential functions. In central areas, the dominant uses are retail, 
cafés and restaurants, offices, public facilities and housing. Property ownership is 
very fragmented, with many small owners and some institutional landlords, such as 
large retail businesses and stores, investors in real estate, and housing associations. 
However, municipalities are often the only substantial party. For the sites around 
railway stations, the dominant uses are more or less the same as in central areas, but 
related to the transport function of the railway station. Some of these sites - those that 
will accommodate the high speed railway - are intended and expected to develop 
into centers of stature. These are: Breda, Rotterdam, The Hague, Amsterdam, Utrecht 
and Arnhem. These sites are being regenerated nowadays, as the case Stationskwartier 
shows for the railway station of Breda. Property patterns are usually less fragmented 
than in central areas, with almost always two big landowners, the municipality and 
the Dutch Railways.
Frame 7b
Private parties in urban regeneration
In the Netherlands, public or commercial organisations usually control most of the 
land, more in urban regeneration than in greenfield development. These institution­
al agents are public (local governments), private non-profit (housing associations, 
woningcorporaties) and/or private commercial (property developers). Former landown­
ers might be present at the beginning of the development, but if present they usually 
share neither risks nor do they participate in the operation. Most of the times their role 
is limited to that of providers of land. That is, urban redevelopment in the Netherlands 
is most of the time the task of institutional agents.
From the 1990s forward, commercial property developers have become important ac­
tors in urban regeneration, as the cases De Funen and Kop van Oost show. Commercial 
developers commission the development of offices and dwellings for sale to the final 
user or to a property investment company. When profit rates increase, developers tend 
to augment the proportion of offices and dwellings developed at their own risk, without 
having sold them before commencing the building, and vice versa. Churches, sport 
clubs and the like usually commission their own buildings, as do production firms 
(Segeren e.a., 2005: 124). There are very few people that commission their own house.
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Most of the public facilities (hospitals, homes for the elderly, education, universities, 
social housing) are commissioned by non-profit companies with a religious, political 
or other kind of social background. These non-profit organizations, previously closely 
related to the public administration due to their dependence on public subsidies, have 
become the last years more autonomous. The most important non-profit agents in ur­
ban regeneration are the housing associations. These social landlords develop social 
housing either themselves or they commission property developers to build it for them. 
They are the most important property management companies in the country, owning 
approximately one third of the Dutch housing stock. Until the 90s, benefiting from 
strong public subsidies, housing associations were the leaders in housing building. 
From 1994 on, since public subsidies diminished, most of them have restructured and/ 
or fused with others, and have begun to develop, besides social housing, commercial 
real estate (Priemus, 1996). This is the case in Kruidenbuurt (Eindhoven), where a social 
landlord is developing 45% of the total number of dwellings as social housing, and 
the rest as free market housing and some commercial space. In 2005 there were 492 
housing associations (Vrom, 2007a: 156).
In the last few years, most of the former public utility companies (energy and water 
supply, telecommunication, railways) have become more autonomous or have even 
been privatized. Some of them owning land have become important partners in urban 
regeneration. Cases De Funen and Stationskwartier are an example of this: here the 
Dutch Railways owned most of the land and became the initiating developer.
Monofunctional residential districts
A second category of urban regeneration sites is districts with a predominantly 
residential use. Urban regeneration policies here aim to strengthen the residential 
use, and therefore provide housing, facilities and public space of good quality. Es­
pecially in pre-war districts, this might involve the removal of old factories that are 
no longer compatible with housing. In the last few years, the Ministry of Housing, 
Planning and Environment has been intensifying its efforts for the regeneration of 
56 districts, and more recently a new selection has been made of 40 districts (the 
prachtwijken), most of them located in monofunctional residential areas. This re­
search has made a brief survey of these 56 regeneration districts. Based on this, it 
is possible to conclude that regeneration takes place predominantly on land owned 
by municipalities or housing associations. Regeneration on privately owned land 
of any significance happens only in a minority of cases and concerns small sites: 
shopping centres and/or residential with about 50-100 dwellings (for more details 
of this survey, see Annex 5).
It is possible to distinguish between two sorts of monofunctional residential districts, 
pre-war and post-war. Pre-war districts are mostly located near or in the multifunc­
tional central areas mentioned above. Many of them have been the subject of regen-
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eration twice: first physical regeneration from the mid-1970s to 1990 (Korthals Altes, 
2007: 1501), and second nowadays again, e.g. case Kruidenbuurt. Property owner­
ship is usually fragmented, even though previous physical regeneration has concen­
trated property to some extent: municipalities and housing associations have become 
the most important landowners. The increased value of the land after re-development 
is usually lower than in multifunctional central areas.
After the 2nd W W  and until 1970, municipalities and housing associations devel­
oped 1.6 million new houses around the existing cities, most of them social hous­
ing. The deterioration nowadays in these districts is evident and has led the central 
and local governments to initiate and stimulate large regeneration projects. These 
post-war districts were built in a systematic way by municipalities and housing as­
sociations, supported by central government subsidies. They incorporated many of 
the design principles of the Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM). 
The main characteristics of these residential districts are monofunctionality, buildings 
of repeated morphology located in the middle of much green, low building density, 
much road infrastructure, many public facilities and a predominance of social hous­
ing. Property ownership is concentrated: municipalities own the public infrastruc­
ture and facilities, and sometimes also the land under the dwellings, which is given 
in leasehold (erfpacht) to housing associations. Corporations own the majority of 
the dwellings and sometimes also the land. In addition, some investors own some 
land and buildings (e.g. shopping centres) and there are also some owner-occupiers 
(both housing and factories). The increased value of the land after regeneration is 
lower than in multifunctional central areas. From 1970 to 1999, another 2.7 million 
dwellings were developed, not only around the existing cities, but also around small 
suburban towns, especially in the western part of the country. This time more atten­
tion was paid to the quality of housing. Generally speaking, the regeneration of these 
districts is not yet a policy issue.
Old brownfield sites
A third category of urban regeneration sites is old brownfield sites. It is possible to 
distinguish between the following: businesses and other sorts of economic-industrial 
activities (case Kop van Oost); gas and electricity factories; harbour areas; railway 
infrastructure (cases De Funen and Stationskwartier); and hospitals, government 
buildings and military sites. In the whole of the country there are about 23,000 ha 
of old business estates that might be the subject of regeneration in the next years 
(Buitelaar et al., 2008: 10-11; Gordijn et al., 2007: 5). Regeneration almost always 
involves replacing the existing uses with new ones. Property ownership varies but is 
in general characterized by the presence of large institutional public or private par­
ties controlling the property: this is certainly the case in the three mentioned cases. 
The increased value of the land after regeneration is low when the existing uses are 
maintained and higher when replaced by housing and offices (Korthals Altes, 2007: 
1502).
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7.2 Capturing value increase and its legal limits in the 
Netherlands
In the Netherlands, the financing of public infrastructure and facilities, in urban re­
generation on privately owned land, is based on contributions from both municipali­
ties and developers. These contributions might be in kind or in money and are usually 
agreed in private law development agreements. This was the case in all the studied 
projects. These agreements are called here 'private law' because they are not regu­
lated in planning law and because they are legally enforceable under private law. 
Since the 2008 Physical Planning Act (Wet ruimtelijke ordening) it has been possible, 
within certain limits, to impose a contribution without the need of a development 
agreement. Frame 7c gives an overview of the binding rules and other planning docu­
ments that are relevant for capturing value increase in the Netherlands.
Frame 7c
Indicative plans and the relevant binding rules
At the local level, Dutch municipalities have the competence to prepare and approve 
zoning plans, both of an indicative and of a binding character. Regarding the indica­
tive plans, these have no legally binding force, neither for the citizen nor for municipal 
planning documents. They are often ad hoc documents, not defined in planning law: 
this was the case in all the studied projects. Planning law prescribes only one sort of 
indicative plan: Structure Plans (Structuurplan), often used in practice, although not 
so much as the ad hoc documents. Two of the four studied schemes included, besides 
ad hoc documents, a Structure Plan. Structure Plans might cover the whole munici­
pality or just a part of it (Klaassen, 2000: 85-88), and have been replaced in 2008 by 
Structure Visions (Structuurvisie).
Municipalities have also the competence to make and adopt Land-use Plans (Bestem­
mingsplan), which can cover the whole municipality (although this does not happen 
often) or a part of it (happens most frequently: for example, Rotterdam has over 400 
Land-use plans, and Nijmegen over 800; Buitelaar et al, 2007: 54). Municipalities 
are obliged to cover the territory outside the built-up area with land-use plans, and 
since the 2008 Physical Planning Act the whole municipal territory. An important part 
of the land use plan has a legally binding character: this is the part that determines 
the use possibilities of land and real estate. A land use plan includes an Explanation 
(Plantoelichting), a Map (Plankaart), and the Land-use Regulations (Planvoorschriften). 
The Regulations contain at least a definition of the permitted land uses (doeleindenom- 
schrijving), and possibly an Outline Definition (Beschrijving in Hoofdlijnen). The Map 
and the Regulations have a legally binding character, and the Explanation in principle 
has not. However, the Explanation might be relevant in those cases in which Map and 
Regulations leave room for interpretation (Van Zundert, 1996: 97-98)
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A land use plan can be detailed or outline. Article 11.1 of the old Physical Planning 
Act, and 3.6 of the 2008 Act, give to the municipality the possibility of stating in the 
land-use plan the obligation to add details later. If the municipality states in the land­
use plan that it has to be detailed later, it becomes an 'Outline Land-use plan with 
obligation of further elaboration' (Globaal bestemmingsplan met uitwerkingsplicht). In 
such a plan, a part or the whole plan area is given outline binding land-use regulations 
(globale bestemmingen). Also, such a plan has to include the rules that will regulate the 
detailing. Then, later, the municipality has the obligation to detail, following the rules 
given in the plan, the outline regulations up to the detailed level of a normal land-use 
plan. Data from 1987 until 1993 show that detailing Outline land-use plans is used 
frequently (Van Damme & Verdaas 1996: 79-80). In the cases Stationskwartier and 
Kruidenbuurt, the land use plan included outline regulations, covering one small plot 
respectively almost all the plan area.
Both the central and provincial governments might freeze or modify the land use plans 
of municipalities, and even replace them with their own documents: in practice, this 
does not happen often. The central government exercises this control through four 
Physical Planning Inspectorates (Inspectie Ruimtelijke Ordening), and the provinces 
also have inspectors. Until the 2008 Physical Planning Act, provincial governments 
had to approve all land use plans definitively. Since then, provinces no longer have to 
approve them, but they retain the power to intervene.
The Physical Planning Act states deadlines for the procedures for a land-use plan. Pre­
vious to the modification of the Act in 2008, if there were neither objections nor ap­
peals against the plan, the definitive approval of the province had to take place within
8 months after publishing the draft land-use plan. If there were objections and/or ap­
peals against the plan, the definitive approval could extend up to thirteen months. In 
general, procedures seem to fall within these terms. Cases De Funen, Kop van Oost (8 
months each) and Stationskwartier (12 months) fell within these deadlines, case Krui­
denbuurt took a little longer (14 months). The 2008 Act has shortened the deadline. 
Nowadays a land use plan must be definitively approved 12 weeks after the close of 
the consultation period.
In urban regeneration, it is possible to approve, instead of a normal land use plan, an­
other similar document: an Urban Renewal Plan (Stadsvernieuwingsplan). None of the 
studied cases used this. The 2008 Act gave to provinces and central government also 
the competence of making and approving a Land use Plan (Inpassingsplan).
The 2008 Act introduced a new sort of plan, the Development contributions Plan (Ex­
ploitatieplan). In case the implementation of a land use plan implies costs for public
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infrastructure and facilities, and these are not secured1, the municipality must approve, 
together with the land use plan, a Development contributions plan. Both documents 
must be processed together. The Development contributions plan must include: a map 
with the delimitation of the development site, a description of the infrastructure provi­
sion works, and a calculation of the costs, revenues, implementation terms and the 
way the costs must be charged among the landowners (exploitatieopzet). In addition, it 
can include additional prescriptions related to the public infrastructure, social housing 
and parcels meant for owner-occupiers building their own house (Hijmans & Fokkema, 
2008: 239-240). The prescriptions of the Development contributions plan are legally 
binding when planning applications are judged. All the studied cases fall under the 
planning law previous to the 2008 Act, and not one of them included a Development 
contributions plan, nor a provincial or national land use plan.
Land use plans of any sort can be departed from. Major departures (vrijstelling/pro- 
jectbesluit) became a common alternative or complement to the land-use plan (Tho­
mas et al., 1983, quoted in Faludi, 1987: 116, 185; Bosch & Hanemaayer, 1992, quot­
ed in Bregman & Sievers, 2002 and Buitelaar et al., 2007: 54; Bröcking & Geest, 1982, 
quoted in Buitelaar et al., ibidem; Van der Ree, 2000: 20, 26). In cases De Funen, 
Kruidenbuurt and Kop van Oost, the municipality, together with making a new land 
use plan, approved during the procedure also major departures from the old existing 
plan for a part of the site, in order to be able to start the works some months before the 
completion of the procedure for the new land use plan.
7.2.1 Betterm ent belongs to the landowner
In the Netherlands, the value increase of land, caused by a change to the permitted 
land use in the binding rules (for example from industrial land to residential and of­
fices), falls to the landowner (Needham, 2007a: 154-155). There is no legal principle 
in the Netherlands, as for example in the Spanish 1978 Constitution, which acknowl­
edges the principle of a public share in the value increase generated by public poli­
cies or by changes of the binding rules (see section 5.3.1). The British 1947 Town and 
Country Planning Act, which nationalized the betterment that accrues from changes 
of the binding rules, might serve also as example but has nowadays no real conse­
quences for capturing value increase (see chapter 6.2.1).
However, in general the legislator has the power to make rules about value capturing: 
there is no legal obstacle as long as the legislator stays within the boundaries of the
1 The definition in this research of 'public infrastructure and facilities' is broader than those costs that 
must be secured. It is difficult however to precisely define those costs that must be secured because 
the 2008 Physical Planning Act does not define them clearly. They comprise in any case physical 
interventions, actions and works and fall anyway within the definition of public infrastructure and 
facilities given in this research.
The Netherlands 227
Dutch General Administrative Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht) and international 
Treaties and Conventions, like the European Convention on Human Rights. However, 
only to a limited extent has the legislator used the power to make such legislation. 
The new 2008 Physical Planning Act can be considered as one of the few examples 
of legislation regulating capturing value increase. Another example is the modifi­
cation in 2004 of the Physical Planning Act to allow municipalities to agree with 
developers that the developer pay the compensation for the decrease in economic 
value of surrounding properties that are consequence of the approval of a new land 
use plan (planschade). The actual legal possibilities for the government to capture 
the increased value in case of private development are mainly limited to cost recov­
ery. 'Cost recovery' is the recovery, through contributions from private developers, 
of those costs that are directly related to the realization of public infrastructure and 
facilities that benefit the development. Developers might contribute either by realis­
ing this infrastructure and facilities directly, or paying public bodies to do so. This has 
not changed with the new 2008 Act. For more details about cost recovery and other 
forms of capturing value increase, see section 1.4.
7.2.2 Capturing value increase through private law agreements
In those cases in which municipalities make costs for providing infrastructure, there is 
the possibility of making a Development Agreement (Exploitatieovereenkomst) with 
the developer in order to recover (some of those) costs. This agreement does not fall 
under the mentioned category 'private law' because its contents are regulated in the 
Physical Planning Act and the Land Development Regulation (Exploitatieverorden- 
ing). The agreement must be based on the local Land Development Regulation, which 
states the conditions and the costs that can be included. The Physical Planning Act 
previous to the 2008's modification stated in article 42 some limitations to the costs 
that could be included in the local Land Development Regulation (see frame 7d). If 
the local government negotiated a higher contribution, which exceeded the limits of 
the local Regulation, a judge could rescind the contract. In such a case, the local gov­
ernment had to refund the whole contribution (De Wolff & Muñoz, 2007: 533-534).
Frame 7d
Limitations to costs in local Land Development Regulation previous to 2008 Act
• The financial contribution had to be limited to a contribution to the costs of servic­
ing the land. This includes the infrastructure provision directly related to the de­
velopment in question. The costs of, for example, off-site infrastructure may not be 
recovered. Value capturing that exceeds the recovery of the named costs was not 
allowed;
• The developer's contributions in land had to be limited to that land that is needed 
for this on-site public infrastructure.
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The situation is different in those cases in which the municipality is not directly in­
volved in providing infrastructure, which is in those cases in which the municipality 
incurs no costs for the infrastructure provision. In these cases, municipalities and de­
velopers are free to make another sort of Development Agreement (Overeenkomst2), 
in which they agree that the developer provides public infrastructure, or affordable 
housing, etc. There are fewer limitations to these agreements than to the other sort, 
because they are not governed by the Physical Planning Act. In principle, municipal­
ity and developer can agree any contribution, also for off-site infrastructure, as long 
as the developer himself provides the public infrastructure. However, if contributions 
consist of a payment to the municipality for the costs made, the above mentioned 
system of the Land Development Regulations, including its limitations, applies.
An important difference with England and Valencia is that planning consent (the ap­
proval of the land use plan, or the departure from it, or granting the building permit) 
cannot formally be made conditional on a Development Agreement of any sort. With 
the first sort of agreement, the municipality can ask for contributions in exchange 
for providing the infrastructure, but not in exchange for granting a planning consent. 
The second sort of agreement must be voluntary. In neither case may the municipal­
ity, formally, condition the granting of planning consent on securing investments or 
implementation of public infrastructure and facilities.
7.2.3 The 2008’s novelties
In 2008, a new Physical Planning Act, which included a new Land Development 
Act (Grondexploitatiewet), and a new Physical Planning Decree (Besluit op de ruimte­
lijke ordening) came into force. This act introduced important novelties for capturing 
value increase (see De Wolff, 2007): (1) they introduce the possibility of imposing on 
the landowners a contribution without the need of the municipality itself making the 
costs, and without the need for a Development Agreement; and (2) they give more 
detail about the sorts of costs that can be imposed to the landowners.
Cost recovery through public law  (Development contributions plan)
In case the implementation of a land use plan implies costs for public infrastructure
2 This sort of Development Agreement receive different names, but its contents are not clearly 
regulated anywhere, so contracts with the same name can be very different in detailing and 
practical consequences. Usually, contracts with outline determinations might receive the name 
Intentieovereenkomst, Samenwerkingsovereenkomst or Ontwikkelingsovereenkomst. Contracts with 
more detailed determinations use to receive the name Realisatieovereenkomst.
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and facilities, and these costs have not been secured3, the municipality must approve 
a Development contributions plan together with the land use plan. A Development 
contributions plan calculates these costs, and the municipality can make granting 
the building permit conditional on a contribution. This is the first time that planning 
consent (in this case, only the granting of the building permit, not the approval of 
the land use plan or departure from it) can be formally made conditional on secur­
ing or paying a contribution. When a landowner submits a building application, the 
municipality can refuse the building permit if the contribution according to the De­
velopment contributions plan for the area has not been secured or paid (De Wolff & 
Muñoz, 2007: 535). The new 2008 Physical Planning Decree regulates the costs that 
can be included in a Development contributions plan (see frame 7e).
Frame 7e
List of possibly costs in a Development contributions plan
The new 2008 Physical Planning Decree prescribes in articles 6.2.3 to 6.2.6, and 
6.2.11 the sorts of costs4 that can be included in a Development contributions plan 
(Vrom, 2008: 109-123, 131-139; Klaassen, 2008: 354-362; Baardewijk, 2008: 758­
759). It is expected that the central government will detail soon some of these articles 
(article 6.2.4.g-j, regarding fundamentally the preparation of plans). These are the costs 
that can be included in the Development contributions plan:
1a. Public infrastructure within or in the immediate surroundings of the development 
site: roads, sewerage, parks, public buildings, etc. Also, in case the new land use 
plan diminishes the economic value of surrounding properties, the compensation 
costs to the owners (planschade);
2a. Public infrastructure and facilities situated within the plan area, which serve this 
and at least another development scheme (bovenwijkse voorzieningen); it is how­
ever not clear whether if, when situated outside the plan area, these public infra­
structure and facilities can also be considered as bovenwijkse voorzieningen, or 
instead as bovenplanse kosten (see under);
3a. Contributions to i) other schemes (bovenplanse verevening) or to ii) investments 
somewhere else (bovenplanse kosten): i) refers to contributions to unprofitable 
schemes run by public or private parties somewhere else within or outside the
3 Costs are 'secured' when there is certainty that there is, or will be, financial means available to pay 
them. This certainty can be created in different ways: i) When there is a development agreement 
or any other form of private law contract that commits any party to pay; ii) When any public body 
commits itself to subsidy the costs; iii) When the municipality has the land and has calculated 
that the profits of selling the land will cover the costs. In this third case, the municipal executive 
power (Burgemeester en Wethouders) or the Local Council (Gemeenteraad) must approve those 
calculations and include them in the municipal budget.
4 It might be that the Development contributions plan does not include the costs and contributions as 
such, i.e. as a sum of money or a contribution. Instead, it can include it as an obligatory prescription 
that in fact means that the developer must make a cost or contribution. E.g. the plan can zone land 
for social housing, which can cost the developer money.
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municipality; ii) refers to contributions to public infrastructure and facilities situat­
ed outside the plan area. Neither i nor ii are necessarily directly related to the de­
velopment in question. Both sorts of contributions can be a contribution in kind, 
(the developer himself might construct the infrastructure or facility), a payment in 
money meant for an specific unprofitable scheme or for a specific infrastructure or 
facility, or a payment in money to a fund5 meant for more than one specific invest­
ment. This fund can be used to contribute to both i and ii (confero article 6.13.7 
2008 Physical Planning Act; Zundert, 2008: 472; Baardewijk, 2008: 762-763);
4a. Social housing within the plan area: percentage and/or number, location, adscrip- 
tion to allocation rules for the tenants and buyers of social rented housing and 
social housing for sale, as long as these allocation rules derive their status from 
housing legislation and local regulations (Vrom e.a. 2008: 139; Klaasen, 2009­
2010: chapter 11.3.4, consulted on 11/02/2010; Nijland, interview in 2010);
5a. The land that is needed for all these public infrastructure and facilities: the land­
owners must be compensated with the market value of their land, and this com­
pensation can be included as a cost in the Development contributions plan.
6. Green and nature areas (parks, water, etc) that have been lost in the development 
site (verloren gegane natuurwaarde, groenvoorzieningen en watervoorzieningen), 
which must be compensated with new green areas in or outside the site.
However, not all the costs included in the Development contributions plan can be 
charged to the landowners. First, only the costs of construction of the infrastructure 
can be charged to the landowners, but not the costs of maintenance and exploitation 
of this infrastructure. With other words, it is not possible to charge a contribution 
meant for running a public infrastructure for a specific period of time after finishing 
its construction (Vrom et al, 2008: 111-112). Only maintenance costs of soil decon­
tamination measures might be charged (Nijland, interview in 2010).
Second, during the consideration of the new Land Development Act, the parliament 
rejected the possibility of charging for the social facilities (maatschappelijke voor­
zieningen), using as examples of social facilities educational facilities and social wel­
fare facilities (welzijn). This means that developers cannot be required to contribute 
neither to the construction of the buildings, nor to the maintenance and exploitation 
of these buildings (thus all costs except the land costs) of social facilities (Van den 
Brand, interview 2008).
Third, article 6.13.5 of the 2008 Physical Planning Act establishes the criteria that 
govern the degree to which the costs can be charged to the landowners: profit (profijt), 
attributability (toerekenbaarheid) and proportionality (proportionaliteit). This means 
that several costs cannot be charged to the landowners:
5 In Dutch, the correct term for 'fund' is 'reserve' because it is called so in the Besluit Beheer en 
Verantwoording. However, the popular term is 'fonds' (Baardewijk, 2008: 761).
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• The costs of that part of infrastructure serving a wider area, including the land 
under the infrastructure, that do not fulfil these criteria;
• Now (Autumn 2009) there is no unanimity about how strict the three legal crite­
ria should be interpreted when assessing whether the contributions to 3a (other 
schemes or public infrastructure and facilities -bovenplanse verevening respec­
tively bovenplanse kosten) can be charged to the landowners. If the criteria are 
interpreted very strictly, it is questionable whether these contributions can be 
charged to the landowners, as the relation with the development in question 
is not direct. Especially the contributions to other schemes would hardly meet 
the criteria (confero Van den Brand, interview 2008; Vrom et al, 2008: 115; 
Baardewijk, 2008: 759-761; Groot, 2009: 465-466).
• It is questionable whether all the costs of refurbishing existing old infrastructure 
would meet these criteria. Municipalities might be obliged to assume part of the 
costs when the existing infrastructure is old and the respective municipal body 
already has reserved some means for its renewal (Vrom et al, 2008: 112; Klaas- 
sen, 2008: 358).
• Not all the costs of plan preparation (the making of plans and studies, and the 
preparation and control of the infrastructure provision) can be charged to the 
landowners. A circular (ministeriële regeling) of the central government will pro­
vide more details about which of these costs can and cannot be charged (Vrom 
et al., 2008: 116-118, 122, 161);
Fourth, regarding those costs that have been already made, these can only be charged 
in case the municipality, at the time that the costs were made, did made explicit 
in the municipal budget which part of the costs should be charged in the future to 
the development in question. If the municipality didn't, then these costs cannot be 
charged, even if they fulfil the three legal criteria (Vrom et al, 2008: 115-116).
Fifth, if the calculated profits do not cover the costs included in the Development 
contributions plan, the deficit (costs minus profits) cannot be charged to the land­
owners. If there is a deficit, this might be due to the method of assessment of the 
accounted value of the land. Land is included as cost in the Development contri­
butions plan for a price equivalent to the price that should be established in case 
of expropriation. This expropriation price follows a residual method of calculation, 
which includes the value increase due to rezoning, actually the price of land has to 
be assessed taking into account all the profits that will accrue after development, i.e. 
all the increased value. This means that the accounted land costs in Development 
contributions plans will be much higher than the minimum land costs, so high that 
a deficit will be common. With other words, the method of calculation of the land 
costs in the Development contributions plans implies that an important part of the 
value increase leaks away to the owner. In regeneration sites this problem is worse, 
as land prices in previous transactions are usually inflated. As the price in previous 
transactions serve as complementary sources to the residual method of assessment, 
this finally contributes to inflating the accounted land costs large above the minimum
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land costs. In addition, in regeneration sites development costs are often higher due 
to the existence of previous installations and buildings, contaminated soil and the 
like (variable A2). In short, it is likely that deficits will be common, especially in ur­
ban regeneration (Dieperink, 2009: 9-10). In our opinion, the first signs after one year 
of application of the 2008 Planning Act confirm this conclusion. A recent evaluation 
of the first results in practice in the first year after the introduction of the 2008 Act 
confirms this conclusion too (Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving, 2010: 63-64)
Cost recovery through private law  (anterior Development Agreement)
There is the possibility that the developer agrees to pay the costs before the approval 
of the Development contributions plan. This can be established in what is called an 
'anterior Development Agreement' (anterieure overeenkomst). If the costs are in that 
way secured, the Development contributions plan does not need to be approved. An 
anterior agreement may include more contributions than those chargeable to land­
owners through a Development contributions plan. First, an agreement can secure 
the already mentioned costs that can be included in a plan, but not charged to the 
landowners. Second, an agreement may secure also some other costs that cannot be 
included in a plan. Frame 7f lists both sorts of additional contributions.
Frame 7f
Additional contributions
The following costs cannot be charged to landowners in a Development contribu­
tions plan, but may be secured through an anterior Development Agreement (Vrom 
et al, 2008: 21-22, 31, 33, 38, 41-42, 45-48, 50, 52, 160; Klaassen, 2008: 379-380; 
Baardewijk, 2008: 756-765; Groot, 2009: 464, 465; Nijland, interview in 2010):
1-5b. The costs that can be included in a Development contributions plan, but cannot 
be charged to landowners: maintenance and exploitation costs of infrastructure, 
those costs that do not meet the three criteria (profit, attributability, proportion­
ality), those that are already made but are not chargeable because such is not 
made explicit in the municipal budget, or those costs that are not covered by the 
calculated profits. The maintenance and exploitation costs of public buildings 
cannot, in principle, be charged because they cannot be considered as belong­
ing to land development (grondexploitatie). It is however not clear if, when the 
public buildings are prescribed as a 'spatial development' (see under), it is pos­
sible or not to agree not only a contribution for its construction, but also for its 
maintenance and exploitation (Klaassen, 2009-2010: chapter 11.3.8, consulted 
at 11-02-2010; Nijland, interview in 2010). Another open question is whether it 
is possible to agree contributions (of any kind: to the construction, maintenance 
or exploitation costs) for 'social facilities' (Maatschappelijke voorzieningen). At 
one side the above-mentioned parliamentary statement, against this possibility, 
was in principle meant for the Development contributions plan, but might also 
determine the possible contents of an anterior Development Agreement. At the
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other side, the 2008 Act and Decree allow municipalities and landowners to 
seal a development agreement and do not limit what a contribution for 'spatial 
developments' might include, so if social facilities are prescribed as 'spatial de­
velopment' there could be the possibility of asking a contribution not only for 
their construction, but also for their maintenance and exploitation (cfr. Van den 
Brand, interview in 2008; Nijland, interview in 2010) 6.
4b. Additional requirements for social rented housing, additional to those that can 
be included in a Development contributions plan (4a). E.g. indications of maxi­
mal prices of the dwellings to be sold to the housing associations, allocation 
rules even if not derived from housing legislation or local regulation, etc. Also, 
additional requirements for social housing for sale, e.g. indications of the maxi­
mal selling prices to the buyers in case of no previous regional agreement on 
this matter, and allocation rules regarding the selection of the buyers even if not 
derived from housing legislation or local regulation.
7. Contributions to 'Spatial development' (ruimtelijke ontwikkeling) situated out­
side the scheme in question. It is not clear what exactly ruimtelijke ontwikkeling 
means. The concept is still vague and might include a large variety of public fa­
cilities: e.g. parks, green and recreational areas, water storage works, landscape 
works, industrial areas to be regenerated, infrastructure and possibly some sorts 
of public buildings (e.g. cultural facilities), and as long as they concern physical 
functions related to urban development. The contribution could maybe not only 
for the construction of the facility, but also for its maintenance and exploitation. 
As mentioned above, it is not clear whether the contributions might concern 
'social facilities'. The contribution can be not only for specific public facilities, 
but also for an unprofitable scheme run by private parties.
6 More specifically, the legal question is as follows: in Dutch law, private law agreements cannot in 
principle include contributions that go further than what public law prescribes for a Development 
contributions plan. However, there are exceptions to this (Van Rossum, 2005: 1st to 7th page):
- In case public law makes explicit that municipality and landowners are allowed to agree 
contributions in a development agreement. This is the case here, as articles 6.12.2.a and 
6.24.1 Physical Planning Act prescribe that municipalities and landowners can agree, in a 
development agreement, contributions for the 'land development' (grondexploitatie), this 
including also contributions for 'spatial developments'. This means that it should be possible to 
agree contributions for the construction, and maybe also for the maintenance and exploitation 
of 'social facilities' (maatschappelijke voorzieningen);
- However, Dutch law also recognizes that there might be an 'unacceptable contradiction' 
(onaanvaardbare doorkruizing in Dutch) with public law in case a development agreement includes 
a contribution that goes against the 'meaning' of the law (strekking van de publiekrechtelijke 
regeling). The 'meaning' of a law is for example the intention that the legislative power had 
when it approved the law. As in this case the Dutch Parliament explicitly rejected the possibility 
of charging landowners with any cost of 'social facilities' (except the costs of providing the 
land for the social facility), the question remains open whether contributions to social facilities 
(construction, maintenance or exploitation) would not imply an 'unacceptable contradiction' 
with public law.
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8. Creaming off plus value: in case the municipality enter into agreement with 
the landowner to develop his land in such a way that the municipality bears 
financial risks (because it itself invests in public infrastructure, or buys the land 
or part of the land, etc), municipality and landowner can also agree that the 
municipality will share the profits. Such an agreement can have a variety of 
forms, depending of the nature of the municipal involvement (bouwclaim- 
overeenkomst and publiek-private samenwerkingsovereenkomst). This goes thus 
further than cost recovery (Nijland, interview in 2010). As this research aims 
only at cost recovery, this possibility of creaming off plus value will be not han­
dled any more in the rest of the sections. However, as it is not precisely clear 
what it means that an infrastructure is 'related' to the site in question, in practice 
there might be ways of creaming off plus value by requiring contributions under 
2, 3 and, specially, 7. The boundary between which infrastructure one could 
consider as 'related' and which not is not easily defined, nor is there agreement 
about it.
Actually, bovenplanse verevening, bovenplanse kosten (3a) and ruimtelijke ont­
wikkelingen (7) are meant for very similar sorts of investments. All three might consist 
of a contribution in kind, a payment for a specific investment, or a payment to a fund 
that can be used for several investments. The difference is that 3a might fulfil (or not) 
the three legal criteria set out above and thus be charged to the landowners through 
a Development contributions plan, while ruimtelijke ontwikkelingen will by definition 
never fulfil these criteria and thus can only be charged through an anterior Develop­
ment Agreement.
In short, a municipality can recover more costs in an anterior Development Agree­
ment than through a Development contributions plan. It is uncertain whether the 
approval of a Development contributions plan might affect the contents of an already 
existing anterior Development Agreement. In principle, the Agreement cannot con­
tradict any of the prescriptions included in the Plan (Vrom et al, 2008: 34; Kluwer, 
2008: 132). This means that some of the contributions agreed in the Agreement might 
be nullified in case a Plan becomes approved.
The costs that can be secured in an anterior Development Agreement are greater than 
those allowed under the old local Land Development Regulation. In other words, 
in those cases in which municipalities themselves provide public infrastructure and 
facilities, and they require landowners to contribute, an anterior agreement implies 
an enlargement of the possibilities for cost recovery. This might be different when a 
municipality does not require any payment in money, but does require that the de­
veloper realizes in kind the public infrastructure and facilities. These cases fell before 
2008 under the old 'private law' Development Agreement (Overeenkomst). It is not 
clear whether the possible contributions in the new anterior Development Agree­
ment are greater or not.
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7.3 Introduction to the studied cases in 
the Netherlands
In most of the studied cases, indicative plans foresaw regeneration. However, before 
regeneration took place, two matters needed to be resolved. First, because in all the 
studied cases new public infrastructure and facilities were needed, the municipali­
ties negotiated with the developers about their contribution and sealed one or more 
Development Agreements of the second sort mentioned above (overeenkomst)7. And 
second, the existing binding rules had to be modified because they did not foresee 
the regeneration of the site: a new land use plan had to be approved, and in some 
cases, for some plots, also one or more departures from the existing land use plan. 
Here follows a brief introduction to the cases (for an overview, see figure 26). The rest 
of the case-based information has been included in the rest of the chapter.
Figure 26. Location of the cases in the Netherlands.
7 Only in two cases was it possible to read the development agreement, and of them it was possible 
only in one to make a copy and keep this copy for later analysis. Based on the indirect evidence, we 
conclude however that all of them belong to the private law-sort overeenkomst.
236 The Netherlands
7.3.1 De Funen,Amsterdam
Urban Regeneration project 'De Funen' (8 ha, 565 apartments, 70 units/ha, about 
2,500 m2 office space, see figure 27) is located to the east of the centre of Amsterdam. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, the site attracted the attention of the planning depart­
ment of the Amsterdam Municipality. In 1991, the Structure Plan of Amsterdam, an 
indicative zoning plan, proposed the redevelopment of the whole site. At that time, 
the site had been abandoned and parts were leased to various tenants (Van Gend & 
Loos and others), who used the buildings for warehousing and storage. Initially Dutch 
Railways, owner of most of the land, was neither interested in developing the site 
nor in selling it to the municipality. This situation remained unchanged until IBC, a 
commercial developer, showed an interest. The first ad hoc, site-specific indicative 
plan on which the current development is based was approved in 1993 (Nota van 
Uitgangspunten Czaar Peterbuurt-Oost'). The existing binding rules did not foresee 
regeneration, thus a new Land-Use plan had to be approved, which occurred defini­
tively in 2000.
Figure 27. Map of 2000 Land use Plan.
The Dutch Railways owned most of the land, the municipality owned some plots and 
the existing public space, and some private individuals owned various other plots. In
1997, after signing a Development Agreement with the municipality, Dutch Railways 
sold most of its land to the property developer, IBC. In 1999 the municipality signed 
a second Development Agreement, this time with IBC. In 2002 Heijmans, another 
commercial developer, bought IBC, and in January 2008 Heijmans was still in charge 
of the development. At that time implementation was in course and more than the 
half of the dwellings were already inhabited.
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7.3.2 Kruidenbuurt Noord, Eindhoven
Urban Regeneration project 'Kruidenbuurt Noord' (17 ha, 650 dwellings, single fam­
ily and apartments, 45 units/ha, plus some offices, see figure 28) is located in the 
south-east of Eindhoven. The neighbourhood was built in the 1930s. At the end of the 
1990s the first indicative ad hoc, site-specific plans were made for regeneration. Of 
some 850 existing houses, almost all of them social housing, 750 units have been or 
will be demolished, leaving some 100 units untouched. Of the 650 new dwellings, 
about 45% will be social housing.
In 1994 the Eindhoven Municipality sold the (freehold rights to the) land under the 
social housing to Trudo (Trudo Stichting), a housing association, and since then own­
ership has been divided. Trudo owns almost all the buildings and the land under 
them (50% of the plan area), while the municipality retains ownership of one public 
building and a playground (2%) and the public space (39%). The 100 houses that 
remain untouched (9% of plan area) are owned privately. Trudo and the municipal­
ity sealed a Development Agreement in 2004, and the new Land-Use Plan was ap­
proved definitively in 2005. By November 2007, 189 dwellings had been delivered 
and inhabited and 194 dwellings were under construction. Phase 3 is expected to 
start at the end of 2009, and phase 4 in 2011.
Figure 28. Map 2005 Land use Plan.
7.3.3 Kop van Oost, Groningen
Urban Regeneration project 'Kop van Oost' (5 ha, 430 dwellings, mainly apartments, 
about 85 units/ha, plus about 4,000 m2 commercial space, see figure 29) is located 
to the east of the centre of Groningen. The site is situated alongside a main road (the 
Sontweg) that will become the main connection between the city centre and a future 
greenfield scheme, Meerstad. The site used to be occupied by a wood-processing 
company and a gas station, but at the time of the development initiative in 2000 the
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site was no longer in use. Only five dwellings were occupied, and these will not be 
demolished but will be accommodated in the regeneration. The Sontweg and a small 
road will be refurbished.
In its 1996 Structure Plan, the Groningen Municipality foresaw the redevelopment of 
this site as a mixed-use scheme mainly for housing and with some commercial facili­
ties. Negotiations with the developer crystallized in the 2005 Development Agree­
ment. The new land-use plan was definitively approved in 2006.
The initial property situation, before the development initiative took place, was as 
follows: Houtgroup-Pont Eecen owned 60% of the land, the municipality owned 
most of the public space (37%), and several private individuals owned the rest (4%). 
In 2000 Jaap Hollestelle, an intermediary/property developer, took the initiative to 
redevelop the site. He bought the land belonging to the wood-processing company. 
After general development terms had been negotiated with the municipality, the land 
was resold, first in 2001 to property developer IBC, and again in 2002 to Heijmans, 
another property developer that had bought IBC. In October 2007, Heijmans was 
providing the infrastructure.
W M i
Figure 29. Map 2006 Land use Plan.
7.3.4 Stationskwartier, Breda
Urban Regeneration project 'Stationskwartier' (16 ha, about 80,000 m2 apartments, 
650 units, 45 units/ha, plus 140,000 m2 office space, some shops, a new railway 
station and 50,000 m2 parking, see figure 30) is located to the north of the centre of 
Breda. The plan area includes the existing Central railway station and its surround­
ings. The area that will effectively be redeveloped is 14 ha, because about 2.5 ha of 
railway land will remain untouched. The station will be completely rebuilt. The exist­
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ing use is mainly related to the railways, but this function has ceased in most of the 
plan area. Nowadays there is, besides the railway station and rail tracks, some infra­
structure for bus stops, parking places, abandoned land, a small green area and a ho­
tel. There are some buildings (the hotel and station), but most of the area is not built.
Since the 1980s, Breda Municipality has developed indicative plans for the regen­
eration of the site into a mixed-use scheme for public transport (railways and bus), 
housing, offices and facilities. In 1998, the Dutch national government designated 
the site as one of the six 'New Key Projects' (NieuwSleutelproject, NSP). Key projects 
are railways stations to be connected to the high-speed railways network. Both na­
tional and provincial governments are involved in the regeneration of the site, for 
example, by giving substantial subsidies. Negotiations between the involved parties 
(municipality, national and provincial governments, and the main landowner Dutch 
Railways) have already crystallized into several development agreements.
The property is divided between Dutch Railways, specifically N S Vastgoed and N S  
Railinfrastrust (together 80% of the plan area), the municipality of Breda (the existing 
public space, 11%, and some plots, 5%: in total 16%) and a private developer and a 
supermarket (together 3%). The municipality approved the new Land-use plan in May 
2007, and in December 2007 the provincial government approved it definitively. At 
the end of 2007, work on infrastructure provision had started on the northern side 
of the railway, and delivery of the last buildings is expected sometime in 2016 (cfr. 
Krabben & Needham, 2008).
Figure 30. Map 2007 Land use Plan.
7.4 How formal rules relevant to zoning in the 
Netherlands can be used
This chapter describes the working in the Netherlands of the formal rules relevant 
to zoning within the value capturing mechanisms. There are different ways (or sub-
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variables) in which these rules can be used in an operational way to capture more of 
the value increase:
• Creating certainty or uncertainty beforehand about future building possibilities 
and contributions;
• Choosing the contents of the binding rules;
• Making the relevant binding rules conditional on securing capturing value in­
crease;
• Modulating property rights;
• Using the procedure for the preparation and approval of the binding rules.
Here follows an assessment of whether each of these sub-variables can affect captur­
ing value increase.
7.4.1 Certainty beforehand about future building possibilities 
and contributions
Summary of the findings
Dutch municipalities can and usually do approve in early stages indicative zoning 
plans that sketch the future development possibilities. This might be a Structure plan 
or an ad hoc document. Binding rules (land use plan or departures from it) are usually 
approved after the negotiations with developers have been successfully completed. 
In the studied cases, indicative plans created some certainty, or expectations, about 
the future building possibilities. However, they created almost no certainty about the 
future contributions. The exceptions were Kruidenbuurt and Stationskwartier: here 
there was some certainty beforehand about the costs and about who should pay 
them. This certainty arose during the plan process, not before, but in any case before 
negotiations had led to definitive development agreements. It seems that specific 
circumstances explain the exceptionality of both cases: in Kruidenbuurt the specific 
circumstance was the special relation between the municipality and the developer, a 
housing association; and in Stationskwartier the special nature of the project itself, a 
national infrastructure NSP-project. In both cases, municipalities created some cer­
tainty about the value capturing goals, namely to limit the public contributions to a 
'lump sum' in Kruidenbuurt, and probably with more ambitious goals in Stationsk­
wartier. It seems that in 'normal' private land schemes (e.g. De Funen and Kop van 
Oost), usually there is no certainty at all, beforehand, about the future obligations 
(Verdaas and Fokkema, interviews 2007). Table 18 summarizes the level of certainty 
in each case.
The findings suggest that certainty about the future building possibilities may be neg­
ative for capturing value increase because it weakens the negotiating position of mu­
nicipalities and might have an inflationary effect on the price of land. In addition, the 
findings suggest a negative effect of uncertainty about future contributions, because
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of the same reasons. Let us see in detail whether public bodies create certainty or 
uncertainty about what, in which sort of documents, and what are the inferred con­
sequences for capturing value increase.
Table 18. Level of certainty, before negotiations took place, about building possibilities and 
about obligations in the Dutch cases.
Certainty about future building 
possibilities
Certainty about future contributions
D e  Funen, Amsterdam Some Very low
Kruidenbuurt, Eindhoven Some Some
Kop van Oost, Groningen Some None
Stationskwartier, Breda Some Some
7.4.1.1 Binding rules are approved after negotiations, so in early stages only 
indicative documents give some certainty 
No legally binding rules before negotiations
The Dutch planning system is supposed to be 'plan-led', in the sense that the land 
use plan is supposed to be approved before negotiations take place. However, there 
is no legal obligation on municipalities to approve the land use plan beforehand, and 
a relatively flexible use is allowed (see frame 7g). In practice this has translated into 
the fact that Dutch municipalities, at least when confronted with comprehensive ur­
ban regeneration developments, usually wait until the negotiations with developers/ 
landowners are finished. When negotiations are finished and, mostly after a Devel­
opment Agreement is sealed, municipalities modify the binding rules, that is, they 
process and approve a new land-use plan to replace the old one, or they approve a 
departure from the old one (interviews with Verdaas and Fokkema, 2007; Vrom et al, 
2008: 67). This suggests that, in practice, the Dutch planning system works similarly 
to the British 'development-led' system, in the sense that binding rules are approved 
only after the development initiative has taken place and negotiations have ended 
successfully. For details about the distinction between plan-led and development-led 
planning systems, see section 2.3.1.
The studied cases support this general conclusion. The municipalities approved the 
new binding rules after the negotiations had been completed. They did so because of 
the consequences for capturing value increase. Municipalities saw the land use plan 
as the final phase of the planning process, because land or most of it was in private 
hands and municipalities could not steer the process through the ownership of land. 
Municipalities waited until some costs had been secured, before approving the land 
use plan or departures from it.
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Frame 7g
Flexible legal rules regarding the place of the land use plan in development processes
First, a land use plan or a departure from it can be adapted to the boundaries of the 
development. Neither the law nor the jurisprudence establishes general limitations 
to the minimum geographical scope (plan area). This can cover a whole municipality 
(does not occur very often) or just a few plots ('postage stamp' plans -postzegelplan). 
Departures cover in practice usually just one or several plots, but also large develop­
ments (Bosch & Hanemaayer 1992: quoted in Bregman & Sievers 2002; Van Damme & 
Verdaas 1996: 73-78). In other words, municipalities can freely delimit the boundaries 
of the plan area. Second, there is no legal prescription that determines when the land 
use plan should be approved, in relation to the rest of the development process. There 
is no prescription whether it should be approved 5, 10 or X years/weeks before the 
development process takes place.
There might be exceptions to this general conclusion. Two experts point out that in 
some cases municipalities approve first, before the negotiations, an outline land-use 
plan with obligation of further detailing. Once the development agreement has been 
sealed, they detail the outline plan (De Wolff and Van Zundert, interviews in 2008). 
Cases Kruidenbuurt and Stationskwartier show indeed the use of outline land use 
plans. However, they were approved after the negotiations had ended successfully. 
Only in Stationskwartier did the approval of outline land use regulations for a small 
plot (3% of the total plan area) precede the negotiations.
Some certainty through indicative plans
Instead of approving binding rules in early stages, Dutch municipalities usually ap­
prove indicative zoning plans. They might be ad hoc for a specific site, or area, or 
they might cover the whole municipal territory or a large part of it. Planning law 
regulates one sort of indicative plan, the Structure Plan, which was replaced in 2008 
by the Structure Vision. More common are indicative plans with a form, contents 
and approval procedure that are not regulated in planning law (e.g. Nota van Uit­
gangspunten, Stedenbouwkundig Plan/visie, Ontwikkelingsprogramma, Programma 
van Eisen, Masterplan4 etc.). The level of certainty offered by these indicative plans, 
whether they are regulated in planning law or not, is limited. This is because (1) they 
are not usually very detailed, and (2) because binding plans can and usually do de­
part from their determinations.
In De Funen several indicative plans have preceded the signing of the first Develop­
ment Agreement in 1997. In 1991 the Structure Plan of Amsterdam foresaw the rede­
velopment of the whole site, and in 1993 the municipality approved a site-specific 
document (Nota van Uitgangspunten Czaar Peterbuurt-Oost0 that established many 
aspects of the future programme (450-500 dwellings, of which 30% social housing, of­
fices and work-places, the situation of most of the public space -including a park -, and 
a list of public facilities and buildings). This means that there was some certainty about
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the future building possibilities. Regarding the future obligations, the 1993 document 
determined to some extent the unprofitable parts: 30% social housing, a park and 
some public buildings. However, it did not say anything about who should pay them.
In Kruidenbuurt several indicative plans have preceded the signing of the Develop­
ment Agreement in 2004. In 1999 the municipality approved a site-specific docu­
ment (Masterplan), which established that 630 to 770 housing units could be built 
there. In 2001 the municipality approved another site-specific plan document (Pro­
gramma van Eisen), which specified to some extent the programme: 650 housing 
units (of which 300 social houses and 175 'middle-expensive' units), a supermarket 
and possibly a public building. This document also vaguely described the public 
space. Altogether, this means that there was some certainty about the future building 
possibilities. In addition to these two documents, another document has been impor­
tant: in 2000 the Municipality of Eindhoven and all the housing associations in the 
city agreed the financial contribution which the municipality would give for urban 
regeneration in the city, which included Kruidenbuurt. Following this agreement, the 
municipality would contribute € 9 million to the regeneration of Kruidenbuurt, and 
the housing association was responsible for the rest of development costs. Thanks 
to this document, it has been since 2000 clear what was going to be the municipal 
contribution, and that the housing association should pay the rest. Dutch housing 
associations and municipalities have in general a close relationship and are used to 
sealing such agreements.
In Kop van Oost several indicative plans have preceded the signing of the Develop­
ment Agreement in 2005. In 1996 the Structure Plan of Groningen foresaw 'house 
and business' on this site (p. 64), and in 1999 and 2004 other documents confirmed 
this zoning, without specifying it very much. In 2004 a plan for a wider area than 
the development in question (Eemskanaalzone - verbinding in Stad. Een visie op de 
ontwikkeling van de Eemskanaalzone) made this outline zoning more specific: circa 
400 units for the site (p. 40). This means that there was some certainty about the fu­
ture building possibilities. Regarding the future obligations, there was no certainty at 
all, as the mentioned documents specified neither any specific unprofitable elements 
nor any cost allocation principle.
In Stationskwartier several indicative plans have preceded the signing of the Devel­
opment Agreement in 2006. The municipality of Breda has prepared since the 1980s 
plans for the regeneration of the site into a mixed-use scheme for public transport 
(railways and bus), housing, office and facilities. These plans were revitalized when 
the central government designated the site as New Key Project (NSP), initially in
1998, and definitively in January 2000. This made clear the redevelopment possibili­
ties of the site. In 2003 the municipality and the central government approved the 
Masterplan Central Breda (Masterplan Centraal Breda), a document that specified 
the building possibilities: 50,000 m2 floor space for housing, between 400 and 650 
units; 20,000 m2 flexible, preferably for housing; 80,000 m2 for office, enlargeable
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up to 120,000 m2; and 8,000 m2 for hotel and shops. It defined further the location of 
the new railway and bus stations, but it did not define the public roads and space. In 
2005 another important document (Structuurvisie Via Breda Spoorzone 2025) ratified 
the figures of the 2003 Masterplan. All this together meant that there was some cer­
tainty about the future building possibilities. Regarding the future obligations, NSP- 
projects usually specify a priori development costs and their allocation, because of 
the financial involvement of the provincial and the central government. It seems that 
this was also the case in Stationskwartier: The 2003 Masterplan included a business 
case that might have played an important role but that was not available for this re­
search. This document included, according to the interviewed developer and public 
officers, a rough calculation of the development costs and a proposal for their alloca­
tion. So this document gave some certainty about the future obligations, before the 
signing of a first agreement in 2003 (Planontwikkelingsovereenkomst) and a second 
Development Agreement in 2006 (Samenwerkingsovereenkomst, SOK).
The question is, what the results of this certainty have been for capturing value in­
crease. Here, a distinction is made between certainty about building possibilities, 
and certainty about contributions.
7.4.1.2 Effects of the certainty about building possibilities: weakening or 
strengthening the negotiation position of municipalities
The fact that municipalities used the land use plan as the final phase in negotiations 
created uncertainty about the future building possibilities. It has not been possible 
to measure in our cases the effects of this, because all the cases had done the same 
and there was no example of the contrary. However, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that this, in general, has strengthened the negotiation positions of municipalities. This 
may have influenced positively capturing value increase. Municipalities had 'more 
to offer' in the negotiations. In Stationskwartier an interviewed public officer consid­
ered that using the land use plan as the final step had been important to achieve a 
good level of capturing value increase. A consulted expert and a representative of the 
Dutch developers consider that, in general, this operational use of the land use plan 
has improved capturing value increase (Verdaas and Fokkema, interviews 2007). The 
representative of the developers considered that, sometimes, this operational use of 
the land use plan has allowed public bodies to receive even part of the plus value, 
going further than cost recovery (Fokkema, interview 2007).
Despite this initial uncertainty, the cases show that indicative plans created some 
certainty about the future building possibilities. In other words, the uncertainty that 
follows the practice of approving the binding rules after the negotiations has been 
reduced by the certainty created by indicative plans. It has not been possible to 
measure the effects of this because all the cases had done the same and there was 
no example of the contrary. However, it seems reasonable to conclude that this di­
minishes somehow the negotiation position of municipalities. Municipalities cannot 
easily and credibly refuse to cooperate in the development of the site, so they have
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'less to offer'. Developers might count on that. In addition, it might have stimulated 
the increase of the land price. An interviewed expert suggested that municipalities 
might be not aware of these negative effects of creating expectations in the early 
stages (Verdaas, interview 2007).
7.4.1.3 Effects of certainty about contributions: lowering land price
Regarding the certainty about future contributions, the studied cases show some dif­
ferences between those without certainty (De Funen and Kop van Oost) and those 
with some certainty (Kruidenbuurt and Stationskwartier). The differences in value 
capturing between the four cases are not very large, but Kruidenbuurt and Stationsk­
wartier stand out. Both cases included an important contribution from the developer 
to public goals: 45% units for social housing in Kruidenbuurt, the costs of which will 
be paid by the developer (a housing association), and a new railways and bus station 
in Stationskwartier, the costs of which will mainly be paid with public subsidies, but 
the developer (Dutch Railways) pays a minor part and will provide all the needed 
land. De Funen also includes social houses (30% of the units), but they seem to be 
subsidized by public bodies (for a comparison of the realized value capturing among 
the cases, see section 7.5). In general, the interviewed public officers and developers 
in Kruidenbuurt and Stationskwartier, explicitly or implicitly emphasized that cer­
tainty about contributions (the 2000 agreement respectively the 2003 Business case) 
has improved capturing value increase. In Kop van Oost, an interviewed developer 
suggested that uncertainty about the future obligations has allowed landowners to 
'drain' most of the value increase by asking a high price for their property. Here land 
has been sold three times, and in the second transaction in 2001 the developer paid 
about € 12m, which is much higher that the estimated market value of the previous 
use (industrial land), about € 3.6m.
A possibly explanation for this apparently positive effect of certainty about future 
obligations on value capturing refers to land price mechanisms. Certainty beforehand 
about future contributions can help developers to pay the right price for land (for 
more details about this economic arguments, see section 2.3.3). This could explain 
the low captured value increase in De Funen and Kop van Oost, and the relatively 
higher value capturing in Stationskwartier. In these three cases, land has been trans­
ferred during the development process. In De Funen and Kop van Oost the price 
of land in the transactions was agreed before there was any certainty about future 
obligations, before the negotiations thus. This might have increased the price of land. 
In Stationskwartier the situation was the opposite: the price of land was agreed once 
there was some certainty about future obligations, which might have moderated land 
price increases. Kruidenbuurt seems however to be less suitable for this explanation, 
as here almost all the land was already in the ownership of the developer, and has not 
been transferred. Additionally, it seems plausible to conclude that the higher level of 
certainty about future contributions in Stationskwartier and Kruidenbuurt made these 
contributions a starting point in the negotiations, reinforcing thus the negotiation 
position of the municipality.
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7.4.2 Choosing the contents of the relevant binding rules
Summary of the findings
The range of legally binding prescriptions that can be included in the land use plan 
and departures from it are remarkably small, when compared with Valencia and Eng­
land. Planning law and the jurisprudence in the Netherlands have considerably limit­
ed the legally binding determinations that land use plans and departures can include: 
only physical zoning aspects, and no development-oriented aspects such as contribu­
tions and implementation schedules. It is also remarkable that, up to 2008, land use 
plans and departures could not require social housing. These limitations seem in the 
studied cases to have affected negatively capturing value increase. The 2008 Physical 
Planning Act has introduced a new sort of binding plan, the Development contribu­
tions plan, which can include development-oriented aspects. Let us see in detail what 
are the possibly contents of the land use plan, the departures from it, and the Develop­
ment contributions plan, and what are the consequences for capturing value increase.
7.4.2.1 Possible contents of the land use plan, before the 2008 Physical 
Planning Act
Up to 2008, the Physical Planning Act (article 10.1) and the Physical Planning Decree 
(article 12.1.a), together with the judicial scrutiny, had defined the limits of the pos­
sible contents of the land-use plan and departures from it. The land-use regulations 
had to be directly related to the building and/or the use of the land and the building. 
This means that indirect relationships were not allowed, for example that it is allowed 
to build only when a road shown in the land-use plan had been constructed (Klaas­
sen, 2000: 107-108). The regulations had also to be 'spatially relevant' (ruimtelijk 
or planologisch relevant) (Priemus and Louw, 2000: 58-59). These limitations meant 
that land use regulations might concern little more than the outline design of the in­
frastructure and the building (building line, height, width and depth of the building) 
and the general zoning (housing, shops, offices, industry, traffic roads, public parks, 
canal, parking place, etc). See frame 7h.
Frame 7h
Limitations to the contents of binding rules before the 2008 Physical Planning Act
Taking account of the mentioned limits, up to 2008, the legally binding parts (the Regu­
lations and the Map) of land use plans and departures from it could not contain the 
following aspects (see, among others mentioned below: Needham, 2000):
• Social housing: it was not possible to include social housing (De Groot and Van der 
Veen, 2003: 660-661; Van der Ree, 2000: 605-607). Indeed, none of the four stud­
ied cases included social housing in the Regulations. In Kruidenbuurt the Explana­
tion did this, but this is the non-legally binding part of the land use plan;
• Obligations: it was not possible to include any kind of financial return or contri­
bution in kind, no matter whether they were intended for on-site or off-site infra­
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structure (De Groot and Van der Veen, 2003: 655; De Jong, 1999: 537). For example 
it was not possible to require in the land use plan and departures from it that the de­
veloper has to pay and/or to construct himself the public infrastructure and facilities.
• Financing and implementation schedules: it was not possible to include temporal 
regulations, i.e. when to commence or to finish development. None of the four 
studied cases included deadlines in the Regulations. In Kruidenbuurt and Stationsk­
wartier only the Explanation included some vague deadlines.
In the studied cases (all of which fall under the Physical Planning Act before 2008) 
these limitations might have had a negative influence on the negotiation position 
of the municipality, and thus on capturing value increase. In De Funen and Station­
skwartier, the municipality included in development agreements requirements that 
could not be included in the binding rules: in De Funen implementation schedules, 
most of which have not been fulfilled, and in Stationskwartier requirements regarding 
social housing, which will probably not be fulfilled. According to public officers in 
charge of the legal affairs in both cases, these requirements might have been legally 
enforceable if they had been included not only in the agreements but also in the 
Regulations of the land use plan.
7.4.2.2 Possibly contents of the land use plan and Development 
contributions plan, since 2008
The 2008 Physical Planning Act has added the possibility of including in the land use 
plan itself and departures from it regulations regarding social housing, but the other 
limitations remain. Articles 3.1.1 and 3.10.3 of the Act allow including in a land use 
plan or departures from it land-use regulations regarding the 'performability' (uitvo­
erbaarheid) of their prescriptions8. Article 3.1.2, lid 1 of the 2008 Physical Planning 
Decree specifies what are 'performability'-regulations: regulations regarding the pos­
sibility of establishing the percentage (but not the location) of the total dwellings that 
must be used for affordable housing (for rent and for sale) and for self-build housing 
(Vrom, 2007b; Vrom, 2007c: 6-7)9.
The 2008 Act introduced a new sort of legally binding plan, the Development con­
tributions plan. This includes a calculation of development costs, and can include in 
any case the following aspects:
8 "(...) Deze  regels (regels met het oog op de bestemming, red.) kunnen tevens strekken ten behoeve  
van de uitvoerbaarheid van in het plan opgenom en bestemmingen (...)." (article 3.1.1 2008 Physical 
Planning Act).
"Aan  het besluit (een aan een BP voorafgaand projectbesluit, red.) kunnen voorschriften en 
beperkingen worden verbonden, welke tevens kunnen strekken ten behoeve van de uitvoerbaarheid 
van het project, (...)" (article 3.10.3 2008 Physical Planning Act).
9 "Ten behoeve van de uitvoerbaarheid kan een bestemmingsplan eisen bevatten met betrekking tot 
sociale huurwoningen, sociale koopwoningen of particulier opdrachtgeverschap." (article 3.1.2, lid
1 Physical Planning Decree).
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• Land for social housing and other contributions: it includes a calculation of the 
development costs, and rules for the allocation of these costs to each plot. It can 
also include a differentiation between social housing for rent, social housing for 
sale and free market housing, and can allocate these categories to each plot and 
prescribe the number of units. For details about the costs that can be included in 
the Development contributions plan, and those that cannot, see section 7.2.3;
• Financing and implementation schedules.
In sum, the 2008 Physical Planning Act partly repairs the limited contents of binding 
rules in the Netherlands. An interviewed expert said that the possibility of requiring 
a certain percentage of social housing in the land use plan will stimulate municipali­
ties to enforce social housing requirements (Verdaas, interview 2007). It seems likely 
that a similar positive effect can be expected from the possibility of introducing other 
contributions and implementation schedules in the Development contributions plan.
7.4.3 Making binding rules conditional on securing capturing 
value increase
As we saw above in section 7.4.1.1, municipalities usually wait until some contribu­
tions have been secured before processing and approving the binding rules that make 
the intended development possible. It seems as if the approval of the binding rules 
was part of the game during the negotiations. Municipalities make clear to develop­
ers that some contributions must be secured before the land use plan or departures 
from it are approved. However, in the Netherlands the legal room for making the 
approval of binding rules conditional on securing capturing value increase is nar­
rower than in Valencia and England. This practice of municipalities is disputable from 
a legal point of view because securing contributions from the developer, or fixing 
deadlines, cannot be considered as 'spatially relevant'. Therefore, it is not possible 
for the municipality to formally make the approval of the Land use Plan conditional 
on achievement of a Development Agreement in which the developer commits itself 
to fulfil investment and implementation schedules.
Summary of the findings
There is an alternative way of conditioning that can help to overcome this shortcoming 
of the Dutch planning system: conditioning through the economic feasibility or per- 
formability (economische uitvoerbaarheid) requirements of the land use plan. The side 
effects here is that, after agreement, the land use plan still must follow the complete 
procedure (which implies a risk of delay and modifications), that developers might eas­
ily appeal to the judges, and that this alternative makes it very difficult for the munici­
pality to build up a clear public discourse. The new 2008 Act can be used to diminish 
to some extend the last two side effects by making a draft of Development contribu­
tions plan (but not approving it) to make clear that only an agreement can make the 
development economically feasible. This alternative way can help to overcome this
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shortcoming of the Dutch planning system, i.e. it can help to strengthen the negotia­
tion position of the municipality, and thus to better the capturing of value increase. The 
other possibility for the municipality is to approve a Development contributions plan 
and condition the granting of the building permit (thus not the approval of the Land 
use plan) on payment of a contribution. However, this brings many disadvantages: the 
municipality might be obliged to advance investments without yet having received all 
the contributions, must assume a heavy administrative procedure, bear some cost-in­
creasing risks, and also the risk of delay in case the landowners do not want to apply for 
building permit on time. In addition, approving a Development contributions plan in­
volves that the municipality cannot recover all the costs. Let us see this in more detail.
7.4.3.1 Conditioning the land use plan and departures from it indirectly 
through the Explanation
The first alternative is indirect: contributions can be considered as essential for the 
economic feasibility or performability (economische uitvoerbaarheid) of the imple­
mentation. The Explanation of land use plans, that part of the document that does not 
have a legally binding character, can include considerations related to the feasibility 
of the plan: e.g. the conditions that are needed to implement the plan, necessary 
contributions, etc. Therefore, if the developer does not agree to make contributions, 
the municipality can refuse to initiate the administrative procedure of approval of 
the land use plan or departure from it, arguing that implementation is not feasible. 
The municipal decision can refer to this paragraph (De Wolff, Van Zundert, Hoekstra, 
Van den Brand, interviews 2008). It is very important that the municipality handles 
a coherent discourse, which is that negotiations are meant to make feasible the im­
plementation of the land use plan. If as a result of no agreement the plan becomes 
unfeasible, the municipality has no other choice than to refuse to initiate the admin­
istrative procedure of modification of the binding rules.
However, this indirect conditioning through the Explanation might have some nega­
tive side effects:
1. Procedural risks: after the sealing of Development Agreement, the land use plan 
(or departure from it) must follow the complete procedure, which implies a risk 
of delay and modifications because of objections and appeals. Formally speak­
ing, agreements cannot restrict the room of the Local Council to decide on the 
plan. As a consequence, municipalities seal the agreement but might not be able 
to avoid modifications to the land use plan, or to avoid delay. Thus, agreements 
are always subjected to the risk, not unthinkable, that the land use plan is later 
modified, or its approval delayed, which can nullify partly or totally the Devel­
opment Agreement (Vrom et al, 2008: 51). In the studied cases this however did 
not seem to be a problem: the land use plans have been processed within the 
legal deadlines and without large modifications;
2. Appeal risks: should a municipality refuse to initiate the administrative proce­
dure of approval of the land use plan or departure from it because the developer 
does not agree to contributions and schedules, there is always a risk of an ap­
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peal to the courts (cfr. Gerritsen, 2010: 26). The reason is that this indirect way 
of conditioning through the economic feasibility paragraph is not the same as 
enumerating, openly, in a municipal decision, the contributions that the devel­
oper has to make. Dutch municipalities cannot behave so openly, and need to 
properly and carefully argue why implementation is not feasible and thus why 
approval is not possible. This is not always easy. If implementation seems feasi­
ble, municipalities cannot use this argument of economic feasibility to refuse to 
initiate the administrative procedure10, even if developers have not agreed to all 
the required contributions11. The introduction of the 2008 Land Development 
Act makes a refusal on these grounds even more difficult: as the municipality is 
now entitled to make a Development contributions plan, in theory the feasibil­
ity can be guaranteed, so the municipality can no longer argue unfeasibility of 
the implementation (thus: lack of agreement with the developer) as a reason for 
refusing to initiate the administrative procedure;
3. Credibility of the municipality's public discourse: a too complex argumentation 
can threaten the credibility of the municipality's public discourse. Because direct 
and open conditioning is not allowed, the public discourse might in practice need 
to hide some of the 'real reasons' for the approval or refusal of land use plans.
7.4.3.2 Conditioning the Land use Plan and departure from it indirectly 
through the Development contributions Plan
The 2008 Act created another alternative way of indirect conditioning. If the devel­
oper does not voluntarily commit himself to contributions and schedules (e.g. in an 
anterior Development Agreement), the municipality can make a draft Development 
contributions plan of all needed investments in public infrastructure and facilities. If 
the draft makes clear that the municipality cannot recover all the costs through the 
Development contributions plan12, municipalities can openly refuse to process and 
approve it, arguing that they cannot bear this deficit (Vrom, 2008: 106). The approval 
of the Development contributions plan is linked to the approval of the land use plan: 
if the approval of this plan implies costs, and these costs are not secured in advance
10 Or if they do, they will risk losing the case if the developer brings it to the courts of justice.
11 A recent sentence illustrates very well how difficult it can be for a Municipality to construct a coherent 
discourse: in De Lutte the Municipality achieved a development agreement with a developer who 
owned part of the plan area. However, several small landowners refused to pay to the developer 
their contribution to the costs. The Municipality refused then to modify the Land use plan for these 
specific landowners, arguing that paying that contribution was necessary to guarantee the economic 
feasibility of the Land use plan. However, the judge sentenced against the Municipality with the 
argument that the economic feasibility was already guaranteed with the development agreement 
that was agreed with the developer [Vz. ABRS 27 January 2010 (De Lutte), nr. 200808233/1/R1].
12 It is already said that Development contributions plans, especially in urban regeneration, have 
often a financial deficit. This is mainly because all the land is included as cost for a price that 
includes the increased value, see section 7.2.3. In other words, the legal rules for the elaboration of a 
Development contributions plan 'create' a deficit by accounting land for the highest possible price. 
While a Development contributions plan must account the land for it highest value, municipality 
and developer can freely agree, in an Anteriour Development Agreement, a lower value and thus 
make a project feasible that following a plan was not.
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(in a Development Agreement or in any other way13), a Development contributions 
plan must be approved. By conditioning the approval of the Development contribu­
tions Plan to guarantees that the deficit will be covered, in fact the municipality can 
condition the approval of the land use plan to the developer covering this deficit. If 
the developer agrees in an anterior Agreement to secure the costs, the municipality 
can approve the land use plan without necessarily approving also the Development 
contributions plan (cfr. interviews with Van den Brand and Hoekstra, 2008).
This alternative might diminish two of the mentioned side effects. First, the chance 
of developers appealing successfully might diminish (side effect 2) because the mu­
nicipality can better argue the non-feasibility. Second, municipalities can be open 
about their decision (side effect 3). However, this alternative might also create a new 
side effect: if the developer agrees in an Anterior Development Agreement to secure 
only the deficit of the Development contributions plan (i.e. those costs that cannot 
be charged to the landowners through this plan), but not those costs that can be 
charged to the landowners, municipalities cannot anymore argue economic feasibil­
ity to refuse. Namely, the costs that can be charged are theoretically guaranteed, i.e. 
landowners are supposed to pay them afterwards, when obtaining a building permit. 
Remember that in an Anterior Development Agreement municipality and developer 
can agree more contributions than allowed in a Development contributions plan. In 
any case, side effect 1 remains: after the sealing of an Anterior Agreement, the land 
use plan still has to be processed, which implies the risk of modifications and delay.
7.4.3.3 Conditioning the building permit directly and openly
The 2008 Act has introduced the possibility of conditioning the building permit in 
an open and direct way: if the municipality approves a Development contributions 
plan, it is possible now to condition the granting of the building permit on the pay­
ment of a contribution. This occurs as follows: the Development contributions plan 
calculates the costs that can be charged to the landowners and allocates those costs 
to each plot. The building permit is conditional on paying this contribution and on 
some requirements about the payment. If payment does not take place, and the de­
veloper has not secured the contribution in other ways, the municipality can require 
the money, stop the building, and finally cancel the building permit. However, ap­
proving a Development contributions plan has some side effects:
1. Risks:
° The municipality might be obliged itself to finance investments in the public 
infrastructure in anticipation of collecting the costs later;
13 Costs are 'secured' when there is certainty that there is, or will be, financial means available to pay 
them. This certainty can be created in different ways: i) When there is a development agreement 
or any other form of private law contract that commits any party to pay; ii) When any public body 
commits to subsidy the costs; iii) When the municipality has the land and has calculated that the 
profits of selling the land will cover the costs. In this third case, the municipal executive power 
(B&W) or the Local Council (Gemeenteraad) must approve those calculations and include them in 
the municipal budget.
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° The municipality has to prepare the plan following certain guarantees and 
checks: this is an important task and implies a risk for the municipality, 
such as the risk of appeals against the appraisal and assessment methods 
of profits and costs (Vrom, 2008: 33-34; Korthals Altes, 2008: 203). At the 
beginning of 2010 many municipalities still are struggling with the lack of 
knowledge and skills necessary to make these plans;
° Landowners have to pay only after applying for the building permit, so if no 
one applies to build, the costs will not be recouped, or recouped with delay. 
This too implies a financial risks for the municipality or any other party in 
charge of the public infrastructure and facilities (Vrom, 2008: 28);
° If the municipality wants to oblige landowners to apply for building permits 
following the schedules included in the Exploitation Plan, the only way 
of doing that is to use expropriation, which implies the obligation to pay 
compensation for the highest market value of the land, which includes the 
increased value due to the future use of the land;
° The approval of a Development contributions plan might nullify some pre­
scriptions of an anterior Development Agreement, as the Agreement cannot 
contradict the prescriptions of such a plan (Vrom et al, 2008: 34; Kluwer, 
2008: 132). So the Development contributions plan might nullify some con­
tributions agreed in the Agreement.
2. Not all the costs can be charged to the landowners (for more details see chapter
7.2.3). These include:
° Costs of maintenance and exploitation of the public infrastructure and fa­
cilities;
° Costs for social facilities;
° Costs that do not meet the three criteria of profit, attributability and propor­
tionality, such as many costs of infrastructure serving wider areas, and/or 
located off-site;
° A possible deficit (frequent in urban regeneration);
° Additional costs for social housing, related to requirements that cannot be 
included in a Development contributions plan, such as not being able to 
prescribe the maximal selling price of social housing for sale in case there is 
no regional agreement on this;
° Costs for 'Spatial development' (ruimtelijke ontwikkelingen) situated out­
side the scheme in question and not necessarily related to it.
7.4.4 Modulating property rights
Summary of the findings
The right to develop (i.e. the exclusive right to develop land, once permissions have 
been granted) belongs in the Netherlands to the landowner. This, together with the 
distribution of the other resources which are necessary for urban regeneration, cre­
ates a strong interdependency between municipalities and landowners: municipali-
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ties have the statutory powers over binding rules, and landowners have the financial 
means and the exclusive right to develop the land. This interdependency gives to 
the landowners the option to wait, which it is often used to oppose municipalities' 
requirements, and often leads to a delay in the development processes.
7.4.4.1 W h o  owns development rights in the Netherlands?
In the Netherlands, development rights belong, in principle, to the landowner. Al­
though in practice municipalities usually feel responsibility for the infrastructure pro­
vision, this is not, as such, regulated by law. Dutch planning law does not explicitly 
refer to infrastructure provision as a public task, responsibility or right. The property 
rights of landowners are primarily defined in the Civil Code (which, in principle, 
gives the owner unlimited rights) and are afterwards limited by the law and the way 
that is worked out in binding rules. There is no kind of 'minimum building right' for 
the landowner. These rules, however, in no way affect the owner's right to be the only 
one entitled to develop whatever the binding rules and the laws foresee on his plot. 
This includes both the infrastructure provision and the building. Once the landowner 
applies for and obtains the needed permits, the landowner can exclude others from 
both providing the infrastructure and building on the land (Needham, 2007a: 152).
By analyzing who has the control over each of the transactions in infrastructure pro­
vision, it has been possible to discern the extent to which development rights belong 
to the landowners. The transactions are: 1) land purchase and assembling, 2) financ­
ing and 3) land preparation and development.
7.4.4.2 Mutual dependence of local authorities and landowners in the 
Netherlands
To analyse the consequences for the power relationship between municipalities and 
landowners of the practical possibilities for controlling transactions 1-3, this research 
developed a model of dependence (see table 19; for more details of the model, see 
section 3.1.1). There was in all the four Dutch cases studied a mutual dependence 
between the involved actors, and this dependence was very strong. It seems that 
the possibilities in practice for assembling the land (transaction 1), gathering the 
financial resources (transaction 2), and indirectly, developing the land to produce 
serviced plots (transaction 3) depend heavily on the landowner's passive consent 
or active collaboration. Transactions 1 and 2 are directly dependent on agreement 
between the municipality and the developers/landowners, and transaction 3 is also 
dependent, but indirectly because it cannot take place without transactions 1 and 2. 
This is because none of the actors controls all the needed resources and because the 
dependence is not avoidable.
The municipality depends on the landowners
On the one hand, the landowner/developer controls two important resources, land 
and investment capacity, which make the municipality dependent on him. In theory 
the municipality has some instruments to avoid this dependence: a public pre-emp­
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tion right (voorkeursrecht) to acquire the land (step 1), the Profit Tax (Baatbelasting) 
to gather financial means (step 2), or expropriation to assembly the land (step 1). 
However, these instruments have limitations. The pre-emption implies a dependence 
of public bodies on the landowner: pre-emption requires that the landowner wants to 
sell his property. The Profit Tax can be applied both in built-up urban areas, whether 
the benefitted serviced building parcels are built or not, and also in greenfield de­
velopments (Klaassen, 2002: 264-268). This tax however plays a marginal role in 
value capturing in the Netherlands: it is rarely used (Groetelaers, 2004: 135; Vrom, 
2008: 19). Regarding expropriation, it is only permitted if it is 'necessary' ('nood­
zakelijk', former article 79 Compulsory purchase Act before modification 2010). If 
a landowner is willing to meet the specifications of the land use plan, and if he is 
capable of developing the land, the jurisprudence considers that there is no necessity 
to expropriate the land: the landowner can realise the new development himself. This 
scenario is called 'self realisation' (zelfrealisatie). However, the specifications of the 
land use plan are not always unambiguous (Priemus & Louw, 2003: 371), not in the 
last place because such plans can neither include contributions nor financing and 
implementation schedules. Normally, an agricultural landowner will not be able to 
fulfil the specifications. However, if he sells his land to a private developer or a build­
ing company, or if he decides to cooperate with such an organisation, the situation 
changes. In that case, the appropriate court will decide that there is no necessity for 
expropriation. Along other aspects that in practice might hamper expropriation (e.g. 
political sensitivities, or procedural risks), the legal criteria that expropriation has to 
fulfil, and specially the criterion that expropriation is not needed if the landowner 
can himself develop the land, has hampered an important number of expropriations. 
By declaring that he is capable of and willing to implement the binding rules, the 
landowner can avoid expropriation. Actually, it is not common to expropriate land in 
the Netherlands for the implementation of land-use plans. Expropriation is used only 
in exceptional circumstances, and then for just a few plots. For example, in Breda 
(case Stationskwartier), there has been no expropriation of land from developers in 
recent years. The new 2008 Physical Planning Act might increase the possibilities for 
municipalities to apply expropriation. The new Development contributions plan can 
include contributions and financing and implementation schedules. This can make 
less ambiguous the specifications under which self realisation can take place, so 
landowners who do not apply for building permits (and pay the corresponding con­
tribution) within the schedules included in the Development contributions Plan can 
no longer argue that they are willing to implement the plan (Vrom, 2008: 206-207).
Summarizing, as a rule, municipalities that want development to take place but do 
not reach an agreement with the landowners (about the purchase and assembly of 
land and about the financing of the infrastructure provision) have the only alternative 
of trying to compulsorily purchase the land and pay for the works.
The landowners depend on the municipality
On the other hand, landowner/developers depend on the municipality because of its
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regulatory powers of approving the binding rules and granting the building permit. 
This dependence also can be labelled as strong because it is not avoidable; public 
bodies are the only actors who can exercise these regulatory powers.
Table 19. Dependence analysis in the Netherlands.
Dependence because 
of land
Dependence because of 
investment capacity
Dependence because of 
regulatory resources
M unicipality depends 
on the landowner/ 
developer
Developers own most of 
the land. Dependence is 
only avoidable through 
expropriation. However, 
expropriation is a rare 
instrument, and 'self 
realisation' gives prefer­
ence to developer.
Municipalities do not 
have financial means to 
invest, so developers are 
only ones who could 
invest. Only in Breda 
was the municipality 
ready to assume some 
financial risks.
Landowner/developer 
depends on 
M unicipality
The municipality ap­
proves the land-use plan 
and departures from it, 
and grants the building 
permits. Dependence is 
not avoidable.
Consequences o f the strong mutual dependency
The consequences in practice of this strong mutual dependency are significant. Land­
owners /developers have the option of not agreeing with the contributions package 
or other development requirements of the municipality. As developers do not always 
control all the land, and thus depend on various landowners, it might take some time 
to reach an agreement with all the landowners about the desirable (for the landown­
ers) price of land. This stimulates the raising of the price of land. An agreement with 
all the landowners depends on the expectation that by delaying negotiations, profits 
for the developer and the price of land could increase in the future. Whether it is the 
developer who owns the land and decides to wait, or it is one or more landowners 
who decide not to sell to the developer: municipalities might be confronted with 
developers that are not willing, and maybe not able, to agree with the required con­
tribution package. This might affect negatively the negotiation position of municipali­
ties, as they might be forced to lower the contributions package if they want to reach 
an agreement. Also, this can delay development because negotiations are prolonged. 
Let us see in detail the findings in the cases.
Findings in De Funen (only apartments)
Dutch Railways, the former landowner, negotiated with the Municipality of Am­
sterdam from the beginning of the 90's till the signing of an outline Development 
Agreement in March 1997. It seems that this semi-autonomous public company had
256 The Netherlands
chosen several times to wait. During a period of several years, negotiations did not 
succeed: the municipality approved in 1994 and 1995 two site-specific indicative 
plans (Stedenbouwkundige Programmas van Eisen), but Dutch Railways rejected 
both plans, arguing that they were financially not feasible. From 1994 to 1997, the 
average national prices of new housing grew in line with or above the general infla­
tion, with a peak of 12% above inflation in 1996 (see figure 31 for prices of new 
dwellings in the Netherlands, and for all dwellings in the province of North Holland, 
where Amsterdam lies). This means that delaying the development had no negative 
financial consequences for Dutch Railways, also because they had owned the land 
for more than 100 years, so there were no financial costs of waiting.
Price housing The Netherlands and provinces North-Holland, North-Brabant and Groningen 
(% growth real prices with reference to previous year)
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Sources:
- Prices new dwellings NL upto 2001: own elaboration, based on BNW (in Vrom 2002);
- Prices new dwellings NL from 2001: own elaboration, based on CBS Statiine. Nieuwbouwwoningen Outputindex 2000 = 100 (on-line 
consultation on 5 Februari 2008: www.cbs.nl).
- Prices existing dwellings NL upto 2001: own elaboration, based on NVM (in NVB 2001).
- Prices new and existing dwellings (single family and appartments) in North-Holland. North-Brabant and Groningen: own elaboration, 
based on Vrom 2007a.
- Inflatie NL: Centraal Bureau Statistiek (www.cbs.nl), Comsumentenprijzen; historie inflatie.
Figure 31. Growth of real prices (price increase minus general monetary inflation) of dwellings in the 
Netherlands and the provinces of North-Holland, North-Brabant and Groningen.
In 1997, after signing the first outline Development Agreement, the Dutch Railways 
sold most of the land to IBC, a property developer. During the following two years IBC 
and the municipality negotiated, and they sealed a second Development Agreement 
in September 1999. The average national prices of new housing grew spectacularly 
at that time: 2.4% above inflation in 1997, 9.1% in 1998 and 6.6% in 1999. Accord­
ing to a public officer, Dutch Railways and IBC agreed that IBC would pay the price 
and receive formally the land at the moment of starting the building, not before. This 
means that besides benefiting from general price rises, IBC did not have to pay inter­
est charges until the start of the building works; so waiting was, from an economic 
point of view, an interesting option. During the negotiations, the developer seems to
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have been clear that he would not accept hard deadlines. The indicative plans and 
the agreements include schedules, but almost none of them has been fulfilled, and 
the chances to impose them through the courts seem to be low. Two involved public 
officers considered that if the municipality had had the choice to exclude the devel­
oper's option to wait, the development process might have been faster.
The fourth moment at which the developer clearly seems to have used his option to 
wait was the start of the building. Although the developer had building permits for 
all the buildings since June 2001, he only started with the first buildings in the sum­
mer of 2002, and he waited about five years before starting the buildings in the rest 
of the site. The negotiations between IBC and the actual developer, Heijmans, have 
played here a clear role. Heijmans bought IBC in the summer of 2002 and decided 
to submit new applications to modify the already granted building permits for the 
remainder of the buildings, arguing that they were financially not feasible. Building 
these dwellings started during 2005 and 2006, when average prices had begun to 
rise again.
Besides causing delay, it seems plausible that the option to wait has weakened the 
negotiation position of the municipality, and thus diminished value capturing. The 
Municipality of Amsterdam seemed worried about the tempo of the development. 
Many public goals established in the first indicative plan of 1993 have finally not 
been included in the Development Agreements of 1997 and 1999. The impression 
arises that the municipality has gradually reduced value-capturing requirements dur­
ing the planning process in order to achieve an agreement with the developer.
Findings in Kruidenbuurt (single-family dwellings and apartments)
Trudo, a social landlord and owner of about the half of the land (the rest was public 
space, owned by the Municipality of Eindhoven), negotiated with the municipality 
from the second half of the 90's till 2004. In 1998, intense consultation with the 
neighbourhood led to a first site-specific indicative plan. In May 2004, negotiations 
ended with the signing of a Development Agreement. From 1997 till 2002, average 
prices of all new dwellings in the Netherlands grew spectacularly, with 2000 being 
the record year (24% increase above inflation). In 2003 and 2004 the increase above 
inflation in the Netherlands might have been negative, but in the province of North- 
Brabant, where Eindhoven lies, the increase was moderated (1% in the Netherlands 
and 2.5% in North-Brabant for single family houses, and 0%  respectively 1% for 
apartments). Moreover, because Trudo had received the land for free in 1994 there 
were no interest charges in case of delay. In sum, it seems clear that waiting was, 
from an economic point of view, an interesting option. However, we did not find 
evidence of specific decisions of Trudo to use its option to wait and delay. Also, it is 
not clear whether the option to wait has affected value capturing significantly, as the 
lump-sum contribution from the municipality (about €10m) was already clear and 
agreed in 2000. Thus, since 2000 the room for negotiating contributions was quite 
narrow.
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Findings in Kop van Oost (apartments)
In 2000, the property developer Mr. Hollestelle, who had agreed with the former 
landowner Houtgroep-Pont Eecen what seems to have been an option to buy the 
land, initiated negotiations with the Municipality of Groningen. After the selling of 
the land in 2001 (Hollestelle sold the land to IBC), and in 2002 (Heijmans bought 
IBC), negotiations ended with the signing of a Development Agreement in June 2005. 
In 2001 and 2002, the national average prices of new dwellings increased above 
inflation by about 6%  each year. For apartments in the province of Groningen also, 
prices increased above inflation during 2003 (4.5%), 2004 (7%) and 2005 (9.5%). 
There is not much information available about the price of land, and whether IBC and 
Heijmans had to pay interest charges or not, but based on the large price increases 
during the negotiation process (2000-2005), it seems reasonable to conclude that 
waiting, from an economic point of view, was an interesting option.
The option to wait seems to have delayed the process. During the negotiations be­
tween Hollestelle and IBC (about 2000-2001) Hollestelle might have chosen to delay 
selling until these negotiations ended. The situation that rose after Heijmans bought 
IBC in 2002 is clearer. Heijmans decided to 'redefine' the plan, as this developer 
used other profit criteria than IBC. This led to the re-making the plans, something 
similar to what happened in De Funen. In other words, Heijmans used its option to 
wait in order to change the plans (Buitelaar et al., 2008: 58; Interview with Segeren, 
2008).
It seems that the option to wait has not only delayed, but also weakened the negotia­
tion position of the municipality and thus lowered capturing value increase. From the 
beginning of the negotiations, the developer argued that there was no much financial 
room in the project, making clear to the municipality that there were not many value 
capturing possibilities. The municipality, which has not had access to the financial 
calculations of the developer, seems to have assumed, in the early stages, that it could 
not ask much from the developer. Also, the municipality accepted several reductions 
in the costs for public space (Buitenlaar et al., 2008: 113-114). The municipality may 
have accepted because it was in a hurry: the site influences the image of the area, 
which is situated between the historic city and the new greenfield scheme Meerstad.
Findings in Stationskwartier (apartments and offices)
Stationskwartier in Breda is peculiar, compared with the other cases. Here, the Mu­
nicipality of Breda bought the land from the developer (Dutch Railways), provides 
the infrastructure, and sells the land back. The municipality and Dutch Railways were 
since the 90's involved in getting this project accepted; together they lobbied by the 
Central Government to get Breda designated as a New Key Project. However, it seems 
that serious negotiations between the public bodies and the Dutch Railways only 
came after the municipality and the central government had reached an agreement 
about the public subsidies in February 2002. In 2003, the municipality approved the 
Masterplan Central Breda (Masterplan Centraal Breda), which included a business
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case. Negotiations ended in May 2006 with a definitive Development Agreement 
with Dutch Railways. During the negotiations (2002?-2006), prices of apartments 
in North-Brabant, where Breda lies, increased moderately above inflation (0% in 
2003, 1%  in 2004, 1.5% in 2005 and 5%  in 2006). There were no interest charges: 
Dutch Railways had owned the land for a long time, and the municipality had not yet 
bought the land from Dutch Railways. The municipality had bought at that time only 
a few small plots. Hence, it seems that waiting was, from the economic point of view, 
an interesting option for Dutch Railways. However, in this case it seems that this was 
an interesting option for the municipality also, which shares part of the financial risks 
of the operation and might also profit from higher market prices.
It is not possible to conclude, based on direct evidence, whether the option to wait 
has played a significant role in delaying the project. Nevertheless, it seems reason­
able to think that this might have been the case: it seems that the municipality has 
aimed to get a share in the profits, and that Dutch Railways has offered some resist­
ance to this. That is, either the developer, or the municipality, or both have used their 
option to wait. This could explain the relatively long negotiation process. Another 
study of this case includes similar conclusions (Krabben & Needham, 2008: 660). 
Besides delay, the option to wait might also have weakened the negotiation position 
of the municipality and lowered capturing value increase. It seems reasonable that 
the option to wait exercised by Dutch Railways has influenced the final negotiation 
results, i.e. that Dutch Railways has got a higher price for its land.
Conclusions
It seems plausible to conclude that the option to wait is exercised often. This was clear 
in Kop van Oost, and probable in De Funen and Stationskwartier. Asked about wheth­
er these findings might be exceptional within urban regeneration in the Netherlands, 
several experts considered that it is not unusual that landowners exercise their option 
to wait and delay development, although they also emphasized that this is not the 
only factor causing delay in Dutch urban regeneration (Van den Brand en Hoekstra, 
interviews in 2008). The cases suggest that the option to wait may have had important 
consequences for the price of the land, the profits of the developer, and the negotia­
tion position of the municipality also. In De Funen and Kop van Oost this was clear.
Exercising the option to wait might have been financially advantageous for the land­
owners and/or the developers, as we have argued. However, there is a second pos­
sible explanation, namely a low economic feasibility of the operations: in at least De 
Funen and Kop van Oost, the developer objected to municipalities' requirements, 
arguing that they threatened the financial feasibility of the operation. According to 
this explanation, confronted with too high development costs, developers might have 
no other option than to delay (because inflated development costs influence the final 
profit of developers and thus their possibilities to contribute, see causal model in 
section 2.4.2). However, it was not so easy to assess in De Funen and Kop van Oost 
whether this was indeed the real reason for delay. To accurately assess the economic
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feasibility, accounted land costs, profit margins of the developer and development 
costs, together with the initial profit, should be known. However, information about 
this is a sensitive matter, and usually developers do not disclose such information. My 
own estimations provided interesting information (for an overview of development 
costs and profits in the Dutch cases, see Annex 4). In Kruidenbuurt, according to fig­
ures given by the developer (most of postings 1-7) and by own estimations (posting 
8, total returns), it is not clear what the profit margin was. The developer's final profit 
might be about €24m, but this excludes a minimum land price (which the developer 
did not had to pay because he obtained the land for free in 1994). In Kop van Oost, 
according to figures given by the developer (Heijmans), his final profit is very narrow: 
€112m minus €110m = €2m. However, my own estimations suggest that there might 
be a larger final profit, about €29m. This suggests that the developers' financial ob­
jections to the municipality's requirements might not be strong. In Stationskwartier, 
according to my own estimations, there is a clear final profit for Dutch Railways: 
€480/520 minus 350/360m= €120/180m. In other words, this estimation suggests 
that the Municipality of Breda could have asked for more contributions for public 
infrastructure and facilities.
Both possible explanations of the findings in the studied cases seem to be generaliz- 
able. They largely match with several experts' view about the general situation in 
urban development in the Netherlands. In general, for those cases in which landown­
ers exercise their option to wait, experts give the following possible reasons: (1) it is 
a way of counteracting the requirements of municipalities, such as those related to 
value capturing. Another source confirms that developers threatening to withdraw 
a plan if municipalities do not lower requirements is not exceptional in the Nether­
lands (Buitelaar et al., 2008: 17, 94-96, 108-110, 112-114); (2) developers expect 
higher selling prices if they wait; (3) they expect to sustain the market prices by 
rationing the delivery of new dwellings; and (4) it might be handy when confronted 
with many projects at the same time. Specifically for urban regeneration, two ad­
ditional reasons are mentioned: (5) land is here owned by many landowners, just 
some of whom prefer to wait; (6) developers are confronted with higher development 
costs, so the financial feasibility is insecure (Van den Brand en Hoekstra, interviews 
in 2008). An interviewed representative of the developers argued similarly when he 
said that development was often delayed because municipalities require too much 
(Fokkema, interview 2007).
7.4.5 Procedure for the preparation and approval of binding 
rules
Summary of the findings
The 2008 Physical Planning Act has introduced changes in the guarantees given to 
initiators. From 2008 onwards, municipalities are obliged to determine within eight 
weeks an application for modification of the land use plan. This might affect captur­
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ing value increase. On the one hand, this measure could diminish the freedom of 
municipalities in the negotiations, and thus worsen the capturing of value increase. 
On the other hand, it could encourage developers to submit more applications, and 
accelerate thus the implementation. Regarding the possibilities to modify and detail 
the binding rules, and to adapt the geographical scope of the plan area in order to 
facilitate the negotiations: this flexibility seems not to affect the capturing of value 
increase significantly, but might be relevant for the tempo of implementation. Finally, 
regarding the possibility of detailing an outline land use plan, this might potentially 
offer, in some cases, some negotiation room for municipalities.
7.4.5.1 Guarantees for those taking the initiative
Under the 2008 Act municipalities, more than before, might be now obliged to take 
a formal decision about an application to modify the binding rules (verzoek tot be­
stemmingswijziging), and this must happen within eight weeks (article 3.9 for a modi­
fication of the land use plan and 3.12 for a departure). The municipality must argue 
its decision properly, which means that the decision must be in accordance with 
the policy stated in the land use plan and in the Structure Vision, if such document 
exists. The municipality can refuse the application within the period of eight weeks; 
afterwards he is supposed to have agreed with the application. If the municipal­
ity nevertheless refuses after this period the applicant can appeal to the courts. Of 
course, the applicant can anyway appeal against the decision of refusing, whether it 
has taken place within or after the period of eight weeks. Actually, this is new: before 
the 2008 Act appeal was not possible, and now it is. This means that a municipality 
cannot ignore such an application, that it is obliged to assess each application, and 
cannot reject without a proper argumentation (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 
(2003: 31; Vrom, 2007c: 31-32; Buuren et al, 2009: 116). It is not possible to empiri­
cally assess whether the novelty influenced capturing value increase in the studied 
cases, because the cases fell under the previous Physical Planning Act. However, it 
seems plausible to conclude that the novelty of the 2008 Act will have some conse­
quences for value capturing. A consulted expert said the following (De Wolff, inter­
view 2008): on the one hand, in some specific cases, the room to refuse applications 
could decrease, and this could weaken the negotiating position of the municipality. 
For example, it could be that no proper arguments could be found to refuse an ap­
plication because the land use plan and/or the Structure Vision already foresee the 
development. On the other hand, the novelty might reduce the risks that developers 
have to bear, and therefore stimulate development initiatives, which might imply 
an acceleration of the development process. There is however no unanimity about 
whether this aspect might be relevant (Verdaas, interview in 2008).
7.4.5.2 Flexibility to modify and detail afterwards approved binding rules
There is in the Netherlands the possibility to modify (wijziging) and depart (vrijstel- 
ling/projectbesluit) from the land use plan following a shorter procedure than if a 
new land use plan must be approved, and there is also the possibility of detailing 
afterwards an outline land use plan (uitwerking).
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Modification of the land use plan following a short procedure (wijziging)
There is the possibility of modifying the land use plan without having to make and 
approve a new one, following a much shorter procedure. This happens as follows: 
the land-use plan can prescribe that the municipality can modify it later (article 11.1 
of the old Act, article 3.6 new Act). Data from 1987 until 1993 show that this way 
of modification was used very often (Van Damme & Verdaas 1996: 79-80). It seems 
that nowadays this form of modification is common too. Cases Kop van Oost and 
Stationskwartier included it in their land use plan. Public officers in the municipali­
ties of Groningen and Rotterdam confirm that it is still a frequently used instrument 
(Interviews with Dollinga and Egberts, 2007).
The land-use plan must then prescribe the limits to the modification. Jurisprudence 
has developed the criterion that a land-use plan that includes the possibility of modi­
fication must include also an objective delimitation (objectieve begrenzing) of the 
modification. The jurisprudence has also defined how far a modification can go. 
Land uses can be replaced by new ones, or the allowed building volume can be in­
creased, provided that the land-use plan states explicitly the alternative land uses and 
volume, and provided that the new land uses and volume do not change significantly 
the structure of the plan (Van der Ree 2000: 428, 435; Klaasen, 2002: 175, 179; in­
terview with Porrey, 2007; Database Kluwer, 2006)14.
In case Kop van Oost the 2006 land use plan foresees the possibility both of rezon­
ing the land use (rezoning the given residential use into commercial facilities) and of 
modifying the building envelop (modifying the given building envelope, relocating 
the building sites, and even introducing new buildings, provided that noise nuisance 
remains under the legal limits). In case Stationskwartier the 2007 land use plan pre­
scribes several possibilities for modification that imply a change of land use: any 
given use can be rezoned into constructions as masts, antenna's, etc, of no more 
than 50 meter height. It is possible to make such a construction upon the building, 
but also to substitute a building for such a construction. Another possibility, limited 
to a specific plot, is to rezone the given uses housing, office space and commercial 
facilities into hotel.
However, it seems clear that in the cases, this possibility of modification did not lead 
to more contributions. The development agreements were already sealed before the 
approval of the land use plan. Modifications of the plan have not led in the studied
14 Examples of this are:
• The municipality of Woensdrecht was able to change the existing land-use from business area 
to housing, after the present companies moved to other location [Vz. ABRS 29 May 1995 
(Woensdrecht), nr. F01.94.0300];
• Small municipalities that are allowed to build only to accommodate their own population can 
use modification to re-zone later to housing, when the new housing is needed. This was the case 
in the municipalities of Zeevang and Leende [Vz. ABRS 3 April 1997 (Zeevang), nrs. E01.97.0046 
and F01.97.0026; ABRS 6 July 1998 (Leende), nr. E01.96.0165].
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cases to renegotiations of the contributions. However, this possibility of modification 
might facilitate implementation, as it creates flexibility to change the programme to 
adapt to changing circumstances. This can be important for developers when reacting 
to more favourable possibilities during the development process.
Departure from the land use plan following a shorter procedure (vrijstelling/ 
projectbesluit)
Major departures from the land use plan are possible (following articles 19 and 19a 
of the Physical Planning Act previous to 2008, and chapter 3.3 of the new Act), and 
are very common in practice. The departure can change substantially the permitted 
land uses and building volume. In cases De Funen, Kruidenbuurt and Kop van Oost 
the municipalities processed, together with the new land use plan, major departures 
from the old land use plan for part of the site: a small plot meant for offices in De 
Funen, and about one quarter of the plan area in Kruidenbuurt and Kop van Oost. 
However, the departures did not lead to more contributions, additional to those al­
ready agreed in the negotiations that preceded the approval of the new land use plan. 
Instead, in Kruidenbuurt and Kop van Oost the departures have accelerated the com­
mencement of the works by about half a year or more. This allowed granting the first 
building permits without having to wait for the definitive approval of the new land 
use plan. In De Funen this was not clear: the departure was granted on November 
2000, while the land use plan was definitively approved one month earlier. However, 
departures can be used in another way than in the studied cases. Instead of being 
processed parallel to a new land use plan to anticipate the granting of a building per­
mit, it can be and is often used alone, as a way of allowing the regeneration of the site 
without having to approve a new land use plan. It seems reasonable to conclude that 
such a use of the legal possibility of departure has similar effects on capturing value 
increase as when processing a normal new land use plan (see sections 7.4.1 to 7.4.3).
Detailing the outline Land use Plan (uitwerking)
Land use plans can include outline land use regulations that can be detailed after­
wards (Globaal BP met uitwerkingsplicht). The detailing follows a short procedure. 
The law15 and the jurisprudence16 delimit the 'minimum' contents of the outline land­
use regulations and prescribe that the plan must state the objective delimitation (ob­
jectieve begrenzing) for the detailing. This means that the detailing must take place 
within established limits (Van Zundert 2004: 148; Van der Ree, 2000: 434). As a con­
sequence of these limits, the detailing cannot introduce 'new' land-use possibilities,
15 Article 13.2 1985 Physical Planning Decree; Explanatory Memorandum of the 1985 Physical 
Planning Act (Tweede Kamer zitting 1955-56, no. 2, p.p. 14-15).
16 KB 19 February 1982 (Norg), in Bouwrecht 1982, p. 511; Afdeling rechtspraak 4 June 1985 
(Amsterdam), in Bouwrecht 1985, p. 915; ABRS 9 june 1998 (Amsterdam), in AB 1998, 338, and in 
Gst. 1999, 7105/6; Afdeling rechtspraak 4 June 1985 (Amsterdam), in Bouwrecht 1985, p. 915; HR 
23 September 1988 (Purmerend), in Bouwrecht 1989, p. 113; KB 1 September 1987 (Rozenburg), nr.
9, in Bouwrecht 1988, p. 31; ABRS 9 june 1998 (Amsterdam), in AB 1998, 338, and in Gst. 1999, 
7105/6.
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nor can it exclude any of the possible land-uses prescribed in the outline regulations. 
However, it can shift the use possibilities between different plots and is therefore po­
tentially interesting in negotiations with the landowners.
In Kruidenbuurt the land use plan, approved in April 2005, prescribes outline land 
use regulations for most of the plan area. The detailing for the first half of the site was 
approved in January 2007, and affected significantly the building possibilities: the 
exact number of dwellings, for which the 2005 plan established a minimum number 
of 650; the building volume, for which the plan established some elements of the 
building envelope, without fixing a maximal number of m2; and some other pos­
sibilities. However, detailing has not had consequences for capturing value increase 
because the development agreements were already sealed before the approval of the 
land use plan. In Stationskwartier the situation is different. Here only 3%  of the plan 
area is covered by outline land use regulations, which have not been detailed at the 
moment of data gathering. The Development Agreement sealed before the approval 
of the land use plan did not include the landowners of this part of the plan area. It 
is unclear whether detailing will be preceded by negotiations and thus to additional 
capturing value increase, but potentially it could offer some negotiation room to the 
municipality to ask some contributions to the landowners.
7.4.5.3 Flexibility to adapt the geographical scope (the plan area) of the 
binding rules accordingly to negotiations with landowners
It seems that land use plans and departures from them can be quite flexibly adapted 
to the negotiation process. Neither the law nor the jurisprudence establishes general 
limitations to the minimum size of the plan area, which means that they can be as 
small as a specific plot (Bosch & Hanemaayer 1992: quoted in Bregman & Sievers 
2002; Van Damme & Verdaas 1996: 73-78). Also, in principle there is no maximal 
number of plots, which means that, if necessary, a plan or departure can be made 
for each plot, no matter how many plots they are. The jurisprudence gives no general 
criterion for disapproving developments based on different small plans. On the con­
trary17, the use of many small binding plans is very common. Data from 1987 until 
1993 seem to confirm this. In that period, more than 50% of all the land-use plans in 
the province of Gelderland were small plans (Van Damme & Verdaas 1996: 76-78). 
After 1993 the use of small binding plans has remained very common in practice.
The studied cases refer to larger sites, of at least 5 ha (Kop van Oost). In all of them the 
municipality was free to delimitate the plan area. They did so very carefully, follow­
ing most of the time considerations related to the property boundaries. In general it 
seems plausible that this flexibility has helped to facilitate the tempo of implementa­
tion, in the sense that proposals included only those landowners willing to develop.
17 Afdeling Rechtspraak Raad van State 21 March 1991 (Roosendaal en Nispen), in AB 1992 p. 353.
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7.5 The actual degree of captured value increase in 
the Netherlands
This chapter focuses on whether the capturing value increase goals are achieved or 
not and on the distribution of costs between the involved parties: who has paid which 
public infrastructure and facilities, and possibly some extras? We look also at whether 
the goals have been achieved on time. The main sources of information are the four 
cases, complemented with other written sources and interviews with relevant ex­
perts. The conclusions are summarized in table 20.
On-site infrastructure provision costs
In all the studied cases, public bodies contributed heavily to on-site infrastructure 
provision costs. In De Funen the municipality assumed an important part: the refur­
bishing of an adjacent road (with a clear, but not exclusive, on-site character), and 
part of the public space (parking places and part of a park). The developer paid the 
costs of the public space with an exclusive on-site character and the other part of the 
park. In Kruidenbuurt the municipality paid about one third of the costs and some 
additional costs for public infrastructure situated within the plan area that serves a 
wider area. The developer (a housing association) contributed two thirds18. In Kop 
van Oost the municipality paid a small part of the public space, and the full costs of 
refurbishing a main road situated within the plan area but serving a wider area. The 
central government subsidized 25% of the soil decontamination costs, which were 
not very high. The developer paid the rest: constructing most of the on-site public 
space and possibly paying minor damage compensation to neighbours. In Stationsk­
wartier, subsidies from the municipality, province and central government covered 
about two thirds of the costs: the public roads and space within the site, and part of 
other on-site infrastructure (soil decontamination, preparation of plans). The devel­
oper (Dutch Railways) paid about one third of the costs. The new railway and bus 
stations (situated within the plan area, but serving a much wider area) are considered 
below.
It seems that, in general, these findings cannot be considered an exception. Public 
bodies in the Netherlands usually contribute heavily, in urban regeneration, to on­
site infrastructure. Both a study of the participation of housing associations in 31 
regeneration sites (De Kam & Needham, 2001: 69), and a more recent study of eight 
cases of private land development in urban regeneration sites (Buitelaar et al., 2008; 
Segeren, interview 2008) include similar findings. Not only the municipality, but 
also other governmental levels, contribute heavily, with subsidy programmes (e.g. 
Investeringsbudget Stedelijke Vernieuwing). Interviewed experts confirm this (Ver­
daas and Van Wageningen, interviews 2008). These conclusions coincide with the 
recommendation made by the Ministry for Housing, Planning and the Environment
18 And in addition provided new accommodation for all the former inhabitants.
Table 20. Comparison table results on capturing value increase in the Netherlands.
On-site land 
development costs
Land for on-site 
public infrastructure
Land for on-site 
public buildings
On-site public 
buildings
Affordable housing Contributions off-site 
public infrastructure 
and facilities
Cream off 
betterment
Developer Public body Developer Public body Developer Public body Developer Public body Developer Public
bodies
General 
knowledge NL
Part of the 
costs
Heavy
subsidizing
Important 
part of the 
land
Important part 
of the land
Commercial 
dev nothing, 
housing assoc 
possibly
Public body 
provides 
most of the 
land
Commercial 
dev nothing, 
housing assoc 
do contribute
Almost
always
Commercial 
dev do not, 
housing as­
sociation do
Sometimes Almost no contribu­
tions of developers 
to public infra/fac 
situated outside plan 
area, and modest 
contribution to infra/ 
fac situated within 
plan area but serving 
a wider area.
none
De Funen 
Amsterdam
Important part Important
part
Important
part
Important part none none none none 30% units, 
less than 30% 
volume
Subsidy 
€2 3,000/unit
A  smal I piece park at 
border plan area.
none
Kruidenbuurt
Eindhoven
(total value real 
estate € 150 m)19
€20 m 
(13% total 
value real 
estate)
E 10 m 
(7% total 
value real 
estate)
7%  total 
plan area
25% total plan 
area, 36% inc I 
adjacent roads
none none none none 45% units 
(developer is 
housing as­
sociation)
none € 0.5 for public facil­
ity outside plan area 
and small contribu­
tion to road within 
plan area.
none
Kop van Oost 
Groningen
(total value real 
estate € 140 m)
€ 6 m
(5% total value 
real estate) 
excl VAT
A  minor part 23% total 
plan area
6%  total plan 
area, 29% inc I 
adjacent roads
none none none none none none none none
S ta tionskwartier 
Breda
(total value real 
estate € 500 m)
€20-30 m 
(4-6% total 
value real 
estate)
€42 m 
(8% total 
value real 
estate)
27% total 
plan area
14% total plan 
area
none none none none none none Minor part of costs, 
and most of the land 
needed for new 
Railways Station 
(developer is Dutch 
Railways)
Eventual 
share in 
profits.
Grey: case in which the developer/landowner contributes the most of the four cases. 
White: case in which the developer/landowner contributes the less of the four cases.
1 9 Total value real estate' are the total returns accruing from the selling of the final real estate (thus includes the selling of the new buildings).
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over the allocation of costs in urban regeneration between municipalities, housing 
associations, real estate investors, commercial developers and inhabitants owning 
their house in de regeneration areas. According to this recommendation, public bod­
ies in urban regeneration should be financially responsible for the refurbishing of the 
public infrastructure, at least when the public space is old and needs refurbishing to 
bring it to current quality standards (Vrom, 2005: 22-23).
Land needed for on-site public infrastructure and facilities
Regarding the land needed for on-site infrastructure provision (excluding the land 
needed for public buildings), in the studied cases public bodies provided most, or 
an important part, of it (roads, public space). In De Funen the municipality provided 
a road at the border but within the plan area of the land use plan, and part of the 
park. The developer provided the land for the public space that has a clear on-site 
character, and for part of the park. In Kruidenbuurt the municipality provided most 
of the needed land, and the developer a minor part. In Kop van Oost the estimation 
depends on whether some adjacent roads (situated within but at the borders of the 
plan area) are included or not: the municipality provided more than the half of the 
needed land if the adjacent roads are included in the calculation, and a minor part 
if excluded. In Stationskwartier the municipality provided one third of the land for 
on-site infrastructure provision and the developer (Dutch Railways) the other two 
thirds. The new railway station is not included here, for this is considered below as 
off-site infrastructure. It seems that, in general, these case-based findings cannot be 
considered an exception. Public bodies in the Netherlands, in urban regeneration, 
usually provide most or at least an important part of the land that is needed for on-site 
public infrastructure. Municipalities usually own land in such areas. Most of the time 
this land is former public space, sometimes normal plots. A recent study supports 
this, and also that municipalities not only provide former public space, but often also 
building plots that were already public or have been bought for the purpose of re­
generation (Buitelaar et al., 2008: 82, 100; Segeren, interview 2008). Several experts 
confirm this (Segeren, Verdaas and Van Wageningen, interviews 2008). Again, these 
conclusions coincide with the principles of allocation of costs recommended by the 
Ministry (Vrom, 2005: 21-23). Although that document refers explicitly only to the 
costs and not to the land, its general principle that public infrastructure and public 
space are the responsibility of public bodies includes the land under them.
In all studied cases the municipality received free the ownership rights over the pub­
lic infrastructure and the land under it (the land that was not already its property). This 
also seems to be a generalizable conclusion, although there are exceptions. There are 
cases in which public infrastructure finally becomes shared ownership of the owners 
of the real estate, for example public space situated above parking garages (Segeren 
and Verdaas, interviews 2008).
Regarding the land needed for public facilities (the land under the public buildings): 
the studied cases do not include public buildings of any kind within the plan area of
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the land use plan. It seems that in Stationskwartier in Breda several public bodies will 
open an office in the new station (court of justice, post office). However, this cannot 
be considered as capturing value increase because those public bodies will have to 
pay the normal commercial price for the office space they are planning to use. The 
new railway station is considered below. Data from an own survey of 56 urban re­
generation districts suggest that these case-based findings are not an exception when 
projects are led by commercial developers (of those districts a minority, see Annex 5). 
None of the studied regeneration schemes led by commercial developers on privately 
owned land include privately financed public buildings. It seems that, in general, in 
urban regeneration on privately owned land led by commercial developers in the 
Netherlands, this is normal. The land needed for public buildings, if they exist, is usu­
ally provided by the respective public body. Again, this matches with the mentioned 
recommendation of the Ministry. That document states that in urban regeneration, 
public bodies should be responsible for the public buildings. Although no explicit 
reference is made to the land under public buildings, it seems clear that the Minis­
try considers that public bodies are also responsible for acquiring the needed land 
(Vrom, 2005: 22, 24). On the other hand, it seems to be common that housing as­
sociations contribute to public facilities such as care facilities or other buildings with 
a public function, although specific figures are not available.
On-site public facilities (the buildings)
This has already been handled above together with the land that is needed for the 
public buildings.
Land and money for on-site and off-site social/affordable housing
Of the four studied cases, only Kruidenbuurt and De Funen included social/afford­
able housing. In Kruidenbuurt the developer, a housing association, will develop 
about the half of the total number of units as social dwellings. The developer bears 
thus the difference between the price of each unit (bedrijfswaarde) and the free mar­
ket price. Besides the social rented units, the developer will sell about one quarter of 
the dwellings for a maximal selling price of € 240,000 final price (price of 1-1-2003, 
to be updated each year). However, it is not clear whether this could be considered 
as a cost to the developer, as we do not know whether this price (€240,000) is below 
the price in the free market. In De Funen the developer builds some social housing 
(less than one third of the units). However, here the developer receives an important 
public subsidy from the central government, thus it is not clear whether the developer 
actually subsidizes the social units, probably not.
The findings in the mentioned own survey of 56 regeneration districts seem to con­
firm the exceptionality of case De Funen. None of those schemes that were found to
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be located on privately owned land and implemented by commercial developers20 
included any social housing. It seems that, in general, in urban regeneration in the 
Netherlands, commercial developers neither develop social housing, nor do they 
pay the costs of it. Social housing seems to be a task almost exclusively for housing 
associations. A recent study of eight urban regeneration cases agrees (Buitelaar et al., 
2008; Segeren, interview 2008). As a consequence, social housing most of the time is 
built only in those projects where housing associations or public bodies control (part 
of) the land, such as in Kruidenbuurt. This conclusion matches with the mentioned 
recommendation of the Ministry. This states that it is the housing association, in ur­
ban regeneration, which is financially responsible for the deficit that is implied in the 
development of social houses (Vrom, 2005: 23).
Land and money for off-site public infrastructure and facilities
Regarding public infrastructure and facilities situated outside the plan area: of the 
four studied cases, only in two of them did the developer contribute to this, and then 
only modestly. In Kruidenbuurt the developer contributed € 0.5m towards a public 
facility situated outside the plan area. In De Funen the developer provided about half 
of a park (land and costs of construction) situated outside the plan area of the land 
use plan, between the new building and the existing neighbourhood. However, the 
land use plan here was delimited very tightly, and actually this park serves clearly 
and mainly the new building in the plan area. In general it seems that the conclu­
sion is generalizable that developers in urban regeneration on privately owned land 
do not contribute significantly to public infrastructure or facilities located outside 
the plan area. In the mentioned survey of 56 urban regeneration districts, none of 
those projects located on privately owned land and implemented by commercial 
developers included contributions for off-site infrastructure, whether this was situ­
ated outside or inside the plan area. Kolprom (2000: 31-53) and a recent study of 
eight cases (Buitelaar et al., 2008: 90; Segeren, interview 2008) agree with this. Also, 
this conclusion seems to fit with the mentioned recommendation of the Ministry. 
This does not even mention the possibility of charging the development in question 
with public infrastructure located elsewhere. Moreover, that document follows the 
principle that public infrastructure is the responsibility of public bodies (see above). 
However, it seems also that, sometimes, urban regeneration schemes do contribute to 
off-site public infrastructure and facilities with a monetary payment to a fund (Fonds 
Bovenwijkse Voorzieningen). Contributions, if they are made, could be between €4.5 
and €10 for every square metre of serviced building plot (Van Wageningen, Staut- 
tener, interviews 2008).
20 Hoograven, Vicona, Onixweg 1-3 (in the city of Utrecht); Kanaleneiland/Transwijk, Winkelcentrum 
(in Utrecht); Malburgen, Winkelcentrum Drieslag (in Arnhem); Zuilen/Ondiep, winkelcentrum 
Rokade (in Utrecht); Heuvel, W SST (in Breda); Presikhaaf, Weldamlaan (in Arnhem). On two 
others the situation was doubtful, for land was private owned but will be acquired by a Public- 
private Partnership (Berflo Es, in Engelo), or land was only partly private owned (Centrumgebied 
Kanaleneiland, in Utrecht)
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Regarding public infrastructure and facilities situated within the plan area, but serv­
ing a wider area (that is why they are considered here off-site): schemes might include 
these in their plan area. In the studied cases this was sometimes clear, sometimes not, 
and in any case developers did not contribute much, except in Stationskwartier. In 
De Funen a street situated at the border but within the plan area has been refur­
bished. The developer will not contribute to this. In Kruidenbuurt several streets situ­
ated at the borders but within the plan area will be refurbished. The developer will 
not contribute significantly: the land was already public (the existing roads) and the 
municipality will pay most of the costs of refurbishing. In Kop van Oost a street situ­
ated at the border but within the plan area will be refurbished. The developer will 
not contribute; the municipality provides the land (the existing road) and pays the 
refurbishing costs. In Stationskwartier a new street and, especially, the new railway 
and bus station will clearly serve a wider area. Most of the costs (not the land) will be 
paid with public subsidies. The developer (Dutch Railways) will contribute with a rel­
atively minor amount to the costs of the new railway station, but will provide all the 
land needed for this station and most of the land for the new public streets. In short, 
in the studied cases, developers pay, if they pay at all, only a small or marginal part 
of the costs of the public infrastructure and facilities situated within the plan area that 
serve a wider area. Also, public bodies provide most of the needed land, with the ex­
ception of Stationskwartier. The mentioned survey of 56 urban regeneration districts 
confirms these case-based findings: the surveyed schemes on privately owned land 
and implemented by commercial developers include, at the most, only a little public 
space directly related to the scheme. An expert confirmed that in urban regeneration 
on privately owned land the contribution of private parties to this is usually modest 
(Van Wageningen, interview in 2008). And, again, these conclusions seem to fit with 
the mentioned recommendation of the Ministry (Vrom, 2005): public infrastructure 
is a responsibility of public bodies.
Creaming off plus value
In the studied cases, public bodies, as such and not as landowners, receive no share 
of the profits. The exception might be Stationskwartier, where the municipality bears 
some risks in the infrastructure provision and might enjoy some profit. Also, the mu­
nicipality will obtain the market value of the future use possibilities for its land, which 
is about 5-7% of the total plan area. But in general, in case of regeneration schemes 
on privately owned land, municipalities do not receive a share in the profits of opera­
tions (Segeren, Verdaas and Van Wageningen, interviews in 2008).
Tempo of implementation of the capturing value increase goals
Now we take into account possible side effects, of which special attention has been 
given to the tempo of implementation of the capturing value increase goals. In the 
studied cases, if land use plans include implementation schedules (Kruidenbuurt and 
Stationskwartier), these are very vague and are included in the Explanation, the part 
of the plan that is not legally binding. The legally binding parts of land use plans can­
not include deadlines for the start or completion of development. In De Funen, Kru-
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idenbuurt and seemingly also in Stationskwartier, it was the development agreement 
(not the Land use plan) that included clear deadlines for the delivery of public infra­
structure and facilities. Deadlines, if existing (whether in the not legally binding part 
of the land use plans and/or in the development contracts) were or will be sometimes 
fulfilled (phases 1 and 2 in Kruidenbuurt) and sometimes not (the deadlines for most 
of the scheme in De Funen, included in the development agreement). It seems that 
in all of the cases there were almost no deadlines that were very hard, in the sense 
that delay of start or delivery of development would lead to significant sanctions for 
the developer. For example, in De Funen the delay was very significant, without this 
bringing any disadvantages for the developer. An interviewed public officer consid­
ered in this case that the municipality would not have had much chance to win a le­
gal suit on this point. In Kruidenbuurt the deadlines, included in the agreement, seem 
also not very hard. The exception could be Stationskwartier. Based on interviews, it 
seems that the deadlines included in the Development Agreement (which was not 
available to me) might have legal consequences: the developer will be obliged to 
sell his land for a low price if he delays more than two years the acquisition of the 
serviced building plots. In short, deadlines, if existing, were not very hard, with the 
exception of Stationskwartier.
These case-based findings seem not to be an exception in urban regeneration in 
the Netherlands. Deadlines, if they are made, are very soft, and delay is common. 
Schemes in which land use plans have been approved, but in which there are sig­
nificant development delays, are not an exception at all. Also, there are cases known 
of development that has never started, or started only after many years of delay and 
only after development terms, and sometimes also the land use plan, have been sub­
stantially redefined (Segeren, interview 2008). It seems clear that delay is very com­
mon in urban regeneration in the Netherlands (Segeren, Van den Brand, Hoekstra, 
interviews in 2008).
7.6 Causal relationships between formal rules relevant 
to zoning and capturing value increase in 
the Netherlands
Section 7.4 gave an answer to Preparatory research question 3: it inferred the possi­
ble causal relations between the independent variable 'formal rules relevant to zon­
ing' and the dependent variable 'capturing value increase'. This chapter summarizes 
first the inferred causalities and then assesses the effect of possible third variables.
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7.6.1 The inferred causalities
The findings suggest that the following sub-variables can influence positively and/or
negatively the degree of capturing value increase (see also the causal model in sec­
tion 2.4.2 and figure 32):
• Sub-variable a, Some Certainty about the future building possibilities, together 
with Uncertainty about the future contributions: this might have been negative 
for intermediary variables negotiation position (of the municipality) and account­
ed land costs, and thus negative for capturing value increase;
• Sub-variable b, Contents of binding rules: not being able to include obligations 
and implementation schedules seems to have influenced negatively intermedi­
ary variable negotiation position (of the municipality);
• Sub-variable c, Making binding rules conditional on agreement: the indirect 
possibilities of conditioning the approval of binding rules to securing public 
infrastructure and facilities can be positive for intermediary variable negotiation 
position (of the municipality), and thus on capturing value increase. However, 
legal limitations to these indirect possibilities have some negative effects;
• Sub-variable d, Property rights: the interdependency between municipalities and 
landowners seems to have a negative effect on intermediary variables accounted 
land costs (higher costs), regular profit margins (negative for capturing value in­
crease, but positive for the developer), negotiation position (of the municipality), 
and delay;
• Sub-variable e, Guarantees for those taking initiative: the obligation, introduced 
in 2008, to determine an application within eight weeks might be negative for 
intermediary variable negotiation position (of the municipality), but positive for 
intermediary variable delay;
• Sub-variable e, Flexibility in modification/departure binding rules: (1) the rela­
tive flexibility to modify the land use plan (wijziging) seems only to be positive 
for intermediary variable delay. (2) The possibility of departing from the existing 
land use plan (vrijstelling/projectbesluit), when used as complement to the new 
land use plan, can affect positively intermediary variable delay;
• Sub-variable e, Flexibility departing binding rules: the possibility of departing 
from the existing land use plan (vrijstelling/projectbesluit), but not as a comple­
ment to the new land use plan, can have, the same as sub-variables a, b and c, 
a positive effect on intermediary variables accounted land costs and negotiation 
position (of the municipality);
• Sub-variable e, Flexibility detailing 'a posteriori': it is not clear whether the pos­
sibility of approving outline land use regulations and detailing them afterwards 
(globale bestemming met uitwerkingsplicht) has consequences for capturing 
value increase, but in some cases it might potentially offer some negotiation 
room to municipalities. In other words, it might strengthen intermediary variable 
negotiation position (of the municipality);
• Sub-variable e, Flexibility to adapt the size of the plan area according to negotia­
tions with each landowner: this might be relevant for intermediary variable delay.
Actions influencing distribution initial profit (D):
1. Public bodies using powers certainly:
- Sub-variable a: uncertainty-certainty -------------------
- Sub-variable b: narrow contents binding rules ----------
- Sub-variable c: indirect conditioning / limits to conditioning
2. Owners using property rights (sub-variable d) -------------
3. Public bodies using powers procedure
- Sub-variable e: guarantees for those taking initiative -----
- Sub-variable e: flexibility modification / departure 
parallel to new land use plan ----------------
- Sub-variable e: flexibility departure
without new land use plan -------------------
- Sub-variable e: flexibility detail ment 'a posteriori'
- Sub-variable e: flexibility sizing plan area ------
Final profit
A
->> Accounted land costs 
Regular profit margins 
Inflated development costs
A
-^ > Négociation position 
->> Delay
Independent variable > < Intermediary variable :
-> CAPTURING VALUE INCREASE
< Dependent variable >
Figure 32. Scheme of the inferred causal relations in the Netherlands between independent variable 'formal rules relevant to zoning', the intermediary
variables and the dependent variable 'capturing value increase'.
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7.6.2 Possible third variables
Here the effect of other, possible third, variables is assessed, related first to the spe­
cific circumstances in the studied cases (variables D4 and D5 of the causal model in 
section 2.4.2), second to market circumstances (variable A1) and third to presumed 
high development costs (variables A2 and A3). The goal is to investigate the possibil­
ity that the inferred causal relationships turn out to be spurious (see section 3.2.1.2 
for more detail about this methodological approach).
Specific circumstances in the studied cases
In Eindhoven, the municipality, at the time of the negotiations about the redevelop­
ment of Kruidenbuurt, was used to implementing the public space itself. Both the in­
terviewed developer and a public officer considered that it took some effort to reach 
an agreement about how the developer should be allowed to take over this task. This 
might have delayed the process.
In two cases, involved parties considered that internal organizational aspects might 
have been relevant. This is the case in Kruidenbuurt, where according to both the 
developer and a public officer, a lack of continuity in the municipal organization de­
layed the process. In Stationskwartier also the developer named this as a delaying fac­
tor. In Stationskwartier an involved public officer considered that the employment of 
skilled managers in both the central government and in the municipality influenced 
value capturing positively.
In two cases, involved parties considered that a good personal relationship between 
the developer and the municipality might have speeded the development process. In 
Kruidenbuurt both the developer and a public officer considered that the good rela­
tionship between both has been relevant. In Kop van Oost, the developer considered 
that a good relationship at managerial level might have been of importance.
In Kop van Oost the removal of a gas filling station was a relevant delaying factor 
(interview with Segeren, 2008).
Market circumstances
It has already been considered above that rising housing prices might have stimulated 
the use of the option to wait in most of the studied cases. For landowners, waiting was 
an interesting option from the economic point of view as the rising of housing prices 
translated into risings of the profits (in the form of higher accounted land prices and/ 
or higher regular and final profit margins). Market circumstances, together with the 
property rights of landowners, which gave them the option to wait and delay develop-
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ment, have thus influenced largely the behaviour of the landowners and the results 
on the finally captured value increase (for more details see 7.4.4.2) 21.
Financial feasibility
It has already been considered that in urban regeneration schemes some involved 
parties perceive the financial feasibility as a problem, a problem that might have 
stimulated the use of the option to wait in several cases. Some of the involved de­
velopers had the wish or the need to undertake time-consuming negotiations to en­
large or ensure financial feasibility (see 7.4.4.2). This third variable is mentioned as a 
general problem in urban regeneration schemes. In other words, in the Netherlands 
in urban regeneration, high land development costs (which consist of the accounted 
land costs, the infrastructure provision costs, the plan preparation costs, the soil de­
contamination costs, the compensation costs and the contributions, see section 2.4.3 
for an explanation of these sorts of costs), in combination with a low initial profit, 
might cause delay and the lowering of requirements because final profits might be 
insufficient.
21 In the studied cases, prices for new apartments (which are most of the new buildings) vary from
about € 2,000 to 3,000 per m2 floor space, depending on the location, and maybe even higher in
Amsterdam:
• Kop van Oost, in Groningen: based on the selling brochure of the developer, it was possible to 
assess the prices of the apartments to be about € 2,500/m2 floor space.
• Stationskwartier, in Breda: based on the total expected returns given by the developer, it was pos­
sible to assess that the prices of the new apartments could be about € 2,000/m2 floor space. This 
estimation seems low when compared with prices in the centre of Breda, where Stationskwartier 
is located. Prices of new apartments in the centrum of Breda vary from € 2,393/m2 in scheme 
WSST (arithmetic average of prices of 19 apartments, on-line site consulted on 9/1/08), to € 
2,555/m2 in 'Aan de kade' (price of the only apartment to sell when site consulted on 9/1/08), 
and € 2,600/m2 in 'Vista Baluarte' (price of the two apartments to sell when site consulted on 
9/1/08).
• De Funen, in Amsterdam: here prices must have been higher, as prices in Amsterdam are signifi­
cantly higher than in Breda and Groningen.
• Kruidenbuurt: it was not possible to obtain prices per m2 floor space.
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The goals of this research are two fold. First we want to learn how to use those formal 
rules that are relevant to zoning to improve cost recovery in the Netherlands. 'Formal 
rules relevant to zoning' are all those formal rules for the exercise of both legally 
binding rules (e.g. a land use plan), including the implications for property rights in 
land, and non-legally binding policy documents. 'Cost recovery' refers to the recov­
ery, through contributions from private developers, of those costs that are related to 
the realization of public infrastructure and facilities that benefit the development. 
Second we want to draw conclusions for the theoretical reflections set out in chapter
2, reflections that have laid the foundations, together with the definition of the prob­
lem in chapter 1, for the research questions and their operationalization in chapter 3. 
The first goal (improving cost recovery in the Netherlands) is achieved in chapter 9 
in the form of recommendations to be applied in Dutch urban development practice 
and legislation. The second goal (theoretical reflections) is achieved in this chapter 8. 
Both chapters rest on the findings of chapters 5 to 7.
Chapter 2, based on policy network literature and current debates on property 
rights in land and flexibility in planning, developed two specific methods of 'Net­
work management' for influencing the interactions within the policy networks in 
urban regeneration, and for influencing the outcomes for capturing value increase. 
These two methods have been included in a model that explains the various cau­
salities of capturing value increase. The methods have also been formulated as 
two hypotheses, which have been tested empirically. The first speculates about the 
effects on capturing value increase of the definition of property rights in land and 
how this influences the power relationship between the involved public and private 
parties. The second speculates about the effects of the certainty created by bind­
ing rules and non-binding policy documents during development processes. In the 
causal model a third speculation came up that has also been empirically tested: the
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assumption that the flexibility in procedures could be relevant for capturing value 
increase.
Power in the policy networks
It seems that the first two hypotheses might indeed be valid. About the third assump­
tion, it has not been possible to infer clear and generalizable relationships between 
flexibility and the results on capturing value increase. The findings in all countries 
suggest that the variables named in the first two hypotheses are indeed relevant for 
capturing value increase, because they can influence the interactions within the 
policy networks in urban regeneration. Public bodies in England and especially in 
Valencia seem, thanks to these tools, to play a role that fits better in the traditional 
interorganizational approach than in the policy network approach. In other words, 
public bodies manage to play a role which is more central hierarchical than that of a 
mere coordinating body.
Municipalities in England and especially in Valencia prescribe beforehand and uni­
laterally clear requirements and obligations to be fulfilled by property developers 
and landowners. That is, public bodies set the goals that developers and landowners 
must fulfil, without previously agreeing this with them. These requirements are the 
bottom-line during the negotiations. This results in a high level of captured value 
increase. In Valencia, municipalities go further than in England, as the Valencian 
municipalities not only set unilaterally the goals, but they have also, thanks to a 
compulsory land readjustment regulation, powers to select the developer they pre­
fer, if necessary by-passing the landowners and without the need of buying or ex­
propriating the land.
Criticisms of the policy network approach
These findings support a first conclusion regarding the advocated role of public bod­
ies in the policy network approach. The dominant role of public bodies in urban re­
generation, especially in Valencia, clearly does not fit within the role that the policy 
network literature gives them, and it undermines some of the basic assumptions of 
that literature: that actors are necessarily interdependent, that public bodies must as­
sume a more modest role and cannot be dominant. The findings suggest that public 
bodies in Valencia and, to a lesser extent in England, are clearly not primus inter 
pares: on the contrary, they are able to unilaterally set out value capturing goals and 
impose their implementation. An important basis for this dominant role is the pos­
sibility in Valencia of avoiding mutual dependency between public bodies and de­
velopers/landowners. The policy network approach might have insufficiently worked 
out the basic idea that underlies the role that it advocates for public bodies. This basic 
idea is that the government always depends on private actors because these have a 
veto power on policy-making and implementation. In Valencia, public bodies can 
effectively avoid this veto power through compulsory land readjustment. This finding 
should stimulate a reconsideration of the basic assumptions in the advocated role of 
public bodies in urban development.
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The rest of this chapter summarizes the findings for each country, compares them and 
enumerates the consequences for the theoretical reflections. Here we follow the narrative 
structure set out in section 3.3.3, which distinguished between the following sub-variables:
1. Certainty beforehand about future building possibilities and contributions;
2. Choosing the contents of the legally binding rules;
3. Making the legally binding rules conditional on the developer securing his con­
tributions;
4. Modulating property rights.
8.1 Certainty beforehand about future building 
possibilities and contributions
Binding rules and also indicative policy documents can create certainty about future 
building possibilities and about the contributions that developers will have to make. 
Certainty can be created before, during, or after negotiations with developers. There 
are important differences between the studied countries. Spain and the region of Va­
lencia belong to a group of 'plan-led countries', in which there is an important level 
of legally binding certainty in early stages of the development process. The Nether­
lands also belongs theoretically to this plan-led system. However, in practice there is 
flexibility, as a consequence of which the Dutch planning system shows similarities 
with the 'development-led' planning system. In this system, characteristic of the UK, 
binding rules are approved after negotiations finish, not before. This is the practice in 
the Netherlands, not only in recent years, but also from at least the early 1980's. This 
deviation of the Dutch system from the theoretical working of the plan-led model (a 
model which the Dutch legislation pre-supposes) seems not to be an exception inter­
nationally (for a comparison of the Netherlands with other eight Western European 
countries, see section 4.1). Let us look at the findings in Valencia, England and the 
Netherlands in more detail:
Certainty about future building possibilities
Municipalities usually create certainty in the early stages, in different degrees, about 
the future building possibilities, that is about what the landowner will be able to 
build. In Valencia this happens through the approval of general land use plans that 
must cover the whole municipal territory. These plans are highly detailed and legally 
binding. In the Netherlands and England, municipalities usually approve indicative, 
not legally binding plans, which create some certainty. Examples of these documents 
in the Netherlands are Nota van Uitgangspunten, Stedenbouwkundig Plan/Visie, On­
twikkelingsprogramma, Programma van Eisen, Masterplan, Structuurplan, Structuur- 
visie, etc; and in England Local Plans, Development Plans, etc. These documents, 
besides being of an indicative character, include often much more vague and outline 
prescriptions that the Spanish general plans. Within these clear differences, there
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seems to be however a trend to increase certainty, at least in Valencia and England. 
This trend is visible in Valencia since the 1980s and, more recently, in England. Lo­
cal public bodies tend to increase certainty in order to improve transparency and 
accountability in their planning decisions. Based on these findings, a first conclusion 
is that part of the literature on comparative planning systems in Europe may not have 
distinguished accurately enough the actual differences in this variable between na­
tional planning systems, at least with regard to the Spanish versus English and Dutch 
systems. This literature has tended to conclude a convergence in this that does not 
match our findings and fundamentally contradicts the literature in Spain, which has 
repeatedly claimed the singularity of the Spanish planning system because it offers 
in very early stages of development processes a much higher level of certainty about 
the development possibilities than any other European country (confero European 
Commission, 1997; Nadin & Stead, 2008: 40, 44-45; Comisión de Expertos sobre 
Urbanismo, 1996: 31-47; García-Bellido, 1999).
Another conclusion is that more certainty beforehand may result in less public value 
capturing. It seems that municipalities that prescribe building possibilities early in the 
development process might stimulate land price increases and might lose a valuable 
negotiation tool. This seems to lead to less capturing of value increase. However, this 
sub variable (certainty about future building possibilities) seems to interact closely 
with the following sub variable (certainty about future contributions, see under). Cer­
tainty about building possibilities might be negative for capturing value increase, but 
if accompanied by certainty about future contributions, it does not necessarily have 
to be negative.
Certainty about future contributions
The differences between Valencia, England and the Netherlands are larger when 
looking at the certainty beforehand about the future contributions, that is, the cer­
tainty about what the landowner will have to contribute to public infrastructure and 
facilities. In Valencia there is in the early stages much certainty about future contribu­
tions through (1) legal minimal standards for public infrastructure and facilities, (2) 
local policy and (3) the approval of legally binding General land use plans. This cer­
tainty has certainly enlarged the capturing of value increase compared to before the 
introduction of these measures. English municipalities usually create, increasingly 
in the last years, some certainty through the approval of (1) site-specific indicative 
plans that establish the contributions for the development in question, and (2) non 
site-specific indicative policy documents about generic public value capturing that 
establish standard contributions for the whole municipality. The approval of these 
generic documents has been stimulated in recent years by the central British govern­
ment, and has influenced the capturing of value increase positively. In the Nether­
lands, most of the time there is no certainty at all, neither created through legally 
binding nor indicative documents. And if there is some certainty, it is limited. In two 
of the Dutch cases, the future contributions were clear neither before negotiations 
took place, nor before the price of land was established. In the other two Dutch cases
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there was some certainty, but this was due to exceptional circumstances. This uncer­
tainty seems to lower the extent of captured value increase.
Table 21. Degree of certainty in Valencia, England and the Netherlands
Certainty beforehand about 
building possibilities
Certainty beforehand about 
contributions
Valencia Always, much certainty Always, much certainty
England Sometimes, some certainty Sometimes, some certainty
The Netherlands Always, some certainty Almost never, and limited certainty
Table 22. Effects certainty on captured value increase.
Certainty beforehand about 
contributions
No certainty about future 
contributions
Certainty beforehand 
about building possibilities
+
some capturing value increase less capturing value increase
No certainty about 
future building possibilities
++
more capturing value increase
+
some capturing value increase
++ : more capturing value increase 
+ : some capturing value increase 
- : less capturing value increase
The explanation for the positive effect which certainty has on contributions is three 
fold: (1) certainty may reduce the price of land, as developers do indeed take account 
of the future contributions when calculating the price to be paid to the landowner, 
and lower land prices augment the financial room for contributing to public infra­
structure and facilities; (2) certainty might also influence the accounted land costs 
(that is, the price at which the land is entered into the accounts for the regeneration 
project) and the regular profit margin of the developer. The accounted land cost and 
the regular profit margins are often not set at the start of development processes. At 
that time, developers often have some room to set them higher or lower. A developer 
confronted with a high contributions package will tend to account the land for a 
lower price in the accounts, and accept that this development site will not contribute 
much to possible losses on other sites. Conversely, a developer confronted with a 
low contributions package will tend to account the land for a higher price. Regard­
ing regular profit margins, developers can consider at the beginning of development 
process the size of the profit, which may vary from 5%  to 20% or more. Once the 
price of land and the regular profit margin have been established, lowering them is 
usually complicated. (3) A third explanation for the positive effect of certainty on con­
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tributions is that certainty strengthens the policy base and the moral authority for the 
public officers to require contributions, so contributions do not need to be introduced 
as something new in the negotiations. Tables 21 and 22 summarize the findings.
Results of testing the 2nd hypothesis
Within the causal model explained in section 2.4.2, the second hypothesis is that 
a modification of one of the context variables (formal rules about certainty about 
development terms, variable B2) could modify the actions of the involved actors 
(how the local public bodies use their formal powers about certainty on development 
terms, variable D1). The second hypothesis speculates therefore that:
Creating uncertainty in early stages of development processes about future building 
possibilities, and certainty about future contributions, can influence capturing value 
increase in a positive way.
The findings seem to confirm this. In the studied cases, creating certainty or leaving 
uncertainty open seems to have had important consequences for the residual price 
mechanisms of the land and for the negotiation position of each party. This can be 
relevant in the debate in the planning profession about the need for flexibility. This 
debate often focuses on the consequences of socio-economic dynamics in planning 
practice, and tends to embrace flexibility as the solution for the unpredictability of 
these dynamics. Flexibility is advocated as the way of achieving a non-linear and 
multi-layered decision-making system. However, the findings underline the impor­
tance of the converse: namely the influence of planning practice on economic dy­
namics that are central to the outcome of planning processes. That is, too much flex­
ibility, at least regarding the private contributions, can affect negatively the quality 
and quantity of private contributions to public infrastructure and facilities. In sum, the 
findings suggest that there must be a certain level of certainty about contributions, in 
order to strengthen the obligations on the private sector for the realization of public 
infrastructure.
8.2 Choosing the contents of legally binding rules
Binding plans might be useful in negotiations if the municipality can include in them 
not only the physical zoning, but also aspects related to the financing and implemen­
tation of public infrastructure and facilities. Do binding plans regulate only a desired 
final picture, without stating who is responsible for its implementation? Or also the 
obligations that must be fulfilled by the developer? The findings suggest that this sub­
variable might be relevant for capturing value increase.
Both in Valencia and England, planning law makes it possible to include in binding 
plans a wide range of requirements:
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• Social/affordable housing: both in Valencia and England it is possible to pre­
scribe social/affordable housing in the binding plans;
• On-site and off-site public infrastructure and facilities: both in Valencia and Eng­
land it is possible to prescribe the obligation to contribute to on-site and off-site 
public infrastructure and facilities. In England, municipalities can also prescribe 
contributions for the building, maintenance and exploitation costs of public 
buildings, including those of social facilities (for example education and social 
services).
• Investing and implementation schedules: in both countries, binding plans in­
clude schedules and deadlines within which contributions must be made.
All these possibilities are positive for capturing value increase. In the Netherlands, 
until the 2008 Physical Planning Act, none of these requirements could be prescribed 
in the binding plans1. After the exploratory research about the Netherlands and an­
other eight Western European countries, we presumed that the fact that, in the Neth­
erlands these requirements could not be prescribed in the binding plans, would be 
negative for capturing value increase. The findings confirm this.
The consequences for the 2nd hypothesis
This finding can be used to refine the 2nd hypothesis (in black letters the addition):
Creating uncertainty in early stages o f development processes about future building 
possibilities, and certainty about future contributions (specially if  it is possible to 
include a ll the contributions as obligatory in legally binding rules) can influence 
capturing value increase in a positive way.
8.3 Making binding rules conditional on the developer 
securing his contributions
The definition of relevant variables handled at the start of data gathering referred only 
to the possible contents of binding plans as a determinant sub-variable. However, 
the findings soon showed that it might be ineffective to do no more than prescrib­
ing contributions and temporal deadlines, because their effectiveness depends on 
another sub-variable: whether binding plans can be made conditional on sealing a 
Development Agreement.
1 The 2008 Act might have introduced some changes, but they came too late for the data gathering 
of this research. For an assessment of whether the 2008's novelties could improve the capturing of 
value increase, see section 9.2.
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The approval of binding plans containing generous value capturing arrangements 
and strict deadlines, as such, does not automatically mean that the developers will 
indeed implement them. It is important to remember that non-fulfilment of arrange­
ments and deadlines may lead to no or almost no sanctions. In order to secure the 
implementation, additionally the developer needs to be bound to do that. England 
and Valencia belong to a group of countries in which it is possible to condition, in 
a formal, open and direct way, the approval of the binding plans to a development 
agreement. This happens as follows: first the binding plans (Planning Permission in 
England, Joint Development Programme in Valencia), including the contributions 
and deadlines, are approved, but only provisionally, following extensive procedures. 
The municipality then openly conditions the definite approval of these binding plans 
to an agreement that secures these contributions and deadlines. When the agree­
ment is sealed, the municipality, without the need of further procedures, approves 
the documents definitely. If such an agreement is not reached, the binding plans 
never come in force. Of the nine studied countries, only Italy seems to show similar 
features to Valencia and England (for an international comparison, see section 4.2.3). 
This clear and open conditioning seems to have improved the capturing of value 
increase, and specially the speed of plan implementation. In Valencia this was very 
clear: the generalization of this statutory power since 1994 has significantly acceler­
ated urban development.
In practice, Dutch municipalities often condition the Land use plan and departures 
from it to securing contributions. However, there is no formal possibility of doing 
so in an open and straightforward way, which we think might have a negative influ­
ence: 1) because in the Netherlands, after an agreement has been reached, the Land 
use plan must follow an extensive procedure (including public participation), which 
means that there is the risk that the plan becomes annulled or seriously modified; 2) 
it implies the risk of the developer appealing to the courts because of an improper 
use of statutory powers; and 3) it makes it very difficult for the municipality to follow 
an open and transparent public discourse, because an open conditioning might be 
illegal (see section 7.4.3.1).
The consequences for the 2nd hypothesis
This finding can be used to refine the 2nd hypothesis (in black letters the addition):
Creating uncertainty in early stages of development processes about future build­
ing possibilities, and certainty about future contributions (specially if it is possible to 
include the contributions as obligatory in legally binding rules, and if  it is possible 
openly and straightforwardly to make the approval o f these rules conditional on 
a development agreement that secures the contributions) can influence capturing 
value increase in a positive way.
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8.4 Modulating property rights
Section 2.2 handled the recent debate in the Netherlands and Spain about the pos­
sibility of splitting development rights from land ownership. An exploratory study 
in section 4.4 of these and another seven Western European countries (England, 
Germany, France, Italy, Flanders, Denmark and Sweden) showed that none of them 
could split property rights in that way, so there were no possibilities of doing empiri­
cal research on this. However, the exploratory study also showed the singularity of 
a modification in 1994 of the land readjustment regulation in the Spanish region of 
Valencia, which could be considered as a light form of splitting. Thanks to this modi­
fied land readjustment regulation, infrastructure provision there is separated from 
property rights. Actually, the Valencian 1994's novelty turned out to be the result of 
this very same debate about splitting development rights from land ownership.
Summary o f the findings and the results of testing the I st hypothesis
These preliminary findings inspired the first hypothesis in this research, which was 
about the effects of modifying the formal rules on property rights in land (such as the 
Valencian land readjustment does) on the capturing of value increase:
A specific form o f splitting the property rights in land (separating infrastructure provi­
sion from property rights) can modify the power-relationships in the network o f actors 
involved in urban regeneration, and this can improve capturing value increase.
The findings of the in-depth research in Valencia, England and the Netherlands con­
firm the hypothesis. The definition of property rights in England and the Netherlands, 
which do not have a land readjustment regulation for urban areas, seems to affect 
the capturing of value increase in a negative way. There is a strong interdependency 
of local authorities and landowners: authorities have the statutory powers over plan­
ning consent, but landowners have the financial means and the exclusive right to 
develop the land. This interdependency gives to the landowners the option to wait, 
which it is often used to combat local authorities' requirements, and leads frequently 
to delaying development processes. In addition, the findings suggest that interde­
pendency leads to an inefficient and sluggish development process, in which costs 
are unnecessary high and different actors manage to appropriate part of the value 
increase, this all leading to higher land development costs such as the costs made in 
preparing plans and negotiating the terms of development. High land development 
costs seem to form an important obstacle for capturing value increase, especially in 
the Netherlands.
These findings suggest some interesting conclusions for the theoretical debate and re­
flections set out in section 2.2. First, however, let us look at the findings in more detail.
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Who owns development rights?
We must here differentiate between the right to the economic value that arises from 
rezoning land, and the right to develop the rezoned land. The rightful owner of the 
economic value that arises from the new use possibilities after the binding zoning 
rules have been modified is different in the studied countries. In England, it is the 
public administration that has right to tax this economic value; in Valencia, most of 
the value belongs to the landowner, and public bodies have right to a part of it (but 
not all); and in the Netherlands, the landowner is the rightful owner of the entire 
value (see section 5.3.1 for Valencia, 6.2.1 for England and 7.2.1 for the Nether­
lands). However, what does not vary, not only in those three countries, but also in 
Germany, France, Italy, Flanders, Denmark and Sweden, is that the right to develop 
belongs to the landowner. The landowner is always the only one entitled to build on 
the land, subject to basic compliance with the zoning regulations and upon obtain­
ing the necessary permits. However, in Spain, Germany, France and Sweden, plan­
ning law explicitly refers to the infrastructure provision as something differentiated 
from the rest of the development rights. In those countries, infrastructure provision is 
a "responsibility" or "task" of the public bodies, but not of the landowner or the de­
veloper. In England, the Netherlands, Flanders, Italy and Denmark, there is in the law 
neither an explicit mention of infrastructure provision as a differentiated component 
of development rights, nor of a public priority in this.
Differences in dependence between public and private actors
The answer to the question 'who owns the development rights' was however not 
specific enough for gathering the empirical data. To make it more specific, section
3.3.1 developed a model to analyse the power/dependency relationships between 
the involved actors (municipality, developer, landowners) in each transaction in de­
velopment processes. These transactions are those needed for infrastructure provision 
namely: 1. land purchase and assembling; 2. financing and; 3. land preparation and 
development, and those needed for the building on the serviced plots namely: 4. land 
disposition; 5. construction and; 6. property transfer. Each of these steps implies trans­
actions of some kind: land, money, property, planning consent, etc. Infrastructure 
provision can only take place after resolving at least the first three transactions, and 
the building after resolving the last three transactions. By analysing who has the con­
trol over each of these transactions, it has been possible to discern who has exactly 
which development right, and how this could affect the capturing of value increase.
For an exploratory analysis of the nine Western European countries see section 4.4.2. 
Regarding the in-depth research in England, Valencia and the Netherlands, there 
seem not to be important differences in the position of actors in the transactions 
involved in the building (transactions 4 to 6). However, regarding the infrastructure 
provision (transactions 1 to 3), there are clear differences in the position of public 
and private actors, and these differences lead to different degrees of interdependency. 
It is possible to distinguish between England and the Netherlands on the one side, 
and Valencia on the other. In England and the Netherlands, as a rule, the transactions
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that are needed to gather the land (transaction 1), find the money (transaction 2) and 
provide the infrastructure (transaction 3) are quite dependent on agreement with the 
landowners. This is because none of the actors controls all the needed resources. 
Municipalities have a monopoly on the regulatory powers for approving the binding 
rules, but the landowners/developers control the land and have the investment ca­
pacity. This mutual dependence is very strong: as a rule, in the absence of a voluntary 
agreement, municipalities have no other alternative than to expropriate/buy the land 
and construct the infrastructure, and maybe pay part of the costs with taxes imposed 
afterwards. The only way for the municipality to avoid dependence on the landowner 
is thus through direct organisational and financial public involvement (see Table 23).
Expropriation has not been applied in the studied cases. In Bristol, where the English 
cases come from, expropriation is rarely used, only in exceptional circumstances. For 
example, in cases where there is disagreement with a minority of the landowners and 
the majority of the landowners support a compulsory buy-out of the minority owners' 
share and are willing to pay the associated costs. In the Netherlands expropriation 
is also exceptional and only justified if it is 'necessary' (noodzakelijk in Dutch). As a 
consequence of this, it is often difficult, or even impossible, to expropriate the land 
for urban regeneration.
Table 23. Dependence analysis English, Dutch and Valencian (before 1994) cases.
Dependence because 
of land
Dependence because 
of investment capacity
Dependence 
because of regulatory 
resources
Local public body 
depends on the land­
owner/developer
Dependence.
Developer/Landowner 
owns the land. Depend­
ence is only avoidable 
through compulsory 
purchase, but this is 
only used in exceptional 
circumstances. Expro­
priation is considered 
slow, expensive and 
risky. In the Netherlands 
the 'necessary' criterion 
gives preference to the 
landowners.
Dependence.
The developers were 
able to invest in buying 
the land and developing 
it. Dependence was not 
avoidable because local 
public bodies were not 
willing to invest. Only in 
the Dutch case of Breda 
the municipality was 
ready to assume some 
financial risks.
Landowner/devel­
oper depends on the 
local public body
Dependence.
The public bodies grant 
the required permissions 
(and in the Netherlands 
and Valencia approve 
the Land use Plan). 
Dependence is not 
avoidable.
Table 24. Dependence analysis region of Valencia after 1 994 Planning Act.
Dependence because of land Dependence because of investment and manage­
ment capacity
Dependence because of regulatory resources
Municipality 
depends on the 
landowners
Dependence, avoidable.
Landowners have most of the land. However, 
dependence is avoidable without much difficulty 
because of the possibility of applying compulsory 
land readjustment, if necessary.
No dependence.
There is no municipal dependence on the land­
owners in this matter. The municipality can point 
out a third party, the urbanizing agent, as the one 
who invest and provides the infrastructure.
Landowner 
depends on 
Municipality
Dependence, not avoidable.
Landowners cannot develop without being select­
ed as urbanizing agent or without the municipality 
selecting a third party as urb. agent.
Also, the municipality approves the binding rules. 
Dependence is not avoidable.
Municipality 
depends on 
urbanizing agent
No dependence.
There is no municipal dependence on the urbaniz­
ing agent in this matter. The municipality can point 
out in a public tender another party as urbanizing 
agent, or select right away a public company as 
urbanizing agent.
Urbanizing agent 
depends on 
Municipality
Dependence, not avoidable.
Urbanizing agents cannot provide the infrastruc­
ture without being selected as urbanizing agent. 
Also, the municipality approves the relevant bind­
ing rules. Dependence is not avoidable.
Landowner 
depends on 
Urbanizing agent
Dependence, avoidable.
Landowners cannot invest without the urbanizing 
agent. Dependence is avoidable since landowners 
may submit an own plan to the public tender and 
became themselves urbanizing agent.
Urbanizing agent 
depends on land­
owner
Dependence, avoidable.
Landowners control the land. However, depend­
ence is avoidable because of the possibility of ap­
plying compulsory land readjustment, if necessary.
No dependence.
There is no dependence on the landowners in this 
matter. If the municipality selects him as urbaniz­
ing agent, he will be able to invest and provide the 
infrastructure, while the landowner is obliged to 
pay the costs. So actually it is not he who is invest­
ing, but the landowners.
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Before the 1994 Act, the situation in Valencian municipalities was very similar to that 
in England and the Netherlands. Even if there was a land readjustment regulation, 
this regulation relied on the support and active collaboration of a majority of the 
landowners, and the only way of forcing readjustment was through a direct public 
organisational involvement.
This changed in 1994. In that year the regional government introduced a new plan­
ning law, and since then there is no more mutual dependence (see Table 24). Valen­
cian municipalities can now opt for compulsory land readjustment, without having 
to become directly involved. The municipality selects in a public tender the urbanis­
ing agent, who may be a public company, the landowners themselves joining in a 
company, but most of the time the agent is a commercial developer. Landowners 
can choose for voluntary expropriation or can participate in the development. If they 
choose expropriation, the urbanising agent pays the compensation and acquires the 
land. If they participate, the landowners have to deliver the land needed for public in­
frastructure and pay to the urbanising agent a proportional share of the land develop­
ment costs (which consist mainly of the infrastructure provision costs). In exchange, 
landowners share the economic value increase: after providing the infrastructure, the 
urbanising agent delivers the serviced building parcels to the landowners and trans­
fers the public infrastructure, free of charge, to the municipality. In sum, although 
landowners still control land, municipalities can now avoid being dependent on the 
landowners, as municipalities can appoint a third party (who does not need to own 
the land) as the urbanising agent, and as municipalities do not need to get directly 
financially involved. Also, the municipalities are not dependent on one particular 
urbanising agent, for this agent can be selected through a public tender.
Option to wait is negative for capturing the value increase
One important consequence of mutual dependence is the option to wait. On the one 
hand, in Valencia after 1994, because there is no mutual dependence, landowners 
do not have the option to wait. On the other hand, in the English and Dutch cases, 
due to the mutual dependence, landowners/developers had the option of waiting. 
Waiting might be a preferred behaviour as land also has an option value that can be 
profitable. When landowners are allowed to wait, it might take some time to reach 
an agreement with all the landowners about the price for the land, for the landown­
ers expect that by delaying negotiations, their profits (the accounted land costs, see 
financial analysis in section 2.4.3) could increase in the future.
In the studied English and Dutch cases, public bodies were often confronted with 
landowners who were not willing to agree with the required contributions package. 
Often public bodies were forced to lower this package in order to reach agreement. 
Also, in several cases in both countries, development processes were delayed after 
developers refused to accept the requirements and plans of the municipality, and ne­
gotiations about these issues dragged on. In two Dutch cases, the developer decided 
to prepare the plans anew, although they were already very advanced, and this de-
290 Conclusions
layed significantly. It is no exception in the Netherlands and also in England, that ur­
ban regeneration is delayed due to landowners using their option to wait. For exam­
ple, in the English case Harbourside, in the city of Bristol, the developer was against 
the requirement of constructing 30% social/affordable housing, finally accepting a 
9%  requirement. A Dutch example is Kop van Oost, in the city of Groningen. Here, 
from the beginning of negotiations, the developer argued that there was little finan­
cial room in the project, thus making it clear to the municipality that there were not 
many value-capturing possibilities. The municipality, which did not have access to 
the financial calculations of the developer, seems in the early stages to have accepted 
that it could not ask for large contributions. Also, the municipality accepted several 
cost saving changes in the quality of the public space constructed by the developer.
Similarly, Valencian municipalities were confronted before 1994 with landowners 
who were not willing to agree with municipal requirements. This affected the captur­
ing of value increase, forcing municipalities to lower the contributions package in or­
der to reach an agreement, this producing irregular, unsystematic and illogical (from 
an urban planning point of view) urban growth, distinguished by low quality and 
scarce public infrastructure. Development sites were too narrow and too small, just 
large enough to provide infrastructure for several plots. Building schemes included 
only the bare minimum of public infrastructure. Most of the time, readjustment fol­
lowed very much the wish of landowners to receive serviced building plots on their 
former property. Instead of following a plan for the most suitable parcelling, readjust­
ment followed the landowners' property boundaries and interests. The urban periph­
ery in the City of Valencia at the end of the 1980's, which is still visible nowadays, is 
a good example. There were large buildings in the middle of deteriorated agricultural 
land and no adequate public infrastructure to support them.
The introduction of the 1994 Valencian Act has had large consequences in practice. 
Nowadays there is no mutual dependence and landowners do not have the option to 
wait. Although compulsory readjustment is not common, it does play an important 
role in dissuading landowners from taking actions that may delay development. Ac­
cording to available data, the 1994 Act had a positive effect on capturing the increased 
value. The regulation broke through the previous pattern of landowners dragging their 
feet, not agreeing to infrastructure provision and speculating on improved market con­
ditions. When a developer submits a proposal and the municipality approves it, land­
owners must follow suit. The consequence was an extraordinary increase in public 
and in private initiatives that resulted in accelerated urban development. The improve­
ment has been both in the quantity and the quality of public infrastructure.
The Valencian cases confirm this general conclusion. For example, in Guillem de 
Anglesola, in the city of Valencia, neither the initiating party nor the other three de­
velopers who in the public tender submitted alternative plans, were linked to the 
landownership in the area. The possibility of selecting a developer without land has 
been a crucial factor. As there were hundreds of owners (many of them residents or
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small landlords), it seems very unlikely that all these actors would have agreed on a 
voluntary land readjustment. Therefore, the option to 'by-pass' the landowners has 
been a crucial factor in redeveloping the site. The landowners and the developer had 
to accept the full contributions package, including additional compensation to the 
owners of the old deteriorated houses.
Financial feasibility as an explanation of the popularity o f the option to wait
There might be at least two different possible motivations for landowners and de­
velopers in England and the Netherlands to choose the option to wait. First, there is 
the expectation that longer negotiations lead to higher profits (in the form of higher 
accounted land costs, or higher regular profit margins, or a higher Final profit, see 
financial analysis in section 2.4.3), due to housing prices increase over time and/or 
reduced contributions. Second, it is possible that municipal requirements endanger 
the financial feasibility of the operation. According to a representative of a British 
housing developers' umbrella organisation, about half of negotiations in the UK fail 
because Local Planning Authorities demand inappropriately large contribution pack­
ages (Whitacker, interview 2007). Public officers in the studied English cases argued 
the contrary and confirmed that contribution packages took into consideration the 
financial feasibility. An interviewed representative of the Dutch developers' umbrella 
organisation had a similar argument, when he claimed that development is often 
delayed because of unreasonably high municipal requirements (Fokkema, interview 
2007).
We can discuss this in terms of several third variables in the causal model set out 
in section 2.4.2: the real estate markets and the plan and site features determine 
how much are the costs (variables A1 and A2), and also relevant is how much and 
how good are the public infrastructure and facilities which public bodies pursue, 
and how high are the contributions that public bodies expect from landowners and 
developers (variable C1). Indirectly the context variables are also relevant that influ­
ence the distribution of the initial profit (variables B): they are relevant because they 
influence the actions of those directly involved in the project (variables D). Table 25 
summarizes which are de costs, returns and the final balance of regenerating a site. 
Section 2.4.3 provides more explanation, and Annexes 3, 4 and 6 give the data for 
the studied cases.
Third variables A, B1 and B2 and the actions of those involved in the project (vari­
ables D1.1, D2.1, and probably also D4 and D5), together with variable C1 influ­
ence the costs that must be made to redevelop a site: the accounted land costs, the 
infrastructure provision costs, the plan preparation costs, the soil decontamination 
costs, the compensation costs and the size of the contributions that must be paid/ 
implemented (costs postings 1-6). In turn, these costs influence the distribution of the 
Initial profit, which in turn influences the size of the Final profit and thus whether the 
landowner/developer is able or not to contribute. It was difficult to empirically assess 
in the studied cases the size of the Final profit because of the lack of reliable sources.
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Table 25. Costs, returns and balance of operations in urban regeneration.
1) Land costs 1a. Minimum land costs: the market value of the land in its current use; 
1b. Accounted land costs: the land price that the developer includes into 
the calculations.
2) Infrastructure provi­
sion costs
This includes not only the infrastructure provision works, but also reserved 
amounts for unexpected expenses, the overhead costs, eventual 'hidden' 
profit margins of the developer, etc. In the Netherlands, they comprise: 
Slopen, bouw  en woonrijp maken, risico en onvoorzien. It should also 
include the financial costs.
3) Plan preparation 
costs
This includes the costs of the preparation of plans, studies, etc (Plankosten, 
or Voorbereiding, toezicht en planontwikkeling).
4) Soil decontamina­
tion costs
This includes the costs of decontaminating the land.
5) Compensation costs This includes compensation to existing owners and inhabitants, for removal 
of activities and residence, demolition of constructions and buildings, etc.
6) Additional contribu­
tions of the devel­
oper
This includes the contributions, in cash or in kind (constructions, build­
ings) to public goals (payments, construction of public infrastructure or 
public buildings, etc) additional to his contributions to the on-site infra­
structure provision costs (even if they might serve a wider area than the 
development in question), which are already included in (2).
7) Real estate develop­
ment costs
This includes the whole development of the real estate, thus not only the 
building costs, but also the preparation of plans (not for providing the 
infrastructure but for the building), overhead costs, possible 'hidden' profit 
margins of the developer, etc.
8) Total returns This includes the total returns accruing from the selling of the real estate 
(office, dwellings, etc).
IN IT IA L PROFIT The value increase that accrued from the regeneration of the site and 
could have been initially available to pay public infrastructure and facili­
ties: 8 - [ (1a + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7)not-inflated - (those costs of 2-7 subsi­
dised by public bodies) ]. Here we assume costs 1 till 7 are not inflated.
DEVELO PER'S FINAL 
PROFIT
The profits of the final developer: 8 - [ (1b + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7) - 
(those costs of 2-7 subsidised by public bodies) ]. This profit must be 
added to a regular profit margin in case the final developer has included a 
regular profit in posting 7.
Information about development costs and profits is a sensitive matter, and develop­
ers were not willing to disclose it. In the Dutch cases, according to estimates based 
on information given by developers, the financial margins appear to be very narrow. 
However, according to my own estimates (posting 9 in Annex 4) there was room for 
higher contributions. For example, according to the developer, in Kop van Oost his 
Final profit was very narrow, €2m. However, my own estimates suggest that it may be 
much larger, around €29m (see section 2.4.3 for a detailed analysis of case Kop van 
Oost). If this was the case, then clearly the developer's objections to the municipal­
ity's requirements were not justifiable from a financial point of view. In sum, in the 
Dutch cases it is not clear if the Final profit of the last involved developer were so nar­
row that opposition against the municipal requirements was justified. The question is 
thus: did developers use the option to wait because land development costs were too
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high, or did they abuse this option in order to increase their profit margins? And: how 
does it comes that in the Valencian cases, despite the fact that contributions were 
very large, the financial feasibility of the operations was not a problem?
In the English cases, following our own estimates, the Final profit margins were bigger 
and allowed for greater contributions (see posting 9 in table in Annex 3). Resistance 
or acceptance of the requirements was based more on the expected land price (how 
much the initial landowner or the developer who bought the land expect to receive 
for his/her land, which translates into the accounted land costs of an operation, i.e. 
cost posting 1b of Table 25) and the expected profit (how much the developer expects 
to profit, i.e. a possible regular profit margin + Final profit) than on the objective fi­
nancial feasibility of the project. For example, in Megabowl, in the city of Bristol, the 
initial price of the land was relatively low, about 3-4.5 € million2, due to uncertainty 
regarding building possibilities, which had discouraged developers from purchasing 
the site in the previous years, and to a heavy competition from other bowling alleys 
in the city. This gave the owner-applicant leeway to contribute more than usual.
Differences in infrastructure provision and plan preparation costs
When analyzing the financial aspects of the cases, this research provided remarkable 
and unexpected findings that helped to answer the above question. We discovered 
large differences in the costs of infrastructure provision and plan preparation in the 
three studied countries (postings 2 and 3). These costs are the highest in the Dutch 
cases, when compared with those in the English and Valencian cases (for details see 
Annex 6, for summary see Table 26): both costs together are in Kruidenbuurt and 
Kop van Oost respectively €438 and €368 per m2 for new public space, and respec­
tively €158 and €148 per m2 total redeveloped land3; in Stationskwartier these costs 
are much higher, €1,212/m2 new public space and €570/m2 total redeveloped land, 
which might be explained by the fact that this figure includes the accounted land 
costs, soil decontamination, compensation costs (postings 1, 4 and 5) and probably 
contains a hidden profit for the municipality. In the English cases the two costs of 
infrastructure provision and plan preparation together are €153/€99, €269/€111 and 
€332/€166 per m2 new public space/total redeveloped land. In the Valencian cases, 
those two costs together are €94/€70, €693/€306, €103/€79 and €94/€744.
2 Calculated at an exchange rate of € 1.5 per £ 1.
3 In our opinion, the most appropriate way of measuring these costs and comparing them with other 
cases is relating costs to the 'new public space', which is the surface that becomes redeveloped and 
will be used for public uses. Most of these costs relate to the construction of public infrastructure 
above or under this surface. It can be expected that a case with more public space will have more of 
these costs than a case that includes less public space. By comparing costs per m2 new public space 
the risk diminishes that a case with little public space scores similarly to a case that includes a larger 
area of public space.
4 The figure for the second case is not representative for the entire Valencian region, but the other 
three cases are (Fernández & Fernández, 2002: 68-74; Gascó, 2006: 72-76; Raga, interview in 
2008).
Table 26. Comparison development costs in the Dutch, English and Valencian cases.
Dutch cases Three additional Dutch 
cases, expert opinion
English cases Valencian cases
Kruid KvO Stati5 / 2 3 Mega6 Temp Harb Cuill Period Cam in Benal
2. Infrastructure 
provision costs
€/m2 new 
public space 438 368 1212 249 222 94 153 269 332 77 418 85 75
€/m2 total 
redeveloped land 158 148 570 164 107 67 99 111 1 66 57 187 65 59
3. Plan
preparation
costs
€7m2 new 
public space Plan preparation costs are 
included in Infrastructure 
provision costs
102 61 24 Plan preparation costs are 
included in Infrastructure 
provision costs
17 269 18 19
€7m2 total 
redeveloped land 67 29 17 13 119 14 15
5 Includes Accounted land, soil decontamination and compensation costs.
6 Includes Soil decontamination and compensation costs.
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Two Dutch experts confirmed the generalisability of the figures from the Dutch cases 
to other Dutch regeneration projects, with nuances, by analysing three recent urban 
regeneration cases initiated by housing associations (projects 1, 2 and 3 in Table 
26 and Annex 6)7. Infrastructure provision and plan preparation costs were together 
€352/€231 in Project 1 and €283/€136 in Project 2. Such figures are not at all excep­
tional in urban regeneration in the Netherlands. Project 3 (€118/€84) is an exception 
to the general conclusion that these costs are much higher in the Netherlands than in 
Valencia. Also, the figures of Projects 1 and 2 suggest that it is not clear whether these 
costs are, on average, higher in the Netherlands than in England (Stauttener and Van 
Bladel, interviews 2008).
Option to wait has inflationary effects on infrastructure provision and plan 
preparation costs
A possible explanation for the high cost of infrastructure provision and plan prepara­
tion costs in England and the Netherlands is that the option to wait has an inflationary 
effect on these costs:
• Delay results in additional studies, meetings, etc, increasing the plan preparation 
costs. In the Dutch Projects 1 and 2, plan preparation costs are €102/€67 and 
€61/29 respectively, in the Valencian cases they are about €18/€14. Unfortu­
nately, it was not possible to specify these costs for the other Dutch and English 
cases;
• Delay and the corresponding uncertainties increase the risks, which translate 
into higher infrastructure provision costs, e.g. allocating higher reserves for un­
expected expenses (risico en onvoorzien in Dutch), and generating higher finan­
cial costs.
7 A possible criticism to the validity of the data of the second-opinion projects is that they might be 
not representative of the total population of urban regeneration projects because of the fact that 
they are initiated by housing associations and not by commercial developers. The argument is that 
housing associations pursue more quality of the public infrastructure and facilities, thus the figures 
should not be compared with cases ruled by commercial developers. I reject this criticism with three 
arguments:
• The three second-opinion projects are used to measure the infrastructure provision and plan 
preparation costs (cost postings 2 and 3 in Table 25), but not to measure the final quantity and 
quality of public infrastructure and facilities;
• The available data of the three second-opinion projects (e.g. the percentage new public space of 
the total redeveloped land) do not induce me to think that they might include much more or less 
public infrastructure and facilities than cases initiated by commercial developers. Thus there is 
in my opinion no reason to think that in the second-opinion projects the infrastructure provision 
and plan preparation costs are higher because the housing associations might have built more 
public infrastructure and facilities. Case Kruidenbuurt (initiated by a a housing association) 
showed also no significant differences with the other three Dutch cases (initiated by commercial 
developers);
• There might indeed be in the second-opinion projects large differences regarding the building of 
social housing and buildings meant for public facilities. I.e. housing associations might indeed 
build more social housing and buildings for public facilities than commercial developers do, 
as the Dutch cases show. However, this does not invalidate my comparison of infrastructure 
provision and plan preparation costs because the costs of social housing and buildings for public 
facilities are not included there, but most probably in cost postings 6 or 7 of Table 25.
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In short, it is possible not only that high costs explain why developers use their option 
to wait and cause delay, but also that delay can increase the costs. However, it does 
not seem reasonable to conclude that delay can explain all the differences between 
the infrastructure provision and plan preparation costs in the Dutch (between €118 
and €438 per m2 for new public space, and between €84 and €231 per m2 total 
redeveloped land) and the Valencian cases (between €94 and €103 per m2 for new 
public space, and between €70 and €79 per m2 total redeveloped land). There might 
be many other variables that can explain part of the differences. The complexity of 
causalities has been set out in the causal model in section 2.4.2. For example differ­
ences in labour costs in the building sector (that might be about 30% higher in the 
Netherlands than in Valencia), in construction materials, in fiscal regime (variables 
belonging to sort A3 in causal model) and conditions of the soil (variable A2) (Staut­
tener en Van Bladel, interviews 2008). It is plausible to conclude that the option to 
wait can explain part of the differences in the infrastructure provision and plan prepa­
ration costs, but that there are other, third variables that can also be relevant.
Option to wait might have inflationary effects on the accounted land costs
In addition, the option to wait can also have an inflationary effect on land prices; 
since market parties owning the land can exercise the option to wait, and this puts 
them in a strong negotiation position, they would be more interested in acquiring 
land, which in turn increases the price of real and expected transactions in the land 
markets. This expectation of higher land prices can have the effect of rising the land 
price that the developer includes in the financial calculations of the operation, i.e. 
the accounted land costs. It seems plausible that the accounted land costs are based 
on the economic value of the new use possibilities of the land after regeneration, 
instead of the previous use possibilities. The findings in the Dutch cases seem to sup­
port this argument: land was often sold for higher prices than the market price in the 
former use. In De Funen the landowner sold his land to the developer in 1997 for a 
price certainly much higher that the value of the actual use possibilities at that time. 
In Kop van Oost the estimated market value of the previous use (industrial land) was 
about €3.6m. However, this land was then sold speculatively in 2000, 2001 and in 
2002. We know that in 2001 it was sold for around €12m, so when it was sold again 
in 2002 the price must have been even higher. Higher accounted land costs influence 
the final profit of developers, diminishing their possibilities of contributing.
The option to wait reinforces the effects of the certainty about future building 
and contributions and vice versa
The effects of the option to wait might reinforce and be reinforced by another vari­
able: the certainty about future building possibilities and future contributions (varia­
bles of the sort B2 and D1 in causal model explained in section 2.4.2, also explained 
above in section 8.1). This can happen in two ways:
• The first landowner, if he has the power to wait, if there is certainty in early stages 
about the building possibilities, and if there is no certainty about the contribu­
tions to be made, asks a higher price for his land;
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• The developer, if he has the power to wait, and if there is no certainty in early 
stages about the contributions to be made, might choose the price of the land 
that he accounts in the financial calculation, and his regular profit margin, to 
appropriate as much value increase as possible. At the start of regeneration proc­
esses, developers often have some room to set them higher or lower. Once the 
accounted land cost and the regular profit margin have been established, lower­
ing them is usually complicated.
Need of further research to land prices and development costs
The availability of reliable information in the studied cases was low, which did not 
allow us to collect important details about the land prices and development costs. 
For example, it was not possible to discern to which degree other sorts of costs such 
as labour costs in the building sector, in construction materials, in fiscal regime (vari­
ables belonging to sort A3 in causal model) and conditions of the soil (variable A2) 
contribute to the higher infrastructure provision costs in England and the Nether­
lands. Another example is that it was not possible to discern whether the developer 
has indeed inflated the price of the land, or whether he included in the infrastructure 
provision costs a 'hidden' profit margin. Further research should focus on the differ­
ences in land prices, infrastructure provision costs and plan preparation costs and 
provide more data that could be used to fine-tune the conclusions of this research.
Conclusions for the theoretical debate and reflections about property rights
This research sought empirical evidence relevant to the debate and the theoretical re­
flections about separating development rights from property rights in land. The find­
ings support the assumption that a specific form of shaping property rights, the Valen­
cian land readjustment regulation, which separates infrastructure provision from the 
control of landowners, can improve the capturing of value increase. In addition, the 
findings strongly suggest that in urban regeneration the regulation has a deflationary 
effect on the costs for providing infrastructure and preparing plans, and possibly also 
on the accounted land costs.
This supports the idea that property law in relation to the goal of producing urban 
space and housing is not only a matter of rights; it also involves obligations. The 
adoption of a combined approach to property rights and duties, through a land re­
adjustment regulation, may help regulate the initiatives taken by landowners and 
commercial developers in such a way that they fulfil a greater role in the creation 
of public infrastructure. It can also help to overcome problems of stagnation in con­
structing new housing. Here I agree with the advocated role of land readjustment 
regulations as an alternative to problems with the traditional forms of land assembly 
(voluntary exchange or public intervention in the form of expropriation) in the UK 
and the United States of America (Hong & Needham, 2007: xv-xix), while at the 
same time the shortcomings of land readjustment regulations should not be forgotten, 
if they do not include enforcement mechanisms to avoid the speculative behaviour of 
landowners (Muñoz & Korthals Altes, 2007).
298 Conclusions
The findings are interesting for the Dutch debate. First, they coincide with the posi­
tion taken by Priemus and Louw, who argue that the increase in private control of the 
land since the 1990s has led to inflation in accounted land costs and impoverishment 
of public infrastructure (2003). A second topic is the dilemma whether Dutch mu­
nicipalities can or cannot satisfactorily achieve their public goals within the current 
legal framework. In this discussion, the concept 'satisfactorily' has not been clearly 
defined; therefore, it is not possible to say whether the definition of property rights in 
land in the Netherlands results in "satisfactorily accomplished" public goals. How­
ever, it is possible to conclude that shaping property rights using a land readjustment 
regulation can significantly improve the capturing of value increase and accelerate 
urban development. That is, it can help to better achieve public goals, because pub­
lic goals usually concern either the finance of public infrastructure and facilities, or 
the implementation on time of building schemes, or both. Section 9.4 gives specific 
recommendations to Dutch public bodies of how to improve the capturing of value 
increase.
For the Spanish debate, the findings support the critical approach of García-Bellido 
and others in the 1990s. In a context of privately owned land and the absence of 
public subsidies and of direct public intervention in urban land markets, breaking 
the monopolistic/oligopolistic position of landowners is the only way to assure good 
quality and adequate quantity of public infrastructure and facilities.


&<
recommendations for 
the Netherlands
One of the goals of this research is to learn how to use formal rules relevant to zon­
ing in order to improve cost recovery in the Netherlands. Chapters 5 to 7 made clear 
that formal rules relevant to zoning in the Spanish region of Valencia and in England 
differ significantly from those in the Netherlands. A comparison between how much 
value increase public bodies manage to capture also shows remarkable differences: 
in Valencia and England, private parties are more committed in urban regeneration 
on private owned land to financing and/or realizing unprofitable elements (i.e. the 
public infrastructure and facilities) than in the Netherlands. This affects not only the 
variety of sorts of contributions, but also the total economic value of the contribu­
tions.
More captured value increase in Valencia and England than in the Netherlands
The differences mainly involve (see Table 27; for details per country see section 5.6 
for Valencia, 6.5 for England, and 7.5 for the Netherlands):
- On-site infrastructure provision costs: in England and Valencia these are mostly 
or fully paid by the developers, while in the Netherlands these are financed with 
large public subsidies;
- Land for on-site public infrastructure: in Valencia this is provided free of charge 
by the landowners, while in England and the Netherlands there are much larger 
public contributions for providing this land;
- Social housing: in England and Valencia, this is paid to a large extent or almost 
fully by the developers, while in the Netherlands this is covered primarily by 
municipalities and housing associations;
- Off-site public infrastructure: in England and Valencia, developers contribute 
significantly (in England primarily with financial means while in Valencia pri­
marily with land). On the other hand, in the Netherlands these contributions are
rare;
Table 27. Comparing captured value increase in the Spanish region ofValencia, England and the Netherlands
On-site land 
development costs
Land for on-site 
public infrastructure
Land for on-site 
public buildings
On-site public buildings Affordable housing Contributions to 
off-site public infra­
structure &  facilities
Creaming of plus 
value
Developer Public body Developer Public body Developer Public body Developer Public body Developer Public bodies
Spanish region 
of Valencia
All or almost 
all these 
costs
No
(only if receiv­
ing building 
plots)
Almost all 
the land
Land that 
already was 
public infra­
structure
Almost all 
the land
Land that 
al ready was 
public infra­
structure
Sometimes Almost
always
Almost all Some minor 
object sub­
sidies
Landowners cede sig­
nificant quantities of 
land, and sometimes 
pay for construction.
10% build­
ing volume in 
developable land; 
often money
England Almost all 
the costs
Indirect 
through land/ 
cheap 
financing
Most of 
the land
Part of the 
land
Part of 
the land
Part of 
the land
Not often Almost
always
Increasing 
amount of 
affordable / 
social housing
Partly Important contribu- In principle, no. 
tions, that increase in 
the final years.
The
Netherlands
Part of the 
costs
Heavy
subsidies
Important 
part of 
the land
Important 
part of the 
land
Commercial 
developer 
none; hous­
ing associa­
tion possibly
Public body 
provides most 
of the land
Commercial 
developer 
none; housing 
association 
contributions
Almost
always
Commercial 
developers 
do not build; 
housing asso­
ciations do
Sometimes Almost no contribu­
tions by developers to 
public infrastructure/ 
facilities outside plan 
area, and modest con­
tribution to infra./fac. 
situated within but 
serving wider area.
none
Grey: Country in which the developer/landowner contributes the most out of the three countries.
Light Grey: Country in which the developer/landowner contributes the second out of the three countries. 
White: Country in which the developer/landowner contributes the least out of the three countries.
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- Creaming off plus value: local public bodies in Valencia cream off a significant 
share of the increase in economic value, even if they own no land. In England 
this does not officially take place, but because of the broad definition of develop­
ers' contributions one might conclude that it does take place; in the Netherlands 
this is the case only when the municipality owns the land and/or invests and 
shares the risk.
Correlation with formal rules relevant to zoning
We concluded in chapter 8 that, when comparing the three countries, there is a strong 
correlation between the captured value increase (the highest in Valencia, lower but 
also high in England, and lowest in the Netherlands) and the possibilities offered by 
the formal rules relevant to zoning: 1) In England and Valencia, the level of certainty 
about future contributions is higher than in the Netherlands (before negotiations start 
and developers buy the land); 2) In England and Valencia, binding rules can include 
more prescriptions than in the Netherlands; 3) In England and Valencia, it is formally 
possible to directly condition the approval of binding rules on the developer secur­
ing contributions, while the legal framework in the Netherlands does not provide 
this possibility; 4) In Valencia, municipalities can avoid dependency on developers 
and landowners thanks to a land readjustment regulation, while in England and the 
Netherlands there is no such possibility.
It is also apparent that this is not a perfect correlation: there are other variables that 
might also explain part of the differences in the captured value increase. One such 
relevant variable is the market price of real estate. This is a context variable of the sort 
A1 described in the causal model (see section 2.4.2). When the data was gathered, 
housing prices in the English cases were significantly higher (€ 3,000-5,000 per m2 
floor space and even more) than prices in the Valencian and Dutch cases (about € 
2,000-3,000 per m2). This could partly explain why English developers offered more 
generous contributions than their Dutch counterparts, but not why Valencian devel­
opers, despite similar market prices with the Netherlands, still contributed somewhat 
more than the English and much more than the Dutch. Other variables that can also 
explain part of the differences in captured value increase are the plan and site fea­
tures (variable of the sort A1), the markets of workforce and building materials, and 
fiscal regimes (variable A3), the definition of the contents and geographical scope of 
the plan (variable C1), and specific circumstances of the involved interactions and 
persons (variables D4 and D5).
Recommendations for the Dutch urban regeneration practice
We saw when describing the research problem for this thesis (section 1.5) that Dutch 
municipalities usually have high ambitions for their public regeneration schemes, 
but, in those cases in which the land is not in public hands, the difficulties in financ­
ing the unprofitable parts (i.e. the public infrastructure and facilities) hamper the 
actual realization of these ambitions and lead to high public subsidies. The findings 
in this research strongly suggest that this is caused by the fact that in the Netherlands
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the increased value that accrues from regenerating a site often 'leaks out'. It might 
be that developers profit from this, taking possession of an important part of the 
value increase, or it might be, optionally or additionally, that the profit margin leaks 
to landowners and to unreasonable development costs. Whatever the reason, it is a 
fact that Dutch developers do not contribute as much as their English and Valencian 
counterparts. It is also clear that this situation in the Netherlands can be explained, to 
a large extent, by the differences in the formal rules relevant to zoning.
I do not assert that urban regeneration in the Netherlands always generates enough 
value increase to pay all the unprofitable parts. Rather, the claim is that, whatever the 
value increase, often it is not available to pay the unprofitable parts. In order to assess 
the magnitude of the problem, and despite the lack of information, I estimated the 
financial structure of the cases and I concluded that an important part of the value 
increase has leaked out. For example, in case Kop van Oost the initial profit of the 
operation (i.e. the profit taking into account a non-speculative land price and reason­
able, non-inflated infrastructure provision and plan preparation costs) could have 
been between € 16 and € 43 million. This money has leaked out into speculative 
land prices (at least € 8.4 million), probably also into inflated infrastructure provision 
and plan preparation costs (about € 5 million), and also into a possible large profit for 
the developer. These leakages left no room for contributions by the developer to the 
public infrastructure and facilities and thus created the need for public subsidisation. 
See Table 4 in section 2.4.3 for more details of case Kop van Oost, and Annexes 4 
and 6 for details for the other Dutch cases.
It follows that, if it is desired to improve cost recovery in the Netherlands, this could 
be achieved by changing aspects of the formal rules relevant to planning. The rest of 
this chapter focuses on those rules that allow Valencian and English public bodies 
to improve the capturing of value increase, and investigates whether and how they 
could be introduced into Dutch practice.
The recommendations seek to answer the main research question, which is the same 
as solving the problem addressed by this research, namely: how to improve cost re­
covery in the Netherlands, by stimulating those parties that profit from development 
to finance the unprofitable parts. Some of these proposed recommendations do not 
require legal modifications of Dutch planning law while others do require. This is 
almost the same as distinguishing between recommendations implementable in the 
short and in the long term. In addition, a fictitious example of an urban regenera­
tion scheme has been used to illustrate the recommendations: Urban Regeneration 
in Sturingerland. The example has been inspired by the example used in Vrom et al. 
(2008) to illustrate the workings of the new Physical Planning Act, introduced on the 
1st of July 2008. My example is the regeneration of an old deteriorated urban area, 
which has buildings and streets and is divided into four parcels A-D (see Figure 33). In 
the example, the abstract recommendations are made more detailed, adapted to the 
specific circumstances. The example is meant to make the recommendations clearer.
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Structure o f this chapter
When enumerating the relevant rules and the subsequent recommendations for 
Dutch practice, I follow the narrative structure set out in section 3.3.3 and distinguish 
between the following sub-variables:
1. Creating Certainty beforehand about future building possibilities and contribu­
tions;
2. Choosing the contents of the legally binding rules;
3. Making the legally binding rules conditional on the developer securing his con­
tribution;
4. Modulating property rights.
9.1 Creating certainty beforehand about future 
building possibilities and contributions
Summary o f the findings
Here follows a summary of the findings that underpin the recommendations. See sec­
tion 8.1 for more details.
Certainty about future building possibilities
Municipalities in all three countries, in order to improve transparency and account­
ability in their planning decisions, usually create certainty in early stages and in
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different degrees, about what the landowner will be allowed to build. In the Neth­
erlands, municipalities usually approve indicative, not legally binding plans, and 
these indicative plans create some certainty, for example Nota van Uitgangspunten, 
Stedenbouwkundig Plan/Visie, Ontwikkelingsprogramma, Programma van Eisen, 
Masterplan, Structuurplan, Structuurvisie etc. In England something similar is done, 
also through indicative documents; in Valencia this is accomplished through the ap­
proval of legally binding General land use plans that must cover the entire territory 
of the municipality.
However, the findings suggest that more certainty beforehand may result in less value 
capturing. If municipalities prescribe early on in the development process building 
possibilities, it might stimulate land price increases, and municipalities could lose 
a valuable negotiation tool. However, certainty about building possibilities is not 
necessarily disadvantageous if accompanied by certainty about future contributions 
(see below).
Certainty about future contributions
There are large differences in the certainty beforehand about what the landowner 
will have to contribute to public infrastructure and facilities. In Valencia in the early 
stages there is high certainty about future contributions through (1) legally prescribed 
minimum standards, (2) local policy, and (3) the approval of legally binding General 
land use plans. English municipalities usually create some certainty through the ap­
proval of (1) site-specific indicative plans that establish the contributions for the de­
velopment in question, and (2) non site-specific indicative generic policy documents 
that establish standard contributions. In the Netherlands, most of the time there is 
no certainty at all, neither through legally binding nor indicative documents, before 
negotiations take place, or before the price of the land is determined.
This certainty in Valencia and England has influenced the capturing of value increase 
in a positive way because: 1) it has lowered the price of the land, because if there is 
no certainty the developer pays too much for the land and has less financial room 
to contribute; 2) certainty lowers the price at which the developer accounts the land 
in the financial calculation of the operation, and the regular profit margin that the 
developer aims for; (3) certainty gives the public officers a strong policy base to re­
quire contributions, which do not need to be introduced as something new during 
the course of the negotiations.
9.1.1 Short-term recommendations: create Certainty in 
indicative documents
Although creating certainty about future building possibilities might have negative 
consequences for public value capturing, this research does not recommend increas­
ing uncertainty. Such a recommendation would not fit within the trend in planning
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policy that pursues transparency and predictability about future development sites. 
Also, the findings show that the possible negative effects can be compensated by 
creating beforehand certainty about future contributions. Thus, the recommendation 
is that Dutch municipalities, before or together with the preparation of indicative 
plans, should create certainty about which contributions will be required from devel­
opers. The new Structure vision (Structuurvisie) can play a central role in achieving 
this goal. In general, it does not seem that this recommendation would encounter 
significant resistance. The adoption of cost recovery policy documents, of the sort 
set out here, fits well within the traditional autonomy of Dutch municipalities, and 
within the legal framework. The only objection could be that the preparation of such 
documents requires that municipalities better foresee their future needs for public 
infrastructure and facilities. Dutch planning is characterized by being vague, open 
and flexible in early stages of development processes. Municipalities usually specify 
and detail their requirements during the plan process, adapting to the specific cir­
cumstances and needs that arise close to the start of development activities. This is 
not compatible with specifying future contributions in the early stages. The following 
will provide more details regarding the recommendation.
9.1.1.1 Certainty about what
Section 7.2.3 shows the costs that can legally be included in a Development con­
tributions plan (Exploitatieplan) and designates which portion can be charged to the 
landowners. It also shows the costs that can be secured in an anterior Development 
agreement (anterieure overeenkomst) and thus charged to the landowners.
The sorts of costs that can be included in the Development contributions plan are 
listed in the new 2008 Physical Planning Decree, and not all of them can be charged 
to the landowners. This regulatory base itself is, however, not enough for creating 
certainty, as developers need to be able to: 1) accurately calculate in an early stage 
of the process those costs that can be included in a Development contributions plan; 
and 2) which portion they will have to pay in case the municipality approves such 
a plan. Table 28 lists the aspects that municipalities should specify in order to make 
those calculations possible.
However, not all of these costs can be charged to the landowners. Probably only part 
of the costs of refurbishing old existing infrastructure within or in the immediate sur­
roundings (1a) can be charged, the other part not, and anyway the maintenance/ex­
ploitation costs of this infrastructure, whether refurbished or new, cannot be charged 
at all. The construction and maintenance/exploitation costs of social facilities (maat­
schappelijke voorzieningen, 1a) cannot be charged; part of the costs of infrastructure 
serving a wider area (2a) cannot be charged; and probably contributions to other 
schemes (3a) too cannot be charged. The already incurred costs most likely cannot 
be charged. In addition, if the calculated profits do not cover the full costs, the deficit 
cannot be charged to the landowners, regardless whether the costs fulfil all the crite­
ria making landowners liable. In regeneration sites this may be frequently the case,
Table 28. Certainty, to be created by Dutch municipalities about the costs that, in case they finally approve a Development contributions plan,
would be included in this plan
Categories of costs that can be 
included in a Development contri­
butions Plan
Municipalities should create certainty by specifying the following...
1a. Public infrastructure and facili­
ties within or in the immediate sur­
roundings of the development site, 
plus possible damage to surrounding 
property owners.
Outline characterization, location and dimensions of roads, sewerage, parks, public buildings, etc. This is needed in 
case the development site is big. In smaller sites, there is no need of much infrastructure and the infrastructure that is 
needed is easily predictable without the municipality having to prescribe it beforehand. Regarding damage to sur­
rounding property owners, municipalities should make clear that the developer is liable to pay the compensation.
2a. Public infrastructure and facili­
ties serving a wider area (bovenwi- 
jk se  voorzieningen)
Because of the confusion regarding the differences between what the 2008 Act calls bovenwijkse voorzieningen, 
bovenplanse verevening/kosten and ruimtelijke ontwikkelingen (3 and 7, see Linder), it is recommended to include a 
similar argumentation as for 3a, and include that argumentation in a Structure vision.
3a. Contributions to (i) other 
schemes (bovenplanse verevening) 
or to (ii) public infrastructure and 
facilities (bovenplanse kosten), not 
necessarily related in a direct way to 
the development in question.
Argumentation
The location and characterization of the needed investments, and at least an outline indication of the costs. It is also 
necessary to characterize the relation between the investments and the scheme that must contribute. The relationship 
between them must be argued, without necessarily having to prove a direct relationship in terms of the three legal 
criteria of profit (profijt), catisality/attribtitabiIity (toerekenbaarheid) and proportionality (fjroportionaliteit).' In Dutch 
terms, the ruimtelijke en functionele samenhang must be argued. It is enough if it is argued why both are related in 
'planning' terms, i.e. with arguments related to traffic, economic, social issues, etc., but it is not enough just to pre­
scribe that the scheme must contribute. In addition, it must be argued why the investments are in the public interest. 
Also an indication of all the schemes that must contribute should be given.
Contributions can be in kind, a payment for a specific investment, or a payment to a fund. In case of payments to 
a fund,2 the goals for the fund must be prescribed, i.e. where is the money going to be spent. This must be done as 
detailed as possible, but, in case investments are not yet well defined and decided, an outline of not detailed pre­
scriptions might be enough. However, probably it will not be possible to include the contributions in a Development 
contributions plan if the investments: a) are not detailed enough to apply the three legal criteria, or b) have not yet 
been spent before the Development contributions plan becomes definitely closed. The contributions could then only 
be included in an anterior Development agreement (see below). Finally, the criteria must be set out following which 
the projects must contribute to the fund.
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In which document
The 2008 Act prescribes that in order to be included in a Development contributions plan and charged to the land­
owners, this argumentation must be included in a Structure vision. If the contribution is to be agreed in an anterior 
agreement (see below), there is in theory no need to include this argumentation in a Structure vision. However, 
because of the confusion about the differences between bovenwijkse voorzieningen (2), bovenplanse verevening/ko­
sten and ruimtelijke ontwikkelingen (7, see below), it is desirable to include the argumentation in a Structure vision. In 
case of contribution to a fund, the argumentation, no matter how detailed, should be included in the implementation 
paragraph (uitvoeringsparagraaf), to be added to the Vision.
Sources: Vrom et al., 2008: 46-48, 85, 127-128, 153; Zundert, 2008: 472; Baardewijk, 2008: 756-757, 759, 762-763; 
Groot, 2009: 464-465.
4a. Social housing within the plan 
area
Minimum percentage and/or minimum number, and the location, of social rented housing and social housing for sale, 
both in the scheme in question and in a wider area (distribution of social housing between the scheme and all other 
schemes in the area) should be specified. Also, some additional requirements that might have consequences for the 
development costs: for social rented housing, allocation rules (as long as these rules derive their status from housing 
legislation and local regulations) and requirements about the minimum period of social function and maximal rent 
price (e.g. that the landowner must secure in a Development agreement that he/she will maintain the social function 
for at least the first 1 0 years); for social housing for sale, rules for the selection of buyers (as long as these rules derive 
their status from housing legislation and local regulations), anti-speculation rules, and, provided there is a previous 
regional agreement on the matter, the maximum price for sale to individual buyers.
5a. The land needed for all this infra­
structure, also for social services
This is already clear from the above-mentioned.
6. Green/natural areas in the 
development site that will be lost 
(verloren gegane natuurwaarde, 
groenvoorzieningen en watervoor­
zieningen)
a) Location of the green areas that will disappear and qualification of these areas as green area (vegetation or water, 
but not for example agricultural land); b) the necessity and the obligation that the projects that are responsible for the 
loss must compensate it; and c) the location and outline indications of the costs of creating new areas that replace 
the areas lost, in or outside the development site. It is necessary that at least a) and b) are included in any plan of the 
central, provincial, regional or municipal governments (e.g. structure visions or land use plans, Vrom e.a, 2008: 47).
1 In section 1.5 it is said that the goal o f this research is to improve cost recovery, not to make it easier for public bodies to cream off the added value. However, the definition of 
w h ich costs fall under 'cost recovery' is not undisputed. The same public infrastructure can be considered as related to the developm ent by one person, but at the same time as 
going too far by another person. The arguments are on both sizes largely o f a normative/ideological character. Especially contributions o f the sorts 2, 3 and 7 might be the subject 
of discussion.
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partly because the method of calculation of the land costs include the highest pos­
sible price, i.e. a maximal accounted land costs (inbrengwaarde in Dutch) instead of 
the minimum land costs (see section 7.2.3 for more details).
Table 29. Certainty to be created by Dutch municipalities, in addition to the costs listed in Table 28, 
about the costs that they wish to include in an anterior Development agreement.
Categories of costs that can be 
included in anterior agree­
ment
Municipalities should create certainty by specifying the following...
1-5b. Those costs that can be 
included in Development con­
tributions plan but not charged 
to landowners (see section 
7.2.3 for more details)
This is already clear if municipalities make clear that all the costs 
listed above in Table 28, also those that cannot be charged through 
a Development contributions plan, will be charged.
4b. Additional requirements 
for social housing
Requirements that might have consequences for the development 
costs: for rented units e.g. allocation rules even if not derived from 
housing legislation or local regulation, or indications of maximum 
price of the units to be sold to housing associations; for units for 
sale e.g. allocation rules regarding the selection of the buyers even 
if not derived from housing legislation or local regulation, and in 
case of no previous regional agreement on this matter, indications 
of maximum selling prices to buyers.
7. Contributions to 'Spatial 
developments' (ruimtelijke on­
twikkelingen) situated outside 
the development in question. 
The contributions can be for 
construction costs, and maybe 
also for maintenance and 
exploitation costs.
The argumentation should be the same as for contributions to other 
schemes or to public infrastructure and facilities (3). The 2008 Act 
prescribes that the argumentation must be included in a Structure 
vision (Vrom et al., 2008: 46-48).
When instead of approving a Development contributions plan, the municipality 
and the developer achieve an anterior Development agreement, it is possible to re­
cover more costs: 1) it is possible to include the not-covered costs mentioned in 
previous paragraph; 2) and in addition it is possible to include in the agreement 
some other costs that cannot be included in a Development contributions plan. Of 
course, finally there must be enough final profit (i.e. profit available to the developer 
to allow him to contribute more) to pay all the costs, but with an anterior Devel­
opment agreement this is easier. The reason is that in this agreement parties have 
the freedom to agree a higher or lower accounted land price, while in a Develop­
ment contributions plan the accounted land price must be the maximum possible 
(i.e. the price of the use of the land after regeneration). In other words, while in 
a Development contributions plan the accounted land costs must be the value of 
the land after regeneration, in a Development agreement it is possible to agree a 
value that falls more in the neighbourhood of the land use prior to regeneration.
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The recommendation is that municipalities that want to recover more costs should 
focus their strategy on signing an anterior Development agreement with the devel­
oper. The first step is to create certainty about the costs that the municipality wishes 
to include in this agreement. This certainty is necessary to allow developers to accu­
rately calculate the development costs and contributions they have to pay in an early 
stage of the development process. Table 29 lists which aspects municipalities should 
specify in order to make those calculations possible.
EXAMPLE OF URBAN REGENERATION IN STURINGERLAND, Part One
In our fictitious example, the Municipality of Sturingerland has created certainty about 
contributions to the costs. These costs cover both those that can be included in a De­
velopment contributions plan, and in a Development agreement:
1a. Public infrastructure and facilities within or in the immediate surroundings of the 
site (map 1a):
• Roads to be refurbished and a new road to connect to the general road network;
• The sewerage within the plan area, and connection to the general sewerage net­
work;
• A park with a playground for children;
• An estimate of the maintenance/exploitation costs for all this infrastructure and 
facilities that should be charged to the developer.
2a: Public infrastructure and facilities serving a wider area (bovenwijkse voorzienin­
gen) (map 2 a):
• Road alongside the plan area, which must be refurbished and which serves three 
schemes, including the development in question;
• A new sewerage pipeline that connects the general network to this scheme and to 
five other schemes;
• A park that serves the entire district;
• An estimate of the maintenance/exploitation costs of all this infrastructure and fa­
cilities that should be charged to the developer.
3a: Contributions to a fund meant for paying investments in off-site schemes and public 
infrastructure and facilities not directly related to the development in question (boven­
planse verevening/kosten). These schemes and public infrastructure and facilities are 
those prescribed in categories 2 and 7. Also included is the estimate of the mainte­
nance/exploitation costs of this infrastructure and facilities that should be charged to 
the developer.
4a: Social housing (map 4):
• A minimum percentage in this part of the city (20% for rent, 20% for sale);
• Indications about location of social housing (in plots along 30 km per hour-roads);
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• Social housing for rent: housing association Z has the competence to select the ten­
ants according to criteria to be agreed with the municipality and based on housing 
legislation and housing local regulations, the owner of the houses must maintain 
the social function for at least 25 years (15 years more than the legal minimum), 
rental price must be X% under the maximum price prescribed in national standard 
(in Besluit op de huurtoeslag);
• Social housing for sale: housing association Z has the competence to select the buy­
ers according to criteria to be agreed with the municipality and based on housing 
legislation and housing local regulations, the buyer cannot sell the house on the 
free market for at least 10 years, and the selling price must be, following a regional 
agreement with other municipalities, Y% under the maximum price prescribed by 
a national standard (in Besluit beheer sociale-huursector) or in this regional agree­
ment.
6: Four green areas will be lost (verloren gegane natuurwaarde, groenvoorzieningen 
en watervoorzieningen), one of which is situated within the development in question 
and will be lost, and three outside. Three green areas will be created or refurbished to 
compensate this loss (map 6-7). In addition, also included is the estimate of the main­
tenance/exploitation costs that should be charged to the developer.
4b: Additional requirements for social housing:
• Social housing for rent: housing association Z has the competence to select the 
tenants according to criteria to be agreed with the municipality but not based on 
housing legislation and housing local regulations. Further, in case housing associa­
tion Z buys the units from the developer, the maximum selling price is to be set so 
that Z does not incur any loss (the bedrijfswaarde);
• Social housing for sale: housing association Z has the competence to select the 
buyers according to criteria to be agreed with the municipality but not based on 
housing legislation and housing local regulations. Further, in case a regional agree­
ment fails, the selling price must be Y% under the maximum price prescribed by a 
national standard (in Besluit beheer sociale-huursector).
7: 'Spatial developments' (ruimtelijke ontwikkelingen) situated outside the develop­
ment in question (map 6-7):
• A district of old social housing that must be regenerated;
• A new International Congress Center;
• Global calculation of the costs of both: € 5 and € 20 million respectively;
• An estimate of the maintenance/exploitation costs of this infrastructure and facilities 
that should be charged to the developer;
• The area within which all development schemes will have to contribute to those 
spatial developments: besides the development in question, also schemes A-M, € 
100 per each m2 of floor space.
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Also, it includes 'spatial developments' situated within the development in question 
but which can only be charged if labelled as 'spatial developments' (map 1a):
• School, community centre (buurthuis), social welfare facility (welzijn) and the es­
timate of the associated maintenance/exploitation costs of this infrastructure and 
facilities that should be charged to the developer.
Map 1a. Public infrastructure and facilities within or in the immediate surroundings of the site in
Sturingerland.
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Map 2a. Public infrastructure and facilities serving a wider area in Sturingerland 
(bovenwijkse voorzieningen).
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Map 4. Social housing in Sturingerland.
Map 6 and 7. Contributions to other schemes (bovenplanse verevening/kosten), to 'Spatial developments' (ruimtelijke ontwikkelingen), and green areas 
that will be lost (verloren gegane natuurwaarden, groen- en watervoorzieningen) in Sturingerland. A to M are the regeneration sites that, in addittion to the
contributions by our site, must also contribute.
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9.1.1.2 Sorts of documents to create certainty: site-specific document, 
generic documents and General zoning plan
Municipalities can create this certainty in different sorts of documents. They can 
choose one or several of them depending on the specific circumstances and many of 
the documents can complement each other. The following demonstrates four differ­
ent possibilities:
Site-specific documents
It has already been said that Dutch municipalities usually work in early stages of the 
development processes towards indicative site-specific plans that create develop­
ment expectations. At the same time, municipalities should also include the obliga­
tory contributions in similar site-specific documents. These site-specific documents 
about contributions can include contribution categories 1 to 7 and should preferably 
be included within the site-specific plans (in the plans or enclosed as an appendix) to 
guarantee a simultaneous approval and publication. A possible example is the 1998 
Planning Brief that preceded the negotiations in case Harbourside, England. This 
document prescribed a contribution for an off-site facility, the obligation to comply 
with local social housing policy and to pay the entire on-site infrastructure, including 
soil decontamination costs (for more details see frame 6d in chapter 6.4.1.1).
Generic document, integral character
Generic documents are valid for the territory of the entire municipality, a part of it or 
for a specific category of schemes. They include standard contributions (so they do 
not necessarily include a map) focussing on all policy fields (social housing, off-site 
infrastructure, social facilities, etc). The standard contributions are applicable to any 
development that takes place within the predefined boundaries or categories, for 
example, standard contributions for greenfield sites, and other standards for regen­
eration sites. This can be a policy document (nota), approved alone or together with 
the land policy document (nota grondbeleid), or just a decision (besluit) of the Local 
Council. An example from abroad is the decision of the Municipality of Valencia in 
2004, in which the municipality specified the contributions that developers should 
pay/implement, in addition to the contributions already established in planning leg­
islation, in the rezoning of former industrial or offices sites into housing (for more 
details see frame 5i in chapter 5.5.1.2). Another example is the 2005 SPD4 document 
from Bristol, which includes detailed standard contributions for all new develop­
ments within the city boundaries (for more details see frame 6e in chapter 6.4.1.1).
Generic document, sectoral character
An alternative to the generic integral document is a document that focuses on spe­
cific policy fields, like social housing. For example, local social housing policy docu­
ments can prescribe standard requirements for social housing (categories 4a and 
4b). Other examples include a policy document for public facilities that serve wide 
areas (nota bovenwijkse voorzieningen, Vrom, 2008: 121, 128), which can prescribe 
categories 2a, 3a, 4a, 4b and 7; and a policy document for long-term investments in
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public infrastructure (meerjarig investeringsplan infrastructuur, op. cit.: 157), which 
can prescribe categories 2a, 3a and 7. The sectoral document should be seen as a 
second best option: the integral document is preferable because it guarantees that all 
contributions in all policy fields are clear. Relying on sectoral documents carries the 
inherent risk of fragmentation and lack of transparency. Both integral and sectoral 
generic documents can be complementary, for example an integral document can 
summarize and integrate prescriptions from several sectoral documents.
General zoning plans
General zoning plans cover the entire territory of the municipality or a part of it 
(without focusing on just one development site), and can include all cost catego­
ries. Possibly, they can also incorporate standard charges, meaning that they also 
become Generic documents. In Dutch practice there are already many indicative 
zoning plans covering the entire territory of the municipality or a large part of it (e.g. 
Structuurplan/Structuurvisie), but usually they include only vague prescriptions for 
categories 1a, 2a, 3a and 7, and say nothing about the others. Furthermore, these 
indicative plans do not usually prescribe who is going to pay/implement the contri­
butions.
9.1.1.3 Indicative Structure vision
Should these sorts of documents (Site-specific document, Generic documents and 
General zoning plan) be of an indicative or a legally binding character? It seems that 
indicative plans fit better in the Dutch planning culture and practice: in early stages 
of development processes, municipalities usually work with indicative plans, but not 
with binding ones. The documents should be binding for the public body that ap­
proves them, but not for the use possibilities of the land. This means that the execu­
tive body or the Local Council must take into consideration the contents of the plan, 
but can also depart from it after proper argumentation. In other words, the documents 
should prescribe the development's basic requirements that must be taken into ac­
count as a hard starting point in the negotiations. During the negotiations, municipal­
ities can consider modifications in order to adapt to specific circumstances. Another 
argument in favour of flexible indicative documents is that a stronger legally binding 
character would create the necessity of regulating by law both the contents of the 
documents and the approval/adoption procedure (Vrom, 2003: 13).
The 2008 Spatial Planning Act introduced a new sort of indicative document that 
may be the ideal document for including any of the mentioned categories of costs 
and sorts of documents: the Structure vision (Structuurvisie). The new Act does not 
prescribe procedural or formal requirements for this document. Structure visions can 
include a broad range of elements: besides the physical zoning, also determinations 
regarding the implementation of the development (article 2.1.1 2008 Act). They can 
have an outline character, but also contain detailed maps and determinations (Vrom, 
2003: 11-13). This means that Site-specific documents and General zoning plans can 
be put in the form of a Structure vision. Also, a Structure vision can focus on one
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singular aspect of planning policy, or several aspects, and on how the developments 
prescribed in it can be implemented (article 2.1.2). This means that Generic docu­
ments can also be shaped as a Structure vision.
The 2008 Act prescribes several direct links between structure visions and cost re­
covery; for some sorts of costs, it is obligatory to use the Structure vision as a vehicle:
• First, anterior Development agreements can include contributions for 'spatial 
developments' (category 7, ruimtelijke ontwikkelingen) only if prescribed by the 
Structure vision (Vrom et al., 2008: 46-48, 85). Table 29 above shows exactly 
what the vision must prescribe;
• Second, a Development contributions plan can include the obligation for the 
landowners to contribute to other schemes or to funds meant for investments 
outside the site in question (category 3a, bovenplanse verevening/kosten) only 
if it is prescribed by a Vision (Vrom et al., 2008: 85). Table 28 gives more details 
about what the Vision must prescribe.
• Third, currently confusion exists regarding the differences between ruimtelijke 
ontwikkelingen, bovenplanse verevening/kosten and bovenwijkse voorzienin­
gen. Because this confusion will not be resolved until jurisprudence has devel­
oped clear criteria, which will take several years, it is highly recommended to 
also include the bovenwijkse voorzieningen in a Structure vision, with a similar 
argumentation as for ruimtelijke ontwikkelingen and bovenplanse verevening/ 
kosten (confero Baardewijk, 2008: 759). This will prevent possible surprises in 
the courts.
• Fourth, compensation costs for green and nature areas (category 6, verloren ge- 
gane natuurwaarde, groen- en watervoorzieningen) can be included in a De­
velopment contributions plan only if they are already mentioned as such in a 
policy document, such as a Structure vision. Furthermore, this document should 
prescribe the necessity of compensation (Vrom et al., 2008: 115).
In short, the Structure vision seems not only to be a logical and handy document. 
Also, the new 2008 Physical Planning Act and Decree create the obligation to use it 
for capturing value increase, at least for cost categories 3a, 6 and 7 (op. cit.: 84-85, 
115). The documents can be reviewed each year, together with the yearly municipal 
budget, in order to provide up-to-date calculations of the contributions.
EXAMPLE URBAN REGENERATION IN STURINGERLAND, Part Two
The Municipality of Sturingerland has specified the future contributions through a set 
of documents. Thanks to all these documents, when the Municipality of Sturingerland 
initiated the negotiations with the developers, the required contributions were the start­
ing point. Also, the developers who bought parcels B, C and D (see Figure 33) took into 
consideration these contributions in the price they agreed with the former landowners. 
The documents are:
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Structure vision Sturingerland 2020
A Structure vision covering all regeneration schemes in the city. This document cor­
responds with the sort General zoning plan and includes cost categories 1a, 2a, 6 and 
7, already detailed in the Part One of the example.
Housing Policy Sturingerland 2020
Together with the Vision 2020, the municipality approved a Housing Policy note for the 
entire territory of the municipality. This document corresponds to the Generic sectoral 
document type and has been added to the 2020 Vision as an appendix. It includes cost 
categories 4a and 4b, already detailed in Part One of the example.
Standard charges in implementation paragraph Structure vision Sturingerland 2020
Together with the Vision 2020, the municipality approved some standard charges, 
which apply for all developments in the city. This document corresponds with the Ge­
neric document type and has been added to the 2020 Vision as part of its implementa­
tion paragraph (uitvoeringsparagraaf). It includes several additional prescriptions about 
cost category 7, already detailed in Part One of the example: a global calculation of the 
costs of all ruimtelijke ontwikkelingen, estimated at € 25 million. When this is divided 
by the estimated m2 of dwellings and office space to be built in the scheme in question 
and in schemes A-M, the standard contribution is €100 per m2 of floor space.
9.1.1.4 The central government stimulates municipalities to prepare 
Generic documents
There is the risk that expectations of future building possibilities arise quickly and 
catch the municipality unprepared or (or even unwilling to prepare) any of the above­
mentioned sorts of documents. The English experience shows that municipalities do 
not always make the necessary efforts. Only after the British central government be­
gan to actively stimulate the approval of Generic integral documents, has the number 
of municipalities that draft these documents grown significantly. The 2005 SPD4 doc­
ument in Bristol is an example of such an intervention. The Dutch central government 
should follow the British example, and stimulate municipalities to do their home­
work. For example, the central government can stimulate municipalities by preparing 
model documents. It is preferable that the central government's efforts focus on stim­
ulating Generic integral documents, which can be but do not necessarily have to be 
integrated in General zoning plans. The advantage of Generic integral documents is 
that they guarantee that all developments in the municipality, from very early stages, 
start with a reasonable level of certainty about future contributions. Afterwards, once 
the development possibilities and the desired contributions are clearer, municipali­
ties can also prepare Site-specific documents to further specify the contributions. In 
this task, the central government should work together with the Association of Neth­
erlands Municipalities (Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten), which often produces 
model documents for daily use by municipalities.
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9.1.2 Long-term recommendations: legal modifications
For the longer term, legal modifications might be necessary to guarantee that in all 
municipalities there is a minimum level of certainty about future contributions. Legal 
modifications must be seen as a second best option, should the above-mentioned 
voluntary measures not be widely applied in practice. The legal modification can be 
accomplished in two ways: first by obliging municipalities to prepare Generic inte­
gral documents, and second by introducing minimum standard charges in planning 
law. These measures may encounter some political resistance. Dutch municipalities 
are used to acting very autonomously in determining their planning policy and may 
see these measures as interference in their competences.
Stimulating and obliging municipalities to introduce Generic integral documents
As we have seen, the first recommendation was to elaborate a model document and 
to offer it to municipalities, which can use it freely and do not need to 'rediscover 
the wheel' on their own. But a model voluntary document is not enough. Article
2.1.2 Physical Planning Act should add the obligation that municipalities approve 
a Structure vision specifically including a Generic integral document, or to include 
this document in the implementation paragraph of a broader Structure vision. These 
Structure visions must be based on a flexible but also obligatory list of contents, a sort 
of index, to be specified in the Physical Planning Decree in addition to the actual list 
of sorts of costs (articles 6.2.3 to 6.2.6). This obligatory index guarantees a certain 
level of uniformity among municipalities, and eliminates the danger of municipalities 
approving documents that are too vague. This gives to landowners and developers 
the certainty that they can expect the same contributions everywhere in the country.
EXAMPLE URBAN REGENERATION IN STURINGERLAND, Part Three
The central government in The Hague is not happy with the progress made by munici­
palities in elaborating an adequate policy base for cost recovery. Sturingerland, with 
its Structure vision 2020 and complementary documents (see example Part Two), is a 
positive exception.
Model document
To stimulate municipalities, the central government and the Association of Nether­
lands Municipalities (VNG) elaborated a model document, based on the experience in 
Sturingerland. It is not obligatory to follow this model, but it can help municipalities to 
elaborate their own documents.
Obligatory Structure vision about cost recovery, and obligatory national list of contents
The Hague decides to go further. The Parliament introduces in the Physical Planning Act 
the obligation for municipalities to approve Structure visions (as a separate document 
or in its implementation paragraph) focusing on cost recovery. Also, the Parliament
322 Recommendations
introduces in the Physical Planning Decree the minimum topics that such a document 
must include, inspired by the documents from Sturingerland. These minimum topics, 
which municipalities must fill in, are an elaboration based on these main categories:
- Social Housing (cost categories 4a and 4b);
- Public infrastructure and facilities serving wider areas (cost category 2a);
- Green/natural areas that will be lost (cost category 6);
- Spatial developments (cost category 7).
Introducing legal minimum standard charges and prescriptions
If, despite this legal obligation, there are still many municipalities that have no or have 
insufficiently elaborated cost recovery documents, the Dutch central government 
could consider a second measure: a modification in the Physical Planning Decree to 
introduce legal minimum standard charges for the entire country. The legal standard 
charges could differentiate between different categories of development sites (e.g. 
residential, offices, industrial, urban regeneration, greenfield development). Mini­
mum standard charges prescribed in law have the side effect that they do not leave 
much flexibility for adaptation to specific circumstances. Therefore, legal minimum 
standard charges could sometimes refer to outline instead of detailed standards, and 
could prescribe the requirement that the municipality must further hammer them 
out in detail. Actually, this means a combination of legal minimum standard charges 
and the above mentioned obligation for municipalities to fill in an obligatory list of 
contents. The Valencian legal standard charges are an example of such a combina­
tion. First, they include minimum standard charges, more or less detailed, such as 
minimum public space, minimum public buildings and parking places depending 
on the land use (residential, industrial, etc). But they also prescribe the obligation for 
municipalities to prepare local planning documents that further detail/complement a 
predefined set of topics (for more details about Valencian legal standard charges, see 
frame 5h in chapter 5.5.1.1).
EXAMPLE URBAN REGENERATION IN STURINGERLAND, Part Four
Despite the measures, there are still many municipalities that have no, or have insuf­
ficiently elaborated, cost recovery documents. Usually, large cities have good docu­
ments, but smaller municipalities do not. An evaluation show that municipalities with 
good documents generally obtain good results in practice, while the others show results 
that are worse and very varied (sometimes adequate, sometimes very bad) depending 
on specific circumstances (negotiations skills of involved public officers, local market 
circumstances, quality and commitment of local politicians, etc.).
National detailed standard charges and prescriptions for cost recovery
The central government in The Hague decides to introduce in the Physical Planning 
Decree detailed standard charges and prescriptive determinations:
Recommendations 323
Standard charges (inspired often by the documents of Sturingerland, see Parts One and 
Two of the example):
• Spatial developments (ruimtelijke ontwikkelingen, cost category 7): € 100 per each 
new m2 of floor space;
• Lost green/natural areas (verloren gegane natuurwaarde, groenvoorzieningen en 
watervoorzieningen, cost category 6): applies to all developments, the developer is 
required to submit a compensation plan (if there is no document already specify­
ing the compensation locations), to implement compensation green and finally to 
transfer it to the municipality;
• Social housing (cost category 4a): a minimum of 20% rent units and 20% selling 
units, taking account of the total m2 of floor space, not the number of units, to pre­
vent developers from constructing social houses that are too small.
Prescriptive determinations, to be detailed by municipalities:
• Public infrastructure and facilities serving wider areas (bovenwijkse voorzieningen, 
cost category 2): municipalities must characterize them, prescribe the locations, 
calculate the global costs, argue the relationship between the infrastructure and 
facilities and the schemes, and prescribe the schemes that benefit and the schemes 
that must contribute;
• Spatial developments (cost category 7): municipalities must review the national 
standard charge of €100 per m2, that serves as a minimum, and prescribe the 
schemes that must contribute;
• Green/natural areas to be lost (cost category 6): municipalities must prescribe the 
compensation locations, and calculate the global costs.
Thanks to these legal standard charges and prescriptions, the required minimum future 
contributions are clear in the Netherlands. These measures have been useful especially 
in those small municipalities that had not prepared any, or prepared insufficient, cost 
recovery documents.
9.2 Choosing the contents of binding rules
As section 8.2 already showed, being able to include aspects related to the financ­
ing and implementation of public infrastructure and facilities in binding plans can 
have a positive effect on capturing value increase. In Valencia and England, planning 
law makes it possible to prescribe in binding rules a wide range of requirements: 
contributions to social/affordable housing, contributions to on-site and off-site public 
infrastructure and facilities, contributions to social facilities (maatschappelijke voor­
zieningen), and also the possibility of prescribing investment and implementation 
schedules for these contributions.
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In the Netherlands, until the 2008 Physical Planning Act, none of these requirements 
could be prescribed in the binding rules, and this had a negative effect on capturing 
value increase. The 2008 Physical Planning Act made it possible for the first time to 
include almost all these requirements. Nowadays, it is possibly to include social/af­
fordable housing both in the Land use plan and the departures from it (a percentage) 
and in the Development contributions plan (allocation to the plots and number of 
units). It is also possible to introduce implementation schedules and contributions 
for most of the on-site infrastructure and for some sorts of off-site infrastructure in the 
Development contributions plan. However, two limitations remain:
1. It is still uncertain whether it is possible to prescribe contributions for main­
tenance/exploitation costs in general, and for construction and maintenance/ 
exploitation costs of social facilities (maatschappelijke voorzieningen) in par­
ticular. The Dutch parliament decided during the deliberation on the 2008 Land 
Development Act to exclude the possibility of charging social facilities through 
a Development contributions plan. Thus, also after the adoption of the 2008 Act, 
Development contributions plans cannot include these contributions, i.e. these 
cannot be charged to the landowners. Besides this, it is not clear whether this 
parliamentary decision has consequences not only for the Development contri­
butions plan, but also for the contents of anterior Development agreements. If 
plans cannot include contributions for social facilities, can agreements? Could 
such contributions be required from the developer, or can they result from a uni­
lateral undertaking by the developer (see frame 7f in section 7.2.3)? If developer 
and municipality agree to such a contribution in an agreement, this might after­
wards be the subject of a legal intervention, in case there is an appeal (Van den 
Brand, interview 2008). To make it possible to charge such contributions without 
the risk of facing appeals, a section should be added to the list of sorts of costs in 
article 6.2.5 of the Physical Planning Decree: "i. Social facilities''.2
2. Many of the costs included in a Development contributions plan cannot be 
charged to the landowner (see sections 7.2.3 and 9.1.1.1): parts of the on-site in­
frastructure, the entire maintenance/exploitation costs, a larger part of the off-site 
infrastructure, the entire costs of off-site public investments not directly related 
to the development in question, and probably also not the costs that have been 
already incurred on the site. To make it possible to charge these costs through 
a Development contributions plan, the list of sorts of recoverable costs (articles
6.2.3 up to 6.2.6 2008 of the Physical Planning Decree) should be enlarged. 
In addition, nowadays landowners must receive the highest value for their land, 
which increases the accounted land costs and thus the probability of a deficit, a 
deficit that must be paid by the municipality. To diminish the possibility of a deficit 
and lower the accounted land costs, article 6.13.5 of the 2008 Physical Planning 
Act, which prescribes that assessment of the value of land must follow expropria­
tion law, should be modified. Instead of following expropriation law, assessment 
should follow the market value based on the land use prior to regeneration.
2 In Dutch: "i. maatschappelijke voorzieningen."
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These are not recommendations that could be introduced in the short term, as this 
shortcoming of the Dutch planning system can only be addressed with legislative 
modification. Relatively speaking, the first one is easier to introduce than the second.
EXAMPLE URBAN REGENERATION IN STURINGERLAND, Part Five
A majority in Parliament supports the modification of article 6.2.5 of the Physical Plan­
ning Decree to make it possible to charge the costs of the building of social facilities to 
landowners through a Development contributions plan. As a consequence of this sup­
port, anterior Development agreements can now also include contributions to these 
costs.
Addition to Structure vision Sturingerland 2020
Thanks to the first legal modification, the Municipality of Sturingerland is now free to 
require a contribution for social facilities. The municipality labels all the social facili­
ties as 'spatial developments' in the Vision 2020, and also prescribes in this document 
that our scheme and schemes A-M must contribute to all these social facilities. In 
total, these encompass 3 schools (one in our scheme), 2 community centres (one in 
our scheme) and 2 social welfare facilities (one in our scheme) (see map 6-7). Now 
the municipality can motivate and determine properly which part of the costs must be 
charged to our scheme.
Addition to Standard Charges in implementation paragraph Structure vision Sturing­
erland 2020
The municipality includes to the standard charges in the implementation paragraph 
of the Structure vision 2020 (see Part Two of the example) another standard charge 
regarding social facilities. The costs of all social facilities in the district (the 3 schools, 2 
community centres and 2 social welfare facilities) are calculated (€ 20m) and divided 
by the estimated number of dwellings and m2 of office space to be built in our scheme 
and in schemes A-M. The resulting standard contributions are set at €1.000 per dwell­
ing and €80 per m2 of floor space for offices.
The second recommendation (enlarging the list of sorts of recoverable costs and modi­
fying the assessment method of the value of land) seems more difficult to introduce, 
as it requires a more profound legal modification and is politically sensitive (value of 
land). Therefore, it will take more time to harness the necessary support in Parliament, 
and to carefully design the best way of modifying the law. Its effects will be illustrated 
in Part Ten of this example.
EXAMPLE URBAN REGENERATION IN STURINGERLAND, Part Six
The situation in our scheme in Sturingerland is as follows:
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Costs that can be included in a Development contributions plan, and charged to the 
landowners:
- The on-site public infrastructure and facilities, including part of the costs of the so­
cial facilities (the land and the building): the school, community centre and social 
welfare facility (here we do as if the first legal modification illustrated in the 5th part 
of the example has taken place), and excluding some of the costs of refurbishing the 
old roads situated within the plan area, and excluding the entire maintenance and 
exploitation costs of any infrastructure or facility (see map 1a).
- That part of the public infrastructure and facilities and of the social facilities that 
serve a wider area (see maps 1a and 2a) and satisfy the three legal criteria (profit, 
attributability and proportionality): the municipality, thanks to the Structure vision 
Sturingerland 2020 (see Part Two of the example) can motivate properly which of 
these infrastructure and facilities serve a wider area, and thus which part of the costs 
corresponds to our scheme and can thus be charged to the landowners.
- Social housing (20% rented, 20% for sale, see map 4a): the municipality, thanks 
to the Housing Policy note Sturingerland 2020 (see Part Two of the example) can 
motivate properly this requirement.
The followings costs probably cannot be included in the Development contributions 
plan, or can be included but probably cannot be charged to the landowners/develop­
ers:
- Some costs of refurbishing the old roads and all the costs of maintaining and ex­
ploiting both the public infrastructure and the social facilities (see map 1a);
- The parts of the public infrastructure and facilities (including the social facilities) 
that serve a wider area but do not satisfy the three legal criteria (see maps 1a and
2 a);
- Part of the costs made by the municipality for the preparation of plans;
- Spatial developments not directly related to this scheme (see map 6-7);
- A deficit in the Development contributions plan: the calculated profits do not cover 
the costs, which are very high in this site due to high infrastructure provision costs 
and soil decontamination costs, but also due to expensive land (high accounted 
land costs). This deficit cannot be charged to the landowners.
The Municipality of Sturingerland has the ambition of lowering the accounted land 
costs to achieve a cost-neutral operation, i.e. that the profits pay all the involved costs, 
also those that cannot be charged to the developers/landowners in a Development 
contributions plan. Therefore, the Municipality has a strong preference for agreeing the 
contributions in an anterior Development agreement, instead of approving a Develop­
ment contributions plan. In a Development agreement, the Municipality and the land­
owners/developers are free to agree a lower price for the land than in a Development 
contributions plan. The Municipality has already calculated that if land is assessed 
on its value prior to regeneration, there will be enough final profit for the landowner/ 
developer to pay all the costs.
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Additional consideration for preferring an anterior agreement
Besides this economic consideration, there is another reason for the Municipality to 
prefer an anterior agreement: the Municipality is facing many development schemes at 
the same time, and has no internal capacity to make, approve and implement a Devel­
opment contributions plan for each scheme.
9.3 Making binding rules conditional on the developer 
securing his contributions
Summary o f the findings
As section 8.3 demonstrated earlier, it is necessary to commit the developer to secure 
the value capturing arrangements and to the strict deadlines that might have been 
included in the binding rules. In England and Valencia it is possible to make, in a 
formal, open and direct way, the approval of the relevant binding rules conditional 
on a Development agreement. This happens as follows: first, the binding rules (Plan­
ning Permission in England, Joint Development Program in Valencia), including the 
contributions and deadlines, become provisionally approved following an extensive 
procedure. The municipality openly conditions the definite approval to an agreement 
that secures these contributions and deadlines. When the agreement is sealed, the 
municipality, without the need of further extensive procedures, approves the binding 
rules definitely. If such an agreement is not reached, the binding rules never come 
into force. This clear and open conditioning seems to have improved public value 
capturing, and specially the speed of plan implementation.
Actual practice in the Netherlands: informal conditioning
In practice, Dutch municipalities also often condition the Land use plan and depar­
tures from it on securing contributions; however, they do not have the formal pos­
sibility of doing so in an open and straightforward way, as in Valencia and England. 
This can have negative side-effects: 1) in the Netherlands municipalities hold back 
the approval of the Land use plan until an agreement has been achieved, so after 
achieving the agreement the plan must follow an extensive procedure (including 
public participation), which means that there is the risk that the Land use plan be­
comes annulled or seriously modified; 2) there is the possibility that the developer 
appeals to the courts against an improper use of statutory powers; and 3) it makes an 
open and transparent public discourse of the municipality very difficult, because an 
open conditioning is illegal (see section 7.4.3.1).
Consequences 2008 Physical Planning Act
Since the 2008 Physical Planning Act, Dutch municipalities, provided they approve a 
Development contributions plan, can make granting the building permit conditional
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on the payment of contributions. Once the Land use plan and the Development con­
tributions plan have been approved, the developer/landowner can submit an appli­
cation for a building permit. The novelty is that the municipality can now condition 
the building permit on the applicant securing his/her contributions; before 2008 this 
was not possible. However, approving a Development contributions plan has some 
side effects: municipalities assume some financial risks because they are responsible 
for the calculations and may need to advance investments; they must put resources 
into making the plan and up-dating it yearly; and they must bear the consequences 
of delay in case developers/landowners do not apply for the building permit. In addi­
tion, not all the costs can be charged to the developers/landowners (for more details 
about these side effects see section 7.4.3.3).
Best option: anterior Development agreement
Thus in principle the best option for municipalities, especially in urban regeneration 
where the deficit in the Development contributions plan may be large, is to seal an 
anterior Development agreement before the approval of the Land use plan, which 
assures that contributions and deadlines are secured and no Development contri­
butions plan is needed. Municipalities can thus informally request that developers 
sign such an agreement (Vrom et al., 2008: 197). However, the actual practice of 
informal conditioning may become more difficult after the 2008 Act. The Act rein­
forced the obligation for the municipality to take a formal decision (in Dutch terms 
besluit) about an application to modify or depart from the Land use plan (article 3.9 
for modification and 3.12 for departure). If the municipality wishes to refuse the ap­
plication, this decision must be taken within eight weeks. It is not necessarily so that 
the municipality wants to refuse, but the possibility of refusing has a strategic impor­
tance: the power to refuse increases the negotiation powers of the municipality. If the 
municipality does not refuse within these eight weeks, it is assumed to have agreed 
with the application, i.e. to agree to start the formal modification/departure proce­
dure. This means that municipalities have eight weeks to decide whether to refuse the 
application. Following the Explanatory Memorandum of the 2008 Act, when making 
the decision to refuse, municipalities have to justify their decision by referring to the 
contents of the Land use plan, and, if existing, of the Structure vision (Tweede Kamer 
der Staten-Generaal, 2003: 31). The enforcement-mechanism is that the applicant 
has now the possibility to appeal (beroep) against a refusal or a non-determination. 
This means that the municipality may be confronted with the following situation: a) 
a developer submits an application that involves the need for investments in public 
infrastructure and facilities; b) the municipality prefers to secure these investments 
through an anterior agreement, so it wants to refuse the application in case the ap­
plicant does not want to sign the agreement; c) however, formally speaking, the mu­
nicipality cannot openly and directly condition the approval of the Land use plan 
or departure from it on such an agreement. In other words, the municipality cannot 
openly and directly refuse the application with the argument that the applicant does 
not want to seal an agreement, but must find other arguments in the existing Land use 
plan, the Structure vision or other policy documents. If the municipality has already
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discussed the application with the developer, and already concluded that its physical 
and functional characteristics are acceptable, there is actually little room left to refuse 
(Gerritsen, 2010: 26). Thus the municipality should decide within eight weeks and, if 
for example the application fits within the Structure vision, or if the municipality has 
publicly already agreed to the physical and functional characteristics of the applica­
tions, it may be obliged to say "yes" and approve a Development contributions plan.
9.3.1 Short-term recommendation: alternative ways of 
conditioning
Although open and straightforward conditioning is not allowed, there are some al­
ternative ways, and the new 2008 Act has added additional possibilities. Here follow 
some recommendations for acting on these alternative possibilities, which do not re­
quire any legal modification. In general, implementation of these recommendations 
should not encounter significant resistance, because they are a continuation and 
refinement of local practice. Nevertheless, these alternative possibilities have some 
negative side effects. For this reason I provide in the following section a second group 
of recommendations that do require some legal modifications.
Conditioning through the Explanation of the Land use plan
The first alternative is to include in the Explanation (Toelichting) of the draft Land 
use plan considerations related to the economic 'performability' of the plan (econo­
mische uitvoerbaarheid in Dutch): these are the conditions that are needed to im­
plement the plan, the necessary contributions, whether there are enough financial 
sources, subsidies, etc. Based on this paragraph, the municipality can argue that con­
tributions are necessary for the economic feasibility of the plan. If the contributions 
are not secured, the plan is not feasible, and can thus not be approved. This alterna­
tive has some negative side effects, very similar to the above mentioned negative side 
effects of the practice of informal conditioning:
1. Procedural risks: after the sealing of Development agreement, the Land use plan 
(or departure from it) must follow the complete procedure, which implies a risk 
of delay and modifications because of objections and appeals. Formally speak­
ing, agreements cannot restrict the decision-making power of the Local Council. 
In Valencia and England, the procedure of approval of the binding plan precedes 
the sealing of the agreement, after which there is only a short definite approval 
(see Figure 34). This means that in Valencia and England, parties can seal the 
agreement with a high certainty that the zoning plan is not going to be modi­
fied, and that there will be no delay. In the Netherlands, agreements are always 
subjected to the possibility that afterwards the Land use plan will be modified or 
its approval will be delayed (Vrom et al.: 51);
2. Appeal risks: if a municipality refuses to approve a Land use plan because the 
developer does not secure contributions, there is always a risk of an appeal to 
the courts. Indirect conditioning through the Explanation is not the same as enu­
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merating, openly, in a municipal decision, the contributions that the developer 
has to secure in exchange for definite approval of the binding rules. Municipali­
ties in the Netherlands need to properly and carefully argue why implementation 
is not feasible and thus why approval is not possible. This is not always easy: if 
implementation seems feasible, municipalities cannot refuse, even if developers 
have not secured all the contributions (to 'look like being feasible' is different 
than to 'be secured'). The introduction of the 2008 Land Development Act added 
an additional disadvantage: a Development contributions plan secures in theory 
part of the needed contributions, so the municipality might not be able to use 
the argument of performability. As demonstrated above, a Development contri­
butions plan is less secure than one may think. In England and Valencia, there is 
no need for complex argumentation: planning law establishes that the developer 
has to secure the contributions stated in the provisionally approved document, 
as a condition for definitive approval;
3. Incongruent municipal public discourse: indirect conditioning through the Ex­
planation poses a threat to the credibility of the municipality's public discourse, 
which in practice may need to hide some of the 'real reasons' for the approval or 
refusal of Land use plans. In England and Valencia, the 'real reasons' are publicly 
approved by the Local Council, and form the open and transparent criteria for 
assessing whether or not to formally approve the binding rules.
Conditioning through the Development contributions plan and proper cost 
recovery policy documents
The 2008 Act has introduced a second alternative. After a planning application has 
been submitted, which requires the modification or departure from the Land use 
plan, the municipality can calculate what would be the costs and which part could 
be charged to the landowners/developers through a Development contributions plan. 
Such a calculation (exploitatieopzet in Dutch) is part of the plan. The municipality 
may ask the applicant to perform the calculation, instead of doing it itself. If munici­
palities apply the recommendations in chapter 9.1 to make and adopt cost recovery 
policy documents (site-specific, generic documents or general zoning plans), they 
can properly justify all the related costs for providing public infrastructure and facili­
ties (and, in case the applicant provides the calculations, municipalities can argue 
why all the costs must be included). This is especially important for public infra­
structure and facilities that go beyond the absolutely necessary on-site infrastructure 
provision. That is, the municipalities can adequately defend the statement that the 
application involves costs that surpass minimum on-site infrastructure provision, and 
also include wider contributions to other public infrastructure and facilities within 
and outside the development site in question.
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DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN VALENCIA AND ENGELAND
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Figure 34. Negotiations, sealing of Development Agreement and approval of legally binding zoning 
plan in development processes in Valencia, England and the Netherlands.
These cost recovery policy documents are very important. Without them, the munici­
pality would most probably not be able to calculate and properly argue the costs, 
certainly not within the stipulated eight weeks period for responding to applications. 
And, in case it is the applicant that must make the calculations, the municipality 
would also not be able to properly argue why the applicant should include all those 
costs that are not strictly needed for on-site infrastructure provision. It is likely that
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the applicant will consider them as 'extra' costs and will not be willing to include 
them as part of the costs that must be charged to his plan. In case the calculation 
makes clear that the municipality cannot recover all the costs through the Develop­
ment contributions plan (which is not unthinkable, especially in urban regeneration, 
and especially if the costs involve not only minimum infrastructure provision but also 
wider contributions), municipalities can openly refuse to process and to approve the 
Development contributions plan, arguing that they cannot bear this deficit (Vrom et 
al., 2008: 106). This is equivalent to refusing to approve the Land use plan.
This conditioning through the Development contributions plan has some advantages 
compared with conditioning through the Explanation in the Land use plan. First, it 
reduces the possibility of success of the developers appeal (side effect 2) because the 
municipality can better argue the non-feasibility of the project. Second, municipali­
ties can be open about their decision (side effect 3). However, if the developer wants 
to secure only the additional costs (but not those costs that can be charged through 
a Development contributions plan) municipalities cannot use the argument of eco­
nomic feasibility to refuse the application. The reason is that the costs that can be 
charged are theoretically guaranteed, even if the developer does not want to seal the 
agreement: the municipality is expected to approve the Development contributions 
plan and landowners/developers are expected to pay these costs when obtaining a 
building permit. The municipality must therefore approve a Development contribu­
tions plan, which was exactly what it wanted to avoid because of the mentioned 
disadvantages, risks and costs of having to approve it. In any scenario, side effect 1 
remains: after the sealing of an anterior Agreement, the Land use plan still has to be 
processed, which carries with it the risk of modifications and delay.
EXAMPLE URBAN REGENERATION IN STURINGERLAND, Part Seven
The Municipality of Sturingerland owns parcel A, Developer B owns parcel B, Devel­
oper C owns parcel C and Developer D owns parcel D (see Figure 33).
Conditioning the Land use plan through Development contributions plan and proper 
cost recovery policy documents
Developer B submitted at moment 0 an application for modification of the Land use 
plan. The initiative is in line with the urban regeneration policy of Sturingerland, which 
is prescribed in the Structure vision 2020 (see Part Two of the example). The municipal­
ity decided to stimulate the initiative, but adopting a 'facilitating' role, i.e. leaving the 
implementation to the developer. The municipality calculated (in an exploitatieopzet) 
the costs that can be attributed to the plan through a Development contributions plan. 
Thanks to the Structure vision 2020 and its implementation paragraph, the municipal­
ity calculated right away the total costs, and motivated them properly. Without these 
documents the municipality would not have been able to motivate either the con­
tribution for the public infrastructure and facilities that serve a wider area (the road
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to be refurbished, the sewerage and park), or the contributions for the 'spatial de­
velopments' (the regeneration of the social housing neighbourhood, the International 
Congress Center and the social facilities), or the compensation green areas provided 
as a compensation for the lost green areas (four areas, to be compensated with three 
new/refurbished ones). It turned out that not all of these costs could be charged to the 
landowners through a Development contributions plan (see Part Six of the example). 
Further, the profits from selling the real estate would not cover all the chargeable costs 
(the costs that can be charged to the landowners) if the land were to be appraised at 
the market value with the future use possibilities. In addition to this deficit, there were 
significant costs that were not secured: the other schemes that were supposed to pay 
the facilities serving a wider area and the 'spatial developments' had not yet been de­
veloped, so their contribution was still uncertain. As the municipality had no financial 
resources to pay these costs, the municipality was able to properly motivate that the 
investments were not secured and thus the Land use plan could not be modified. In 
other words, the municipality was able to properly argue why the application of devel­
oper B had to be refused.
The calculations made clear that the profits were large enough to cover all the costs, as 
long as the land is not appraised at the full market price with the future use possibili­
ties. The municipality made clear to Developer B that he had to pay all the costs, i.e. to 
accept a lower price for the land. Both entered negotiations that ended in Developer B 
agreeing with the municipal requirements. Below, this example is worked out in three 
alternative scenarios: Ia, Ib and II:
• Scenario Ia: Developer B succeeds in buying all the land for a low price;
• Scenario Ib: Developer B succeeds in buying all the land for a low price and direct 
conditioning of the Land use plan is made possible through a legal modification;
• Scenario II: Developer B is not successful in buying all the land for a low price (see 
section 9.4).
Below, scenario Ia is worked out, while the other scenarios are expanded in subse­
quent portion.
Scenario Ia: Developer B succeeds in buying all the land for a low price
Developer B succeeded in buying all the land from the Municipality and from Devel­
oper C and Developer D for a price that allowed him to pay all the costs, i.e. for a price 
lower than the full market price with the future use possibilities. He signed an anterior 
Development agreement with the Municipality securing the costs that could not be 
charged through a Development contributions plan. However, Developer B refused to 
secure the costs that were supposed to be recovered through the Development con­
tributions plan. According to planning law, the Municipality can recover these costs 
when granting the building permits. As a consequence, the Municipality could not 
refuse the application because these costs were in theory already secured. The Munici­
pality had to approve the Development contributions plan, together with the Land use
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plan, which was displeasing for the local politicians. The Municipality had to advance 
the investment for refurbishing the road, the purchase of the land needed for the school, 
community centre, park and sport field, and also some investments for an infrastructure 
that serves a wider area (e.g. refurbishing the adjacent road, and contributions to other 
facilities in the district). Also, the municipality had to face more risks: first, other parties 
submitted appeals against the Land use plan, which had to be modified and suffered 
delay (side effect 1); and second, Developer B delayed his application for a building 
permit (because of market circumstances), so finally the municipality had to deal with 
the financial costs of the delay.
On the positive side, the Municipality had initially a strong argumentation to refuse 
the application, so the risks of appeals against its request to seal an anterior agreement 
were lower (side effect 2). That is why developer B agreed to secure at least part of the 
costs. Furthermore, the municipality could be open about the real reasons behind ac­
cepting or refusing the application (side effect 3).
9.3.2 Long-term recommendation: direct conditioning through 
legal modification
As shown, short-term recommendations leave some negative side effects unresolved: 
even if the municipality successfully seals an anterior Development agreement, the 
Land use plan still has to be processed. This carries the risk of modification and delay 
(side effect 1). Possibly, if the developer is not willing to secure the costs that theo­
retically can be charged through a Development contributions plan, municipalities 
might be obliged to approve the Development contributions plan in any case. It is 
already said that this implies some side effects: municipalities might need to assume 
risks and part of the costs. To remove these disadvantages, it is recommended to al­
low in planning law for direct conditioning, similar to how this happens in Valencia 
and England. The central government should introduce several legislative modifica­
tions. First, it is necessary to allow contributions to be prescribed in the Land use 
plan, instead of only in a Development contributions plan. One paragraph could be 
added to article 3.1.2 of the 2008 Physical Planning Decree or to the Physical Plan­
ning Act itself:
With regard to economic feasibility, a Land use plan/departure from it 
can include requirements related to the implementation o f public infra­
structure and facilities, and, if necessary, schedules for the realization
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of the works, activities, measures and buildings, and if needed phasing 
them in relation to each other.3
Second, to make it possible to make the approval to an agreement conditional, a 
sentence should be added to chapter 3.2 of the 2008 Physical Planning Act (for the 
procedure of the Land use plan) and to chapter 3.3 (for the departure from it):
When and if the Land use plan or departure from it prescribes require­
ments related to the performability (requirements about social housing 
to rent and to sell, owner-occupied building, sorts of shopping, selling 
prices of social dwellings, the realisation of public infrastructure and 
facilities, and implementation schedules, red.), the realization o f these 
requirements must be secured in a development agreement before the 
Land use plan or departure are formally approved.4
It is to be expected that these modifications would encounter some political resist­
ance. Criticisms would be made that municipalities are 'selling' planning consent. 
The argument might be made that the planning activity of public bodies must take 
account only of spatially relevant considerations, and that securing contributions 
does not fall under this competence. However, this is misplaced criticism, as the 
introduction of the Development contributions plan and the possibility of condition­
ing granting of building permit to a financial contribution has already weakened the 
legal argument that only spatially relevant considerations are relevant for assessing 
building applications.
URBAN REGENERATION IN STURINGERLAND, Example Part Eight
Scenario Ib: direct conditioning Land use plan through legal modification, and Devel­
oper B manages to buy all the land for a low price
The Dutch central government, after receiving a lot of complains from municipalities 
like Sturingerland, decides to make it legally possible to make the Land use plan con­
ditional on securing contributions.
3 In Dutch: " Ten behoeve van de uitvoerbaarheid kan een bestemmingsplan/projectbesluit eisen 
bevatten met betrekking tot de uitvoering van openbare infrastructuur en voorzieningen, en 
voor zover nodig een fasering van de uitvoering van werken, werkzaamheden, maatregelen en 
bouwplannen, en zo nodig koppelingen hiertussen".
4 In Dutch: " Wanneer het bestemmingsplan of projectbesluit eisen bevatten met betrekking tot 
de uitvoerbaarheid [eisen m.b.t. sociale huurwoningen, sociale koopwoningen, particulier 
opdrachtgeverschap, branches van detailhandel, geldende koopprijsgrenzen voor sociale 
koopwoningen, de uitvoering van openbare infrastructuur en voorzieningen, en tijdschema's waarin 
dat moet gebeuren, red.], definitieve vaststelling zal kunnen plaatsvinden pas nadat uitvoering van 
deze eisen binnen de gestelde termijnen verzekerd is in een privaatrechtelijke overeenkomst".
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After Developer B submitted at moment 0 an application for modification of the Land 
use plan, the Municipality of Sturingerland motivated properly within the period of 8 
weeks the contributions that the developer had to face. The municipality enumerated 
the requirements, without having to calculate the costs that can be charged through 
a Development contributions plan (i.e. without having to make a exploitatieopzet), 
which saved much time and effort for the municipality. Initial contacts with Developer 
B revealed that he was willing to accept a lower land price and to assume the require­
ments, which resulted from the fact that developer B managed to agree with the other 
landowners a low price for their land (low enough to allow paying the contributions). 
The Municipality initiated the procedure for modifying the Land use plan. During the 
procedure, the municipality and Developer B negotiated and discussed the require­
ments, and the Local Executive decided finally to accept some modifications to the 
original list of requirements because it became clear during the negotiations that this 
was necessary in order to make the operation feasible. The Local Council provisionally 
approved the modification of the Land use plan. This provisionally approved Land use 
plan included a list of all the contributions, including the agreed changes. The Land 
use plan stated that all these contributions must be secured within one year, otherwise 
the plan cannot be definitely approved. Public consultation had already taken place, 
and all parties had already had the chance to make objections and appeals. The Mu­
nicipality and Developer B negotiated a Development agreement that secured all the 
contributions, conscious of the fact there would be no further possibility to object or 
appeal against the plan. After the sealing of the Agreement, the Local Council approved 
the plan definitely in a shortened procedure.
9.4 Modulating property rights
Summary of the findings
Section 8.4 has already explained how the definition of property rights in England 
and the Netherlands (where, contrary to Valencia, there is no land readjustment regu­
lation that modulates the right to provide the infrastructure) seems to hinder the cap­
turing of value increase. In short, these are the conclusions:
• There is in England and the Netherlands a strong interdependency between local 
public bodies and landowners and developers: as a rule, the transactions that 
are needed to provide the infrastructure are highly dependent on agreement with 
the landowners/developers. This is because none of the actors control all the 
needed resources: public bodies have the statutory powers for planning consent, 
but landowners/developers have the financial means and the exclusive right to 
develop the land. This interdependency cannot be resolved using expropriation 
or the pre-emption right (voorkeursrecht in Dutch), because these instruments 
have severe limitations in practice, and they imply a direct organisational and 
financial involvement of public bodies;
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• The situation in Valencia has changed radically after the regional government 
introduced a new planning law in 1994: since then there is, to provide the infra­
structure, no longer any unavoidable mutual dependence between public bod­
ies and landowners. Valencian municipalities can now opt for compulsory land 
readjustment, without having to become directly involved. The municipality se­
lects in a public tender the urbanising agent, who may be a public company 
or the landowners themselves joining in a company but most of the time is a 
commercial developer. Landowners can choose for voluntary expropriation or 
can participate in the development. If they choose expropriation, the urbanis­
ing agent pays the compensation and acquires the land. But if they decide to 
participate, they have to deliver the land needed for public infrastructure and fa­
cilities and pay to the urbanising agent a proportional share of the infrastructure 
provision, plan preparation, soil decontamination, compensation costs and ad­
ditional contributions (costs postings 2-6, see financial analysis in section 2.4.3). 
In exchange, landowners share the economic betterment: after providing the 
infrastructure, the urbanising agent delivers the serviced building parcels to the 
landowners and transfers the public infrastructure, free of charge, to the munici­
pality. In sum, although landowners still control the land, the mutual depend­
ence is now easily avoidable as municipalities have the possibility to appoint a 
third party (who does not necessarily need to own the land) as the urbanising 
agent, and do not need to become directly financially involved. Also, the mu­
nicipalities are not dependent on one particular urbanising agent, for he/she can 
be selected through a public tender.
• The interdependency between public bodies and landowners in England and the 
Netherlands gives to the landowners the option to wait, which it is often used 
to oppose the requirements set by local public bodies. Specially in the Nether­
lands, public bodies conclude that they cannot ask too much, which leads to 
low capturing of the value increase;
• This interdependency frequently leads to delays in the development processes. 
Often development is delayed because developers refuse the requirements and 
plans of the municipality, and the negotiations about these issues are prolonged. 
Also, sometimes the developers do not succeed in buying the land for a reason­
able price. Success of the negotiations depends on the developers' and land­
owners' expectations that, by delaying negotiations, their profits (regular profit 
margin, included in posting 2, and final profit for the developer, posting 9, and 
accounted land costs for the landowner, posting 1) would increase.
• This interdependency leads to higher accounted land costs (posting 1); market 
parties are more interested in acquiring land, as control of the land puts them in 
a strong negotiating position, and they are thus ready to pay more for it, which 
in turn inflates the real and expected market value of land.
• In addition, the findings suggest that interdependency leads to an inefficient and 
sluggish development process, in which costs are unnecessarily high and differ­
ent actors each manage to appropriate part of the value increase. This leads to 
higher costs for infrastructure provision (posting 2) and plan preparation (posting
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3); in England and the Netherlands they are very often between 1.5 and 4 times 
higher than in Valencia. This can partly explain why Valencian developers, al­
though able to sell the real estate for market prices similar to those in the Nether­
lands, can contribute much more than the Dutch developers. This can also partly 
explain why Valencian developers, although not selling the real estate for market 
prices as high as those in England, can contribute similarly or even more than 
the English developers. In other words, in England and the Netherlands, inflated 
infrastructure provision and plan preparation costs seem to form an important 
obstacle to capturing value increase.
EXAMPLE URBAN REGENERATION IN STURINGERLAND, Part Ten 
Scenario II: Developer B does not manage to buy all the land
After the Municipality of Sturingerland and Developer B agreed that all the costs should 
be paid out of profits, (see Part Seven of the example), Developer B started, with the 
support of the Municipality, contacts and negotiations with Developers C and D. How­
ever, Developers C and D had other goals. Developer C was also positive about the 
initiative, but he was neither willing to sell his land (he wants to implement the plan), 
nor to be so 'generous' as Developer B. He only wants to contribute to the costs that, 
according to planning law, can be included in a Development contributions plan and 
charged to the landowners. Developer D is truly a 'free rider'. He wants to implement 
the plan, but expects to be able to do so without having to contribute his fair share.
During the contacts and negotiations, the landowners have exercised the option to wait 
several times:
• Developer D was from the very beginning not willing to negotiate;
• Developer C was positive about the initiative, but the negotiations were blocked 
since he did not accept having to sell his land, nor to pay a full contribution;
• Developer B also exercised the option to wait, first, during his negotiations with the 
former landowner of parcel B, one year after moment 0. At that time, the Developer 
B decided to freeze the negotiations with the municipality (when Developer B took 
the initiative at moment 0, he did not own the land). Second, two years later, when 
another developer bought Developer B, the new developer B, who paid a very high 
price for the land, needed higher profit margins and decided to reconsider the plan.
It is clear that there is a strong mutual dependence between de municipality and land­
owners B, C and D. The municipality does not even consider the possibility of buying 
or expropriating parcels C and D. First, the owners say that they are willing to develop 
their land and this hampers expropriation. Second, the Municipality of Sturingerland 
does not have the financial means to do so. Buying or expropriating land in Sturing­
erland is something that only happens in very special circumstances, and, if it occurs, 
just for few plots.
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The consequences for value capturing are important. The municipality is considering 
lowering the requirements (to recover only the costs that can be included in the De­
velopment contributions plan and charged to the landowners, but not the additional 
costs). In the meantime, the process has suffered delays; five years after moment 0 
(when Developer B, not yet the owner of parcel B, took the initiative) still nothing 
has happened, only a lot of deliberation and plan preparation. The price of land has 
risen, and Developer C has sold his land to another developer, for a much higher 
price than the price in the former use. Also, the costs are growing, costs made by 
the municipality (negotiations with Developers B, C and D, some research, negotia­
tions with province about possible subsidies to cover the deficit) and costs made 
by Developer B (negotiations with the Municipality and Developers C and D, some 
research and financial costs derived from the money he had to borrow at year 1 to 
buy parcel B).
9.4.1 Short-term recommendation: assessment of financial 
feasibility
It has already been said that it is often not clear whether the final profit of the devel­
opers could have allowed for higher contributions. In the studied Dutch cases, there 
was little available information, and the developers did not provide much additional 
information. In Kop van Oost and Stationskwartier my own estimates suggest that 
more contributions would have been feasible. Indirect evidence that there might 
have been more financial room than argued by the developers is that in De Funen 
and Kop van Oost, during or after the negotiations, land was sold several times for 
higher prices than the price in the former use.
Municipalities could conduct more research into the profit margins in the early stages 
of development processes, and use this information as a clear and transparent start­
ing point in the negotiations with developers. This research should be made together 
with the first document that creates development expectations, for example in the 
recommended site-specific cost recovery documents mentioned in section 9.1.1.2. 
Stationskwartier could serve as an example. Here the municipality calculated the 
development costs and profits in a business case attached to the 2003 Masterplan 
Centraal Breda, and these calculations served as a starting point in the negotiations, 
in which the municipality might have succeed in getting part of the increased value. 
Municipalities can fine-tune the calculations as negotiations come nearer. This rec­
ommendation is in line with some relevant recent conclusions (Vrom et al., 2008: 
41; Vrom-raad, 2009: 5). Another complementary possibility is that developers are 
required to submit a calculation of the costs and profits (exploitatieopzet) to the mu­
nicipality.
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9.4.2 Short-term recommendation: land readjustment through 
private law agreements, supported by expropriation and 
pre-emption
To avoid the negative consequences of the dependency of municipalities on land­
owners/developers, it is recommended to work with a specific contractual formula, 
inspired by the Valencian land readjustment model. Commercial developers, acting 
as a sort of Valencian urbanizing agent, can agree with landowners that, in exchange 
for sharing development profits, they do not use their option to wait. This recom­
mendation is based not only on the Valencian model, but also on the experience 
with the preparation for the redevelopment of an industrial site of about 16 ha in 
the Municipality of Zevenhuizen-Moerkapelle (Zuidplaspolder, Province of South 
Holland). During 2007 and 2008, I was asked to advise how the owners of the firms 
and the land could themselves regenerate their land by involving a commercial de­
veloper to play the role of an urbanizing agent. Although this experiment failed, the 
experience has served to fine-tune this recommendation (see Annex 7). One of the 
conclusions is that Dutch developers are not always comfortable with the role of 
urbanizing agent, i.e. of a developer that in principle only profits from land develop­
ment, but not from the development of the real estate. This experience has led us to 
refine the recommendation: to carefully select a property developer who is familiar 
with less conservative ways of developing land. A possibility to be seriously taken 
into account is to involve a Valencian urbanizing agent, possibly in partnership with 
a Dutch developer.
The recommendation is to involve landowners in urban development, thus to involve 
them in sharing the land development costs (postings 1 to 7) and the final profits 
(posting 9). This should provide several advantages: (a) it annuls the need to buy the 
land, or at least to buy all the land, as landowners themselves participate in the op­
eration (in Zevenhuizen this could have led to a reduction in the amount of money 
that must be borrowed, by at least € 45.5 million); (b) it reduces the risks of delay re­
sulting from landowners, instead of supporting the operation, behaving in an strategic 
way (i.e. waiting) to obtain the highest possible price for their land; (c) a and b should 
considerably reduce the costs of the operation: there should be no need to buy land 
in advance (posting 1), and it should reduce the amounts reserved for unexpected 
expenses (posting 2, in Zevenhuizen this could have led to a reduction of about € 
1.15 million) and the plan preparation costs (posting 3); (d) c should considerably 
reduce the financial costs (in Zevenhuizen this could have led to a reduction of at 
least € 14.3 million), as there is need of less external financing. But, how does one 
convince landowners to share the risks and the profits?
Plan documents
First, two plan documents must be prepared, which will form the basis for anterior 
Development agreements I and II (see under):
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Land use plan (Bestemmingsplan)
The municipality and/or the urbanizing agent must prepare a draft of a Map (Plankaart) 
of the Land use plan, detailing the following aspects:
° The zoning of land uses, building alignments and building envelopes;
° The volume of the building, per land use.
If detailed prescriptions are not possible, the draft must at least prescribe the mini­
mum building volume and the approximate location of serviced building parcels5. 
The goal of these documents is to sufficiently support the negotiations around Agree­
ment I (see below): at that time, it must be possible to provide details to the land­
owner about the serviced building plots and the building volume which he/she can 
expect if he/she signs the agreement.
Draft plan infrastructure provision works
This is similar to the Valencian Infrastructure Provision Project (Anteproyecto de Ur­
banización), and includes: (a) a scheme of the infrastructure, with a description of 
those elements that determine the total costs, such as the quality of the public space; 
(b) a scheme of the sewerage network; (c) a scheme of the road network and the other 
facilities; (d) a description of existing infrastructure networks, and the feasibility and 
the costs of connection to the new development. In principle, it is the urbanizing 
agent who should prepare this document, as it requires his/her expertise in cost cal­
culations and full commitment to the calculations.
Anterior Development agreement I: urbanizing agent-landowners
The urbanizing agent proposes Agreement I to the landowners. This can be done indi­
vidually, whereby the developer separately proposes Agreement I to each landowner. 
Alternatively, or complementarily, landowners might join an ad hoc organization, 
similar to the Valencian Association of Urban Interest (Asociación de Interés Urbanís­
tico), which would deal with the urbanizing agent. In the experiment in Zevenhui­
zen, landowners have joined in a cooperative (see Annex 7). A combination of both 
is possible: the urbanizing agent could deal with both an organization of the major­
ity of landowners and with individual landowners who opt not to join the ad hoc 
organization.
5 Before deciding for a detailed or for an Outline Land use plan, one important aspect should be 
considered: the degree of detail in a Land use plan can have consequences for the calculation of the 
compensation that landowners should receive in case of expropriation of their land. In an Outline 
Land use plan, the compensation is an average of the whole plan area (the so-called complexwaarde), 
which means that the owner of the land for the profitable construction receives less than in case of 
a Detailed Land use plan. In a Detailed Land use plan, the compensation is calculated based on 
smaller areas, which means that the owner of the land for the profitable construction receives an 
average of the values of similar plots of land, e.g. land zoned for profitable housing, but not land 
zoned for a park (Needham & Geuting, 2006: 4). In case municipalities want to use expropriation to 
stimulate landowners to collaborate, an Outline Land use plan could be more useful than a Detailed 
Land use plan.
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In Agreement I, the urbanizing agent agrees with the landowners/cooperative, to pro­
vide himself the infrastructure and produce serviced building parcels for a given price 
and within a given deadline. This requires the following ingredients to be included in 
the Agreement: (i) a calculation of the total land development costs, i.e. the infrastruc­
ture provision costs, the costs of preparing plans, compensation costs, eventual soil 
decontamination costs, possible additional contributions to public infrastructure and 
facilities (postings of the sort 2-6, see financial analysis in section 2.4.3); (ii) the cir­
cumstances under which these costs can be reviewed and how this review should take 
place; (iii) the regular profit margin of the urbanizing agent (included in posting 2); (iv) a 
calculation of the share each landowner will have to pay; (v) the method of payment (in 
money or in kind -in serviced building parcels); and (vi) the implementation schedules. 
The experience in Zevenhuizen, where it took more than one year before there was 
certainty about which contributions the landowners should pay (see Annex 7), leads 
me to ascertain the importance of the recommendation given in section 9.1.1 : it is im­
portant that, before the elaboration of the plan documents and the negotiations, there is 
already certainty about at least the contributions that should be made. In other words, 
before the urbanizing agent starts elaborating the plan documents and negotiating, the 
municipality must clearly define and publicly announce the required contributions.
Also, the agreement must include a set of rules for the land readjustment. These 
rules must be specific enough to make clear to the landowner the main features of 
the serviced building parcels he can expect to receive under the Agreement. Possibly, 
the Agreement can include a provisional proposal for readjustment that specifies the 
number, location and dimensions of the new parcels, and which landowner is going 
to receive them.
In exchange, the landowners agree with the urbanizing agent to provide their land 
and pay their share of the costs within a given deadline, for example to pay in instal­
ments while the infrastructure provision works are being carried out. A variant of this 
is to agree payment in kind, i.e. the landowners transfer to the urbanizing agent part 
of the final serviced building parcels as payment. For this purpose, the urbanizing 
agent should make explicit in Agreement I the price of the serviced parcels, and/or 
negotiate a price separately with each landowner or group of landowners.
Anterior Development agreement II: urbanizing agent-municipality
The urbanizing agent agrees with the municipality the following: (a) possibly, in case 
of an outline Land use plan, to prepare afterwards a detailed plan and submit it to the 
municipality; (b) possibly, in case there are some landowners not willing to partici­
pate, to prepare the expropriation dossier and to pay the compensation; (c) to provide 
the infrastructure according to the Draft plan infrastructure provision; (d) to maintain 
the public infrastructure until it is transferred to the municipality; (e) implementation 
schedules; (f) the circumstances under which the agreement ceases to be in force; 
and (g) a scheme of monetary and non-monetary penalties for the case of not fulfill­
ing the agreement.
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In exchange, the municipality agrees with the urbanizing agent the following: (a) to 
exert all reasonable efforts to process and approve the Land use plan and possibly a 
detailed plan and a Development contributions plan; (b) to apply pre-emption rights 
(voorkeursrecht) on the industrial site, which means that the municipality can block 
the selling of land, and make the selling of land conditional on sealing anterior De­
velopment agreement I; (c) possibly and if necessary, to use all reasonable efforts to 
expropriate the property of non-collaborating landowners; (d) possibly and if neces­
sary, to use all reasonable efforts to facilitate the relationship between the urbaniz­
ing agent and the public utilities companies; (e) to accept the public infrastructure 
once it is finished and to assume thereafter responsibility for maintenance (an option, 
in case costs of maintenance could be agreed in an anterior Agreement, is also to 
agree here and in Agreement I a contribution by the landowners/developer to future 
maintenance costs, posting 6); and (f) the circumstances under which the agreement 
ceases to be in force.
Stimulating and enforcing agreement
The feasibility of this recommendation depends on agreement, because the landown­
ers, the urbanizing agent and the municipality must all agree. Dutch municipalities 
should use some instruments to stimulate landowners to cooperate:
1. Municipalities can make the processing and approval of the Land use plan (or 
possibly the outline Land use plan) conditional on the landowners' and the ur­
banizing agent's signing of the agreements (see section 9.3.1 for details of how 
to do that);
2. Municipalities can settle pre-emption rights on the development area and make 
the selling of land and removal of pre-emption conditional on agreeing with the 
anterior Development agreement I;
3. In case a minority of landowners oppose, municipalities can use the Devel­
opment contributions plan as an enforcement instrument. The Development 
contributions plan can reinforce the possibility of municipalities to expropri­
ate those landowners who oppose implementation. Municipalities can include 
in the Development contributions plan a clear scheme of implementation and 
the moment at which the landowner has to apply for a building permit and pay 
his/her contribution. Once the opposing landowner pays his/her contribution 
to the municipality, the municipality gives the money to the other landowners 
who have to assume all the costs. If an opposing landowner does not apply for 
a building permit on time, municipalities could consider expropriation. Munici­
palities can even announce publicly in the early stages that they intend to apply 
expropriation in case of delay, which might have a dissuasive effect. In a possible 
expropriation procedure, the landowner can declare that he/she is willing to 
implement. However, if he/she does not apply for a building permit (and pay the 
corresponding contribution) within the deadlines included in the Development 
contributions plan, municipalities have good arguments for executing expropria­
tion (Verdaas, interview in 2007; Van Gelder, interview in 2008; Vrom et al., 
2008: 207). There is even the possibility of accelerating the expropriation pro­
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cedure, provided that no appeals against the Development contributions plan 
have been submitted concerning the plot to be expropriated (Vrom et al., 2008: 
206-207);
Side effects
This recommendation has some side effects, mainly because the enforcement instru­
ment implies the possible approval of a Development contributions plan and expro­
priation:
• Approving a Development contributions plan, as demonstrated in section 9.3.1, 
involves financial risks, direct organizational involvement of the public bodies 
and allows less public value capturing than in case of an anterior Development 
agreement;
• In principle, the Agreement cannot contradict any of the prescriptions included 
in the Development contributions plan (Vrom et al., 2008: 34; Kluwer, 2008: 
132). This means that some of the contributions agreed in the Agreement might 
be nullified after the approval of the plan;
• Expropriation increases the financial risks because compensation follows market 
values after regeneration, i.e. the value takes account of an important part of the 
future building possibilities. Expropriation takes place once the Land use plan 
is already approved, and hence when future building possibilities are already 
certain and land prices inflated. This problem can be partly resolved if the sec­
ond recommendation in section 9.2 (introducing legal modification that allow for 
assessment of land value according to the market value of land use prior to re­
zoning) is introduced. A lower compensation would diminish the financial risks; 
however, as compensations must be paid in advance, there are still associated 
financial risks.
• Even with lower compensations, expropriation may be an unpopular instrument 
politically. In the studied Dutch cases, municipalities considered it only in very 
exceptional circumstances, such as to expropriate some marginal land in case 
landowners clearly opposed and delayed development. Expropriation of a sub­
stantial part of the land seems not to be an option in Dutch practice. In none of 
the examined cases in which developers exercised their option to wait (i.e. De 
Funen, Kop van Oost and probably Stationskwartier), was the municipality able 
to bear the financial responsibility of expropriating the land, especially because 
the developers owned most of the land (most of it in De Funen, 60% in Kop van 
Oost and 80% in Stationskwartier). In all the three cases, expropriation was not 
an alternative in the first place because the landowners themselves expressed 
willingness to develop.
Considerations about the feasibility o f the recommendation
In principle, this recommendation fits within existing planning law because it is pri­
marily based on private law agreements. However, it involves a new approach in 
Dutch practice and this encounters some difficulties. The experience in Zevenhui­
zen illustrates these very well. In Zevenhuizen, the plan documents described above
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have been elaborated, but they were not detailed enough in their contents because 
the developer did not spend enough money on elaborating them. The consequence 
was that the involved parties never reached the recommended agreements. It is im­
portant to remember that in the Netherlands, unlike in Valencia, planning law does 
not regulate the prescribed content of these documents, so it is free for developers 
to decide. Without detailed documents and without the agreements, there was too 
much uncertainty for landowners to decide. Also, the municipality needed a long 
time to decide on the needed contributions, and then hesitated to proceed further. 
As a consequence, the experiment in Zevenhuizen failed. See Annex 7 for a more 
detailed explanation of the specific mismatches with the above recommendation that 
can explain the failure of this experiment.
EXAMPLE URBAN REGENERATION IN STURINGERLAND, Part Ten 
Continuation of Scenario II, in which Developer B did not succeed in buying all the 
land for a low price (see Part Nine of the example): there is enough support for land 
readjustment through private law agreements
The Municipality of Sturingerland and Developer B conclude that, if nothing changes, 
regeneration will last for years. They decide to apply land readjustment through private 
law agreements. Developer B makes a draft Land use plan and calculates the costs of 
land development. He offers, in anterior Agreement I, to Developers C and D that they 
will each pay, proportionally to the area of their land, the costs of developing the land 
(postings 2-6, see financial analysis in section 2.4.3) and Developer B will provide the 
land that is needed for public infrastructure and facilities. Developer B also proposes a 
schedule for the payments and transfer of land. As compensation, developers C and D 
will receive serviced building parcels. To compensate for differences in the economic 
value of the resulting building parcels (half of parcel C is zoned for a school, and most 
of parcel D is zoned for a park, see map 1a), Agreement I includes land readjustment 
rules: each developer will receive building parcels with an economic value propor­
tional to their share. This means that developers C and D will each receive a building 
plot on parcels A and B.
In addition, developer B and the municipality agree in anterior Agreement II the mutual 
obligations: the developer will prepare the draft Land use plan and the municipality 
will process the plan. In addition, they agree an option that Developer B will buy par­
cel A, which is municipal property.
Initially, Developer C rejects the proposal because he is not willing to pay all the 
costs. Without the support of at least Developer C there is no hope. The municipality 
settles a pre-emption right on the whole plan area, and makes clear that this right will 
be revoked, and the Land use plan will be modified, only when and if Agreement I is 
signed. It is also helpful that the Parliament has recently decided to enlarge the lists of
346 Recommendations
recoverable costs through a Development contributions plan (see the first part of the 
second recommendation in section 9.2). Developer C realizes that there are not longer 
differences between paying through a Development contributions plan and through 
an anterior Agreement. Municipality and Developers B and C negotiate and finally 
Developer C signs Agreement I.
Developer D is more difficult to persuade. He is not willing to pay any contribution, 
and does not give in to the pressure. The municipality decides to approve, together 
with the Land use plan, a Development contributions plan including detailed sched­
ules for the payments. The municipality announces expropriation in case developer D 
does not apply for the building permit and pay his contribution on time.
Developer B constructs the public infrastructure on parcels A, B and C, and developer 
C contributes with money and with land. Because the approval of the Development 
contributions plan has invalidated part of Agreement II in parcel D, the municipality 
has to assume part of the costs. Fortunately, thanks to the recent legislative changes 
about the costs that can be charged through a Development contributions plan, the 
municipality has to assume lower costs than without those legislative changes. Never­
theless, the municipality must assume some costs. In addition, the following happens: 
Developer D refuses to apply for a building permit on time. Now, the municipality can 
argue that Developer D is not willing to implement, and expropriates his parcel. Fol­
lowing Agreement II Developer B receives parcel D and pays the compensation. This 
increases his risks: he already bought parcels A and B, the process has lasted for years, 
and now he also has to pay expensive compensation for parcel D. Compensation is 
expensive because the Expropriation Act prescribes that it must follow the market value 
of the land use after regeneration. In case Parliament agrees with the second part of the 
second recommendation in section 9.2, expropriation will be cheaper, but Developer 
B must still advance more investments and assume higher risks and financial costs. As 
a consequence, Developer B must renegotiate the quality of the public infrastructure 
and diminish his contributions. The Municipality, which realizes that the financial fea­
sibility is under strong pressure, accepts reluctantly these modifications. It will have to 
either subsidize more costs, or just accept a lower quality of the public infrastructure 
and facilities. Developer B constructs the park and the basketball playfield on parcel D. 
Finally Developer B transfers the public infrastructure to the municipality.
9.4.3 Long-term recommendation: land readjustment 
regulation
As illustrated above, there are not many possibilities for the municipality to avoid 
dependency on the landowners, and the only ultimate enforcement mechanism is 
expensive expropriation. In order to have an alternative to expropriation, the Dutch
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central government can introduce a land readjustment regulation in planning law. 
The idea is that, in addition to the possibility of expropriation, municipalities have 
also the alternative of land readjustment. Complementary to the possibility of expro­
priating the land and paying compensation in money, municipalities should then be 
able to oblige those landowners who want to share development profits, to provide 
land and contribute to the costs, in exchange for serviced building parcels. The pro­
posed regulation, inspired by the Valencian land readjustment, includes the follow­
ing features:
• The one who provides the infrastructure and organizes the land readjustment 
is a third party, not necessarily one of the landowners. This third party can be a 
public or a private body playing the role of urbanizing agent;
• The municipality selects the urbanizing agent based on the qualities and the 
costs of the submitted plan for the infrastructure provision. Possibly, in case the 
urbanizing agent also prepares the Land use plan, the municipality will also 
evaluate this plan;
• Landowners must provide the land necessary for public infrastructure and facili­
ties, and pay, in instalments during the works, the costs (postings 2-6, see finan­
cial analysis section 2.4.3). In exchange they receive serviced building parcels.
• The regulation includes the possibility of applying compulsory land readjustment.
Considerations about the feasibility of introducing a public law  land readjustment 
regulation
The current level of protection of property rights in the Netherlands implies strong 
legal and procedural guarantees in the expropriation procedure. The land readjust­
ment procedure in Valencia also requires extensive procedural and legal guaran­
tees. However, introducing a land readjustment regulation in the Netherlands could 
encounter political resistance because landowners are accustomed to enjoying a 
stronger position.
EXAMPLE URBAN REGENERATION IN STURINGERLAND, Part Eleven
Continuation of Scenario II, in which Developer B did not succeed in buying all the 
land for a low price (see Parts Nine and Ten): there is not enough support for land 
readjustment through private law agreements, so the central government introduces 
a public law land readjustment regulation.
Developers C and D do not agree with Agreement I, despite the pressures. The only 
choice for the Municipality of Sturingerland is to approve the Development contribu­
tions plan and assume the corresponding risks and deficit, and possibly to expropriate
parcels C and D. However, this means assuming a large part of the costs and expro­
priating half of the plan area. The Municipality decides to halt the efforts to redevelop 
the site.
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The Dutch central government, based on this and other experiences of frustrated ur­
ban regeneration, decides to introduce a land readjustment regulation in planning 
law. Now the Municipality of Sturingerland can apply land readjustment. Developer 
B submits his proposal (Land use plan & infrastructure provision costs & proposals of 
Agreements I and II). The Municipality, after considering the proposal, decides to or­
ganize a public tender. Any party is eligible to submit an alternative plan. Developer C 
submits an own proposal. Developer X, who has no land, also submits a proposal. The 
Municipality evaluates the three proposals and draws the conclusion that Developer X 
has the best plan, followed by Developer B. Developer C has the worst plan, because 
it offers less contributions than the others. The Municipality finally decides to select 
the proposal of Developer B, because one of the selection criteria gives preference to 
landowners.
Once Developer B has been selected as urbanizing agent, developer C finally agrees 
with Agreement I. Developer D still does not want to collaborate. Developer B sub­
mits a Land Readjustment plan to the Municipality, a plan that includes the contribu­
tions and the land that developer D has to deliver. The Municipality approves it, after 
which Developer D decides to collaborate. He provides part of his land (the land 
needed for the park and basketball playfield) and pays his contribution. Finally he 
receives the same reimbursement as Developers B and C: building parcels with an 
economic value that corresponds to his proportional share in the development. This 
means that he receives a building parcel in parcel D, and another one in either parcels 
A or parcel B.
9.5 Epilogue
The way planning policy is implemented in the Netherlands has changed dramati­
cally in the last decades. Until the end of the 80's and the start of the 90s, there was 
a predominance of public parties in land development. Today, private parties are 
taking over the lead, also implying a transition from public to private ownership of 
development land. This change has been fuelled by the diminishing of public subsi­
dization and the need for public parties get rid of the financial risks involved in land 
development. However, practice in urban regeneration shows that this privatization 
has not reduced the need for public subsidization and has not produced new neigh­
bourhoods with public infrastructure and facilities of high quality. Instead, due to a 
lack of good regulation, the change has resulted in an increase in land speculation, 
high development costs and the leaking away of the increased value. Both public and 
private parties are at a disadvantage: public bodies still must subsidize, and private 
parties are confronted with high costs and risks. The general public is also at a disad­
vantage: there is a general dissatisfaction with the public infrastructure and facilities 
in new neighbourhoods.
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The Dutch central government has made efforts to solve this problem, the most rel­
evant effort being the 2008 Land Development Act (Grondexploitatiewet). This act 
consists of a timid step that, if developed and brought to its ultimate consequences, 
might help in some cases to regulate the private implementation of planning policy 
in a more effective way. However, this act, in its present form, will not resolve all 
the problems by far. Probably it was very hard for the legislator to introduce all the 
necessary changes. After all, the Dutch planning system, as in any other country, 
consists of close interrelated sets of rules, customs and interests. In addition, there 
is in the Netherlands no long experience of public regulation when there is private 
predominance in land development. However, instead of looking abroad to other 
countries with more experience in this, the Dutch legislator, consciously or not, in­
herited and assumed several Dutch paradigms without a fundamental, critical view 
of them. First, the predominant normative paradigm in the Netherlands that the land­
owner is the only legitimate owner of the value increase. Here the legislator over­
looked, for reasons obvious in the Dutch context, another possibility that is popular 
in other European countries: that public bodies also have right to a share of the value 
increase. Second, the Dutch legislator assumed, with the Dutch experience in public 
land policy in mind, the paradigm that the only way of enforcing an adequate private 
involvement must be a direct and financial involvement of public bodies. The transla­
tion of both paradigms in the 2008 Land Development Act has resulted in an unnec­
essarily complex set of legal instruments that charges municipalities with too many 
tasks and risks - too many in the light of their capacities. The experience in England 
and Spain shows that when private parties control the land, public regulation must 
be based on simple and clear roles: public bodies regulate beforehand, private bod­
ies implement and assume all the corresponding risks. Public bodies must clarify the 
rules under which private parties operate, leaving less room for discretion during the 
negotiations with landowners and property developers. Instead, the Dutch legislator 
chose the most difficult path: obliging public bodies to assume direct responsibility, 
costs and risks in land development. In addition, the 2008 Act does not answer the 
most fundamental challenge: how to dissuade land speculation and divert part of the 
value increase to finance public infrastructure and facilities.
The international financial and economic crisis is exasperating the shortcoming of not 
being able to finance the public infrastructure and facilities with the economic value 
increase that arises when land is rezoned. The size of the public expenditure meant 
to fight the economic crisis has no precedent. Also the Netherlands has introduced 
massive investment programs to postpone budgetary cuts, save banks and industries 
and pump money in the economy. However, that large public expenditure will lead 
to a long period of cuts in public budgets. In the Netherlands, from 2011 onwards, 
public bodies will severely cut their expenditure, and since 2009 many municipali­
ties are already suffering serious cuts. Most probably, theses cuts will adversely af­
fect the subsidization of urban planning and, especially, of urban regeneration. This 
reduction in public funds takes place at the same time as the Dutch governments are 
pursuing the ambitious goal to give priority to the regeneration of old and deteriorat­
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ed urban areas instead of greenfield developments. This is additionally problematic 
because urban regeneration is easier to say than to do, as it usually involves more 
costs than greenfield development, at least in the short term. The concurrence of 
these two factors (public budgetary cuts and renewed focus on urban regeneration) 
is placing urban development and its quality under serious pressure. The risk is that, 
due to absence of adequate funds, the development and quality of the new urban 
areas will suffer. This makes it necessary to improve the capturing of value increase 
in order to finance public infrastructure and facilities.
This research seeks to provide an answer to this need. As the examples of England 
and Spain show, it is possible to improve the situation. It is true that the economic 
crisis can delay improvement: it shall take indeed some time until landowners, de­
velopers and investors accept that their land is over-assessed. But finally they will 
assume (and some of them are already assuming) that land must be entered for lower 
prices in the accounts of urban projects. It is important that public bodies introduce 
soon the recommendations in this chapter 9 in order to a) divert part of the released 
value increase towards the public goals; b) to lower land development costs; c) and 
to prevent landowners, developers and investors from again over-assessing their land 
once market prices recover in the future!
The recommendations in chapter 9 follow a gradual approach, from voluntary meas­
ures that fit within the 2008 Land Development Act, to more profound, legal modifi­
cations for the longer term. The recommendations focus first on helping public bod­
ies, especially municipalities, to fully take advantage of the opportunities offered in 
the 2008 Land Development Act. If municipalities act appropriately, they can signifi­
cantly improve the capturing of value increases. At the same time, there are serious 
limitations of the Act and it is not likely that all municipalities will be able to fulfil all 
the requirements that are needed to fully take advantage of the Act. Therefore, I have 
also provided recommendations that aim to address the legal limitations. In this, I 
have tried to propose changes of the law only where this was strictly necessary, and 
to stay as much as possible within the existing legal framework. Finally, conscious of 
the fact that there are limitations that cannot be resolved with timid modifications, 
also more fundamental long-term legislative changes are offered.


Annex 1: Check lists
Check-list Preparatory Research Question 1
These are the sub-variables of the independent variable 'formal rules relevant to zoning', and the check­
lists that were handled to gather the data for Preparatory Research Question 1:
Where (in which planning documents) are the relevant binding rules brought into force?
First, all sorts of planning documents have been studied that might bear legally binding rules for the use 
of land. Here this research operated with the methodological principle of comparative law, 'functional­
ity', which states that in law the only things that are comparable are those that fulfill the same function 
(Zweigert & Kötz, 1998: 34-35). In this case the common function was that of bearing binding rules.
Second, those sorts of planning documents have been selected that might be relevant for this research 
project: (1) they might be operationally used by the local authorities, from which follows that the com­
petences of making and/or approving them have to be in the hands of those local public authorities. It 
also follows that local public authorities need room for a certain amount of discretion when deciding 
whether or not to approve them; (2) the planning documents can imply a substantial modification of the 
land use possibilities, as to have a clear effect on the value of the property.
When (in relation to the negotiations) are the relevant binding rules approved?
The following aspects have been studied: First the procedure of approval: which steps form the pro­
cedure? How long does it take to make and approve the relevant binding rules? Second the moment 
of formal approval, with regard to: the negotiations between the local authority and the developers/ 
landowners and the start of the works. Third the legal constraints regarding the moment of approval: do 
land use plans have obligatorily to cover the whole municipal territory? And does planning law conceive
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land use plans as a procedural chain among other planning instruments, and fix the moment in which 
they must be approved?
What are the possibly contents of the relevant binding rules?
Not all possible contents of binding rules are important. Only those aspects are studied that could be 
relevant for public value capturing: land-use classes (housing, office, industry, public space, open space: 
are they fixed in the law?); building envelope (length, width, and height); price category of housing (so­
cial or free market housing); distinction between rented and owner occupied housing; temporal regula­
tions (when to start and/or to finish the infrastructure provision and the building); financial contributions 
or other kind of contributions (contributions in kind such as infrastructure provision, construction of 
public facilities, etc, contributions in money, in land, damage compensation); development agreements 
that secure the contributions?
Who has the right to implement the relevant binding rules?
To whom belong the development rights? To the landowner, to the developer, to the municipality or to 
a combination of them? To make the question more specific, the sub-variable has focussed on five dif­
ferent questions:
1. Who has the control on each of the six transactions in development processes?
2. Which are the resources (material and regulatory resources) needed for each of the transactions?
3. H ow  are these resources distributed between the involved parties?
4. What are the dependence patterns that result from the allocation of resources?
5. Are these dependence patterns avoidable?
These questions might have a different answer depending on the specific formula of development. E.g. 
it is different if land is owned by commercial developers that if it is owned by the municipality. Three 
scenarios have been considered:
• Fully private development: private actors develop the location, also the public infrastructure. The 
land, or a majority of it, is in their hands;
• Private development with public infrastructure provision: land, or a majority of it, is in private hands, 
and the developer produces serviced plots and develops the building. However, a public authority 
plays an active role by providing part or all the public infrastructure;
• Public development: a public authority develops the location. It acquires the land, invests in infra­
structure provision and, finally, sells the serviced building plots.
How flexible are the relevant binding rules?
Related to the procedural guarantees, these aspects have been studied:
(1) Have initiative takers right to a proper municipal decision?
(2) Have initiative takers right to appeal against the municipal decision?
Related to the flexibility of modification, three aspects have been researched:
(1) W hat are the procedural requirements of modifying (wijziging in Dutch);
(2) Departing from (vrijstelling) and
(3) Detailing (uitwerking) the existing binding rules?
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Related to the flexibility to approve binding rules gradually, three aspects have been researched:
(1) The rules for the delimitation of the geographical scope of the plan areas;
(2) Whether there is a maximum allowed number of different binding rules documents per area;
(3) Whether municipalities were free to approve the detailing of global plans.
Check-list Preparatory Research Question 2
These are the sub-variables of the dependent variable 'capturing of value increase' and the check-lists 
that were handled to gather the data for Preparatory Research Question 2:
Who pays the following value capturing goals?
These are: on-site land development costs; land needed for on-site public infrastructure and facilities; 
on-site public facilities (public buildings); on-site and off-site social/affordable housing; off-site public 
infrastructure and facilities; and creaming off betterment.
Are the value capturing topics implemented on time?
More specifically: have the deadlines for the implementation of the value capturing goals been achieved 
or not? This regards both the deadlines included in development agreements and in the binding rules.
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Annex 2: Planning legislation
Planning legislation in the Spanish region ofValencia
This is the most important body of legislation directly related to urban development (Parejo & Blanc,
1999: 25):
1. National legislation: 1954 Expropriation Act (Ley de Expropiación Forzosa); 1956 Land Act (Ley del 
Suelo); 1976 Refunded Act (Texto Refundido de la Ley del Suelo 1976) of the 1975 Land use and Ur­
ban Planning Act (Ley sobre el Régimen del Suelo y  Ordenación Urbana); 1978 Planning Regulation 
(Reglamento de Planeamiento); 1992 Refunded Act (Texto Refundido de la Ley del Suelo 1992) of 
the 1990 Land use and Urban Planning Act (Ley sobre el Régimen del Suelo y  Ordenación Urbana); 
1998 Land Use Planning and Appraisal Act (Ley sobre Régimen del Suelo y  Valoraciones); 1999 
Building Act (Ley de Ordenación de la Edificación); 2003 Urgent Liberalisation Measures on Real 
Estate and Transport Sectors Act (Ley de medidas urgentes de liberalización en el sector inmobiliario 
y transportes); 2007 Land Act (Ley de suelo); Some environmental and sectorial legislation, that 
might also rule the land-use: Water Act (Ley de Aguas); Coasts Act (Ley de Costas); Natural Espaces, 
and W ild  Flora and Fauna Conservation Act (Ley de Conservación de los Espacios Naturales y  de la 
Flora y Fauna Silvestres).
2. Valencian legislation: 1990 Nomenclator of Nuisance Activities Decree (Nomenclátor de activi­
dades molestas, insalubres, nocivas y peligrosas); 1994 Planning Act (Ley Reguladora de la Activi­
dad Urbanística, LRAU), substituted in 2006 by the 2005 Planning Act (Ley Urbanística Valenciana, 
LUV); 1998 Planning Regulation (Reglamento de Planeamiento), substituted in 2006 by a new Plan­
ning Regulation (Reglamento de Ordenación y Gestión Territorial y  Urbanística); 1999 Standard 
Building Regulation Order (Reglamento de Zonas de Ordenación Urbanística); 2004 Territory and 
Landscape Act (Ley del Territorio y  el Paisaje); 2006 Landscape Regulation (Reglamento del Paisaje); 
2006 Golf Courses Act (Ley de los Campos de Golf).
Planning legislation in England
This is the most important body of legislation directly related to urban development in England (W il­
liams & Wood, 1994: 68; Evans & Davoudi, 2005: 25; Cullingworth & Nadin, 2006: 533-535):
1. Basic legislation, issued by the UK Parliament: Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (TCP); Listed 
Building and Conservation Act 1990 (LBCA); Planning and Compensation Act 1991; Planning and 
Compulsory Purchase Act 2004;
2. Statutory Instruments, issued through delegated legislative powers:
a) Regulations: Town and Country Planning (Modification And Discharge Of Planning Obliga­
tions) Regulations 1992; Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) 
(England and Wales) Regulations 1999;
b) Orders: Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987; Town and Country Planning 
(General Development Procedure) Order 1995;
3. 'Circulars' or 'Policy Guidance notes': Circular 15/92, 'Publicity for Planning Applications'; Circular 
11/95, 'Use of conditions in planning permission'; O D PM  Circular 05/2005, 'Planning obligations', 
which substituted the previous Circular 1/97;
4. Planning policy guidance notes (PPGs), Minerals policy guidance notes (MPGs) and Planning Policy
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Statements (PPS): there are many of them. In 2005, there were 25 PPGs and 17 MPGs. PPG's are 
nowaday being gradually replaced by the PPSs. Important PPG's and PPSs are: PPG3 "Housing", 
published in 2000; PPS11 "Regional Spatial Strategies', published in 2004; PPS12 "Local Develop­
ment Frameworks", published in 2004.
Planning legislation in the Netherlands
This is the most relevant body of legislation on planning that might be involved in urban development 
(Needham et al., 1993: 23 and 48-54; Hijmans and Gerzon, 1995: 30-32; Klaassen, 2000: 28 and 487): 
Physical Planning Act (Wet op de Ruimtelijke Ordening), approved in 1962, substantially modified in 
1985 and the last time on 1 July 2008; 2008 Land Development Act (Grondexploitatiewet), included in 
articles 6.12-6.24 of the 2008 Physical Planning Act; Physical Planning Decree (Besluit op de Ruimte­
lijke Ordening), approved in 1985 and modified significantly in 2008; 2001 Building Decree (Bouw­
besluit); Housing Act (Woningwet), approved in 1901 and substantially modified in 1992; Town and Vil­
lage Regeneration Act (Wet op de Stads- en Dorpsvernieuwing) and the Town and Village Regeneration 
Decree (Besluit op de Stads- en Dorpsvernieuwing), introduced both in 1985; 2000 Urban Regeneration 
Act (Wet Stedelijke vernieuwing); Monuments Act (Monumentenwet), approved in 1961 and modified 
substantially in 1988; Act General Administrative Law (Algemene wet bestuursrecht, Awb); Civil Code 
(Burgelijk Wetboek); Expropriation Act (Onteigeningswet).
Some environmental legislation and other sectorial legislation also regulate the use of land: Noise Nui­
sance Act (Wet Geluidhinder), Soil Protection Act (Wet Bodembescherming), Superficial Water Contami­
nation Act (Wet Verontreiniging Oppervlaktewateren), Atmospheric Contamination Act (Wet Inzake de 
Luchtverontreiniging), Underground Water Act (Grondwaterwet), Environment Management Act (Wet 
Milieubeheer), Railway Act (Spoorwegwet), Roads Act (Wegenwet) and Traffic Act (Wegenverkeerswet).
Annex 3: Development costs and returns in the English cases
Megabowl Temple Quay Harbourside
Paid by 
developer
Paid by 
public bodies
Paid by 
developer
Paid by 
public bodies
Paid by developer Paid by 
public bodies
1) Land costs €11 m 1 N o data 
available
No data 
available
Not available
2-3) Infra prov and plan preparation costs 
(€/m2 new public space; total redeveloped land)
€1,2 m 2 €0.1 m Estimation: €8mJ €0.2 m €12 .54 €0.6m 5
(€1 53/m2; €99/m2)
(€2 69/m2; €111/m2) (€332/m2; €1 66/m2)
4) Soil decontamination costs Estimation: €5m €1 5 m
5) Compensation costs Estimation: 
probably no/low
Estimation: 
probably no/low
6) Additional contributions of developer €1,7 m6 About €6m7 €3 3 m8
7) Real Estate development costs 
Average costs (C/m2 floor space)9
€1 3.2m (€985/ 
m2)10
Estimation:
€114m 
(€1,000/m2)11
Estimation: €123m 
(€1,000/m2)12
8) Total returns €37.1 in13 €409m14 €404in15
9) Developer's Final Profit 
(incl/excl the price paid for the land)
€1 Om
(incl land price)
€2 76m
(excl. land price)
€2 20m
(excl. land price)
1. The price paid for the possible purchase of land;
2-3. Infrastructure provision and plan preparation costs: this includes the whole development up to the delivery of serviced building plots, thus not only the infrastructure provi­
sion works, but also the preparation of plans, reserved amounts for unexpected expenses, the overhead costs, possible 'hidden' profit margins of the developer, etc. It is not 
known whether the figures include or exclude the financial costs.
4. Soil decontamination costs.
5. Compensation costs: this includes compensation to existing owners and inhabitants, for removal of activities and residence, demolition of constructions and buildings, etc.
6. Additional contributions of the developer: contributions, in cash or in kind (constructions, buildings) to public goals (payments, construction of public infrastructure or public 
buildings, etc) additional to his contributions to the on-site infrastructure provision costs (even if they might serve a wider area than the development in question), which are 
already included in (2).
7. Real Estate development costs: this includes the whole development of the real estate, thus not only the building costs, but also the preparation of plans, overhead costs, pos­
sible 'hidden' profit margins of the developer, etc;
8. Total returns: the total returns accruing from the selling of the real estate (office, dwellings, etc).
9. Developer's Final Profits: 8 - [1dev + 2-3dev + 4dev + 5dev + 6dev + 7dev], This regards the profits of the developer, i.e. it excludes the possibility of costs paid by public bodies.
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1 € 11 m is the price paid by a developer to the landowner after agreement was achieved about the contributions. The minimum land cost (the value of the land taking into account 
only the use of the site as bowling alley) was € 3-4.5m. Change rate € 1.5 per £ 1.
2 Megabowl: This information is based on an assessment given by the consultancy that assesses the developer. Own assessment of compensation costs is that they are not 
significant, as there are no contracts that must be cancelled and the existing building belonged to the developer. Also, soil decontamination costs are probably nothing or very 
low. Calculation average costs, with possible but improbable compensation and soil decontamination costs: €1,3m : 8,500 m2 new public space (65% total plan area Planning 
Permission) = €1 53/m2 public space; Or €1,3m : 13,104 m2 total redeveloped land (100% total plan area Planning Permission) = €99/m2 total redeveloped land.
3 Temple Quay: figures were not available, this is an own estimation, based on these assumptions: (1 ) probably there are no compensation costs (as most of the former industrial 
buildings and premises were already demolished); (2) Infrastructure provision costs are an own estimation based on costs in Megabowl and Harbourside. Calculation average 
costs, excl. soil decontamination costs, inel. possible but improbable compensation costs: €8.2m : 30,400 m2 new public space (55% plan area, minus an existing school, which 
will remain untouched) = €269/m2; Or €8.2m : 74,000 n f total redeveloped land (100% total plan area, includes existing school) = €111/m2. About 66,000 of the 74,000 m2 of 
the total plan area has been effectively redeveloped. The other ca. 8,000 m2 correspond to an existing school of which only part has been refurbished. Possible explanation for 
relatively high costs: figures are an estimation based on figures of Megabowl, plus better quality for the public space.
4 Harbourside: probably there are no compensation costs (as most of the area was not anymore in use); Figures are based on information given by the developer and the public 
officer. Calculation average costs, with possible but improbable compensation costs: €1 3.1m : 39,500 m2 new public space (50% total plan area) = €332/m2 new public space; 
Or €1 3.1m : 78,900 m2 total redeveloped land (100% total plan area) = €166/m2 total redeveloped land.
5 Harbourside: these costs are stated in the Planning Agreement.
6 Megabowl: This information is based on the Planning Agreement, which was available for this research.
7 Temple Quay: €3.1 m are stipulated as payment in Planning Agreement, the other €3m concern off-site high way works and are an own rough estimation.
8 Harbourside: €30.5m in payments to LPA (stipulated in Planning Agreement), about €2m in kind in construction works off-site high ways, €0.6 payment to LPA that invest them 
in on-site infra.
9 Real Estate Development costs are similar probably because there is only one empirical source, the costs in Megabowl. Therefore, these averages are not much valid.
10 Megabowl: The developer estimates real estate development costs of social dwellings (10.050 m2 floor space) and open market dwellings (3,350 m2 floor space) in €985/m2 floor 
space: 13,400 m2 floor space x €985/m2 floor space = €1 3.2m.
11 Temple Quay: figures were not available, this is an own estimation, based on costs Megabowl (about €1,000/m2 floor space); 114,000 m2 floor space x €1,000 = €114m.
12 Harbourside: figures were not available, this is an own estimation, based on costs Megabowl (about €1,000/m2 floor space); 122,740 n f floor space x €1,000 = €123m.
13 Megabowl: estimation affordable units, based on Planning Agreement and information given by developer, is €3.1 m; estimation for free market units, based on market prices and 
estimation developer, is €34m (about €3,380/m2 floor space).
14 Temple Quay: estimation for affordable units (€5.3m) is based on Planning Agreement; estimation commercial part (dwellings, office and commercial, in total €404m) is own 
assessment based on prices Megabowl and on actual market prices in the area. Prices dwellings are about €4,000-4,500/m2 floor space.
15 Harbourside: estimation for affordable units (€4.7m) is based on Planning Agreement; estimation commercial part (dwellings, office and commercial, in total €399m) is own 
assessment based on prices Megabowl and on actual market prices in the area. Prices dwellings are about €4,000-4,500/m2 floor space.
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Annex 4 : Development costs and returns in the Dutch cases
Kruidenbuurt Kop vail O ost Stationskwartier
Paid by 
developer
Paid by 
public bodies
Paid by developer Paid by 
public bodies
Paid by 
developer
Paid by 
public bodies
1) Land costs Developer bought 
only some plots for 
€1 ,4 m
Developer bought 
in 2001 land for
€12m 16
€30-40m + 
small amount 
for new 
Station17
€65-€15m= 
€50m 18
2-3) Infra prov and plan preparation costs 
(€/m2 new public space; total redeveloped land)
€1 2.6m 19 €11,5 m + costs 
roads and sewer 
pipelines
€7m (€3 68/m2; €148/m2)20 
+ Refurbishing road and some 
public space
(€43 8/m2; €1 58/m2) (W ith soil decontamination costs 
and possible compensation costs: 
€1,212/m2 new public space;
€570/m2 total redeveloped land)21
4) Soil decontamination costs - €0.37m €0.12m
5) Compensation costs €5.4m €0.1 6m
6) Additional contributions of developer €0.5m22 About €1 5 m
7) Real Estate development costs
Average costs (€/dwelling and/or m2 floor space)
€1 06 m23 €90 m24 € 320 m25
€144,000/dwelling, 
about €1,200/m2
€21 0,000/dwelling, 
about €1,600/m2
About 
€1,300/m2
8) Total returns €1 50 in26 €112 or €1 39m27 €480-520m28
9) Developer's Final Profit (incl/excl the price 
paid for the land)
€24 m (excl. 'boek­
waarde' most of land)
€2m (112-110), or 
€29m (139-110)
(inel. land price)
€120-1 80m 
(inel. land 
price)
1 = The price paid for a possible purchase of land;
2-3 = Infrastructure provision and plan preparation costs: this includes the whole development up to the delivery of serviced building plots, thus not only the infrastructure 
provision works, but also the preparation of plans,, reserved amounts for unexpected expenses, the overhead costs, possible 'hidden' profit margins of the developer, etc. It is not 
known whether the figures include or exclude the financial costs.
4 = Soil decontamination costs.
5 = Compensation costs: this includes compensation to existing owners and inhabitants, for removal of activities and residence, demolition of constructions and buildings, etc.
6 = Additional contributions of the developer: contributions, in cash or in kind (constructions, buildings) to public goals (payments, construction of public infrastructure or public buildings, 
etc) additional to his contributions to the on-site infrastructure provision costs (even if they might serve a wider area than the development in question), which are already included in (2).
7= Real Estate development costs: this includes the whole development of the real estate, thus not only the building costs, but also the preparation of plans, overhead costs, pos­
sible 'hidden' profit margins of the developer, etc.
8= Total returns: the total returns accruing from the selling of the real estate (office, dwellings, etc).
9= Developer's Final Profits: 8 - [1dev + 2-3dev + 4dev + 5dev + 6dev + 7dev], This regards the profits of the developer, i.e. it excludes the possibility of costs paid by public bodies.
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16 This is the price paid by IBC to Hollestelle in 2001. Because Heijmans bought the land in 2002 (as part of IBC), the price paid by Heijmans, the actual developer, could be higher.
17 Stationskwartier: there are probably no or few compensation costs, as most of the area was empty before development takes place. There are significant soil decontamination 
costs.
18 Stationskwartier: this €65m include the subsidies for both the land development and for the new Railways and bus Station. A rough own estimation of the costs of 3 km off-site 
roads are between €10-20m, for the sake of calculation €1 5m. These €15m are considered as a contribution.
19 Kruidenbuurt: this information is based on the 'Grondexploitatie', which was available for this research. Calculation average costs, which excludes costs roads and pipelines: 
€24.1 m : 55,000 m2 new public space (32% total plan area Land use Plan, it excludes refurbished Heezerweg and Korianderstraat) = €438/m2 new public space; Or €24.1 m : 
153,000 m2 total redeveloped land (89% total plan area Land use Plan, it excludes the Heezerweg and Korianderstraat) = €1 58/m2 total redeveloped land.
20 Kop van Oost: this information is based on interviews with developer and public officers. Calculation average costs: €7m : 1 9,000 m2 new public space (24% total plan area Land 
use Plan, it excludes Sontweg, Europa weg, the canal, about 4,000 m2 new public space and the building) = €368/m2 new public space; Or €7m : 47,200 m2 total redeveloped land 
(59% total plan area Land use Plan, excludes Sontweg, Europaweg and the canal) = €148/m2 total redeveloped land.
21 Stationskwartier: Calculation average costs, which include possible but improbable compensation costs, and soil decontamination costs: €80m : 66,000 m2 new public space 
(41% total plan area land use Plan, includes the new Station, excludes the Belcrumweg and the 3 km off-site roads that will be refurbished) = €1,212/m2 new public space; 
Or €80m : 140,000 m2 total redeveloped land (88% total plan area Land use Plan, includes the land occupied by the commercial buildings, the rest, about 10%, will remain 
untouched) = €570/m2 total redeveloped land. Possible explanation for relatively high costs: it includes the land for new road and new station, land that has been 'bought' to 
NS, a possible profit for the municipality and the soil decontamination costs.
22 Kruidenbuurt: This information is based on the 'Grondexploitatie', which was available for this research.
23 Kruidenbuurt: The developer estimates real estate dev costs of dwellings (650 units) in €144,000/unit. Own estimation is that costs commercial space (about 10,000 m2) are about 
€1,240/m2 gross floor. Calculation average costs: €106m : (650 dwellings + 10,000 m2 commercial space), about €1,200/m2 gross floor.
24 Kop van Oost: €90m is an estimation of the developer. Calculation average costs: an own estimation of total m2 gross floor is 56,000 m2 (44,000 m2 apartments + 8,000 m2 single 
family houses + 4,000 m2 commercial space); Thus, €90m : 56,000 m2 = €1,600/m2 gross floor.
25 Stationskwartier: € 320 m is an estimation based on information given by a former developer, and regards only the development costs of the commercial real estate (i.e. housing, 
office, shops and parking, whether this is in the normal plots or in the building of the new Station), but not the transport function of the new Station. Calculation average costs: an 
own estimation is that the total building volume is 240,000 m2 gross floor (including all the commercial space, i.e. housing, office, shops and parking; and excluding the transport 
function of the new Station); Thus €320m : 240,000 m2 gross floor = €1,300/m2 gross floor space.
26 Kruidenbuurt: This is an own estimation, based on actual selling prices of the real estate; the developer gave no estimation.
27 Kop van Oost: The developer estimates the total revenues for the selling of the real estate in € 112m, inclusive BTW. Own estimations, based on the actual selling prices of real 
estate, produce higher figures, € 139m and € 1 89m. Consulted about this, experts assessed the first estimation (€ 1 39m) as more realistic (Stauttener & Van Bladel, interview 
2008).
28 Stationskwartier: two estimations, both based on selling price of 150,000m2 in 'Gemengde doeleinden 2'; one based on information given by former developer is €480m; own 
estimation, based on general market prices in the area, is €510-520m.
A
n
n
ex
es

Annexes 363
Annex 5: Survey of Monofunctional residential districts
On behalf of this research, a brief survey has been made of a significant part of 56 urban regeneration 
districts (56 wijken in Dutch). This list of 56 districts is made by the Ministry of Housing, Planning and 
Environment. This survey focused on development schemes on privately owned land situated within 
these districts. The survey consisted of:
• Based on an overview of 56 Urban Regeneration areas of the Ministry of Housing, Planning and 
Environment (http://www.vrom.nl/pagina.html?id=11136, consulted on September 2007), 15 dis­
tricts were selected that showed some indications of development on privately owned land: Heuvel 
(Breda), Berflo Es (Hengelo), Rustenburg/Oostbroek (The Hague), Q4 (Venlo), Crooswijk Noord and 
Hoogvliet (Rotterdam), GMS (Heerlen), Bartjes/Eikendonk/Hofstad (Den Bosch), Binnenstad (Hel­
mond), Nieuw Noord (Tilburg), Presikhaaf and Malburgen (Arnhem), and Zuilen/Ondiep, Hoog­
raven/Tolsteeg and Kanaleneiland/Transwijk (Utrecht);
• Public officers responsible for and/or familiar with these 15 districts were interviewed telephonically 
during September 2007;
• Of the 15 districts, only 7 districts (8 schemes) seemed indeed to have development on privately 
owned land. They are all small sites (50-100 dwellings): Hoograven, Vicona, Onixweg 1-3 (in the 
city of Utrecht); Kanaleneiland/Transwijk, Winkelcentrum (in Utrecht); Malburgen, Winkelcentrum 
Drieslag (in Arnhem); Zuilen/Ondiep, winkelcentrum Rokade (in Utrecht); Heuvel, W SST (in Breda); 
Presikhaaf, Weldamlaan (in Arnhem). On two others the situation was doubtful, for land was pri­
vately owned but will be acquired by a Public-private Partnership (Berflo Es, in Engelo), or land was 
only partly privately owned (Centrumgebied Kanaleneiland, in Utrecht). So in total 7 clear private 
schemes, and 2 doubtful. 4 schemes regard shopping centers;
• In the mentioned 8 private schemes, private regeneration includes hardly any private financing 
of public infrastructure and facilities. Developers do not finance social housing in any of these 8 
schemes, and, at the most, they construct themselves some public space, which is directly related to 
the scheme, or within the scheme itself. Only in one case (Winkelcentrum Rokade) is was not pos­
sible to discover whether the developer had paid or not a contribution to the municipality.
Annex 6: Comparison development costs and returns in theValencian, English and Dutch cases
Valencian cases English cases Dutch cases Dutch cases (second opinion)
Guillem Periodista Camino Benalúa Megabowl Temple Harbourside Kruidenbuurt KopvOost Stations­
kwartier Project 129 Project 230 Project 331
1. Land costs Not available €11 m Not available Not available €1.4m +
'boekwaarde'32
at least 
€12 m
€80m
(€1,212/m2; 
€5 70)33
€ 14.6m €0.9m €31.3m
2. Inf ras prov costs
(€/m2 new public 
space; total redevel­
oped land)
€0.66m 
(€77/ m2; 
€5 7/m2)34
€1.1 m 
(€41 8/m2; 
(€1 87/m2)35
€3.3m 
(€85/m2; 
€6 5/m2)36
€5.5m 
(€75/m2; 
€5 9/m2)37
€1.3m 
(€1 5 3/m2; 
€99/m2)38
Estimation: 
€8.2 m 
(€2 69/m2; 
€111/m2)39
€13.1m
(€3 32/m2; 
€1 66/m2)40
€24.1 m 
(€43 8/m2; 
€1 5 8/m2)41
€7m
(€3 68/m2; 
€148/m2)42
€ 9.8m 
(€2 49/m2; 
€1 64/m2)
€6.2m 
(€2 22/m2; 
€107/m2)
€12.2m 
(€94/m2; 
€67/m2)
3. Plan prep costs
(€/m2 new public 
space; total redevel­
oped land)
€0.15 
(€1 7/m2; 
€1 3/m2)43
€0.7
(€2 69/m2; 
(€119/m2)44
€0.7 
(€1 8/m2; 
€1 4/m2)45
Ca. €1.1 m
(€19/m2; 
€1 5/m2)46
€4m
(€102/m2; 
€67/m2)
€1.7 
(€61/m2; 
€2 9/m2)
€3.1 m 
(€2 4/m2; 
€1 7/m2)
4. Soil decontamina­
tion costs
- - Evt costs are 
included in 2)
Evt costs are 
included in 2)
€5m €1 5m - €0.5m - - -
5. Compensation 
costs
€1.9m €2.2 m €7.8m €1.9m No/low No/low €5.4m €0.1 6m - €2.6m €2.4m
6. Additonal contri­
butions of developer
- €1.6m €1 4.2m 2.683 m2 
floor space47
€1.7m About €6m €33m €0.5 m About €1 5 m - - €1 m?
7. Real estate dev 
costs (€/m2 floor 
space)
No data No data €86.5m 
(€1,1 50/m2)
No data €1 3.2 m 
(€98 5/m2)
Estimation: 
€114m
(€1,000/m2)48
Estimation:
€123m 
(€1,000/m2) 49
Estimation:
€106 m (about 
€1,200/m2)
€90m (about 
€1,600/m2)
€320 m
(about
€1,300/m2)50
No data No data No data
8. Total returns
(average €/m2 floor 
space)
No data No data €432 m 
(€5,750/m2)
No data €37.1 m 
(€3,380/m2)
€409 m 
(€4,000- 
4,500/m2)
€404m 
(€4,000- 
4,500/m2)
€1 50m €112 m,
€1 39m51
€480-
520m52
No data No data No data
1. The price that the developer paid for the land;
2. Infrastructure provision costs: this includes not only the infrastructure provision works, but also reserved amounts for unexpected expenses, the overhead costs, possible 'hidden' profit margins of 
the developer, etc. In The Netherlands, they comprise: Slopen, bouw en woonrijp maken, risico en onvoorzien. TheValencian cases do exclude financial costs, second opinion Dutch cases too. It is not 
known whether the figures for the Dutch and English cases include or exclude the financial costs.
3. Plan preparation costs: the costs of the preparation of plans, studies, etc (Plankosten, or Voorbereiding, toezicht en planontwikkeling).
Soil decontamination costs.
4. Compensation costs: this includes compensation to existing owners and inhabitants, for removal of activities and residence, demolition of constructions and buildings, etc.
5. Additional contributions of the developer: contributions, in cash or in kind (constructions, buildings) to public goals (payments, construction of public infrastructure or public buildings, etc) additional 
to his contributions to the on-site infrastructure provision costs (even if they might serve a wider area than the development in question), which are already included in (2).
6. Real Estate development costs: this includes the whole development of the real estate, thus not only the building costs, but also the preparation of plans, overhead costs, possible 'hidden' profit mar­
gins of the developer, etc;
7. Total returns: the total returns accruing from the selling of the real estate (office, dwellings, etc).
29 Project 1 : demolition of social facility (zorginstelling) in a large city, developer is foundation that owned all the land, plan area 59,900 m2, 39,300 m2 public space (66% plan area), 80 single family
dwellings, 1 80 apartments, 1,500 m2 commercial facilities, 13,000 m2 public facilities, 800 underground parking places.
30 Project 2: demolition of social housing in a small town, developer is the housing association owning the land, plan area 57,700 m2, 27,900 m2 public space (51 %  plan area), 160 single family dwellings, 
60 apartments.
31 Project 3: demolition of social housing in a medium city, developer is the housing association owning the land, plan area 182,000 m2, 129,900 m2 public space (71% plan area), 180 single family 
dwellings, 280 new apartments, 500 renewed apartments, 650 parking places in buildings.
32 NL, Kruidenbuurt: developer bought only some plots. The value of the rest of the land ('boekwaarde') is not known.
33 NL, Stationskwartier, with possible but improbable compensation costs, and inc I. soil contamination costs and the price of land: €80m : 66,000 m2 new public space (41% total plan area land use Plan, 
includes the new Station, excludes the Belcrumweg and the 3 km off-site roads that will be refurbished) = €1,212/m2 new public space. Possibly explanation high costs: it includes the land for new road 
and new station, and that has been 'bought' to Dutch Railways, soil decontamination costs, and an possible profit for the Municipality.
34 Valencia, Guillem de Anglesola: €0.66m : 8,552 m2 new public space (74% total plan area Land use Plan) = €94/m2 new public space. €0.66m : 11.489 m2 total redeveloped land = €57/m2 total 
redeveloped land.
35 Valencia, Periodista Gil Sumbiela, incl. possible soil decontamination costs: €1.1 m : 2,597 m2 new public space (44% total plan area Land use Plan) = €418/m2 new public space. €1.1 m : 5.867 m2 total 
redeveloped land = €187/m2 total redeveloped land.
36 Valencia, Camino Hondo del Grao, included possible some decontamination costs: €3.3m : 38,720 m2 new public space (76% total plan area Land use Plan) = €85/m2 new public space. €3.3m : 50.716 
m2 total redeveloped land = €65/m2 total redeveloped land.
37 Valencia, Benalúa Sur, included possible some decontamination costs: €4.4m : 58,701 m2 new public space (79% total plan area development unit-1 Land use Plan) = €75/m2 new public space. €4.4m 
: 74.168 m2 total redeveloped land development unit-1 = €59/m2 total redeveloped land.
38 England, Megabowl, with possible but improbable compensation and decontamination costs: €1.3m : 8,500 m2 new public space (65% total plan area Planning Permission) = €153/m2 new public space.
39 England, Temple Quay: figures were not available, this is an own estimation, based on these assumptions: (1 ) probably there are no compensation costs (as most of the former industrial buildings and 
premises were already demolished); (2) Infrastructure provision costs are an own estimation based on costs in Megabowl and Harbourside, plus scenario of better quality public space. The average costs, 
included possible but improbably compensation costs, are: €8.2m : 30,400 m2 new public space (55% plan area, minus an existing school, which will remain untouched) = €269/m2. Possible explanation 
for higher costs: figures are estimation based on scenario of public space probably of higher quality in this part of the city than in Megabowl.
40 England, Harbourside, with possible but improbable compensation costs: €13.1 m : 39,500 m2 new public space (50% total plan area) = €332/m2 new public space. Possibly explanation higher costs: 
figures are estimation based on scenario of public space probably of higher quality in this part of the city than in Megabowl.
41 NL, Kruidenbuurt: this €24.1 m excludes some costs for roads and sewer pipelines. €24.1 m : 55,000 new public space (32% total plan area Land use Plan, it excludes refurbished Heezerweg and 
Korianderstraat) = €438/m2 new public space.
42 NL, Kop van Oost: this €7m excludes the costs of refurbishing some public space within the plan area and a main road alongside the plan area. €7m : 19,000 m2 new public space (24% total plan area 
Land use Plan, it excludes Sontweg, Europaweg, the canal, about 4,000 m2 new public space and the building) = €368/m2.
43 Valencia, Guillem de Anglesola: €0.1 5m : 8,552 m2 new public space (74% total plan area Land use Plan) = €18/m2 new public space. €0.1 5m : 11.489 m2 total redeveloped land = €13/m2 total 
redeveloped land.
44 Valencia, Periodista Gil Sumbiela, incl. possible soil decontamination costs: €0.7m : 2,597 m2 new public space (44% total plan area Land use Plan) = €269/m2 new public space. €0.7m : 5.867 m2 total 
redeveloped land = €119/m2 total redeveloped land.
45 Valencia, Camino Hondo del Grao, included possible some decontamination costs: €0.7m : 38,720 m2 new public space (76% total plan area Land use Plan) = €18/m2 new public space. €0.7m : 50.716 
m2 total redeveloped land = €14/m2 total redeveloped land.
46 Valencia, Benalúa Sur, included possible some decontamination costs: €1.1 m : 58,701 m2 new public space (79% total plan area development unit-1 Land use Plan) = €19/m2 new public space. €1.1 m 
: 74.168 m2 total redeveloped land development unit-1 = €15/m2 total redeveloped land.
47 Valencia, Benalúa Sur: Municipality receives 2.683 m2 floor space as building rights;
48 England, Temple Quay: figures were not available, this is an own estimation, based on costs Megabowl (about €1,000/m2 floor space): 114,000 m2 floor space x €1,000 = €114m.
49 England, Harbourside: figures were not available, this is an own estimation, based on costs Megabowl (about €1,000/m2 floor space); 122,740 m2 floor space x €1,000 = €123m.
50 Stationskwartier: development costs of the commercial real estate (i.e. housing, office, shops and parking, whether this is in the normal plots or in the building of the new Station), but excludes the transfer 
function of the new Station.
51 NL, Kop van Oost: The developer estimates the total revenues for the selling of the real estate in €112 m, inclusive BTW. Own estimations, based on the actual selling prices of real estate, produce higher 
figures, €139m and €1 89m. Consulted to this, experts assessed the first stimati on (€ 1 39m) as more realistic (Stauttener &Van Blade I, interview 2008).
52 NL, Stationskwartier: estimation former developer is €480m; own estimation, based on general market prices in the area, is €510-520m.
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Annex 7: Experiment in Zevenhuizen, South-Holland
Introduction to the experiment
The Valencian urban development model became an inspiration for a group of 17 companies, all 
of them located in the industrial area 'Nijverheidscentrum' (16 ha) in the municipality of Zevenhu- 
izen-Moerkapelle, located inbetween the cities of The Hague, Gouda and Rotterdam. Three of the 
companies own 85% of the land, and most of them have a strong commitment to Zevenhuizen, 
as they are or were originally local companies. Most of the companies joined together in a coop­
erative, Coöperatie 'De Viergang' U.A. The goal of the cooperative was to move the industrial area 
to a new location, situated not far away and called 'De Viergang' (64 ha, see Figure). The compa­
nies were concerned about the continuation and modernization of their industrial activities, which 
are threatened by new plans that foresee the construction of 1,200 houses around the industrial
Figure Annex 7. In grey colour, business area 'Nijverheidscentrum' (16 ha); in light grey, 
the town of Zevenhuizen; circumscribed in black, the new location for the business and horticulture
area, called 'De Viergang' (64 ha).
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area 'Nijverheidscentrum'. 'De Viergang' is located besides the A12, one of the most impor­
tant highways in Holland. Besides new sites for the firms, it was also planned to accommodate in­
door horticulture (greenhouses) that must be relocated from other places. 35% of the area should 
be industry, 45%  greenhouses and 20%  double use. Rabobank Vastgoed, the property development 
department of a cooperative bank, supported initially the initiative by assuming the costs of plan prepa­
ration. Later, once Rabobank Vastgoed fused with developer Bouwfonds, a new management took over 
the operation.
The costs of the operation are: the costs of preparing the plans (posting 3, see financial analysis in sec­
tion 2.4.3), of transferring the firms to the new location (posting 5), of buying the land in the new loca­
tion (posting 1), of demolishing the old plants and providing the infrastructure in both the former and 
the new location (posting 2), and of developing 611 new houses in the former industrial area (posting 
7). Table Annex 7 specifies most of these costs in Zevenhuizen. The idea was that the companies partici­
pate in the operation to move their industries to the new location and finance the costs by: (1) selling 
the 611 new houses in the former industrial area; (2) selling plots to the horticulture farmers in the 'De 
Viergang'; and (3) paying for the increase in value of their property (land and industrial buildings) that 
accrue from the removal to a first-class site and the renewal of the installations. The basic principle was 
that the operation would be 'value neutral' for the companies: that the value of their existing property 
(plant plus land) plus their investment would be the same as the value of their new properties. In other 
words: that the value increase that accrues from rezoning the former and new business area serves to 
pay all the necessary costs. The operation was planned to be finished in 2015.
Conclusions about the experience in Zevenhuizen
The plan documents recommended in section 9.4.2 have been elaborated in Zevenhuizen, but they were 
not detailed enough in their contents, as a result of which the involved parties never reached the rec­
ommended agreements. Without detailed documents and without the agreements, there was too much 
uncertainty: landowners did not want to decide until they knew exactly how much they would have to 
contribute and which building parcels they would receive. Also, the municipality needed a long time 
to decide which contributions were needed, and then hesitated to proceed further until all the costs of 
public infrastructure and facilities had been secured. As a consequence, the experiment in Zevenhuizen 
failed. In our opinion, the following mismatches with the recommendations in section 9.4.2 can explain 
the failure (cfr. HD Projectrealisatie, 2009; Lamot, Vriend, Penning and Hunen, interviews in 2010):
• Financial calculations not detailed enough: the initiating developer (Rabobank Vastgoed) had spent 
a limited amount of money for the elaboration of a draft plan for the infrastructure provision works, 
for calculating the costs of implementing these works, for calculating the costs of removal of the 
firms, and for properly assessing the costs of acquiring the 64 ha land for the new business area. 
Initially the developer had planned to elaborate more detailed studies and calculations. However, 
after it fused with one of the largest Dutch developers (Bouwfonds), a new project leader took over 
the operation and decided not to spend more on it. Lack of certainty about the real costs influenced 
negotiations in a negative way, making it difficult for the landowners to achieve an agreement with 
each other and with the developer and the municipality. This was very clear for the removal costs 
of the firms, which were calculated on the basis only of the figures provided by the companies in­
stead of on detailed research. This was also very clear for the fiscal consequences of the operations
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(which were not researched), for the costs of acquiring the 64 ha land in the new business area (the 
municipality initially estimated them at € 24 per m2 of land, based on the estimated compensation 
for the possible expropriation of the land, but changed afterwards the assessment to € 50), and for 
the reserved amount for unexpected expenses (€ 2.3 million, part of posting 2 in Table Annex 7, 
which was higher than usual because the lack of detail of the plans increased the uncertainties, this 
leading to reserving 20%  of the infrastructure provision costs, instead of a more normal rate of 10%).
• Unclear land readjustment: another consequence of a limited budget for plan preparation is that 
during the negotiations there was no proposal concerning the rules for the land readjustment, so it 
was not possible to make clear to the firms/landowners how the serviced building plots in the new 
industrial location would be distributed between the different owners. In other words, the firms/ 
landowners had not a final, clear picture of their future location.
• Unclear public contributions: it took too long to clarify which contributions to public infrastructure 
and facilities were obligatory. After the above mentioned plan documents had been submitted to the 
municipality in March 2007, it took more than one year (till June 2008) until the local and provincial 
public bodies clarified which contributions should be made to social housing (30%) and to off-site 
public infrastructure (a contribution of € 10m). The fact that the certainty about the contributions 
came very late hampered the negotiations, and in October 2008 it became clear that the contribu­
tions would lead to a large deficit. This leads us to ascertain the importance of the recommendation 
given in section 9.1.1: it is important that, before the elaboration of the plan documents and the 
negotiations, there is already certainty about at least the contributions that should be made. In other 
words, before market parties start elaborating the plan documents and negotiating, public bodies 
must have made clear what the contributions must be.
• Unprofessional attitude of the firms/landowners: the data that were necessary for elaborating the 
plan documents were gathered during 2006 and 2007. Important data, obtained from the firms/ 
landowners, were: a) how much does it cost to move the firms to the new location, and to maintain 
production during the transition from the old to the new location; and b) the fiscal consequences of 
the increase in value of the properties (vennootschapsbelasting in Dutch). Both were important for 
calculating the financial feasibility of the operation, and the possibilities for the firms to borrow the 
necessary money. Regarding the costs of moving the firms (a), afterwards it appears that the firms did 
not provide accurate information, or at least that they did not make the necessary efforts to elabo­
rate and provide accurate information. It is also possible that the delay in the negotiations made it 
increasingly difficult for them to maintain their initial assessment, which reinforces the analysis that 
their assessment was not professional enough. Another possible explanation is that the companies 
became more pessimistic due to the financial crisis that arose the end of 2008 and consciously de­
cided to inflate the costs to hamper the project.
Additional factors can explain why the experiment in Zevenhuizen failed:
• Economic crisis: at the end of 2008, when negotiations entered the vital phase, an international 
credit crisis broke out, and soon it became clear that it would have large effects on the market price 
of real estate. For example, in the calculations made by the developer at the end of 2007 that served 
as basis for the negotiations, the selling price of the houses was expected to increase yearly by 3%, 
while after one year the reality was that prices lowered by 5%. This is a very relevant context variable 
that influences the size of the initial profit in urban development (see section 2.4.2 - variable sort 
A1). In general, the sentiment among the firms worsened significantly. It is important to remember
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that this sort of project, in which landowners become actively involved in regeneration, sharing costs 
and profits, are a novelty in the Netherlands. In those times of uncertainty, the landowners became 
more conservative and pessimistic. For example, they changed their mind about the initial estima­
tion of the above mentioned costs of moving the firms and the fiscal consequences;
• High demolition costs (posting 2): the costs for demolishing the industrial buildings and cleaning the 
land (€ 43 per m2 for new public space1, plus the financial costs and the actualization costs -i.e. the 
costs of bringing the costs up to date) were higher than normal because in business areas like this 
there is more asphalt that has to be removed than in housing areas;
• Land costs: the price of the land in business area Nijverheidscentrum was high, as the firms to be 
removed are active and have a high economic value. This is also a context variable that influences 
the size of the initial profit (variable sort A2). Although the firms were ready to deliver their property 
(land + plant on it) for a very low price2, renouncing any increase in value that would accrue from 
the rezoning into housing, the fact is that the minimum land costs (the value of the properties in their 
former use) was still very high, about € 45.5 million (€ 330-360 per m2 of land).
• Land costs: the experiment was based upon a novelty in the Netherlands, namely that landowners 
themselves participate in urban regeneration, sharing costs and profits. Following this there was no 
need to acquire the land in the business area Nijverheidscentrum. Although the final evaluation 
of the operation (redevelopment Nijverheidcentrum + building new business area in De Viergang) 
accounted the value of the land (€ 45.5m) as a cost, the fact is that it was not necessary to account 
this value as a cost in the calculations of the redevelopment of Nijverheidcentrum. The reason is 
that, there was no need to advance this investment of € 45.5m because there was no need to buy 
this land. However, this changed with the new management in charge after the fusion of Rabobank 
Vastgoed with Bouwfonds. The new management wanted to buy the land in advance to become the 
developer of the 611 houses. As a consequence of this fundamental change of the financial structure 
of the operation, the land costs increased considerably. First, the € 45.5m and an actualization of the 
costs with another € 4.2 m had to be accounted as a cost of redeveloping Nijverheidcentrum (posting 
1 in Table Annex 7). In addition, this led to more financial costs (about € 14.3m). The total accounted 
land costs became the largest part of the land development costs (€ 64m of in total €93.5m). In other 
words, redeveloping Nijverheidscentrum became more expensive when the developer decided to 
buy the companies out instead of collaborating with them.
• Fundamental disagreement between developer and landowners: although the Cooperative (i.e. the 
landowners) was not in principle reluctant to allow a commercial developer to acquire the land 
and develop the real estate on it, they wanted to be independent and they considered this move of 
the developer as a transgression of the starting point of the experiment: active participation of land­
owners, facilitated by an urbanizing agent, to diminish land development costs and accelerate the 
development. The claim of the new management of Rabobank Vastgoed/Bouwfonds was actually an 
attempt to organize things as usual. After several meetings with the Cooperative, during the autumn 
of 2008 Rabobank/Bouwfonds decided to withdraw from the operation. It seems clear that Dutch
1 New public space is the surface that is redeveloped and will be used for public uses. Most of 
infrastructure provision and plan preparation costs relate to the construction of public infrastructure 
above or under this surface.
2 Only the cadastral value for property taxes purposes (W O Z waarde in Dutch), plus 20%. The 
cadastral value for property taxes purposes is based on the land use 'industry', but not on the future, 
more profitable land use 'housing'.
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developers are not comfortable with the role of urbanizing agent, i.e. of being a developer that in 
principle only profits from land development, but not from the development of the real estate.
• Infrastructure and plan preparation costs: the infrastructure provision and plan preparation costs 
for transforming the current industrial site Nijverheidscentrum into serviced land for housing were 
calculated at ca. € 297/m2 new public space. This is similar to usual realized costs in urban regenera­
tion in the Netherlands (from € 300 to 500), and much higher than in Valencia (from € 90 to 110). 
The actual definition of property rights in the Netherlands, that give to the landowners the option to 
wait, might explain why the costs were so large: (a) the reserved amount for unexpected expenses 
(€ 2.3 m, € 23/ m2 new public space, plus actualization and financial costs) was twice as high due 
to the uncertainties about the calculations and about whether it is possible to achieve an agreement 
with landowners; (b) it might be that the calculations in Zevenhuizen included hidden costs for 
compensating losses in other schemes, and/or high regular profit margins. It is however important to 
remember that differences with Valencia can also be caused by other third variables such as labour 
costs in the building sector, in construction materials, in fiscal regime (variables belonging to sort A3 
in causal model in section 2.4.2) and conditions of the soil (variable A2). A final remark: although 
being high compared with Valencia, infrastructure and plan preparation costs in Nevenhuizen are 
not among the highest in the Netherlands. This could be explained by the fact that the calculations 
implicitly have presupposed that the landowners were going to be supportive and thus that the de­
velopment process would be smooth and would not suffer delay. This might have avoided the need, 
frequent in the Netherlands, of making additional studies, negotiations (plan preparation costs), of 
extra financial costs, etc.
Doing things as usual is expensive
The experience in Zevenhuizen shows how the actual definition of property rights in the Netherlands, 
which gives to landowners the option to wait, and the uncertainties and strategies that result from it, 
lead to the initial profit margin leaking away into high accounted land costs (at least € 14.3m more than 
necessary), and into high infrastructure provision and plan preparation costs (both together about € 
297/m2 new public space). In addition, they lead to the need of advancing large investments to buy the 
land (€ 45.5m). This clearly shows that only a fundamental change in the development strategy towards 
formulas that incorporate landowners into the operation will lead to lower costs.
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Table Annex 7. Comparison land development costs for the regeneration of the existing industrial site 
'Nijverheidscentrum' (not the new business area, and taking into account the acquisition of the land) 
in Zevenhuizen, the Netherlands and Valencia (see also section 9.4 and Annex 6).
Valencia Nederland Nijverheidscentrum Zevenhuizen
1. Accounted 
land cost
€45.5m; plus €4.2m bringing costs 
up to date (actualization costs); plus 
€14.3m financial costs; in total €64m
2. Infras prov 
costs (€/m2 new 
public space)
(Between 70 and 
90 €/ m2)
(Most of the time 
between 250 and 
400 €/m2, some 
times even higher)
€ 18m 
(179€/m2)
Bringing costs up to 
date: € 5.6m; Finan­
cial costs: € 2.7m.
In total thus €29.6m 
(297 €/m2)3. Plan prep costs 
(€/m2 new public 
space)
(Circa 20 €/ m2) (Most of the time 
between 50 and 
100 €/m2)
€ 3.3m 
(33€/m2)
Accounted land cost: The price that the developer (expects to) pay for the land and includes in the accounts as 
cost.
Infrastructure provision costs: this includes not only the infrastructure provision works, but also reserved 
amounts for unexpected expenses, the overhead costs, possible regular profit margins of the developer, etc. In 
The Netherlands, they comprise: Slopen, bouw  en woonrijp maken, risico en onvoorzien.
Plan preparation costs: the costs of the preparation of plans, studies, etc. In Dutch: plankosten, or Voorbereiding, 
toezicht en planontwikkeling.
Actualization costs: all costs are presupposed to increase yearly by 2 %  the accounted land costs and by 3 %  the 
rest of the cots.
Financial costs: the financial costs that accrue from having to anticipate investments, with other words, form hav­
ing to spend money before the final products (real estate) are sold.
Land decontamination costs and compensation costs are excluded.
New  public space is the surface that is redeveloped and will be used for public uses. Most of infrastructure provi­
sion and plan preparation costs relate to the construction of public infrastructure above or under this surface.
372 Annexes
Lists of terms
List of terms English-Spanish
Association of Urbanistic Interest 
Autonomous Community (region)
1978 Constitution 
Compulsory land readjustment 
Definitive Infrastructure Provision 
Project 
Detailed binding rules 
Detailed Planning 
Development Agreement 
Development unit 
Economical-financial Proposal 
Equitable redistribution of betterment, 
costs and duties 
Expropriation
General Municipal Planning 
General Land-use Plan 
Housing cooperative 
Joint Development Program
Joint development organisation 
Juridical-economical Proposal 
Land Readjustment 
Land Readjustment Project 
Land to be developed 
Legal standards public infrastructure and 
facilities 
Local Council
Municipal Patrimony of Land 
Municipality 
Partial Plan 
Physical zoning
Pre-emption right (right of first refusal) 
Property register 
Provincial government 
Provisional Infrastructure Provision 
Project 
Redistribution Area
Agrupación de Interés Urbanístico 
Comunidad Autónoma 
Constitución Española 
Sistema de Cooperación
Proyecto de Urbanización 
ordenación pormenorizada 
Planeamiento de desarrollo 
Convenio Urbanístico 
Unidad de Ejecución 
Proposición Económico-Financiera
redistribución equitativa de beneficios y cargas 
Expropiación
Planeamiento General Municipal 
Plan General de Ordenación Urbana, PGOU  
Cooperativa de viviendas 
Programa para el desarrollo de una Actuación 
Urbanística, PAI 
Junta de Compensación 
Proposición Jurídico-Económica 
Reparcelación 
Proyecto de Reparcelación 
Suelo urbanizable
Estándares Urbanísticos 
Pleno del Ayuntamiento 
Patrimonio Municipal de Suelo 
Ayuntamiento 
Plan Parcial 
Planeamiento físico 
derecho de tanteo y retracto 
Registro de la Propiedad 
Diputación Provincial
Anteproyecto de Urbanización 
Área de reparto
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Reference Development Allowance 
Rezoning one urban use to other 
Rezoning a non urban use to an 
urban one 
Sector
Social-affordable housing
Special Plan
Structural binding rules
Technical Alternative
Unit of modal use
Urban Land
Urban Renewal Plan
Urbanization
Urbanizing agent
Urbanization charges
Urbanization canon
Urbanization costs
Voluntary land readjustment
Zoning land into urban and non-urban
Zoning land into different urban uses
List of terms English-Dutch
Accountability
Anterior Development Agreement 
Contributions for other schemes 
Definition of land uses 
Departure from the Land-use Plan 
Detailing of Land-use Plan 
Development Agreement
Development Regulation
Economic performability/feasibility
Explanation
Housing association
Development contributions Plan
Land development contributions Act
Land-use plan
Land-use regulations
Leasehold
Lost green areas
Map
Modification Land-use Plan
Aprovechamiento tipo 
recalificación
reclasificación
sector
Vivienda con Protección pública/ 
Vivienda protegida 
Plan Especial 
ordenación structural 
Alternativa técnica 
unidad de aprovechamiento 
Suelo urbano 
Plan de Reforma Interior 
Urbanización 
agente urbanizador 
Cargas de urbanización 
Canon de urbanización 
Costes de urbanización 
Sistema de Compensación 
clasificación 
calificación
Toerekenbaarheid 
Anterieure overeenkomst 
Bovenplanse kosten 
Doeleindenomschrijving 
Vrijstelling/Projectbesluit 
Uitwerking
Exploitatieovereenkomst/ 
Realisatieovereenkomst 
Exploitatieverordening 
Economisch uitvoerbaarheid 
Plantoelichting 
Woningcorporatie 
Exploitatieplan 
Grondexploitatiewet 
Bestemmingsplan 
Planvoorschriften 
Erfpacht
Verloren gegane groenvoorzieningen
Plankaart
Wijziging
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Municipality
New Key Project
Objective delimitation
Outline binding land-use regulation
Outline Definition
Outline Land-use plan with obligation 
of further elaboration 
Performability/feasibility 
Physical Planning Decree 
Physical Planning Inspectorate 
Pre-emption 
Profit 
Profit tax 
Proportionality 
Province
Public facilities and interventions 
Public infrastructure and facilities serving 
a wider area 
(Provincial) Land-use Plan 
Self realisation 
Social facilities 
Spatially relevant 
Stamp plan 
Structural Plan 
Structural Vision 
Urban Renewal Plan
Gemeente
Nieuw Sleutelproject, NSP 
Objectieve begrenzing 
Globale bestemming 
Beschrijving in Hoofdlijnen
Globaal bestemmingsplan met uitwerkingsplicht 
Uitvoerbaarheid
Besluit op de ruimtelijke ordening 
Inspectie Ruimtelijke Ordening 
Voorkeursrecht 
Profijt
Baatbelasting
Proportionaliteit
Provincie
Ruimtelijke ontwikkelingen
Bovenwijkse voorzieningen
Inpassingsplan
Zelfrealisatie
Maatschappelijke voorzieningen
Ruimtelijk/planologisch relevant
Postzegelplan
Structuurplan
Structuurvisie
Stadsvernieuwingsplan
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Interviews
Specific interviews
Meant to collect specific knowledge to fill in the gaps in literature and cases. Interviews were structured
following the specific questions, each interview being therefore specific and different from the others.
For the list of specific interviews of persons involved in the cases, see section 'Cases'. Here follows a list
of this sort of interviews made to experts. The interviews took from 15 minutes to 3 hours:
• Spain/Valencia:
°  García-Bellido García de Diego, Javier; long talks during 29 and 30 August 2005, Madrid.
°  Blanc Clavero, Francisco; live interviews on 24 February 2007, 21:45-23:00 (telephone inter­
view); 9 June 2008, 23:00-23:40 (telephone interview), and e-mails 12 June, 2, 3 and 17 July 
2008.
° Sanchís Cuesta, José Alberto; telephone interview 27 May 2008, 16-16.30.
°  Raga, Francisco; telephone interview 15 October 2008; short interview by email on 27 January 
2010.
• England:
°  Stephen Crow, Cardiff School of City and Regional Planning, telephone interview on 11 April
2006, 14:00-15:00.
°  Vincent Nadin, University of the West of England; live interviews on 22 March 2007, 13.00­
15.15, and on 5 April 2007, 13:30-16:00.
°  Chris A. Lyons, London School of Economics; telephone interview on 24 Augustus 2007, 10:30­
11:35.
°  John Henneberry, University of Sheffield; telephone interview on 29 Augustus 2007, 1 7:00-18:00.
• The Netherlands:
°  J.J. van Dollinga, Municipality of Groningen, Planning and Economy Department, division Legal 
Affairs; telephone interview on 11 September 2007, 15:30-16:20; 1 3 September 16:45-17:00.
°  K. Porrey, Municipality of Rotterdam, Legal Affairs Department of Planning and Housing; tel­
ephone interview on 12 September 2007, 15:30-16:20.
°  W.A. Egberts, Municipality of Rotterdam, Legal Affairs Department of Planning and Housing, 
telephone interview on 13 September 2007, 16:00-16:30.
°  Arno Segeren, Ruimtelijk Planbureau, written comments to written interview, 28 January 2008. 
Written comments on 11 February 2008.
° Co Verdaas, Gedeputeerde Gelderland; written answer to questionnaire on 12 February 2008.
° Herman de Wolff, Delft University of Technology, live interviews, 11 February 2008, 16:50­
17:00; 12 March 2008, 15:00-15:15.
°  J.W. van Zundert, telephone interview, 14 March 2008, 14:30-15:10.
°  Ernst van Gelder, Municipality of Rotterdam, telephone interviews, 12 March 2008, 14:45­
15:10; 1 April 2008, 17:00-17:45.
°  J.A.M. van den Brand, telephone interviews, 28 March 2008, 11:30-12:00; 4 April 2008, 10:30­
11:30; 11 April, 11:00-11:20.
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o Jaap Hoekstra, telephone interviews, 3 April 2008, 10:00-10:50; 16 April 2008, 16:35-16:50.
°  Kim van Wageningen, Van Keulen & van Zutphen, email-interview in June 2008. 
o Theo Stauttener and Robin van Bladel, City Beautiful, live interviews, 9 May 2008, 15.30-17.30;
27 June 2008, 15:00-17:30. 
o Arno Lamot, Zuidplas Advies, live interview, 12 February 2010, 11.00-13.00. 
o Arend Vriend, Van Keulen & van Zutphen, telephone-interview, 3 March 2010, 13-13:20. 
o Harry Nijland, Municipality of Apeldoorn, telephone-interview, 3 March 2010, 14:45-15:25;
email-interview 5 March 2010. 
o Martien Penning, Hillenraad, telephone interview, 3 March 2010, 15:45-16:10. 
o Hunen, Dennis van, e-mail interviews, Bouwfonds Ontwikkeling, 10 and 29 March 2010.
• Germany: Benjamin Davy, University Dortmund, telephone interview on 22 may 2006, 1 5:00-1 6:00.
• France: Vincent Renard, École Polytechnique, CNRS, telephone interview on 17 march 2006, writ­
ten comments on 9 June 2006, telephone interview on 4 January 2007, 17:00-17:15, and 11 January
2007, 11.15-11.45.
• Italy: Federico Oliva, Professor urban planning at the Polytechnic University of Milano, telephone 
interview on 5 January 2007 (16:30-17:30) and on 6 January (11-11:45).
• Sweden: Thomas Kalbro, Royal Institute of Technology, telephone interview on 11 mei 2006, 13.00­
15.00; and live interview on 12 oktober 2006, 13.00-15.30.
• Flanders: Herman de Wolff, TU Delft, Studiegroep Omgeving, live interview on 3 April 2006; Elisa­
beth Wouters, OM GEVING, telephone interview and written comments on 8 January 2008, 1 7-1 8:45.
• Denmark: Stig Enemark (University Aalborg), telephone interviews on 24 may 2006, 13.30-14.30, 
and 30 may 2006, 11-12.15.
Generic interviews
Meant for obtaining knowledge about the possible causal relationship between variables 'formal rules 
relevant to zoning' and 'public value capturing', i.e. meant for answering Preparatory Research Ques­
tion 3. All these interviews followed also a semi-structured form: all possibly relevant sub-variables of 
'formal rules relevant to zoning' were listed that might have had influence on sub-variables of 'public 
value capturing'. The construction of the questionnaire has followed a meticulous method (Emans, 
2002: 114-160). A transcription of the generic interviews was sent to the interviewed, which had the 
opportunity to comment on their contents. Two different groups of persons have been interviewed here.
(1) Persons involved in the studied cases: per case at least an involved public officer and the developer. 
The questionnaire differed a little depending on the position of the person in the case and country in 
question, as each case and each country show different relevant sub-variables of 'formal rules relevant 
to zoning'. Also, the questionnaire differed depending on the available time (minimal 45 minutes, maxi­
mal ca. 2 hours). A list of the interviewed persons can be found in section 'Cases'.
(2) Experts and representative of interest groups: relevant experts at national level, and the representa­
tives of the developers, also at national level. The questionnaires here differed a little depending on the 
country in question, as each country shows different relevant sub-variables of 'formal rules relevant to 
zoning'. These interviews used to last longer, about 1.5 till 3 hours. The interviewed experts were:
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• Spain/Valencia:
o Baño León, Jose María; Universitat de Valencia, live interview on 22 December 2006, 12:05­
14:00.
o Blanc Clavero, Francisco; live interviews on 1 November 2006, 18:30-21:30; on 27 November 
2006, 11.00-15.00 (visit to building sites) and 18.30-21.30 (interview); 
o Escribano, Alejandro, live interview 20 December 2006, 18:30-19:45, and telephone interviews 
some days later, about 1 hour. 
o Fernández, Gerardo Roger; live interview 26 oktober 2006, 12.30-15.00 uur. 
o Montiel, Antonio, significative member of Salvem, civil organization for the defence of natural 
environment and historic and cultural urban patrimony. 21 November 2006, 20:30-22:30. 
o Muñoz Solsona, Benjamín, chairman Asociación Procincial de Promotores Inmobiliarios 
y Agentes Urbanizadores de Valencia [Provincial Association of Developers and Urbanizing 
Agents of Valencia], and Cañellas Sierra, Carlos, legal adviser same association. 20 December
2006, 11.35-13.15.
o Rubio, Rafael chairman of local representatives social democratic party (PSPV) in Local Council 
of Valencia. 23 November 2006, 9:45-11:15.
• England:
o Hellen Holland, leader of Labour in the Local Council of Bristol; telephone semi-structured in­
terview on 26 July 2007, 14:30-14:00. 
o Andrew Whitaker, Head of Planning of the Home Building Federation; live semi-structured inter­
view on 2 July 2007 9.30-11.45.
• The Netherlands:
o Co Verdaas, Gedeputeerde Gelderland, telephone interview, 14 November 2007, 8:00-9:00; and 
19 November 2007, 8:30-9:00; written comment to the transcription on 21 November 2007. 
o Jan Fokkema, voorzitter Neprom, live interview on 27 November 2007, 15:15-16:30; schriftelijk 
commentaar van Jan Fokkema ontvangen op 29 Nov, en verwerkt op 30 Nov.
Cases
The in situ data gathering for the cases took place in the following periods:
• Region of Valencia: November and December 2006;
• England: June 2007;
• The Netherlands: beginning of 2005 for case De Funen and Winter of 2007-2008 for rest of cases.
Live interviews took place in these periods. Interviews made by telephone took place afterwards. The 
interviews were both above-mentioned sorts 'specific' and 'generic' interviews:
• Valencian cases:
o Case Guillem de Anglesola:
■ Francisco Raga, chief of the Department PAI of the Municipality of Valencia, interviews on 
Wednesday 25 October (13:00-14:00) and Monday 6 November 2006 (9:30-10:30);
■ Tomas Garcia Robles, chief of the Department Land Readjustment of the Municipality of
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Valencia, interview on 9 November 2006 (13:00-13:20).
■ Jorge Anglada Such, lawyer, and Ana Cantos, lawyer, Consulting Cantos Anglada, commis­
sioned by the urbanizing agent, Proara; interview on Wednesday 29 November 2006, 16:00­
17:45.
o Case Periodista G il Sumbiela
■ Francisco Raga, chief of the Department PAI of the Municipality of Valencia, interviews on 
Wednesday 25 October (13:00-14:00) and Monday 27 November 2006 (13.30-14.45);
■ Jose Antonio Berzosa Lamata, Architect-planner; Guillermo Berzosa, lawer; and Miguel An­
gel Sanjose Calabuig, Developer, G RU PO  INM OBILIARIO  DAEMI; interview on Tuesday 28 
November 2006, 17.00-18.45.
o Case Camino Hondo del Grao
■ Francisco Raga, chief of the Department PAI of the Municipality of Valencia, interviews on 
Wednesday 25 October (13:00-14:00) and Monday 27 November 2006 (1 3.30-14.45);
■ Raúl Peñalver Cabanero, developer, Vallehermoso Valencia; interview on Thursday 30 No­
vember 2006 (16:30-17:45).
o Benalúa Sur
■ José Manuel Santamaría Vidal, director of TERRA Recursos Inmobiliarios, leading party in 
N UEVO  SECTOR, the urbanizing agent, upto July 2002; Interview on 21 December 2006, 
9:00-10:30.
■ Rosa Rocamora, lawer of Perez Segura & Asociados, commissioned by the urbanizing agent, 
Grupo P.R.A.S.A. since 2002. Interview on 21 December 2006, 10:45-11:45; telephone in­
terview on 3 January 2007, 10:50-11.40.
■ Manuel Beltra, Municipality of Alicante, Chief Planning Department (Servicio Planeamiento 
y Gestion, Departamento Tecnico de Planeamiento); Telephone interview on Thursday 26 
October (12:00-13:00), and live interview on 21 December 2006 (12:15-15:15);
■ Miguel Garulo, Municipality of Alicante, Management Department; Telephone interview on 
Friday 12 January 2007 (18:05-19:00).
• English cases:
o Case Megabowl:
■ Jim Cliffe, Planning Obligations Project Manager of the Strategic and Citywide Policy Team of 
the Bristol City Council, the person that monitors the fulfilment of planning obligations: live not 
structured interview on Thursday 7 June 2007 (10-11.10); written answers to written questions 
on 18 June 2007;
■ John Douglas, Planning Officer of the Bristol City Council, the person who was in charge of 
this planning application; live semi-structured interview on 26 June 2007 (14-15.00); written 
comments to the transcription of the interview on 2 July; written answer to written questions 
on 22 June.
■ Jonathan Jarman, Angus Meek Partnership Ltd (the agent of Applicant Tenpin Limited, the 
applicant), the person in charge of this planning application: live semi-structured interview 
on Thursday 21 June 2007, 10:00-11:30; written and live answers to written questions on the 
same day, 9:30-10:00; other telephone comments on 24 July 2007, 17:50-17:55.
o Case Temple Quay:
■ Jim Cliffe, Planning Obligations Project Manager of the Strategic and Citywide Policy Team of
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the Bristol City Council, the person that monitors the fulfilment of planning obligations: live 
not structured interview on Thursday 7 June 2007 (10-11.10); written structured interview 
answered on 6 Augustus 2007;
■ Ian Collinson, planning officer of the City of Bristol in charge of this project at the time of the 
granting of Planning Permission; live semi-structured interview on Thursday 28 June 2007, 
14.00 -15.00, and written comments by e-mail on 2 July 2007;
■ Erik Hall, Planning Director Castlemore Securities Ltd, the developer of Temple Quay; tel­
ephone semi-structured interview on 8 Augustus 2007, 15:00-15:50.
o Case Harbourside:
i. Jim Cliffe, Planning Obligations Project Manager of the Strategic and Citywide Policy Team 
of the Bristol City Council, the person that monitors the fulfilment of planning obligations: 
live not structured interview on Thursday 7 June 2007 (10-11.10); written answers to written 
interview on 6 Augustus 2007;
ii. Richard Holden, Planning Officer Bristol City Council: live semi-structured interview on 3 
July 2007 (11.00-12.30); written answers to written interview on 6 Augustus 2007; several 
comments per E-mail along Augustus 2007.
iii. Ian Cawley, developer Crest Nicholson: telephone semi-structured interview on 28 Augustus
2007, 11:00-12:10.
• Dutch cases:
o Case De Funen
■ Dries Jense, projectmanager Municipality of Amsterdam in this project from 1995 to 2000. 
Interview January 2005 the 20th, 11-12:30.
■ Arthur van Gemmert, developer Heijmans IBC Real Estate Development. Interview January 
2005 the 25th, 13-14:00.
■ Jenny Brummelman, housing association De Key. Interview February 2005 the 3th, 16-17:15.
■ David Holtes, legal expert in the Centre Borough of the Municipality of Amsterdam, author 
of the Development obligations contract of 1997. Interview April 2005 the 29th, 11:30-14:00.
■ Hilda de Boer, chief Department of Planning Policy, and Conny van Rijk, legal expert, maker 
of the Local Land-use plan 'Quarter Czaar Peter-East', both from the Central District of the 
Municipality of Amsterdam. Interview July 2005 the 11th, 10-12:00.
o Case Kruidenbuurt
■ Rob Thijssen (developer, Trudo) live interview on 13 November 2007, 14:00-16:00; written 
answers to written questions on 28 November 2007;
■ Cees Zeeuwen (Land Development Company Municipality of Eindhoven), live interview 13 
November 2007, 14:00-16:00.
o Case Kop van Oost
■ Richard Crebs, jurist Real Estate development of the Municipality of Groningen: live inter­
view on 29 November 2007, 11:20-12:20; written answers to written questionnaire on 6 
December 2007;
■ Jaap Dallinga, jurist Planning and Economy Department, division Legal Affairs of the Munici­
pality of Groningen: written answers to written questionnaire on 6 December 2007;
■ Gerrit Liefering, Municipality of Groningen: written answers to written questionnaire on 6 
December 2007;
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■ Lonneke Zuijdwijk, developer Heijmans: live interview on 10 December 2007, 16:30-17:30;
■ Vincent Tuiten, developer Heijmans: written answers to written questionnaire on 18 Decem­
ber 2007.
o Case Stationskwartier
■ J.M. Vollaard, planner, Department Juridical Plans, Municipality of Breda. Mr. Vollaard was 
the author of the 2007 Land use Plan; live interview on 8 November 2007, 11:30-13:15.
■ J. Bosma, Stichting Stationskwartier (civic organization), written questionnaire, answered on 
26 November 2007.Gerard van Veggel, project leader, and Van Berkel, plan economist, both 
of the Municipality of Breda; live interview on 7 January 2008, 14:00-15:15.
■ Bram Loggers, ex project leader of NS Real Estate; live interview on 21 January 2008, 14:10­
15:00.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
Traditionally Dutch public bodies used to follow an 'active' land policy: they bought 
the land to be developed or regenerated, provided the infrastructure, and sold the 
serviced building plots to housing associations and commercial developers. At the 
end of the 80's, several policy changes caused a gradual shift to more passive or fa­
cilitating formulas. Increasingly, it is the housing associations and the market parties 
that buy the land, or most of it, and develop sites. Urban development in general 
(both greenfield development and the regeneration of urban sites) usually implies 
an economic value increase of the land, but also the need to invest in new roads 
and public space, drainage, public buildings and social housing, compensations, 
etc (from now on: "public infrastructure and facilities"). If municipalities follow an 
active land policy, they can pay those costs by selling the serviced building plots. 
However, since Dutch municipalities decreasingly have disposal over the land, they 
encounter problems with covering those costs, while the landowners are not willing 
to contribute. This has led to lowering public targets, for example in the regeneration 
of deteriorated Dutch neighbourhoods, and to the need for public subsidization.
This research asks the question whether, when land is in private hands, the economic 
value increase caused by regeneration could be used (all or at least part of it) to pay 
the public infrastructure and facilities. This research investigates whether a particu­
lar set of legal instruments, the 'formal rules relevant to zoning', could be useful to 
stimulate landowners to contribute, i.e. to improve the capturing of value increase. 
Formal rules relevant to zoning are: binding rules regulating the use of land and real 
estate, and the administrative approval procedure for these binding rules; property
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rights in land; and not-legally binding policy documents. Value increase in urban 
regeneration can be of different sorts: caused by investments in infrastructure, by re­
zoning the site, or just by the general increase in the demand for land. This research 
distinguishes three different meanings attached to 'capturing value increase': 'cost 
recovery' (recovery, through contributions from landowners, of the costs of public 
infrastructure and facilities), 'value capturing' (capturing by public bodies that have 
invested in, for instance, infrastructure, of the increased property values) and 'cream­
ing off plus value' (public body capturing all sorts of value increase). All three types 
of capturing are considered in this research.
A fundamental question is, who should receive the value increase. Following a con­
servative liberal tradition, any value increase belongs to the landowner, while an 
alternative tradition advocates that it belongs to the community. A common topic in 
the neo-classical theory of economic rent is the idea of taxing it. These ideological 
differences have led to different instruments for capturing value increase, some of 
them seeking to capture all of the value increase and others seeking only to internal­
ize the negative impacts of urban development (that is, cost recovery). Because in the 
Netherlands only the latter is allowed, this research makes recommendations for cost 
recovery and not for creaming off the plus value. Some recommendations fit within 
the existing Dutch legal framework, including the new Physical Planning Act (Wet 
ruimtelijk ordening) and Land Development Act (Grondexploitatiewet). Other recom­
mendations imply a modification of this legal framework. So the problem to which 
this research wants to find a solution is formulated as follows:
How  could formal rules relevant to zoning be used in the development phase of 
comprehensive urban regeneration developments on privately owned land in the 
Netherlands in order that the profitable parts finance the unprofitable parts?
In order to answer it, the following research questions need first to be answered:
• Preparatory research question 1: How  can those formal rules relevant to zoning 
be used in comprehensive urban regeneration developments on privately owned 
land?
• Preparatory research question 2: What is the extent o f capturing value increase 
in comprehensive urban regeneration developments on privately owned land?
• Preparatory research question 3: H ow  does the way in which formal rules rel­
evant to zoning are used influence capturing value increase?
• Main research question: How  could formal rules relevant to zoning be used in 
the Netherlands in order that the profitable parts finance as much as possible the 
unprofitable parts?
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Chapter 2 - Theoretical framework: capturing value increase 
within policy networks
An urban regeneration project can be analyzed as a policy network in which pub­
lic bodies try to improve the capturing of value increase by interacting with other 
parties. The 'policy network approach' results from the academic debate about the 
changing role of public bodies and market parties in the last decennia. The founda­
tions can be found in policy science in the early 1970s. While in the traditional intra- 
organizational approach, public management is a top-down authoritarian activity, in 
the policy network approach, the power relation between actors is less hierarchical. 
Resource dependence is a method to discover the structural factors that can explain 
this relation. A first structural factor is that policy networks consist of different actors 
each of them pursuing its own goals. This carries the potentiality of a conflict. At the 
same time, the actors are mutually dependent because none of them controls all the 
resources that are needed to pursue its goals. The strength of this dependence de­
pends on the importance and 'substitutability' of the resource. Both the distribution 
of resources and the power relations of actors are regulated and shaped by formal 
rules (laws). In turn, the power relations often shape, consolidating or altering, the 
formal rules. A second structural factor is that governments always depend on the 
resources of others and are thus not anymore the dominant actor but a primus inter 
pares. Critics say that the policy network approach devalues the status of the public 
sector, and that a close involvement of public bodies in interactions and partnerships 
is undesirable because networks are non-transparent and uncontrolled.
My research can be seen as criticism of the basic assumption that public bodies in 
land development projects always have to depend on other actors. I provide two 
measures to modify the interactions within the policy networks, and thereby to mod­
ify the outcomes in capturing value increase: first modifying property rights in land, 
and second modifying certainty and flexibility in planning.
Property rights in land
One might think that property rights give the owner total freedom to decide how to 
use his land. However, the reality is that formal rules restrict this. Formal rules can 
come from private law and are meant to regulate the normal traffic of property rights 
between persons. But formal rules can also come from public law and are meant to 
regulate how public bodies can impose restrictions on property rights. Especially 
after the introduction in the 19th Century of the social function of property and of 
sanitary considerations, public law has significantly limited property rights in land. 
Nowadays the owner can enjoy his property only if he/she does so within the legal 
rules and prescriptions, and after receiving a public authorization or concession. In 
Great Britain, the Netherlands and Spain there is much debate about this. In 1947 a 
British law introduced and operationalized what was called the nationalization of 
development rights. As a consequence, the value increase became the subject of a
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charge, a charge that however does not exist anymore. This nationalization did not 
go further, and the principle remained that landowners are the only ones who can 
develop their land.
The mentioned problems in the Netherlands with the financing of the public infra­
structure and facilities have been the subject of controversy and debate. The question 
has been discussed whether public law offers public bodies enough instruments to 
influence urban development. Some authors are more optimistic about this, while 
others are sceptical. Some consider that property rights in land create a sort of oli­
gopoly of landowners and advocate a modification of property rights in order to 
stimulate free competition.
Since the 19th Century, the difficulties faced in Spain by public bodies in financ­
ing public infrastructure and facilities inspired proposals and measures that affected 
property rights. In 1956 a land readjustment regulation was introduced that made 
profiting from the value increase conditional on taking responsibility for infrastruc­
ture provision. Landowners are, since then, obliged to provide the infrastructure. 
As compensation, they share the serviced building plots. Municipalities are obliged 
to approve a General Land use Plan covering the entire municipal territory to give 
certainty to the landowners about the building possibilities. The detailed character 
of this plan, and its strong legal binding status has made Spain a singular case in 
the international context. The land readjustment regulation failed however to assure 
good and enough public infrastructure and facilities. Since the 1980s, critics (sin­
gularly García-Bellido) advocated breaking the oligopoly of landowners by giving 
the development rights to the public bodies. Inspired by this proposal, in 1994 the 
region of Valencia introduced a new law to tackle land speculation and to improve 
capturing value increase. In fact this law separated infrastructure provision from land 
ownership.
Certainty and flexibility in planning
There is a lively debate about the desirable degree of flexibility in planning: must 
planning create certainty at early stages of development processes (so that public 
bodies can control urban development) or be flexible (to adapt to circumstances)? 
If zoning plans are approved early, and include detailed prescriptions, and it is not 
possible to modify them, then there will be less flexibility and more certainty. While 
flexibility was seen as a negative feature in the 1960s, nowadays the perception has 
changed. As we will see later, the degree of certainty has important consequences for 
capturing value increase.
There are two traditions related to the degree of flexibility and certainty in urban 
planning. The 'plan-led' traditions (like the Dutch planning system) are supposed to 
provide at early stages certainty about the future development possibilities through 
the approval of legally binding land use plans. The 'development-led' tradition (like 
the British planning system), although there might be some indicative zoning plans
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in early stages, is assumed to give less certainty and leave more room for negotiations 
with developers and landowners. These differences are the consequence of historic 
differences: the plan-led system rests on the centrality of the rule of law and the 
development-led system on judge-made law and procedural fairness.
Causal model: which variables influence the capturing of value increase in urban 
regeneration?
Different actors are involved in urban regeneration: public and private, with regula­
tory powers or not, with or without land, with a direct or indirect interest. All of them 
interact with each other within a complex set of variables to finally shape the degree 
of captured value increase. If the economic value of the site clearly increases due to 
the regeneration, there is an initial profit. But this initial profit should be distributed 
in such a way that contributions for public infrastructure and facilities are paid for. If 
the final profit is large enough, it is possible to subtract those contributions. The size 
of the initial profit, and whether it translates into a final profit depends on several 
variables:
A. Context variables influencing size initial profit: real estate markets, plan and site 
features, markets of workforce and building materials, and fiscal regimes.
B. Context variables influencing distribution initial profit, i.e. the formal rules rel­
evant to zoning.
C. Actions of those directly involved in the project, including those with formal 
powers, which influence the size of the initial profit: definition of the contents 
and geographical scope of the plan.
D. Actions of those directly involved in the project, including those with formal 
powers, which influence the distribution of the initial profit: how the local pub­
lic bodies and the owners use the formal rules relevant to zoning, how local 
public and private bodies interact informally, and specific circumstances.
This research focuses on how the variables in bold print can be manipulated, but 
must also take into account all the other variables, for all of them together influence 
the size and the distribution of the initial profit, i.e. capturing value increase. There 
are many ways in which the initial profit 'leaks out' so it is no longer available to 
pay the public infrastructure and facilities. One way is that the accounted cost of the 
land (inbrengwaarde in Dutch) can be much higher than the minimum land cost, i.e. 
higher than the value of the possibilities in the previous use. For example, in the stud­
ied Dutch case Kop van Oost, the minimum land cost was about € 3.6 million, while 
the accounted cost was at least € 12 million. Another sort of 'leak' is the regular profit 
margin that the developer charges as a kind of normal fee. Both the accounted land 
cost and the regular profit are often not defined at the start of development processes, 
and landowners and developers can at that time set them higher or lower: higher if 
there is certainty about the building possibilities (how much and what the landowner 
will be able to build), and lower is there is certainty about the future contributions 
(how much the landowner will have to contribute, in kind or in money). Also relevant 
is the negotiation position of the public bodies. If there is certainty about building
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possibilities, the negotiation position of a municipality weakens because it cannot 
negotiate more contributions in exchange for allowing building possibilities. If there 
is certainty about the future contributions, its negotiation position will be better as 
these contributions become the starting point of negotiation. Finally, its negotiation 
position will also be better if the public body openly makes the approval of the zon­
ing plan conditional on the developer securing his contributions. Landowners are in 
a good negotiating position because their ownership of land allows them to ask the 
maximum possible price for their land. Besides, they might delay the development 
processes, and in turn delay implies higher development costs in e.g. financial costs, 
longer plan preparation, etc. Higher development costs jeopardize also the initial 
profit. For example, in the Dutch case Kop van Oost de land development costs were 
about € 7 million, while they could have been much lower, about € 2 million. Delay 
can be the result of difficult negotiations with a multitude of landowners, and/or a 
deliberate strategy of landowners if they expect that the price of land could increase 
in the future. As a consequence of all these interactions, the initial profit disappears. 
In case Kop van Oost the municipality had to subsidize the public infrastructure and 
facilities while an initial profit of about € 18.5 million seems to have leaked out.
Two measures to improve capturing value increase: two hypotheses
The above mentioned measures to improve capturing value increase (modifying 
property rights in land and certainty and flexibility in planning) are formulated as two 
hypotheses:
1. A specific form of splitting the property rights on land (separating infrastructure 
provision from property rights) can modify the power-relationships in the net­
work o f actors involved in urban regeneration, and this can improve capturing 
value increase.
2. Creating uncertainty in early stages o f development processes about future build­
ing possibilities, and certainty about future contributions, can influence captur­
ing value increase in a positive way.
Chapter 3 - Method
This research studies a 'phenomenon': the interaction between municipalities, when 
making use of the formal rules relevant to zoning, and the developers/landowners 
regenerating a site. I focus on two variables: whether the application of formal rules 
relevant to zoning (the independent variable) could contribute to a more effective 
capturing of value increase (the dependent variable). The final goal is to produce 
knowledge that supports the formulation of recommendations for how Dutch prac­
tice could improve capturing value increase, but at the same time not delay urban 
regeneration.
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I made several choices. First, mainly to base the research on a limited number of 
cases: four in Valencia, three in England, and four in the Netherlands. It was possible 
neither to gather data from a large enough sample of cases that would allow a repre­
sentative statistical analysis, nor to perfectly isolate from possible intervening varia­
bles the relationship between the independent and the dependent variables. Besides, 
case research offers more information about the phenomenon and its interaction with 
the context than a one moment-survey. The data gathering took place before the start 
of the international financial and economic crisis in the Summer/Autumn of 2008, 
and specifically for Spain before the start of the crisis in the Spanish real estate mar­
kets at the end of 2007. For important data, I made a last round of data gathering at 
the end of 2009 and during 2010.
My second choice was to produce findings with a high validity and to avoid the 
risk, inherent to case-based research, of producing knowledge, so specific that it 
could not lead to general conclusions and recommendations for the Netherlands. 
This meant introducing three groups of provisions to increase both the internal and 
the external validity of the findings:
1. Using the hypothetical-deductive method to empirically test the two hypotheses;
2. Using variants of the method of difference to avoid the risk of third variables 
and of spurious correlations between the independent and dependent variables: 
elaboration of a list of possible third variables to assess their role in each country 
and case; limiting the total population of the cases and selecting countries with 
a similar political, economical and social background in order to maintain the 
context as constant as possible; selecting for in-depth research those countries 
with contrasting planning models in order to maximize the variance in the in­
dependent variable, which led to choosing an international comparison of plan­
ning systems; selecting cases that might include innovative practices; finally, 
when possible I studied the phenomenon before and after a modification of the 
independent variable (a modification of a law);
3. Using some techniques specifically to strengthen the external validity or gener- 
alizability of the findings: selecting representative cases, and using data sources 
additional to the cases.
This research was not interested in studying the whole phenomenon, i.e. in a de­
scription of all the characteristics of the phenomenon, but in identifying the relevant 
variables from the rest of the infinite number of other variables that could character­
ize the phenomenon. Therefore this research focused on several sub-variables of the 
independent and dependent variables. To distinguish them, this research developed a 
dependence model, and used the theoretical framework (included the two hypothe­
ses) and the causal model. The independent variable (formal rules relevant to zoning) 
was subdivided into five sub-variables to analyse how public bodies use the formal 
rules relevant to zoning (preparatory research question 1):
a) Certainty beforehand about future building possibilities and contributions;
b) Choosing the contents of binding rules;
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c) Making binding rules conditional on the developer securing his contributions;
d) Modulating property rights in land;
e) Procedure for the preparation and approval of relevant binding rules: guarantees 
to the initiative-holders; flexibility to modify existing binding rules; flexibility to 
determine the geographical scope of the binding rules accordingly to negotia­
tions with landowners.
The dependent variable (capturing value increase) too was subdivided into several 
sub-variables: all possible forms of contributions from developers/landowners and 
also possible side effects, especially the tempo of implementation. This allowed eval­
uating the degree of finally captured value increase (preparatory research question 
2). Preparatory research question 3 has been answered by inferring the sort of causal 
relationship between the independent and the dependent variables. The answers are 
in fact the tested hypotheses, for example: "if municipalities establish in early stages 
of development processes which contributions developers will have to pay/realize, 
capturing value increase will improve".
After answering each preparatory research question for each country in chapters 5 
to 7, chapter 8 draw conclusions for the academic debate based on the tested hy­
potheses. All those answers and tested hypotheses, but incorporating also specific 
knowledge of the Dutch situation (legislation, political and cultural considerations), 
are used to give in chapter 9 an answer to the main research question, i.e. to make 
recommendations for the Dutch practice.
Chapter 4 - Quick scan: formal rules relevant to zoning in 
W estern European countries
The first step in international comparative research is exploratory research into the 
independent variable 'formal rules relevant to zoning' in the Netherlands and an­
other eight Western European countries: Germany, England (part of the UK), Flanders 
(part of Belgium), France, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, and Spain (region of Valencia). By 
studying countries with a similar context, as these have, reduces the influence of third 
variables. The second step is to select the Spanish region of Valencia and England 
because they show the broadest variation in the independent variable (they stand 
for contrasting models of planning systems). The reason is that this increases the pos­
sibilities of producing significant findings. These two countries and the Netherlands 
are the subject of in-depth research in chapters 5-7.
The differences found in the exploratory research in the nine countries were remark­
able. Regarding the place of binding rules in the negotiation processes, England rep­
resents the 'development-led' planning system model, and Spain/Valencia (togeth-
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er, although to a lesser extend, with France, Italy and Flanders) the 'plan-led'. The 
Netherlands, the same as Germany, Sweden, and Denmark, follows in practice the 
development-led approach because the binding rules that make new developments 
possible are approved only after intending developers have negotiated the content 
with the municipality. Regarding the contents of binding rules, the Netherlands (up 
to 2008), together with Denmark, has almost no development-oriented binding rules 
(these are documents that prescribe the practical development of an area: temporal 
and financial regulations, or other kind of regulations intended for the implementa­
tion), while England and Valencia do. Further, the Dutch binding rules (except the 
new Development contributions plan after 2008), together with the Danish, have 
the narrowest contents (i.e. they can include not much more than the physical zon­
ing), while England has the broadest. Finally, in the Netherlands, Germany, France, 
Sweden, Denmark and Flanders the approval of the binding rules (planning consent) 
cannot be made, formally and openly, conditional on the developer securing the im­
plementation (the developer committing in a contract to provide the infrastructure, 
to cede land for free, to contribute to the costs, etc), while in England, Valencia and 
Italy this is possible and is the standard procedure.
Regarding the property rights in land, in all the studied countries, ownership rights 
include the right to build. There is no case where property rights are fully separated 
from the right to develop the land. That is, landowners are the only ones entitled to 
build on their land, and they can exclude others from doing so. However, in Valen­
cia, Germany, France and Sweden the infrastructure provision is in the planning law 
explicitly identified as a public task, while in the Netherlands, England and the other 
countries it is not. Further, in Valencia and, to a lesser extent also in Germany and 
Sweden, infrastructure provision can be implemented without need of agreement 
with the landowner, as there is the possibility of compulsory land readjustment. On 
the contrary, in the Netherlands, England, France, Italy, Sweden, Flanders and Den­
mark, infrastructure provision is dependent on agreement with the landowners, and 
this dependence can only be avoided through major public involvement in financial 
and organizational terms (buying land and applying pre-emption, expropriation or a 
posteriori special tax formulae). Regarding the procedure for approval of the binding 
rules, in England certain major modifications are possible with a very simple proce­
dure, while in the Netherlands and Valencia a heavy procedure is needed.
Chapter 5 - Valencia
The Spanish region of Valencia has almost full competence to make and implement 
planning law, and it subsidizes, together with the central government of Madrid and 
many municipalities, several policies oriented to the revitalization of historic areas 
and some other deteriorated neighbourhoods. But most urban regeneration has been 
undertaken in the last decennia by private initiatives to rezone into new residential,
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retail and office schemes old industrial and offices sites located within the existing 
urban areas. This research focuses on these sorts of regeneration projects, where there 
is no public subsidization. To rezone the land, public bodies must first modify the 
previous binding rules, which are of two sorts: 'General Land use Plan' and 'Detailed 
Plans'. General Plans cover the entire municipal territory and have a legally binding 
character. In extension areas, they zone the land into urban and not urban, prescribe 
the possible building typologies, the main public infrastructure and facilities and the 
exact extent of the building rights that belong to each landowner (the 'Reference De­
velopment Allowance', a sort of floor space index). This allowance gives a very high 
certainty about the future building possibilities. In addition, in extension areas to be 
developed soon and in regeneration areas, General Plans include also very detailed 
prescriptions: alignment, height and volumes of the buildings and the minor pub­
lic infrastructure and facilities. Detailed Plans are meant for specific sites, and can 
modify and must anyway detail, if they are not detailed already, the General Plans.
Traditionally, Spanish public bodies have aimed to finance the unprofitable parts in 
urban regeneration with the profitable parts. This aim has led to the introduction of 
the already mentioned land readjustment in 1956. The readjustment of the property 
boundaries and the infrastructure provision had to be organised by all the landown­
ers themselves. If landowners did not cooperate, the municipality could overrule 
them applying compulsory land readjustment or expropriation. In 1978 the central 
government introduced a set of legal minimal standards of public infrastructure and 
facilities that, together with the General Plans, created certainty about the future 
contributions to be paid/realized by the landowners. However, the 1956 land read­
justment regulation stimulated land speculation (which led to high accounted land 
costs), suffered from great difficulties in organizing landowners and in addition de­
layed the development processes (which both led to inflated development costs). 
This resulted in poorly serviced building sites, with inferior public infrastructure and 
facilities and huge building volumes. In 1994 the Valencian regional government in­
troduced important novelties in the land readjustment regulation. First, it introduced 
a third party, in addition to the municipality and the landowner/developer: the ur­
banising agent (agente urbanizador). This third party is not required to own land and 
can be directly appointed by the municipality (public land development company) 
or be chosen in a public tender (commercial builder or developer). After being as­
signed, the urbanising agent assumes responsibility for the infrastructure provision 
and for the land readjustment. Second, the 1994 law gave guarantees to the commer­
cial parties if they wanted to participate in the public tender. Third, Detailed Plans 
had to be complemented with a document including all the development-oriented 
aspects and a Development Agreement. Anyone can participate in the public tender 
by submitting a proposal to the municipality, as landownership is not required, and 
anyone can submit objections or alternative proposals. After evaluation, the Local 
Council decides on a definitive proposal and selects the urbanising agent. The urban­
ising agent makes and submits to the municipality a detailed proposal for the public 
infrastructure and for the land readjustment. After readjusting the property bounda-
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ries (compulsorily if necessary), the municipality receives the public infrastructure 
and facilities and often also some serviced building plots, and the landowners the 
remaining plots. Finally, the owners of the plots submit building applications and the 
municipality issues building permits. The Valencian novelty has been introduced in 
most of the other seventeen Spanish regions.
How far can the contributions of landowners and developers go? In Spain, munici­
palities capture part of the value increase in urban extension areas, and they to this 
by requiring landowners to cede between 5 and 15% of the serviced building plots to 
the municipality. In addition, landowners must pay the infrastructure provision costs 
and provide the land needed for that, and pay to the urbanizing agent his overhead 
costs and a profit margin. In principle, the public buildings (schools, hospitals etc) 
must be paid by the respective public body, except social housing, which must be 
built and paid by the landowners. Additionally, it is also possible to oblige landown­
ers to cede land situated elsewhere that is needed for off-site infrastructure. Munici­
palities are free to agree additional obligations with the urbanizing agent, which must 
pay them from his own resources and cannot charge them to the landowners.
Three cases are located in the City of Valencia: Camino Hondo del Grao (5.7 ha, 465 
apartments plus considerable amount of offices and retail); Guillem de Anglesola 
(1.2 ha, 125 apartments, plus some retail); and Periodista G il Sumbiela (0.6 ha, 100 
apartments, plus some retail). One case is located in the City of Alicante: Benalúa 
Sur (8 ha, 600 apartments, plus considerable amount offices and retail). In all four 
cases, there was a General Plan that prescribed in detail the future development pos­
sibilities, but a Detailed Plan had anyway to be approved before being allowed to 
redevelop the site. In cases Camino and Benalúa, the Detailed Plan modified major 
aspects of the General Plan. In Guillem  and in Periodista, the Detailed Plan detailed 
and modified only minor aspects. In all the cases, the urbanizing agent is a private 
party selected in a public tender, sometimes a professional developer, as in Guillem  
and Periodista, sometimes the landowners themselves joining together as urbanizing 
agent, as in Camino and Benalúa. Most of the time, urbanizing agents not only pro­
vide the infrastructure, but also buy some land and become developer of the build­
ings. In Periodista most landowners sold their property relatively quickly to the ur­
banizing agent. In Guillem  they waited and most of them sold at the time of the land 
readjustment procedure. In Camino and Benalúa the land was already the property 
of the urbanizing agent (as landowners themselves became the urbanizing agent).
Chapter 6 - England
The central UK government and the regional and local public bodies have produced 
two main urban regeneration policies: policies meant for inadequate housing (which 
have a long tradition), and policies for the regeneration of the inner cities (which
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started in the 1970s). In the last decennia, as the studied cases show, public bodies 
have been seeking a larger involvement from commercial developers in financing 
public infrastructure and facilities for urban regeneration. To rezone the land, the 
Local Planning Authorities (LPAs) must first modify the previous binding rules. In Eng­
land, zoning plans covering wider areas might play an important role, but they are of 
an indicative character, i.e. they have no direct statutory consequences for the use of 
land and real estate. The only legally binding land use plan is the 'Planning Permis­
sion', which focuses on a specific site. Once a developer submits an application for a 
planning permission, the LPA can impose planning conditions on the permission, or 
can negotiate contributions in a Planning Agreement ('106-agreement').
In England public bodies have in principle the right to tax the increase in value caused 
by the rezoning of land. In the past, several types of tax have been introduced, but all 
have been rescinded. Capturing value increase in practice takes place through requir­
ing developers to contribute towards mitigating the impact of development. Contribu­
tions have become generalized since the 1970s, evolving from physical infrastructure 
provision on the specific site (on-site), towards also environmental, community and 
social infrastructure often located outside the specific site (off-site). This includes de­
velopers being asked to provide affordable housing. Controversy in the last years 
about the scope of contributions has led to a more tight regulation of the contribu­
tions that can be asked from developers, but this has not reduced the contributions.
The three studied cases are located in the City of Bristol: Harbourside/Canon's Marsh 
(7.8 ha, 700 apartments, 44,000 m2 office, 30,000 m2 leisure and facilities); Temple 
Quay (7.4 ha, 495 apartments, 61,000 m2 office, and 7,000 m2 leisure and facilities); 
and Megabowl (1.3 ha, 184 apartments). The 1997 Bristol Local Plan (a zoning plan 
of an indicative character covering the entire city) gave, for all the three cases, non- 
legally binding and outline prescriptions. Before redevelopment was allowed, one 
or more planning permissions had to be granted, and these permissions included 
requirements about contributions that had been negotiated with the developers and 
finally secured in Development Agreements.
Chapter 7 - The Netherlands
The Dutch national and local public bodies pursue urban regeneration and stimulate 
new building within the boundaries of existing cities. There are specific policies for: 
multifunctional central areas, including railway stations (case Stationskwartier, 16 
ha, 650 apartments, plus much office space, some shops, a new railway station and 
much parking); monofunctional pre- and postwar residential districts (case Kruiden- 
buurt, 17 ha, 650 dwellings, plus some offices); and old brownfield sites (cases De 
Funen -8 ha, 565 apartments, some offices- and Kop van Oost -5 ha, 430 apartments, 
plus some commercial space). Urban regeneration usually involves the making of
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indicative zoning plans, many of which are not regulated in planning law. However, 
before regeneration takes place, first the financial means must be found to pay the 
public infrastructure and facilities, and second a new land use plan (bestemmingsp­
lan) or departures from it must be approved.
In the Netherlands, the value increase of land falls to the landowner. The actual legal 
possibilities for capturing the increased value are limited to cost recovery, i.e. to ask­
ing developers to pay those costs of public infrastructure and facilities that benefit 
the development. This has not changed with the new 2008 Physical Planning Act 
and Physical Planning Decree. In general, contributions of developers are a result 
of negotiation. Since the 2008 Act it is possible to require from the landowners a 
contribution without the need of negotiation. The municipality must then approve 
a Development contributions plan, and can then formally condition the building 
permit (not the approval of the land use plan or departure from it) on the landowner 
contributing to the costs. The 2008 Decree regulates the sorts of costs that can be 
imposed on the landowners through a Development contributions plan: costs of on­
site infrastructure and social housing, and of off-site infrastructure directly related to 
the development site. This excludes the costs of maintenance and exploitation, of 
social facilities (maatschappelijke voorzieningen) and part of the costs of refurbish­
ing old infrastructure and of plan preparation. Moreover, as landowners cannot be 
required to contribute part of the increased value of their land towards those costs, 
making a Development contributions plan in urban regeneration sites often implies 
the municipality having to pay an additional deficit. Instead of approving a Develop­
ment contributions plan, municipalities and developers/landowners are, since 2008, 
free to agree contributions in a Development agreement, called an 'anterior Devel­
opment agreement' (anterieure overeenkomst). An anterior Agreement may include 
more contributions than a Development contributions plan.
Chapters 8 and 9 - Conclusions and recommendations for the 
Dutch practice
More captured value increase in Valencia and England than in the Netherlands
The findings make clear that formal rules relevant to zoning in the Spanish region of 
Valencia and in England differ significantly from those in the Netherlands (see follow­
ing sections). A comparison of how much value increase public bodies manage to 
capture shows also remarkable differences: in Valencia and England, private parties 
are committed in urban regeneration on private owned land to contribute more than 
in the Netherlands. The differences mainly involve:
- On-site infrastructure provision costs: in England and Valencia these are mostly 
or fully paid by the developers, while the Netherlands finances these with large 
public subsidies;
414 Sum m ary
- Land for on-site public infrastructure: in Valencia this is provided free of charge 
by the landowners, while England and the Netherlands there are much larger 
public contributions for providing this land;
- Social housing: in England and Valencia, this is paid to a large extent or almost 
fully by the developers, while in the Netherlands this is covered primarily by 
municipalities and housing associations;
- Off-site public infrastructure: in England and Valencia, developers contribute 
significantly (in England primarily with financial means while in Valencia prima­
rily with land), while in the Netherlands these contributions are rare;
- Creaming off plus value: local public bodies in Valencia cream off a significant 
share of the economic value increase, even if they own no land. In England this 
does not happen officially, but because of the broad definition of developers' 
contributions one can conclude that it does happen. In the Netherlands this is the 
case only when the municipality owns the land and/or invests and shares the risk.
I conclude that there is a strong correlation between the captured value increase (the 
highest in Valencia, lower but also high in England, and the lowest in the Nether­
lands) and the different possibilities offered by the formal rules relevant to zoning. 
However, the correlation is not perfect. There are other variables that might also 
explain part of the differences in the captured value increase. A relevant one is the 
market price of real estate. When the data were gathered, housing prices in the Eng­
lish cases were significantly higher than prices in the Valencian and Dutch cases. This 
could partly explain why English developers offered more generous contributions 
than their Dutch counterparts, but not why Valencian developers, despite similar 
market prices to those in the Netherlands, still contributed somewhat more than the 
English, and much more than the Dutch. Other variables that can also explain part of 
the differences are the plan and site features, the markets for labour and for building 
materials, fiscal regimes, the definition of the contents and geographical scope of the 
plan, and specific circumstances of the involved interactions and persons.
General conclusions for the academic debate
Chapter 2 developed two specific measures, formulated as hypotheses, for influenc­
ing the interactions within the policy networks in urban regeneration and the re­
sulting captured value increase. These two hypotheses have been tested empirically. 
The first speculates about the effects on capturing value increase of the definition of 
property rights in land and how this influences the power relationship between the 
involved public and private parties. The second speculates about the effects of the 
certainty created by binding rules and non-binding policy documents during devel­
opment processes. In the causal model in chapter 2, a third speculation came up that 
has also been empirically tested: the assumption that the flexibility in procedures 
could be relevant for capturing value increase.
About the third assumption, it has not been possible to infer clear and generaliz- 
able relationships between flexibility and the results for capturing value increase.
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However, it seems that the first two hypotheses might indeed be valid. The formal 
rules regarding property rights and certainty are indeed relevant because they can 
influence the interactions within the policy networks. Public bodies in England and 
especially in Valencia seem, thanks to these formal rules, to play a more powerful 
role than in the Netherlands. Municipalities in England and especially in Valencia 
prescribe beforehand and unilaterally clear requirements and obligations, which re­
sult in a high level of captured value increase. In Valencia, municipalities go further 
than in England, as the Valencian municipalities have also, thanks to a compulsory 
land readjustment regulation, powers to select the developer they prefer, if necessary 
by-passing the landowners and without the need of buying or expropriating the land. 
The dominant role of public bodies, especially in Valencia, clearly does not fit within 
the role that the policy network approach gives them, and it undermines some of the 
basic assumptions of that approach: that actors are necessarily interdependent, that 
public bodies must assume a more modest role and cannot be dominant.
The next paragraphs explain the different ways (or sub-variables) in which formal 
rules are used to influence capturing value increase. Per sub-variable, some further 
conclusions for the academic debate and the recommendations for the Dutch prac­
tice are given. The recommendations follow a gradual approach, from voluntary 
measures that fit within the 2008 Land Development Act, to more profound, legal 
modifications for the longer term.
Creating certainty beforehand about future building possibilities and 
contributions.
Summary of the findings
Municipalities in all three countries usually create certainty in early stages (before 
the negotiations with developers) and in different degrees, about what the landowner 
will be allowed to build. In the Netherlands, municipalities usually approve indica­
tive, not legally binding plans, which create some certainty, for example nota van 
uitgangspunten, stedenbouwkundig plan/visie, structuurvisie, etc. In England some­
thing similar is done, also in indicative documents, and in Valencia through the ap­
proval of the legally binding General Land use Plans. The findings suggest that more 
certainty beforehand may result in less value capturing because it might stimulate 
land price increases, and municipalities lose a valuable negotiation tool. However, 
certainty about building possibilities, if accompanied by certainty about future con­
tributions (see below), is not necessarily negative.
There are large differences in the certainty beforehand about future contributions. In 
Valencia, in early stages there is much certainty through (1) legal minimal standards, 
(2) local policy and (3) the approval of the General Plans. English municipalities usu­
ally create some certainty through the approval of (1) site-specific indicative plans 
that establish the contributions for the development in question, and (2) non site- 
specific, indicative generic policy documents that establish standard contributions. In
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the Netherlands, most of the time there is no certainty at all, neither created through 
legally binding nor indicative documents, before negotiations take place, or before 
the price of land is established. This certainty in Valencia and England has influenced 
the capturing of value increase in a positive way because: 1) it lowers the price of 
the land, because if there is no certainty, the developer pays too much for the land 
and has less financial room to contribute; 2) certainty lowers the price for which the 
developer accounts the land in the financial calculation of the operation, and the 
regular profit margin which the developer aims for; 3) certainty gives the public offic­
ers a strong policy base for requiring contributions during the negotiations.
Conclusions for the academic debate
The findings seem to confirm the second hypothesis:
Creating uncertainty in early stages of development processes about future building 
possibilities, and certainty about future contributions, can influence capturing value 
increase in a positive way.
Part of the literature on comparative planning systems in Europe may have wrongly 
concluded, at least with regard to the Spanish versus English and Dutch systems, 
that planning systems are tending to converge in their level of certainty. The findings 
might also be relevant to the debate in the planning profession, a debate in which 
flexibility is often advocated as a positive asset: for the findings underline that there 
should be a certain level of certainty about contributions, in order to better capturing 
value increase.
Recommendations for the Dutch practice
Dutch municipalities, before or together with the preparation of indicative plans 
that precede development, should create certainty about which contributions will 
be required from developers. The list of sorts of contributions included in the 2008 
Decree is not enough for creating certainty, because that list is too general and in an 
early stage of the process does not allow developers to accurately calculate exactly 
which costs they have to contribute. Therefore, municipalities should create certainty 
about those costs that will be charged through a Development contributions plan. 
However, because this plan does not allow all the costs to be recovered, municipali­
ties should not approve a Development contributions plan, but try to negotiate with 
the developer more contributions in an anterior Development agreement. Therefore, 
municipalities should create certainty about those costs that they wish to recover 
through anterior agreements, in addition to those that can be recovered through a 
Development contributions plan.
The recommended certainty can be created in different sorts of documents, many 
of which can complement each other: (1) site-specific documents accompanying 
the commonly used indicative site-specific plans; (2) generic documents including 
standard charges of an integral (covering all policy fields) or sectoral (covering just
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one policy field) character; and (3) general zoning plans including the obligatory 
contributions, possibly in standard form. Any of these sorts of documents should 
be preferably of an indicative character, because this fits better within the Dutch 
planning tradition. The recently introduced Structure vision (Structuurvisie) can be 
the ideal sort of document, not only because it is a flexible document, but also be­
cause it is obligatory for charging some sorts of contributions. The Dutch central 
government should also help and stimulate municipalities to create certainty, for 
example by making, together with the Association of Netherlands Municipalities, 
model documents. Should the voluntary measures not be widely applied in practice, 
then the central government should introduce some legal modifications: first oblig­
ing municipalities to prepare generic integral documents to be included in Structure 
visions, and second introducing minimal legal standard charges and prescriptions for 
the entire country.
Choosing the contents o f binding rules
Summary of the findings and recommendations for the Dutch practice
Binding plans might be useful in negotiations if the municipality can include in them 
not only the physical zoning, but also aspects related to the financing and implemen­
tation of public infrastructure and facilities. Do binding plans regulate only a desired 
final picture, without stating who is responsible for its implementation? Or also the 
contributions that must be provided by the developer? Both in Valencia and England, 
planning law makes it possible to include in binding plans a wide range of require­
ments:
• Social/affordable housing: both in Valencia and England it is possible to pre­
scribe social/affordable housing in the binding plans;
• On-site and off-site public infrastructure and facilities: both in Valencia and Eng­
land it is possible to prescribe the obligation to contribute to on-site and off-site 
public infrastructure and facilities. In England, municipalities can also prescribe 
contributions towards the building, maintenance and exploitation costs of pub­
lic buildings, including those of social facilities (for example education and so­
cial services).
• Investing and implementation schedules: in both countries, binding plans in­
clude schedules and deadlines within which contributions must be made.
All these possibilities are positive for capturing value increase. In the Netherlands, 
until the 2008 Act, none of these requirements could be prescribed in the binding 
rules, and this had a negative effect on capturing value increase. The 2008 Act made 
it possible for the first time to include almost all these requirements. Nowadays, it 
is possible to include social/affordable housing both in the Land use plan and the 
departures from it (a percentage of such housing) and in the Development contribu­
tions plan (allocation to the plots and number of units). It is also possible to introduce 
implementation schedules and contributions for most of the on-site infrastructure 
and for some sorts of off-site infrastructure in the Development contributions plan.
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However, three limitations remain:
1. It is not possible to include in Development contributions plans contributions to­
wards construction and maintenance/exploitation costs of social facilities (maat­
schappelijke voorzieningen), and it is uncertain whether such contributions can 
be agreed in anterior Development agreements. To make it possible to charge 
such contributions, article 6.2.5 of the 2008 Decree should be modified.
2. As already explained, many costs cannot be charged to the landowners through 
a Development contributions. Therefore the list of sorts of recoverable costs (ar­
ticles 6.2.3 up to 6.2.6 of the 2008 Decree) should be enlarged.
3. In a Development contributions plan, landowners has right to the highest value 
for their land, which increases the accounted land costs and thus the probability 
of a deficit, a deficit that must be paid by the municipality. Therefore, article
6.13.5 of the 2008 Act, which prescribes that assessment of the value of land 
must follow expropriation law, should be modified.
Conclusions for the academic debate
This finding can be used to refine the 2nd hypothesis (in black letters the addition):
Creating Uncertainty in early stages o f development processes about future building 
possibilities, and Certainty about future contributions (specially if  it is possible to 
include a ll the contributions as obligatory in legally binding rules) can influence 
capturing value increase in a positive way.
Making binding rules conditional on the developer securing his contributions
Summary of the findings
The approval of binding plans containing generous value capturing arrangements and 
strict deadlines, as such, does not automatically mean that the developers will indeed 
implement them. In order to secure the implementation, additionally the developer 
needs to be bound to do that. In practice, Dutch municipalities often do condition 
the Land use plan and departures from it on a Development agreement in which the 
developer secures the contributions; however, they do not have the formal possibility 
of doing so in an open and straightforward way. This has negative side effects:
1. Procedural risks: after the sealing of the Development agreement, the Land use 
plan (or departure from it) must follow the complete procedure, which implies 
a risk of delay and modifications because of objections and appeals. In Valencia 
and England, the procedure of provisional approval of the binding plan precedes 
the sealing of the agreement, after which there is only a short definite approval. 
This means that in Valencia and England, parties can seal the agreement with a 
high certainty that the zoning plan is not going to be modified, and that there 
will be no delay;
2. Appeal risks: if a municipality refuses to approve a Land use plan because the 
developer does not secure contributions, there is always a risk of an appeal to 
the courts. In England and Valencia, planning law establishes that the developer
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has to secure the contributions stated in the provisionally approved Land use 
plan, as a condition for definitive approval;
3. Incongruent municipal public discourse: in practice the municipality may need 
to hide the 'real reason' for the approval or refusal of Land use plans, i.e. whether 
the developer agrees to sign a Development agreement. In England and Valen­
cia, the 'real reason' is publicly approved by the Local Council, and forms the 
open and transparent criteria for assessing whether or not to formally approve 
the plan.
In the Netherlands, once the Land use plan and the Development contributions plan 
have been approved, the developer/landowner can submit an application for a build­
ing permit. The novelty is that the municipality can now condition the building per­
mit on the applicant securing his/her contributions; before the 2008 Act this was 
not possible. However, approving a Development contributions plan has some side 
effects: municipalities assume some financial risks because they are responsible for 
the calculations and may need to advance investments; they must put resources into 
making the plan and up-dating it yearly; and they must bear the consequences of 
delay in case developers/landowners do not apply for the building permit. In addi­
tion, as we saw above, not all the costs can be charged to the landowners. Thus in 
principle the best option for Dutch municipalities is to seal an anterior Development 
agreement before approving the Land use plan: this assures that contributions and 
deadlines are secured and no Development contributions plan is needed. Munici­
palities can informally request that developers seal such an agreement. However, the 
actual practice of informal conditioning may become more difficult after the 2008 
Act. The Act has reinforced the obligation on the municipality to take a formal deci­
sion about an application to modify or depart from the Land use plan. If the munici­
pality wishes to refuse the application (the possibility to refuse increases the nego­
tiation powers of the municipality), this decision must be taken within eight weeks. 
Municipalities must justify their decision by referring to approved policy and zoning 
plans, and the applicant has now the possibility to appeal against a refusal or a non­
determination. In other words, the municipality cannot openly and directly refuse the 
application with the argument that the applicant does not want to seal an agreement, 
but must find other arguments in the existing Land use plan, the Structure vision or 
other policy documents. If the municipality has already concluded that the physical 
and functional characteristics of the application are acceptable, there is actually little 
room left to refuse and thus to negotiate.
Conclusions for the academic debate
The findings can be used to refine the 2nd hypothesis (in black letters the addition):
Creating Uncertainty in early stages o f development processes about future building 
possibilities, and Certainty about future contributions (specially if it is possible to 
include the contributions as obligatory in legally binding rules, and if  it is possible 
openly and straightforwardly to make the approval o f these rules conditional on
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a development agreement that secures the contributions) can influence capturing 
value increase in a positive way.
Recommendations for the Dutch practice
Although open and straightforward conditioning is not allowed, there are some alter­
native ways, and the new 2008 Act has added additional possibilities:
• To argue that contributions are necessary for the economic feasibility of the Land 
use plan: if the contributions are not secured and/or there is a deficit, the mu­
nicipality should pay these costs. But because the municipality has no financial 
means to do so, it can refuse the plan, arguing that it is economically not feasible. 
This alternative has the same three side effects mentioned above: (1) procedural 
risks, (2) appeal risks (indirect conditioning through the economic feasibility of 
the plan is not the same as openly enumerating the contributions that the devel­
oper has to secure), and (3) incongruence of the municipality's public discourse.
• To condition through the Development contributions plan and proper cost re­
covery policy documents. After a planning application has been submitted, a 
calculation of the costs (exploitatieopzet) can make clear which part could be 
charged to the landowners through a Development contributions plan. If mu­
nicipalities apply the recommendations made above to make and adopt cost 
recovery policy documents, it is possible to adequately defend that the applica­
tion involves costs that surpass minimal on-site infrastructure provision, and also 
to include wider contributions towards other public infrastructure and facilities 
within and outside the development site in question. These cost recovery policy 
documents are very important: without them, it would most probably not be 
possible to calculate and properly argue all the costs. In case the calculation 
makes clear that the municipality cannot recover all the costs, municipalities 
can openly refuse the application, arguing that they cannot bear the deficit. This 
alternative for conditioning still has the 1st side effect mentioned above (proce­
dural risks), and an additional side effect: if the developer agrees to secure in an 
anterior Development agreement the additional costs (but not those costs that 
can be charged through a Development contributions plan) municipalities can­
not use the argument of economic feasibility to refuse the application.
To remove the disadvantages of both alternatives, it is recommended that the cen­
tral Dutch government should allow in the planning law direct conditioning, similar 
to how this happens in Valencia and England. Therefore two specific modifications 
should be added to the 2008 Act and possible also to the Decree.
Modulating property rights in land
Summary of the findings
There is in England and the Netherlands a strong interdependency between local 
public bodies and landowners and developers. As a rule, the transactions that are 
needed to provide the infrastructure are quite dependent on agreements between
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public bodies and the landowners and developers because none of the actors con­
trol all the needed resources: public bodies have the statutory powers for planning 
consent, but landowners/developers have the financial means and the exclusive right 
to develop the land. This interdependency cannot be resolved by using expropria­
tion or the pre-emption right, because these instruments have severe limitations in 
practice, and they imply a direct organisational and financial involvement of public 
bodies. The situation in Valencia has changed radically after the regional government 
introduced the new planning law in 1994: since then there is, to provide the infra­
structure, no longer any unavoidable dependence between public bodies and land­
owners. Valencian municipalities can now opt for compulsory land readjustment, 
without having to become directly involved. The municipality selects in a public 
tender the urbanising agent, and landowners can choose voluntary expropriation or 
participation in the development. If they choose expropriation, the urbanising agent 
pays the compensation and acquires the land. But if they decide to participate, they 
have to deliver the land needed for public infrastructure and facilities and pay to the 
urbanising agent a proportional share of the land development costs. In exchange, 
landowners share the value increase: after providing the infrastructure, the urbanis­
ing agent delivers the serviced building parcels to the landowners and transfers the 
public infrastructure, free of charge, to the municipality. In sum, although landown­
ers still control the land, the mutual dependence in now easily avoidable as munici­
palities have the possibility to appoint a third party (who does not necessarily need 
to own the land) as the urbanising agent, and municipalities do not need to become 
directly financially involved. Also, the municipalities are not dependent on one par­
ticular urbanising agent, for they can point out a public land development company 
as urbanising agent or select the agent through a public tender.
The interdependency between public bodies and landowners in England and the 
Netherlands gives to the landowners the option to wait, which it is often used to 
oppose the requirements set by local public bodies. Especially in the Netherlands, 
public bodies often conclude that they cannot ask too much, which leads to low 
captured value increase. This interdependency frequently leads also to delays in the 
development processes, because landowners/developers refuse the requirements of 
the municipality, or because developers do not succeed in buying the land for a 
reasonable price. The outcome of the negotiations depends on the developers' and 
landowners' expectations that, by delaying negotiations, their profits would increase. 
Another consequence is higher accounted land costs: market parties are more inter­
ested in acquiring land, as control of the land puts them in a strong negotiating posi­
tion, which in turn inflates the real and expected market value of land.
In addition, the findings suggest that interdependency leads to an inefficient and 
sluggish development process, in which costs are unnecessary high and different ac­
tors manage to appropriate part of the value increase. This leads to higher costs for 
infrastructure provision and plan preparation; in England and the Netherlands they 
are very often between 1.5 and 4 times higher than in Valencia. This leaves more
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financial room for the Valencian developers to contribute than for the Dutch and 
English developers.
Conclusions for the academic debate
The findings confirm the first hypothesis:
A specific form of splitting the property rights in land (separating infrastructure provi­
sion from property rights) can modify the power-relationships in the network o f actors 
involved in urban regeneration, and this can improve capturing value increase.
This research sought empirical evidence relevant to the debate about separating de­
velopment rights from property rights in land. The findings support the assumption 
that separating infrastructure provision from the control of landowners through a land 
readjustment regulation can improve the capturing of value increase. In addition, the 
findings suggest that the land readjustment regulation can have a deflationary effect 
on the costs for providing infrastructure and preparing plans, and possibly also on the 
accounted land costs. The regulation can also help to overcome problems of stagna­
tion in constructing new housing. The findings are interesting for the Dutch debate. 
They coincide with the position taken by those who argue that the increase in private 
control of development land since the 1990s has been disadvantageous for the public 
goals and public finances. They also support the conclusion that shaping property 
rights can help to better achieve public goals in urban planning. For the Spanish 
debate, the findings support the critical approach of those who, in the 1990s, argued 
that breaking the monopolistic/oligopolistic position of landowners is the only way 
to assure good quality and adequate quantity of public infrastructure and facilities. 
More research is needed into an international comparison of land prices and devel­
opment costs. Further research should focus on the differences in land prices, infra­
structure provision costs and plan preparation costs, and should provide more data 
that could be used to fine-tune the conclusions.
Recommendations for the Dutch practice
First of all, municipalities could conduct more research into the profit margins in the 
early stages of development processes, and use this information in the negotiations 
with landowners and developers. This research should be made together with the first 
documents that create development expectations.
Second, to avoid the negative consequences of the dependency of municipalities on 
landowners/developers, it is recommended to work with a specific land readjust­
ment contractual formula based on two different anterior Development agreements. 
A commercial developer, acting as a sort of Valencian urbanizing agent, can agree 
with landowners that, in exchange for sharing development profits, they participate 
in the development. The municipality should support this by conditioning the bind­
ing rules on the landowners achieving an agreement with the developer-urbanizing 
agent, by if necessary making use of the expropriation and pre-emption powers, and
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by approving a Development contributions plan. The recommendation, if applied, 
should provide several advantages: (a) it annuls the need to buy the land, or at least to 
buy all the land, as landowners themselves participate in the operation; (b) it reduces 
the risks of delay resulting from landowners, instead of supporting the operation, be­
having in an strategic way (i.e. waiting) to obtain the highest possible price for their 
land; (c) a and b should considerably reduce the costs of the operation: there should 
be no need to buy land in advance, and it should reduce the amounts reserved for un­
expected expenses and the plan preparation costs; (d) c should considerably reduce 
the financial costs, as there is need of less external financing.
However, the approval of a Development contributions plan, which in the recom­
mendation might be necessary to force some landowners to cooperate, has some 
disadvantages, as mentioned before. Also, expropriating land is very expensive and 
involves a direct financial involvement of the municipality, and in addition is a politi­
cally sensitive measure that cannot be exercised if landowners express willingness 
to carry out the development themselves. To remove these disadvantages, the Dutch 
central government, inspired by the Valencian land readjustment regulation, should 
introduce a land readjustment regulation in planning law.
Epilogue
At the end of the 80's and begin of the 90's, the Dutch government introduced rele­
vant changes to diminish public subsidization and reduce the financial risks of public 
bodies in urban development. However, practice shows that this has not reduced the 
need for public subsidization and has not produced new neighbourhoods with good 
public infrastructure and facilities. The 2008 Land Development Act is an effort to 
solve this problem. Although the Act might, under certain circumstances, be helpful, 
it suffers from two fundamental shortcomings. First, it assumes that the landowner is 
the only legitimate owner of the value increase that arises from rezoning the land. 
Here the Dutch legislator refused to introduce another possibility that is popular in 
other European countries: that public bodies also have right to a share of the value 
increase. Second, it assumes that the only way of enforcing public goals must be a 
direct and financial involvement of public bodies. This resulted in an unnecessarily 
complex set of legal instruments that charges municipalities with too many tasks and 
risks - too many considering their capacities. The experience in England and Spain 
shows that public leadership in urban development must be based on simple and 
clear roles: public bodies regulate beforehand, private bodies implement and assume 
all the corresponding risks.
A final remark: the international financial and economic crisis is leading already to 
less public expenditure. If no measures are taken to deviate part of the value increase 
to pay public infrastructure and facilities, public budgetary cuts will place urban 
development and its quality under serious pressure, especially in the regeneration of 
urban sites.

Hoofdstuk 1 - Introductie
Het is nog niet zo lang geleden dat Nederlandse overheden vaak een actief grondbe­
leid voerden: ze kochten de grond, maakten die bouw- en woonrijp en verkochten 
de bouwkavels aan woningcorporaties of commerciële ontwikkelaars. Eind jaren '80 
werd een aantal beleidsveranderingen doorgevoerd die tot een geleidelijke overgang 
naar meer passieve of faciliterende vormen van grondbeleid leidde. Het zijn tegen­
woordig steeds vaker de woningcorporaties en marktpartijen die grond kopen en 
locaties ontwikkelen.
Zowel stadsuitbreiding als herstructurering van binnenstedelijke locaties brengen 
meestal een stijging van de economische waarde van grond met zich mee, maar ook 
de noodzaak aan investeringen, zoals in openbare faciliteiten, wegen, kabels en lei­
dingen, maatschappelijke voorzieningen en sociale woningbouw, schadevergoedin­
gen, en dergelijke (hierna kortweg: 'openbare infrastructuur en faciliteiten'). Wanneer 
gemeenten een actief grondbeleid voeren, kunnen ze deze kosten betalen dankzij de 
uitgifte van bouwkavels. Echter, sinds gemeenten steeds minder vaak over de grond 
beschikken lukt dat steeds minder goed, terwijl grondeigenaren niet geneigd blijken 
te zijn om bij te dragen aan de kosten. Dit heeft geleid tot een versobering van de 
openbare infrastructuur en faciliteiten en tot de noodzaak van publieke subsidiëring.
In dit onderzoek wordt de vraag gesteld of, in die gevallen waarbij de grond in bin­
nenstedelijke locaties in private handen is, de economische waardestijging die het 
gevolg is van bestemmingswijziging (geheel of gedeeltelijk) zou kunnen worden 
gebruikt om de openbare infrastructuur en faciliteiten te betalen. In dit onderzoek
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wordt nagegaan of een aantal wettelijke instrumenten, de 'formele regels relevant 
voor ruimtelijke ordening', gebruikt zou kunnen worden om grondeigenaren te ver­
leiden om mee te betalen. Met andere woorden: om overheden beter van waarde­
stijging van de grond te laten profiteren om de nodige infrastructuur en faciliteiten te 
betalen (kortweg: 'publiek waardestijgingsverhaal').
Formele regels die relevant zijn voor ruimtelijke ordening zijn: bindende voorschrif­
ten over het gebruik van grond en vastgoed, en over de administratieve procedure 
van deze voorschriften; grondeigendomsrechten; en niet bindende ruimtelijke be­
leidsdocumenten. Er zijn verschillende soorten waardestijging: veroorzaakt door in­
vesteringen in infrastructuur, door herbestemming van de grond, of gewoon door de 
algemene toename van de vraag naar grond. Dit onderzoek onderscheidt drie sub­
begrippen onder 'publiek verhaal van waardestijging': 'kostenverhaal' (het verhalen, 
via de bijdragen van grondeigenaren, van de kosten van openbare infrastructuur en 
faciliteiten), 'waardevangst' (vangst door overheden die bijvoorbeeld in infrastruc­
tuur geïnvesteerd hebben in de omgeving van het in waarde gestegen vastgoed), en 
'baatafroming' (waarbij een overheidsinstantie alle soorten waardestijging vangen).
Een fundamentele vraag is wie de waardestijging zou moeten kunnen vangen. Vol­
gens een conservatief-liberale traditie hoort alle waardestijging toe aan de grondei­
genaar, terwijl een alternatieve traditie bepleit dat ze aan de gemeenschap toebe­
hoort. Een vaak voorkomend onderwerp in de neoklassieke economische theorie is 
het belasten van de waardestijging. Deze ideologische verschillen hebben geleid tot 
verschillende instrumenten voor het verhalen van waardestijging, waarvan sommige 
een volledige baatafroming nastreven en andere alleen het internaliseren van de ne­
gatieve gevolgen van bouwplannen. Omdat in Nederland alleen deze tweede vorm 
van waardestijgingvangst is toegestaan, maakt dit onderzoek beleidsaanbevelingen 
voor kostenverhaal en niet voor baatafroming. Sommige aanbevelingen passen bin­
nen het huidige wettelijke kader, inclusief de nieuwe Wet ruimtelijke ordening en de 
in afdeling 6.4 van deze wet inbegrepen Grondexploitatiewet. Andere aanbevelin­
gen impliceren een wijziging van dit wettelijke kader. Dit is dus het probleem dat dit 
onderzoek probeert op te lossen:
Hoe zouden de formele regels relevant voor ruimtelijke ordening gebruikt kunnen 
worden in de ontwikkeling van omvangrijke herstructurering- en functieveranderings- 
plannen op private grond in Nederland, opdat de rendabele delen de onrendabele 
delen betalen?
Om hier een antwoord op te geven, dienen eerst de volgende onderzoeksvragen te 
worden beantwoord:
Voorbereidende onderzoeksvraag 1: Hoe kunnen de formele regels relevant voor 
ruimtelijke ordening gebruikt worden in omvangrijke herstructurering- en functiever- 
anderingsplannen op private grond?
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• Voorbereidende onderzoeksvraag 2: Hoeveel waardestijging in omvangrijke her­
structurering- en functieveranderingsplannen op private grond wordt verhaald 
om de openbare infrastructuur en faciliteiten te betalen?
• Voorbereidende onderzoeksvraag 3: Hoe wordt de mate van publieke waar- 
destijgingsverhaal beïnvloed door de manier waarop de formele regels relevant 
voor ruimtelijk ordening worden gebruikt?
• Hoofdonderzoeksvraag: Hoe zouden de formele regels relevant voor ruimtelijke 
ordening gebruikt kunnen worden in Nederland om ervoor te zorgen dat de ren­
dabele onderdelen de onrendabele onderdelen zo veel mogelijk betalen?
Hoofdstuk 2 - Theoretisch kader: publiek verhaal van 
waardestijging binnen beleidsnetwerken
De herstructurering van een binnenstedelijke locatie kan worden bestudeerd als 
ware het een beleidsnetwerk waarin publieke partijen proberen meer waardestij­
ging te verhalen door met andere partijen de interactie aan te gaan. De 'beleids- 
netwerkbenadering' is het resultaat van academisch debat omtrent de veranderde 
rol van publieke en private partijen in de laatste decennia. De oorsprong van deze 
benadering ligt in de politieke wetenschap in de vroege jaren '70. Terwijl publieke 
sturing in de traditionele intra-organisaties benadering een autoritaire activiteit is, 
zijn in de beleidsnetwerkbenadering de machtsverhoudingen tussen partijen minder 
hiërarchisch. Door de beschikbaarheid van middelen en de resulterende onderlinge 
afhankelijkheden te bestuderen, is het mogelijk om de structurele factoren bloot te 
leggen die machtsverhoudingen verklaren.
1. Een eerste structurele factor is dat beleidsnetwerken uit verschillende actoren 
bestaan die elk hun eigen doelen nastreven, wat in potentie conflicten met zich 
mee kan brengen. Tegelijkertijd zijn partijen afhankelijk van elkaar omdat nie­
mand alle middelen controleert die nodig zijn om ieders doel te bereiken. De 
sterkte van deze afhankelijkheid ligt aan het belang en de 'vervangbaarheid' 
van de middelen. Zowel de verdeling van middelen als de machtsverhoudingen 
tussen actoren zijn gereguleerd door formele regels (wetgeving). Aan de andere 
kant geven de verdeling van middelen en de machtsverhoudingen vaak juist 
vorm aan formele regels. Een tweede structurele factor is dat overheden altijd 
afhankelijk zijn van de middelen van anderen. Volgens de netwerkbenadering 
zijn overheden daarom niet meer dé dominante partij, maar meer een primus 
inter pares. Critici voeren aan dat de netwerkbenadering de status van de over­
heid devalueert. In deze kritische visie is de betrokkenheid van overheden in sa­
menwerkingsvormen met andere partijen - wat typerend voor beleidsnetwerken 
is - negatief omdat netwerken transparant noch controleerbaar zijn.
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Dit onderzoek kan worden gezien als een kritiek op de veronderstelling dat overhe­
den in stedelijke herstructurering altijd afhankelijk zijn van andere partijen. Over­
heden hoeven niet altijd de rol van primus inter pares te accepteren: zijn kunnen 
effectief en met recht boven de andere partijen staan en die sturen. Het onderzoek 
biedt twee maatregelen aan om interacties binnen beleidsnetwerken te veranderen 
en zodoende overheden meer waardestijging te laten verhalen: eerst door grondei- 
gendomsrechten aan te passen en vervolgens door de mate van zekerheid en flexibi­
liteit in planvorming te veranderen.
Grondeigendomsrechten
Men zou kunnen denken dat eigendomsrechten aan de grondeigenaar een totale vrij­
heid bieden om zijn grond te gebruiken. Echter, de realiteit is dat formele regels deze 
rechten beperken. Privaatrechtelijke regels zijn bedoeld om het normale verkeer van 
eigendomsrechten tussen individuen te organiseren. Publiekrechtelijke regels regu­
leren hoe overheden beperkingen kunnen opleggen aan eigendomsrechten van der­
den. Het publiekrecht heeft, sinds in de 19e eeuw de sociale functie van eigendom 
en volksgezondheid aan belang wonnen, aanzienlijke beperkingen opgelegd aan 
grondeigendomsrechten. Tegenwoordig kan de eigenaar zijn grond alleen gebruiken 
binnen de grenzen van wettelijke voorschriften, en waar nodig slechts nadat hij hier 
toestemming voor heeft gekregen.
In Groot-Brittannië, Nederland en Spanje bestaat al langere tijd debat over beperkin­
gen van eigendomsrechten. In 1947 introduceerde een Britse wet de zogenaamde 
'nationalisatie van eigendomsrechten', wat tot gevolg had dat waardestijging werd 
belast. Tegenwoordig bestaat deze belasting echter niet meer. De nationalisatie van 
eigendomsrechten is niet verder doorgevoerd, in die zin dat het principe dat grondei­
genaren de enigen zijn die op hun grond kunnen bouwen, onaangetast bleef.
In Nederland zijn bovengenoemde problemen met de financiering van openbare 
infrastructuur en faciliteiten onderwerp van controversie en debat geweest. Zo is 
de vraag bediscussieerd of het publiekrecht aan overheden voldoende instrumenten 
biedt om regie te voeren op ruimtelijke ontwikkeling. Sommige auteurs zijn hier op­
timistisch over, anderen nogal sceptisch. De sceptici vinden dat eigendomsrechten 
een soort oligopolie van grondeigenaren creëert. Zij bepleiten een aanpassing van 
eigendomsrechten om vrije concurrentie te bevorderen.
In Spanje hebben overheden vanaf de 19e eeuw moeilijkheden ondervonden om 
de openbare infrastructuur en faciliteiten te betalen. Dat heeft geleid tot meerdere 
voorstellen en maatregelen die betrekking hebben op eigendomsrechten. In 1956 
werd een stedelijke herverkavelingregeling geïntroduceerd die het profiteren van de 
waardestijging voorwaardelijk stelde aan het nemen van verantwoordelijkheid over 
de grondexploitatie. Grondeigenaren zijn sindsdien verplicht om de openbare in­
frastructuur en faciliteiten te realiseren en te betalen. Ter compensatie delen ze de 
bouwkavels. Gemeenten zijn verplicht om een Algemeen Bestemmingsplan voor het
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gehele gemeentelijke grondgebied vast te stellen om hiermee grondeigenaren ze­
kerheid te bieden over de bouwmogelijkheden. De gedetailleerdheid van dit plan 
en zijn sterk juridisch bindend karakter geven Spanje internationaal een bijzondere 
plek. De herverkavelingregeling resulteerde echter niet in voldoende en goede open­
bare infrastructuur en faciliteiten. Vanaf de jaren '80 bepleitten critici (in het bijzon­
der García-Bellido) om een einde te maken aan de oligopolie van grondeigenaren 
en de ontwikkelingsrechten aan de overheid te geven. Geïnspireerd door dit voorstel 
introduceerde de regio Valencia in 1994 een wet om de grondspeculatie te bestrijden 
en het publieke verhaal van waardestijging te verbeteren. In feite betekent deze wet 
een splitsing van de grondexploitatie van grondeigendomsrechten.
Zekerheid en flexibiliteit in ruimtelijke planvorming
In de academische wereld en in de ruimtelijke ordeningspraktijk wordt een leven­
dig debat gevoerd over de noodzakelijke maat van flexibiliteit in ruimtelijke plan­
vorming: moet planvorming in een vroeg stadium zekerheid creëren over het plan 
(opdat overheden het resultaat kunnen controleren) of juist flexibiliteit bieden (om 
aanpassing aan de omstandigheden mogelijk te maken)? Wanneer ruimtelijke plan­
nen in een vroeg stadium vastgesteld worden, gedetailleerde voorschriften bevatten, 
en het niet mogelijk is om ze achteraf te wijzigen, dan is er minder flexibiliteit en 
meer zekerheid dan vice versa. In de jaren ;60 had 'flexibiliteit' vaak een negatieve 
bijklank, tegenwoordig wordt daar vaak positiever naar gekeken. Later zullen we 
zien dat de mate van flexibiliteit belangrijke gevolgen heeft voor het publieke waar- 
destijgingsverhaal.
Wat flexibiliteit en zekerheid in planvorming betreft, zijn er twee tradities. In de 
'plangeleide' traditie (zoals het Nederlandse planologische stelsel) wordt uitgegaan 
van het bieden van een grote mate van zekerheid over de toekomstige ontwikkelings­
mogelijkheden in een vroeg stadium met behulp van juridisch bindende ruimtelijke 
plannen (zoals het bestemmingsplan). In de 'ontwikkelingsgeleide' traditie (zoals het 
Britse stelsel) wordt uitgegaan van minder zekerheid en meer ruimte voor onderhan­
delingen met ontwikkelaars en grondeigenaren, ook al kunnen in een vroeg stadium 
indicatieve ruimtelijke plannen bestaan. Deze verschillen zijn het gevolg van histo­
rische verschillen in het rechtsstelsel: plangeleide tradities leunen op de centrale rol 
van wetgeving in de rechtsstaat, en ontwikkelingsgeleide tradities op de centrale rol 
van jurisprudentie en het principe van procedurele billijkheid.
Causaal model: welke variabelen beïnvloeden het publieke waardestijgingsverhaal 
in stedelijke herstructurering?
Verschillende actoren zijn betrokken bij stedelijke herstructurering: publieke en pri­
vate, met regulerende bevoegdheden of niet, met of zonder grond, met een direct of 
indirect belang. Allen interacteren met elkaar binnen een complex van variabelen 
en een van de uitkomsten is een bepaalde mate van waardestijgingsverhaal. Wan­
neer herstructurering tot waardestijging leidt is er een initiële winst. Deze initiële 
winst dient echter zodanig te worden verdeeld zodat uiteindelijk een finale winst
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overblijft waarmee de openbare infrastructuur en faciliteiten betaald kunnen worden. 
De initiële winst, en of die zich laat vertalen in een finale winst, is afhankelijk van 
verscheidene variabelen:
A. Context variabelen die de hoogte van de initiële winst beïnvloeden: vastgoed­
markten, plan- en locatie-eigenschappen, arbeids- en bouwmaterialenmarkten, 
en belastingregime.
B. Context variabelen die de verdeling van de initiële winst beïnvloeden, dat wil 
zeggen: de formele regels die relevant zijn voor ruimtelijke ordening.
C. Acties van direct in het project betrokken actoren, inclusief die actoren met 
formele regulatorische bevoegdheden, welke de hoogte van de initiële winst 
beïnvloeden: hoe overheden de inhoud en fysieke begrenzing van plannen be­
palen.
D. Acties van direct in het project betrokken actoren, inclusief die actoren met 
formele regulatorische bevoegdheden, welke de verdeling van de initiële winst 
beïnvloeden: hoe overheden gebruik maken van formele regels relevant voor 
ruimtelijke ordening, hoe publieke en private partijen interacteren, en specifieke 
omstandigheden.
Dit onderzoek focust op de manier waarop de vet gekleurde variabelen gemanipu­
leerd kunnen worden. Bovendien wordt rekening gehouden met alle andere variabe­
len omdat ze allemaal gezamenlijk de hoogte en de verdeling van de initiële winst 
(de publieke waardestijgingsvangst) beïnvloeden. Er zijn vele manieren waarop de 
initiële winst kan weglekken zodat die niet meer beschikbaar is om openbare infra­
structuur en faciliteiten te betalen. Een manier is dat de inbrengwaarde van grond 
veel hoger kan zijn dan de minimale grondwaarde. Met andere woorden: hoger dan 
de waarde van de bestaande bestemming. Bijvoorbeeld, in het bestudeerde project 
Kop van Oost in Groningen, was de minimale grondwaarde circa € 3.6 miljoen, ter­
wijl de inbrengwaarde tenminste € 12 miljoen was. Een andere manier waarop de 
initiële winst kan weglekken is door het reguliere winstpercentage dat ontwikkelaars 
als verdienste in rekening brengen.
Aan het begin van planprocessen zijn zowel de inbrengwaarde als het reguliere 
winstpercentage nog niet vastgelegd. Beide kunnen in een later stadium hoog vast 
komen te staan, bijvoorbeeld omdat er veel zekerheid is over de toekomstige bouw­
mogelijkheden (hoeveel en wat zal de grondeigenaar kunnen bouwen) terwijl de ze­
kerheid over toekomstige bijdragen (hoeveel de grondeigenaar zal moeten bijdragen, 
in natura of in pecunia) laag is.
Daarbij is de onderhandelingspositie van overheden ook relevant. Wanneer ontwik­
kelaars of grondeigenaren al zekerheid hebben over bouwmogelijkheden, dan kan 
de gemeente minder gemakkelijk bijdragen van private partijen vragen. Wanneer er 
wel zekerheid is over de verplichte bijdragen, dan is de onderhandelingspositie van 
de gemeente juist sterker omdat deze bijdragen dan het uitgangspunt in de onder­
handelingen zijn. De gemeentelijke onderhandelaars hebben in dat geval een sterke
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beleidsbasis voor hun eisen. Tenslotte, de onderhandelingspositie van de gemeente 
zal ook beter zijn wanneer de gemeente de vaststelling van het bestemmingsplan 
openlijk voorwaardelijk kan stellen aan een overeenkomst waarin de ontwikkelaar 
zijn bijdragen zekert. Grondeigenaren hebben een goede onderhandelingspositie 
omdat ze over de grond beschikken, wat hen in staat stelt om de maximale prijs te 
vragen voor hun grond. Tegelijkertijd kunnen grondeigenaren planprocessen vertra­
gen, en vertraging brengt hogere grondexploitatiekosten met zich mee die ten koste 
gaan van de initiële winst. Bijvoorbeeld, in Kop van Oost waren de grondexploitatie­
kosten circa € 7 miljoen, terwijl ze veel lager hadden kunnen zijn, namelijk ongeveer 
€ 2 miljoen. Vertraging kan het gevolg zijn van moeizame onderhandelingen met een 
veelheid aan grondeigenaren, maar ook een bewuste strategie van grondeigenaren 
wanneer ze verwachten dat de grondprijs kan stijgen in de toekomst. Het gevolg van 
deze interacties kan zijn dat er weinig overblijft van de initiële winst. In Kop van Oost 
moest de gemeente de openbare infrastructuur en faciliteiten subsidiëren terwijl een 
initiële winst van mogelijk € 18,5 miljoen was weggelekt.
Twee maatregelen om publiek waardestijgingsverhaal te verbeteren = twee 
hypotheses
De twee bovengenoemde maatregelen ter verbetering van publieke waardestijging- 
vangst worden geformuleerd als hypotheses:
1. Een specifieke vorm van scheiding van grondeigendomsrechten (grondexploi­
tatie scheiden van eigendomsrechten) kan de machtsverhoudingen in het ac- 
torennetwerk in stedelijke herstructurering veranderen, en dit kan het publieke 
waardestijgingsverhaal verbeteren.
2. Onzekerheid creëren in een vroeg stadium van planprocessen over toekomstige 
bouwmogelijkheden, en zekerheid over toekomstige bijdragen, kan het publieke 
waardestijgingsverhaal positief beïnvloeden.
Hoofdstuk 3 - Methode
Dit onderzoek bestudeert een 'fenomeen', namelijk de interactie tussen gemeenten 
die gebruik maken van formele regels relevant voor ruimtelijke ordening en de ont­
wikkelaars en grondeigenaren die een locatie herstructureren. De focus ligt op een 
aantal variabelen, namelijk het gebruik van formele regels relevant voor ruimtelijke 
ordening (de onafhankelijke variabele) en het door overheden verhalen van de waar­
destijging (de afhankelijke variabele). Het einddoel is om kennis te produceren die 
als basis kan dienen voor het formuleren van beleidsaanbevelingen ten einde het 
waardestijgingsverhaal in de Nederlandse praktijk van herstructurering te verbeteren, 
en tegelijkertijd planprocessen niet te vertragen.
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In dit onderzoek worden een aantal keuzes gemaakt. De eerste is dat deze studie 
op een beperkt aantal cases leunt: vier in Valencia, drie in Engeland en vier in Ne­
derland. Het was niet haalbaar om voldoende cases te bestuderen waarmee een 
representatieve statistische analyse mogelijk was, noch om de relatie tussen de on­
afhankelijke en afhankelijke variabelen perfect te isoleren. Daarnaast biedt case-on- 
derzoek meer informatie over het fenomeen en diens interacties met de context dan 
een eenmalig enquête. In Engeland en Nederland vond de dataverzameling plaats 
voor de aanvang van de internationale financiële en economische crisis in de zomer 
van 2008. In Spanje vond ze voor de aanvang van de vastgoedcrisis, aan het eind 
van 2007, plaats. Voor belangrijke aspecten is er een laatste dataverzamelingsronde 
uitgevoerd, aan het einde van 2009 en gedurende 2010.
De tweede keuze was om de validiteit van de bevindingen te optimaliseren en hier­
mee een risico dat inherent aan case onderzoek is, te vermijden, namelijk dat zodani­
ge specifieke kennis wordt geproduceerd dat het niet kan leiden tot generaliseerbare 
conclusies en beleidsaanbevelingen. Dit leidde ertoe dat drie groepen maatregelen 
geïntroduceerd zijn om zowel de interne als de externe validiteit te versterken:
1. De hypothetisch-deductieve methode te hanteren om de twee hypotheses empi­
risch te falsificeren;
2. Varianten van de 'method of difference' te hanteren om het risico te vermijden 
van derde variabelen en van spurieuze correlaties tussen de onafhankelijke en 
afhankelijke variabelen: vervaardiging van een lijst met mogelijke derde varia­
belen om te evalueren wat hun rol is in elk land en case; beperking van de totale 
populatie van cases, en tevens die landen te selecteren met een vergelijkbare 
politieke, economische en sociale achtergrond om met beide maatregelen de 
context zo constant mogelijk te houden; voor uitvoeriger onderzoek landen te 
selecteren met tegenovergestelde planologische stelsels om hiermee de variantie 
in de onafhankelijke variabele te maximaliseren, wat geleid heeft tot een inter­
nationale vergelijking; die cases selecteren die innovatieve praktijken in zich 
meedragen, en tenslotte, als dat mogelijk was, het fenomeen bestuderen voor en 
na een verandering in de onafhankelijke variabele (een wettelijke wijziging);
3. Verscheidene technieken te hanteren waarmee de externe validiteit (of gene- 
raliseerbaarheid) kon worden versterkt: representatieve cases te selecteren en 
alternatieve, complementaire bronnen te gebruiken naast de cases.
Dit onderzoek is niet gericht op het bestuderen van het gehele fenomeen, dat wil 
zeggen op een omschrijving van alle eigenschappen van het fenomeen. In dit on­
derzoek gaat het om het identificeren van de relevante variabelen in het totaal van 
variabelen die het fenomeen kunnen karakteriseren. Daarom focust dit onderzoek 
op een aantal subvariabelen van de onafhankelijke en afhankelijke variabelen. Om 
die te identificeren werd een afhankelijkheidsmodel ontwikkeld en tevens gebruik 
gemaakt van het theoretische kader en het causaal model, inclusief de twee hypothe­
ses. De onafhankelijke variabele (formele regels relevant voor ruimtelijke ordening) 
werd zodoende verdeeld in vijf subvariabelen om preciezer te kunnen analyseren
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hoe overheden de formele regels gebruiken (voorbereidende onderzoeksvraag 1):
a) Zekerheid voorafgaand over toekomstige bouwmogelijkheden en bijdragen;
b) Inhoud van bindende voorschriften;
c) Bindende voorschriften voorwaardelijk stellen aan zekering door ontwikkelaar 
van zijn bijdragen;
d) Grondeigendomsrechten wijzigen;
e) Procedure voor voorbereiding en vaststelling van relevante bindende voorschrif­
ten: garanties voor initiatiefnemers; flexibiliteit om bestaande bindende voor­
schriften te wijzigen; flexibiliteit om plangrenzen van bindende voorschriften af 
the stemmen op onderhandelingsproces met grondeigenaren.
De afhankelijke variabele (het publiek waardestijgingsverhaal) werd ook onderver­
deeld in een aantal subvariabelen: alle mogelijke soorten bijdragen van ontwikke­
laars en grondeigenaren, en tevens mogelijke neveneffecten, in het bijzonder het 
tempo van het planproces. Hiermee werd het mogelijk om de mate van publiek 
waardestijgingsverhaal te evalueren (voorbereidende onderzoeksvraag 2). Voorbe­
reidende onderzoeksvraag 3 is beantwoord door het soort causale relatie tussen de 
onafhankelijke en afhankelijke variabelen af te leiden. Het antwoord is in feite een 
geteste hypothese, bijvoorbeeld: "wanneer gemeenten in een vroeg stadium van 
planprocessen vastleggen welke bijdragen ontwikkelaars moeten betalen, dan zal 
het publieke waardestijgingsverhaal verbeteren".
Nadat in hoofdstukken 5 tot en met 7 elke voorbereidende onderzoeksvraag is be­
antwoord voor alle drie landen, worden in hoofdstuk 8 op basis van de geteste hy­
potheses conclusies getrokken voor het academische debat. Al deze antwoorden en 
geteste hypotheses, met daarbij eveneens specifieke kennis over de Nederlandse situ­
atie (wetgeving, politieke en culturele overwegingen) zijn nodig om in hoofdstuk 9 
een antwoord te geven op de hoofdonderzoeksvraag, namelijk om beleidsaanbeve­
lingen te formuleren voor de Nederlandse praktijk.
Hoofdstuk 4 - Quick scan: formele regels relevant voor 
ruimtelijke ordening in West-Europese landen
De eerste stap in het internationaal vergelijkende onderzoek is verkennend onder­
zoek naar de onafhankelijke variabele in Nederland en in acht andere West-Europese 
landen geweest: Duitsland, Engeland (onderdeel van Groot-Brittannië), Vlaanderen 
(onderdeel van België), Frankrijk, Zweden, Denemarken, Italië en Spanje (regio Va­
lencia). Door deze landen, die een vergelijkbare context kennen, te bestuderen, is 
de invloed van mogelijke derde variabelen verminderd. De tweede stap is het besluit 
om de regio Valencia en Engeland te selecteren omdat zij de breedste variantie toon­
den in de onafhankelijke variabele (zij staan voor tegenovergestelde modellen van
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planologische stelsels). Hiermee zijn de kansen vergroot dat betekenisvolle bevindin­
gen worden geproduceerd. Deze twee landen, samen met Nederland, zijn dan ook 
het onderwerp van diepgaand onderzoek in hoofdstukken 5 t/m 7.
Uit het verkennende onderzoek kwamen belangrijke verschillen tussen de landen 
naar boven. Wat betreft de plaats van bindende voorschriften in het onderhande­
lingsproces staat Engeland voor het 'ontwikkelingsgeleide' planologische stelsel, en 
Spanje/Valencia (samen, maar in mindere mate, met Frankrijk, Italië en Vlaanderen) 
voor het 'plangeleide' stelsel. Nederland, net zoals Duitsland, Zweden en Denemar­
ken, volgt in de praktijk de ontwikkelingsgeleide aanpak omdat de bindende voor­
schriften die nieuwe ontwikkeling mogelijk maken pas vastgesteld worden nadat ge- 
interesseerde ontwikkelaars over de inhoud onderhandeld hebben met de gemeente. 
Wat betreft de inhoud van bindende voorschriften, heeft Nederland (tot 2008), sa­
men met Denemarken, bijna geen uitvoeringsgerichte bindende voorschriften. Dat 
wilt zeggen: voorschriften gericht op de planuitvoering (dit zijn documenten die de 
praktische uitvoering van een plan voorschrijven: fasering- en financiële voorschrif­
ten, of andere soorten regels bedoeld voor de planuitvoering). Engeland en Valencia 
hebben dit soort voorschriften wel. De Nederlandse bindende voorschriften (geen 
rekening houdend met het nieuwe exploitatieplan) hebben samen met de Deense, 
de meest beperkte inhoud (zij kunnen niet veel meer voorschrijven dan ruimtelijk re­
levante aspecten), terwijl Engeland de breedste heeft. Tenslotte, in Nederland, Duits­
land, Frankrijk, Zweden, Denemarken en Vlaanderen kan de vaststelling van binden­
de voorschriften (planologische inpassing) niet, formeel en openlijk, voorwaardelijk 
worden gesteld aan de bereidheid van de ontwikkelaar om de uitvoering te zekeren 
(dat de ontwikkelaar in een contract de verplichting op zich neemt om de openbare 
infrastructuur te realiseren, grond vrij van kosten over te dragen aan de gemeente, 
bij te dragen aan de kosten, en dergelijke). In Engeland, Valencia en Italië is dit wel 
mogelijk en is daar zelfs de standaardprocedure.
In alle landen is het recht om te bouwen onderdeel van de eigendomsrechten. Er 
is geen land waar eigendomsrechten volledig gescheiden zijn van het recht om de 
grond te ontwikkelen. Met andere woorden: grondeigenaren zijn de enigen die ge­
autoriseerd zijn om op hun grond te bouwen, en zij kunnen anderen belemmeren 
om dit te doen. Echter, in Valencia, Duitsland, Frankrijk en Zweden wordt de aan­
leg van openbare infrastructuur en faciliteiten in de ruimtelijke ordeningswetgeving 
expliciet geïdentificeerd als een publieke taak, terwijl in Nederland, Engeland en 
de andere landen dat niet zo is. In Valencia en, in mindere mate ook in Duitsland 
en Zweden, kunnen de openbare infrastructuur en faciliteiten, dankzij de mogelijk­
heid van gedwongen herverkaveling, worden aangelegd zonder overeenstemming te 
hebben bereikt met de grondeigenaren. Daar tegenover staat dat in Nederland, En­
geland, Frankrijk, Italië, Zweden, Vlaanderen en Denemarken, de aanleg van open­
bare infrastructuur en faciliteiten wel afhankelijk is van overeenstemming met de 
grondeigenaren. Deze afhankelijkheid kan alleen worden vermeden als de overheid 
directe verantwoordelijkheid draagt, in zowel financiële als organisatorische zin (de
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grond kopen, en/of voorkeursrecht, onteigening of baatbelasting toepassen). Wat de 
procedure voor de vaststelling van bindende voorschriften betreft, is het in Engeland 
soms mogelijk om reeds vastgestelde bindende voorschriften ingrijpend te wijzigin­
gen door middel van een simpele en korte procedure, terwijl daar in Nederland en 
Valencia een zware procedure voor nodig is.
Hoofdstuk 5 - Valencia
De Spaanse regio Valencia heeft bijna alle bevoegdheden in ruimtelijke ordenings- 
wetgeving en subsidieert, samen met de centrale regering in Madrid en een groot 
aantal gemeenten, een aantal programma's gericht op de herstructurering en revita­
lisering van historische gebieden en verpauperde buurten. Echter, het leeuwendeel 
van herstructurering dat in de laatste decennia heeft plaatsgevonden, is het initiatief 
geweest van private partijen, die zonder publieke subsidies verouderde binnenste­
delijke bedrijfs- en kantoorlocaties hebben getransformeerd tot woningen, winkel­
ruimte en kantoren. Dit onderzoek focust op dit soort herstructureringsprojecten.
Om een locatie te transformeren moeten eerst de bestaande bindende voorschrif­
ten worden gewijzigd. Er zijn twee soorten bindende voorschriften: het 'Algemeen 
bestemmingsplan' en het 'Gedetailleerde plan'. Algemene plannen dekken het hele 
gemeentelijk grondgebied en hebben een juridisch bindend karakter. In uitbreidings­
gebieden bestemmen ze de grond in bebouwbaar en niet-bebouwbaar, schrijven ze 
de mogelijke typologieën voor, de openbare hoofdinfrastructuur en hoofdfaciliteiten, 
en het exacte aantal bouwrechten waar elke eigenaar recht op heeft (in de vorm van 
een floor space index). De bouwrechten geven een hoge mate van zekerheid over 
de toekomstige bouwmogelijkheden. Tevens, in uitbreidingsgebieden die binnen af­
zienbare tijd dienen te worden ontwikkeld, en in binnenstedelijke locaties, houden 
Algemene plannen ook zeer gedetailleerde voorschriften in. Die voorschriften heb­
ben betrekking op de rooilijn, de hoogte en het volume van de gebouwen en de 
kleine openbare infrastructuur en faciliteiten. Gedetailleerde plannen zijn bedoeld 
voor specifieke locaties. Als het Algemene plan niet reeds gedetailleerd is, wordt dat 
in een Gedetailleerd plan gedaan.
Traditioneel hebben Spaanse overheden altijd getracht om de onrendabele onderde­
len van stedelijke herstructurering te betalen met de rendabele onderdelen. Dit streven 
leidde in 1956 tot de introductie van de reeds genoemde stedelijke herverkavelingre- 
geling. Grondeigenaren werden verplicht om de herverkaveling van eigendomsgren­
zen en de grondexploitatie zelf te organiseren en te betalen. Wanneer grondeigenaren 
hier niet aan meewerkten kon de gemeente de eigenaren terzijde schuiven door ge­
dwongen herverkaveling of onteigening toe te passen. In 1978 introduceerde de cen­
trale regering een reeks wettelijke minimale standaarden van openbare infrastructuur 
en faciliteiten welke, samen met het Algemene plan, zekerheid schiep over de toe­
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komstige verplichte bijdragen. Echter, de herverkavelingregeling uit 1956 stimuleerde 
grondspeculatie (wat leidde tot hoge inbrengwaardes voor de grond), ontmoette veel 
verzet van de grondeigenaren en leidde tot vertraging van planprocessen (beide leid­
den tot onnodige meerkosten in de grondexploitatie). Deze tekortkomingen leidden 
tot bouwplannen met onvoldoende openbare infrastructuur en te massieve, opgebla­
zen bebouwing. In 1994 introduceerde de regionale regering van Valencia belangrijke 
wijzigingen in de herverkavelingregeling. Eerst werd een derde partij geïntroduceerd, 
naast de gemeente en de grondeigenaar of ontwikkelaar: de urbaniseerder (agente 
urbanizador). Deze partij hoeft geen grond te bezitten en kan rechtstreeks worden 
geselecteerd door de gemeente (het gaat dan om een publiek grondbedrijf) of geselec­
teerd worden in een publieke tender (commerciële ontwikkelaar). Eenmaal geselec­
teerd neemt de urbaniseerder de verantwoordelijkheid voor de grondexploitatie en de 
herverkaveling. Ten tweede gaf de wet uit 1994 garanties aan de commerciële partijen 
wanneer ze mee wilden doen met de publieke tender. Ten derde werden Gedetailleer­
de plannen voortaan vergezeld met een document met daarin alle uitvoeringsgerichte 
bindende voorschriften en een realisatieovereenkomst. Een ieder (het is niet nodig om 
grond te bezitten) kan meedoen aan de publieke tender door een plan in te dienen bij 
de gemeente, en een ieder is vrij om bezwaren of alternatieve plannen in te dienen. 
Na evaluatie beslist de gemeenteraad over het definitieve plan en selecteert zij de ur­
baniseerder. Deze partij maakt en dient bij de gemeente in een gedetailleerd voorstel 
voor de openbare infrastructuur en faciliteiten en voor de herverkaveling. Nadat de 
eigendomsrechten zijn gewijzigd (dit kan desnoods worden afgedwongen) ontvangt 
de gemeente de openbare infrastructuur en faciliteiten en de grondeigenaren de reste­
rende bouwkavels. Tenslotte dienen de eigenaren van de bouwkavels bouwaanvragen 
in bij de gemeente, die vervolgens bouwvergunningen gunt. De Valenciaanse noviteit 
is inmiddels in bijna alle Spaanse regio's geïntroduceerd.
Hoe ver kunnen de bijdragen van grondeigenaren en ontwikkelaars gaan? In Spanje 
hebben gemeenten in uitbreidingslocaties recht op de afroming van een deel van de 
waardestijging: grondeigenaren dienen tussen de 5%  en 15% van de bouwkavels 
over te dragen aan de gemeente. Daarnaast dienen de grondeigenaren de grondex- 
ploitatiekosten te betalen (de aanleg van infrastructuur en faciliteiten, de plankosten 
en het winstpercentage van de urbaniseerder) en de nodige grond ter beschikking 
te stellen. In principe dienen de gebouwen met een openbare functie (scholen, zie­
kenhuizen en dergelijke) te worden betaald door de bevoegde overheid, maar dat 
geldt niet voor de bouw van sociale woningen, die betaald en gerealiseerd dienen te 
worden door de grondeigenaren. Tevens is het ook mogelijk om van grondeigenaren 
te eisen dat ze elders gelegen grond overdragen ten behoeve van bovenwijkse facili­
teiten. Gemeenten zijn vrij om over aanvullende eisen te onderhandelen met urbani­
seerders. Indien de urbaniseerder daarin toestemt, moet hij die extra kosten uit eigen 
middelen betalen en kan hij die niet in rekening brengen aan de grondeigenaren.
In de stad Valencia zijn er drie cases onderzocht: Camino Hondo del Grao (5,7 hec­
tare, 465 appartementen plus aanzienlijk bouwvolume kantoor en detailhandel);
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Guillem de Anglesola (1,2 hectare, 125 appartementen, plus een beetje detailhan­
del); en Periodista G il Sumbiela (0,6 hectare, 100 appartementen, plus een beetje 
detailhandel). Een case is gelegen in de stad Alicante: Benalúa Sur (8 hectare, 600 
appartementen, plus aanzienlijk bouwvolume kantoor en detailhandel). In alle vier 
cases is in een vroeg stadium een Algemeen plan opgesteld dat gedetailleerde voor­
schriften inhield, maar toch moest er een Gedetailleerd plan worden vastgesteld al­
vorens de locatie herontwikkeld mocht worden. In de cases Camino en Benalúa 
wijzigde het Gedetailleerde plan majeure voorschriften van het Algemeen plan; in 
Guillem  en Periodista mineure voorschriften. In alle cases was de urbaniseerder een 
commerciële partij die geselecteerd werd in een publieke tender. Soms waren dat 
professionele ontwikkelaars (Guillem  and Periodista), soms de grondeigenaren zelf 
die gezamenlijk urbaniseerder zijn geworden (Camino en Benalúa). In alle gevallen 
is vastgelegd dat de urbaniseerders de openbare infrastructuur en faciliteiten aanleg­
gen. Omdat zij meestal ook een groot deel van de grond gekocht hebben, zullen zij 
ook de ontwikkelaars van het vastgoed worden. In Periodista verkochten bijna alle 
eigenaren de grond vrij snel aan de urbaniseerder. In Guillem  wachtten ze. De mees- 
ten verkochten de grond pas ten tijde van de herverkavelingprocedure. In Camino 
en Benalúa was de grond reeds het eigendom van de urbaniseerder (aangezien de 
grondeigenaren zelf als urbaniseerder werden geselecteerd).
Hoofdstuk 6 - Engeland
De centrale Britse regering en de regionale en lokale overheden in Engeland hebben 
twee belangrijke vormen van herstructureringsbeleid ontwikkeld: beleid bedoeld 
voor verpauperde woningen (dit beleid heeft een lange traditie), en beleid bedoeld 
voor de stadsvernieuwing (ingezet vanaf de jaren '70). De bestudeerde cases laten 
zien dat overheden in de laatste decennia geprobeerd hebben een ruimere betrokken­
heid van commerciële ontwikkelaars in de financiering van openbare infrastructuur 
en faciliteiten te verwezenlijken. Om een locatie te kunnen herontwikkelen dienen 
gemeenten (Local Planning Authorities) eerst de bestaande bindende voorschriften 
te wijzigen. Ruimtelijke plannen en visies kunnen in Engeland een belangrijke rol 
spelen, maar ze zijn indicatief. Met andere woorden: ze hebben geen rechtstreekse 
consequenties voor de gebruiksmogelijkheden van grond en opstallen. Het enige 
plandocument met een juridisch bindend karakter is de Planning Permission. Nadat 
een ontwikkelaar voor een concrete locatie een aanvraag heeft ingediend voor een 
Planning Permission, kan de gemeente ervoor kiezen om alleen voorwaarden te stel­
len, of verder te gaan en bijdragen te onderhandelen in een realisatieovereenkomst 
(Planning Agreement, oftewel 106-agreement).
In Engeland heeft de overheid in principe recht om de waardestijging die dankzij her­
bestemming ontstaat, te ontvangen. In het verleden was hier een specifieke belasting 
voor, maar die bestaat niet meer. Publiek waardestijgingsverhaal vindt in de praktijk
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plaats door aan ontwikkelaars bijdragen te vragen om de negatieve externaliteiten 
van bouwplannen te repareren. Deze praktijk werd vanaf de jaren '70 gemeengoed. 
De soorten bijdragen evolueerden van aanvankelijk vooral het bouw- en woonrijp 
maken van de locatie zelf (on-site), richting bijdragen bedoeld om milieu- en maat­
schappelijke faciliteiten te bekostigen, vaak gesitueerd buiten de specifieke locatie 
(off-site). Ontwikkelaars worden tegenwoordig ook gevraagd om sociale woning­
bouw te realiseren. In de laatste jaren ontstond controversie over de vraag hoever 
gemeenten mogen gaan in hun eisen. Dat heeft geleid tot een strakkere regulering 
van het soort bijdragen dat men mag vragen, maar dat heeft niet tot een vermindering 
van bijdragen geleid.
De drie bestudeerde cases zijn gelegen in de stad Bristol: Harbourside/Canon's Marsh 
(7,8 hectare, 700 appartementen, 44.000 m2 kantoor, 30.000 m2 commerciële ruimte), 
Temple Quay (7,4 hectare, 495 appartementen, 61.000 m2 kantoor, en 7.000 m2 com­
merciële faciliteiten) en Megabowl (1,3 hectare, 1 84 appartementen). Het Bristol Local 
Plan uit 1997 (een ruimtelijk plan met een indicatief karakter dat de hele stad dekt) 
gaf, voor alle drie cases, niet juridisch bindende, globale voorschriften. Alvorens de 
herontwikkeling mocht aanvangen, moest de gemeente een of meerdere Planning Per­
missions verlenen, en deze permissions hielden eisen in over bijdragen die onderhan­
deld waren met de ontwikkelaars en uiteindelijk leidden tot realisatieovereen komsten.
Hoofdstuk 7 - Nederland
De Nederlandse overheden streven stedelijke herstructurering na en stimuleren 
nieuwbouw binnen de grenzen van bestaande steden. Er is specifiek beleid voor: 
multifunctionele centrale locaties, inclusief spoorstations (case Stationskwartier, 16 
hectare, 650 appartementen, plus veel kantoren, een beetje detailhandel, een nieuw 
station en veel parkeergebouwen); monofunctionele voor- en naoorlogse wijken 
(case Kruidenbuurt, 17 hectare, 650 woningen, plus een beetje kantoren) en oude 
bedrijventerreinen (cases De Funen -8 hectare, 565 appartementen, beetje kanto­
ren en Kop van Oost -5 hectare, 430 appartementen, plus een beetje commerciële 
ruimte). Bij stedelijke herstructurering worden vaak indicatieve ruimtelijke plannen 
vastgesteld, waarvan de meerderheid niet is gereguleerd in wetgeving. Voorafgaand 
aan de herontwikkeling van de genoemde locaties moesten eerst de financiële mid­
delen worden gevonden om de openbare infrastructuur en faciliteiten te betalen, en 
bovendien bestond er behoefte aan de wijziging van de bestaande bestemming.
In Nederland behoort de waardestijging van grond aan de eigenaar. De huidige wet­
telijke mogelijkheden om waardestijging te verhalen zijn beperkt tot kostenverhaal, 
met andere woorden: tot bijdragen om die openbare infrastructuur en faciliteiten te 
betalen waarvan de betreffende locatie baat heeft. Dit is niet veranderd met de nieu­
we Wet ruimtelijke ordening (Wro) en Besluit ruimtelijke ordening (Bro) uit 2008. In
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het algemeen zijn bijdragen van ontwikkelaars het resultaat van onderhandelingen. 
De nieuwe Wro maakt het voor het eerst mogelijk om grondeigenaren een bijdrage 
te vragen zonder dat daar onderhandelingen noodzakelijk voor zijn. Hiervoor dient 
de gemeente een exploitatieplan vast te stellen, wat haar in staat stelt om formeel en 
openlijk de bouwvergunning (maar niet de vaststelling van het bestemmingsplan of 
vrijstelling/projectbesluit) voorwaardelijk te stellen aan een bijdrage. De Bro regu­
leert de soorten kosten die gemeenten kunnen doorberekenen aan grondeigenaren 
middels een exploitatieplan. Het gaat dan om kosten voor de openbare infrastructuur 
en faciliteiten en van sociale woningen binnen het plangebied, en van planover- 
schrijdende faciliteiten die rechtstreeks gerelateerd zijn aan de desbetreffende loca­
tie. Niet inbegrepen zijn een deel van de planoverschrijdende faciliteiten, de kosten 
van onderhoud en exploitatie, van maatschappelijke voorzieningen, en een deel van 
de kosten van planvoorbereiding en van de herinrichting van oude infrastructuur. 
Daarnaast, omdat het niet aan grondeigenaren mag worden gevraagd om (een deel 
van) de waardestijging van hun grond af te staan, impliceert het maken van een ex­
ploitatieplan in stedelijke herstructureringsprojecten vaak een deficit in de grondex­
ploitatie, die voor rekening van de gemeente komt. In plaats van het vaststellen van 
een exploitatieplan, zijn gemeenten en ontwikkelaars of grondeigenaren sinds 2008 
vrij om bijdragen af te spreken in een overeenkomst. Een dergelijke overeenkomst 
wordt 'anterieur' genoemd. Een anterieure overeenkomst mag meer bijdragen in­
houden dan een exploitatieplan.
Hoofdstukken 8 en 9 - Conclusies en beleids-aanbevelingen voor 
de Nederlandse praktijk
Publieke partijen verhalen meer waardestijging in Valencia en Engeland dan in 
Nederland
De bevindingen maken duidelijk dat formele regels relevant voor ruimtelijke orde­
ning in Valencia en Engeland aanzienlijk anders zijn dan in Nederland (zie volgende 
secties). Een vergelijking tussen hoeveel waardestijging overheden kunnen verhalen 
toont ook opmerkelijke verschillen. In stedelijke herstructureringslocaties op private 
grond in Valencia en Engeland dragen private partijen meer bij dan in Nederland. De 
verschillen betreffen de volgende soorten bijdragen:
- Bouw- en woonrijp maken op locatie: in Engeland en Valencia worden deze 
kosten grotendeels of geheel betaald door de ontwikkelaars, terwijl ze in Neder­
land vaak betaald worden met publieke subsidies;
- Grond voor de openbare infrastructuur en faciliteiten op locatie: in Valencia dra­
gen grondeigenaren deze grond gratis en vrij van kosten, terwijl in Engeland en 
Nederland er veel grotere publieke bijdragen zijn om deze grond te verkrijgen;
- Sociale woningen: in Engeland en Valencia worden sociale woningen (het hier­
bij behorend tekort) grotendeels of bijna geheel betaald door de ontwikkelaars,
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terwijl in Nederland dit tekort voornamelijk betaald wordt door gemeenten en 
woningcorporaties;
- Bovenwijkse faciliteiten die buiten de locatie liggen: in Engeland en Valencia 
dragen ontwikkelaars hier substantieel aan bij (in Engeland voornamelijk met 
geldelijke bijdragen, in Valencia primair met grond), terwijl in Nederland dit 
soort bijdragen nauwelijks voorkomt;
- Baatafroming: gemeenten in Valencia romen een substantieel deel van de eco­
nomische waardestijging van grond af, ook als ze geen grond bezitten. In Enge­
land is formeel gezien geen sprake van baatafroming, maar omdat de mogelijke 
soorten bijdragen van ontwikkelaars ruim zijn gedefinieerd zou het mogelijk 
zijn om te concluderen dat daar wel sprake van is. In Nederland is dit alleen 
het geval wanneer de gemeente de grond bezit en/of zelf investeert en risico's 
draagt.
Er is een sterke correlatie tussen de verhaalde waardestijging (het hoogste in Va­
lencia, lager maar nog steeds hoog in Engeland, en het laagst in Nederland) en de 
verschillende mogelijkheden die de formele regels relevant voor ruimtelijke ordening 
bieden. Echter, deze correlatie is niet perfect. Er zijn andere variabelen die mogelijk 
ook een deel van de verschillen in verhaalde waardestijging verklaren. Toen de data 
werden vergaard, waren de woningprijzen in de Engelse cases aanzienlijk hoger 
dan de prijzen in de Valenciaanse en Nederlandse cases. Dit zou gedeeltelijk kun­
nen verklaren waarom Engelse ontwikkelaars meer genereuze bijdragen leveren dan 
hun Nederlandse collega's, maar geheel niet waarom Valenciaanse ontwikkelaars, 
ondanks vergelijkbare marktprijzen met Nederland, toch iets meer dan de Engelse 
en veel meer dan de Nederlandse ontwikkelaars bijdragen. Andere variabelen die 
ook een deel van de verschillen kunnen verklaren zijn de plan- en locatie-eigen- 
schappen, arbeids- en bouwmateriaalmarkten, belastingregime, inhoud en fysieke 
begrenzing van plannen, en specifieke omstandigheden van de betrokken interacties 
en personen.
Algemene conclusies voor het academische debat
Hoofdstuk 2 zette twee specifieke maatregelen neer, geformuleerd als hypotheses, 
bedoeld om de interacties te beïnvloeden binnen de beleidsnetwerken in stedelijke 
herstructurering en het resulterende waardestijgingsverhaal. Deze twee hypotheses 
zijn empirisch getest. De eerste speculeert over de effecten op waardestijgingsverhaal 
van de definitie van grondeigendomsrechten en hoe dit de machtsverhouding beïn­
vloedt tussen de betrokken publieke en private partijen. De tweede speculeert over de 
effecten van de zekerheid die in de loop van planprocessen wordt gecreëerd, dankzij 
bindende en niet bindende voorschriften. In het causale model in hoofdstuk 2 ont­
stond een derde veronderstelling die ook empirisch is getest: de veronderstelling dat 
de flexibiliteit in planprocessen relevant zou kunnen zijn voor waardestijgingsverhaal.
Over deze derde veronderstelling was het niet mogelijk om een duidelijke en ge­
neraliseerbare relatie te concluderen tussen flexibiliteit en waardestijgingsverhaal.
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Echter, het blijkt dat de twee eerste hypothesen wel valide zijn. De formele regels 
betreffende eigendomsrechten en zekerheid zijn inderdaad relevant omdat ze de 
interacties in beleidsnetwerken kunnen beïnvloeden. Overheden in Engeland en in 
het bijzonder in Valencia blijken, dankzij deze formele regels, een meer krachtige 
rol te spelen dan in Nederland. Gemeenten in Engeland en in het bijzonder in Valen­
cia schrijven voorafgaand en zonder overleg met ontwikkelaars en grondeigenaren 
heldere eisen en verplichtingen voor, wat resulteert in een hoge mate van verhaalde 
waardestijging. In Valencia gaan gemeenten verder dan in Engeland omdat de Valen­
ciaanse gemeenten, dankzij een afdwingbare stedelijke herverkavelingregeling, de 
bevoegdheid hebben om de ontwikkelaar te selecteren die zij prefereren, desnoods 
de grondeigenaren te omzeilen en hoeven zij geen grond te kopen of te onteigenen. 
Deze dominante rol van overheden, in het bijzonder in Valencia, past duidelijk niet 
binnen de rol die de beleidsnetwerkbenadering hen toekent, en ondergraaft som­
mige van de veronderstellingen die aan de basis van deze benadering ten grondslag 
liggen: dat actoren noodzakelijkerwijs onderling afhankelijk van elkaar zijn, dat pu­
blieke actoren een meer bescheiden rol moeten accepteren en niet krachtig kunnen 
zijn.
De volgende paragrafen verklaren de verschillende manieren (of subvariabelen) 
waarmee formele regels gebruikt worden om waardestijging te verhalen. Per subvari- 
abele worden conclusies getrokken voor het academische debat en voor de beleids­
aanbevelingen. Deze aanbevelingen volgen een graduele aanpak, van vrijwillige 
maatregelen die binnen de Grondexploitatiewet vallen en meteen kunnen worden 
toegepast, naar meer diepgaande, wettelijke wijzigingen voor de middellange ter­
mijn.
Zekerheid creëren voorafgaand over de toekomstige bouwmogelijkheden en 
bijdragen
Samenvatting van de bevindingen
Gemeenten in alle drie landen creëren vaak, in een vroeg stadium (voordat de onder­
handelingen tussen gemeenten en ontwikkelaars plaatsvinden) en in verschillende 
mate, zekerheid over wat de grondeigenaar in de toekomst zal mogen bouwen. In 
Nederland stellen gemeenten vaak indicatieve, niet juridisch bindende plannen vast, 
plannen die een bepaalde mate van zekerheid creëren. Het gaat dan bijvoorbeeld 
om nota's van uitgangspunten, stedenbouwkundige plannen en visies, structuurvisies 
en dergelijke. In Engeland gebeurt iets vergelijkbaars, ook middels indicatieve plan­
documenten, en in Valencia gebeurt dit middels de vaststelling van juridisch binden­
de Algemene bestemmingsplannen. De bevindingen suggereren dat meer zekerheid 
vooraf kan resulteren in minder publiek waardestijgingsverhaal omdat zekerheid de 
stijging van grondprijzen stimuleert, en omdat gemeenten een waardevol onderhan- 
delingsinstrument kwijtraken. Echter, zekerheid over de bouwmogelijkheden, als die 
vergezeld wordt door zekerheid over toekomstige bijdragen (zie onder), hoeft niet 
negatief te zijn.
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Er zijn grote verschillen wat betreft de zekerheid die voorafgaand aan het planproces 
over toekomstige bijdragen bestaat. In Valencia is er in een vroeg stadium veel zeker­
heid middels (1) wettelijke minimale standaarden, (2) gemeentelijk beleid en (3) de 
Algemene bestemmingsplannen. Engelse gemeenten creëren vaak enige zekerheid 
middels (1) locatiespecifieke indicatieve plannen die de bijdragen vastleggen voor de 
specifieke locatie, en (2) niet op specifieke locaties gefocust, indicatieve generieke 
beleidsdocumenten die standaard bijdragen vastleggen.
In Nederland is er meestal helemaal geen zekerheid, noch middels juridisch bin­
dende, noch middels indicatieve documenten, voordat onderhandelingen plaats 
hebben, of voordat de grondprijs wordt bepaald. Deze zekerheid in Valencia en En­
geland is positief geweest voor waardestijgingvangst omdat: 1) het verlaagt de grond­
prijs, omdat wanneer er geen zekerheid bestaat, de ontwikkelaar geneigd is te veel 
voor de grond te betalen waardoor hij minder financiële ruimte overhoudt om bij te 
dragen; 2) zekerheid dwingt de ontwikkelaar zijn reguliere winstpercentage en de 
prijs waarvoor hij de grond inbrengt in zijn exploitatieberekening te verlagen; 3) ze­
kerheid geeft de onderhandelende gemeentelijke ambtenaren een sterke beleidsbasis 
om bijdragen te eisen.
Conclusies voor het academische debat
De bevindingen blijken aldus de tweede hypothese te bevestigen:
Onzekerheid creëren in een vroeg stadium van planprocessen over toekomstige 
bouwmogelijkheden, en zekerheid over toekomstige bijdragen, kan het publieke 
waardestijgingsverhaal positief beïnvloeden.
Wat de vergelijking tussen de Spaanse versus de Engelse en Nederlandse stelsels 
betreft, blijkt een deel van de literatuur over planologische stelsels in Europa ver­
keerde conclusies te hebben getrokken. Gesteld wordt namelijk dat steeds meer 
planologische stelsels vergelijkbare niveaus van zekerheid bieden (de zogenaamde 
'convergentie'), wat door de bevindingen over Spanje, Engeland en Nederland in 
dit onderzoek wordt tegengesproken. De bevindingen van dit onderzoek zijn ook 
relevant voor het debat in de planologie, een debat waarin flexibiliteit vaak wordt 
nagestreefd als iets positiefs: de bevindingen benadrukken dat er juist behoefte is aan 
een bepaalde mate van zekerheid over bijdragen wanneer men het publieke waarde­
stijgingsverhaal wil verbeteren.
Beleidsaanbevelingen voor de Nederlandse praktijk
Nederlandse gemeenten zouden zekerheid moeten creëren over de bijdragen die 
zij willen vragen aan ontwikkelaars. Dat kan voorafgaand of tegelijkertijd met de 
voorbereiding in een vroeg stadium van planprocessen van indicatieve plannen. De 
kostensoortenlijst uit de Bro is niet voldoende gedetailleerd om zekerheid te creëren 
omdat deze lijst het niet mogelijk maakt voor ontwikkelaars om in een vroeg stadium 
accuraat te berekenen welke kosten en bijdragen zij precies zullen moeten dragen.
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Daarom zouden gemeenten zekerheid moeten creëren over de kosten die eventueel 
doorberekend zouden worden middels een exploitatieplan. Verder, omdat dit plan 
het niet mogelijk maakt om alle kosten te verhalen, zouden gemeenten eerst moeten 
proberen om met de ontwikkelaar meer bijdragen af te spreken in een anterieure 
overeenkomst. Daarom zouden gemeenten ook zekerheid moeten creëren over die 
kosten die ze middels anterieure overeenkomsten willen verhalen, aanvullend op de 
kosten die ze middels exploitatieplannen willen verhalen.
De aanbevolen zekerheid kan worden gecreëerd in verschillende soorten documen­
ten, waarvan velen elkaar kunnen aanvullen: (1) locatiespecifieke documenten die de 
gebruikelijke locatiespecifieke indicatieve plannen vergezellen; (2) generieke docu­
menten inclusief standaard bijdragen van een integraal (alle beleidsvelden dekkend) 
of sectoraal (betreffende alleen een beleidsveld) karakter; en (3) algemene ruimtelijke 
plannen met daarin de verplichte bijdragen, eventueel in standaard vorm. Al deze 
soorten documenten zouden bij voorkeur een indicatief karakter moeten hebben 
omdat dit beter past in de Nederlandse planologische traditie. De recent geïntrodu­
ceerde structuurvisie kan het ideale soort document zijn, niet alleen omdat het een 
flexibel plandocument is, maar ook omdat het verplicht is om een aantal soorten 
bijdragen te mogen verhalen. Het Rijk zou gemeenten moeten helpen en stimuleren 
om zekerheid te creëren, bijvoorbeeld door samen met de Vereniging Nederlandse 
Gemeenten model documenten te maken. Wanneer deze vrijwillige aanbevelingen 
niet breed zouden worden overgenomen door de gemeenten, dan zou het Rijk een 
aantal wetwijzigingen moeten introduceren: eerst door gemeenten te verplichten om 
generieke integrale documenten op te nemen in structuurvisies, en vervolgens door 
wettelijke minimale standaard bijdragen en voorschriften te introduceren voor het 
hele land.
De inhoud van bindende voorschriften bepalen
Samenvatting van de bevindingen
Bindende plannen kunnen bruikbaar zijn in de onderhandelingen wanneer de ge­
meente daarin niet alleen de ruimtelijke relevante aspecten kunnen opnemen, maar 
ook aspecten gericht op de praktische planuitvoering. Schrijven bindende plannen 
alleen het gewenst fysieke eindbeeld voor, zonder aan te geven wie verantwoordelijk 
is voor de implementatie van dit eindbeeld? Of ook de bijdragen die de ontwikkelaar 
moet leveren? Zowel in Valencia als Engeland maakt ruimtelijke ordeningswetgeving 
het mogelijk om in bindende plannen een breed assortiment aan bijdragen op te 
nemen:
a) Sociale woningbouw: zowel in Valencia als Engeland is het mogelijk om sociale 
woningbouw voor te schrijven in bindende plannen;
b) On-site en off-site openbare infrastructuur en faciliteiten: zowel in Valencia als 
Engeland is het mogelijk om de verplichting voor te schrijven van bijdragen aan 
on-site en off-site openbare infrastructuur en faciliteiten. In Engeland kunnen 
gemeenten ook bijdragen voorschrijven voor de bouw, onderhoud en exploi-
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tatiekosten van openbare gebouwen en faciliteiten, ook van maatschappelijke 
voorzieningen (bijvoorbeeld onderwijs en sociale voorzieningen);
c) Termijnen en fasering van investeringen en de planuitvoering: in beide landen 
kunnen gemeenten in bindende plannen voorschrijven binnen welke termijn en 
fasering de bijdragen gerealiseerd/betaald moeten worden.
Al deze mogelijkheden zijn positief voor het publieke waardestijgingsverhaal. In Ne­
derland kon, voordat de nieuwe Wro in werking trad, geen van deze bijdragen wor­
den voorgeschreven in bindende voorschriften en dit had negatieve effecten voor het 
waardestijgingsverhaal.
Beleidsaanbevelingen voor de Nederlandse praktijk
De nieuwe Wro maakt het voor het eerst mogelijk om bijna al deze bijdragen op te 
nemen. Tegenwoordig is het mogelijk om sociale woningbouw in zowel het Bestem­
mingsplan als in de vrijstellingen daarvan op te nemen (een percentage), als in het 
exploitatieplan (concrete locatie en aantal eenheden). Het is ook mogelijk om in het 
exploitatieplan termijnen voor de planuitvoering op te nemen, en tevens bijdragen 
voor de meeste on-site, en voor een deel van de off-site openbare infrastructuur en 
faciliteiten. Echter, de volgende beperkingen zijn nog steeds van kracht:
1. Het niet mogelijk om in exploitatieplannen bijdragen op te nemen voor de 
bouw, het onderhoud en de exploitatiekosten van maatschappelijke voorzienin­
gen. Bovendien is het onzeker of deze bijdragen afgesproken kunnen worden in 
anterieure overeenkomsten. Om deze bijdragen mogelijk te maken, zou artikel
6.2.5 Bro gewijzigd moeten worden.
2. Zoals reeds uiteengezet, kunnen veel kosten niet doorberekend worden aan de 
grondeigenaren middels een exploitatieplan. Daarom zou de kostensoortenlijst 
(artikelen 6.2.3 tot 6.2.6 Bro) moeten worden uitgebreid.
3. In een exploitatieplan hebben grondeigenaren recht op de hoogste waarde van 
hun grond, wat zich vertaalt in hoge inbrengwaardes en dat doet de waarschijn­
lijkheid van een tekort toenemen, een tekort dat door de gemeente dient te 
worden gedekt. Daarom zou artikel 6.13.5 Wro, dat voorschrijft dat de waarde­
bepaling van grond de onteigeningswet moet volgen, gewijzigd moeten worden.
Conclusies voor het academische debat
Deze bevinding leidt tot een uitwerking van de 2e variabele (in vette lettergrepen de 
toevoeging):
Onzekerheid creëren in een vroeg stadium van planprocessen over toekomstige 
bouwmogelijkheden, en zekerheid over toekomstige bijdragen (vooral wanneer het 
mogelijk is om alle bijdragen als verplicht op te nemen in juridisch bindende voor­
schriften), kan het publieke waardestijgingsverhaal positief beïnvloeden.
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Bindende voorschriften voorwaardelijk stellen aan zekering door ontwikkelaar van 
zijn bijdragen
Samenvatting van de bevindingen
De vaststelling van bindende plannen met daarin genereuze bijdragen en strikte ter­
mijnen, als zodanig, betekent niet automatisch dat de ontwikkelaars die inderdaad 
gaan uitvoeren. Ten einde de implementatie te verzekeren dient de ontwikkelaar zich 
hier tevens aan te verbinden. In de praktijk stellen Nederlandse gemeenten vaak het 
bestemmingsplan en/of de vrijstellingen daarvan voorwaardelijk aan een overeen­
komst waarin de ontwikkelaar zijn bijdragen verzekert. Echter, formeel is het niet 
mogelijk om dit op een directe en open manier te doen. Dit heeft negatieve nevenef­
fecten:
1. Procedurele risico's: na de ondertekening van de overeenkomst, dient alsnog de 
hele administratieve procedure tot vaststelling van de nieuwe bestemming door­
lopen te worden, wat het risico van vertraging en wijzigingen met zich meebrengt 
wegens eventuele zienswijzen en beroepsprocedures. In Valencia en Engeland, 
gaat de procedure van voorlopige vaststelling vooraf aan de ondertekening van 
de overeenkomst, en daarna is er alleen nog een korte definitieve vaststelling 
nodig. Dit betekent dat in Valencia en Engeland partijen een overeenkomst kun­
nen sluiten met een hoge mate van zekerheid dat het nieuwe Bestemmingsplan 
succesvol zal worden vastgesteld, en dat er ook geen vertraging gaat optreden;
2. Beroepsrisico's: wanneer een gemeente weigert een nieuw bestemmingsplan 
vast te stellen omdat de ontwikkelaar de bijdragen niet wil verzekeren, dan be­
staat altijd het risico dat de ontwikkelaar een beroep indient bij de rechter. In 
Engeland en Valencia schrijft r.o.-wetgeving juist voor dat de ontwikkelaar de 
bijdragen die opgenomen zijn in het voorlopig vastgestelde bestemmingsplan 
moet verzekeren alvorens de definitieve vaststelling mag plaatsvinden;
3. Inconsistentie van het gemeentelijk publieke betoog: in de praktijk kunnen 
gemeenten gedwongen worden om de 'echte redenen' voor de vaststelling of 
weigering van het nieuwe bestemmingsplan te verbergen. De echte reden kan 
namelijk zijn dat de ontwikkelaar wel of niet bereid was om een overeenkomst 
te tekenen. In Engeland en Valencia worden de echte redenen publiekelijk vast­
gesteld door de gemeenteraad. De gemeenteraad stelt namelijk de open en 
transparante eisen vast waaraan de ontwikkelaar zal moeten voldoen en welke 
opgenomen dienen te worden in een overeenkomst. Pas nadat de ontwikkelaar 
aan deze eisen heeft voldaan, mag het bestemmingsplan definitief worden vast­
gesteld.
In Nederland kan de ontwikkelaar of grondeigenaar een bouwaanvraag indienen, 
nadat het bestemmingsplan en het exploitatieplan zijn vastgesteld. De noviteit met 
de nieuwe Wro is dat de gemeente nu de bouwvergunning voorwaardelijk kan stel­
len aan de zekering van de bijdragen; voor de nieuwe Wro was dat niet mogelijk. 
Echter, een exploitatieplan vaststellen heeft ook neveneffecten: gemeenten moeten 
financiële risico's dragen omdat ze verantwoordelijk zijn voor de exploitatieopzet en
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wellicht voorinvesteringen moeten plegen. Zij moeten investeren in het maken en 
het jaarlijks herzien van het plan en ze moeten de gevolgen dragen van vertraging 
wanneer de ontwikkelaars of grondeigenaren hun bouwaanvraag zouden uitstellen. 
Daarnaast, zoals hierboven vermeld, kunnen niet alle kosten worden doorberekend 
aan de grondeigenaren. Dus in principe is de beste optie voor Nederlandse gemeen­
ten om een anterieure overeenkomst te sluiten alvorens het bestemmingsplan wordt 
vastgesteld. Hiermee zijn de bijdragen en de termijnen verzekerd en is er geen nood­
zaak voor een exploitatieplan. Gemeenten kunnen ontwikkelaars informeel vragen 
om een anterieure overeenkomst te sluiten. Echter, de huidige praktijk van infor­
mele voorwaardelijkstelling kan moeilijker worden met de nieuwe Wro. De Wro 
heeft namelijk de verplichting versterkt voor gemeenten om een formeel besluit te 
nemen wanneer een partij de gemeente verzoekt om de bestemming te wijzigen. 
Wanneer de gemeente het verzoek wenst te weigeren (deze mogelijkheid versterkt 
de onderhandelingspositie van de gemeente), dient dit besluit binnen een periode 
van acht weken na het verzoek te worden genomen. Gemeenten dienen hun besluit 
te verantwoorden door te verwijzen naar vastgesteld beleid en ruimtelijke plannen, 
en de verzoeker heeft nu de mogelijkheid om beroep in te dienen tegen een weige- 
ringsbesluit. Met andere woorden, de gemeente kan niet openlijk en rechtstreeks het 
verzoek weigeren met het argument dat de verzoeker een overeenkomst niet wenst 
te sluiten, maar moet andere argumenten vinden in het bestaande bestemmingsplan, 
de structuurvisie of andere vastgestelde beleidsdocumenten. Wanneer de gemeente 
reeds bekend heeft gemaakt (bijvoorbeeld in gesprekken met de verzoeker welke 
genotuleerd zijn) dat er geen bezwaren zijn tegen de ruimtelijke relevante aspecten 
van het bouwplan, is er in feite weinig ruimte over om te weigeren en dus om te 
onderhandelen.
Conclusies voor het academische debat
De bevindingen worden gebruikt om de tweede hypothese verder uit te werken (in 
vette lettergrepen de toevoeging):
Onzekerheid creëren in een vroeg stadium van planprocessen over toekomstige 
bouwmogelijkheden, en zekerheid over toekomstige bijdragen (vooral wanneer het 
mogelijk is om alle bijdragen als verplicht op te nemen in juridisch bindende voor­
schriften, en wanneer het mogelijk is om openlijk en rechtstreeks de vaststelling van 
de bindende voorschriften voorwaardelijk te stellen aan de ondertekening van een 
anterieure overeenkomst die de bijdragen verzekert), kan het publieke waardestij­
gingsverhaal positief beïnvloeden.
Beleidsaanbevelingen voor de Nederlandse praktijk
Alhoewel een open en directe voorwaardelijkstelling niet toegestaan is, zijn er som­
mige alternatieve wegen om dit toch indirect te doen, en de nieuwe Wro heeft daar 
een aantal mogelijkheden aan toegevoegd:
• Beargumenteren dat de bijdragen noodzakelijk zijn voor de economische uit­
voerbaarheid van het bestemmingsplan: wanneer de bijdragen niet zijn verze­
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kerd en/of er is sprake van een tekort, dan zou de gemeente deze kosten moeten 
dragen. Maar wanneer de gemeente aanvoert geen financiële middelen te heb­
ben om het tekort te dekken, dan kan zij het plan weigeren met het argument 
dat het economisch niet uitvoerbaar is. Deze alternatieve manier van voorwaar­
delijkstelling heeft dezelfde bovengenoemde negatieve neveneffecten: (1) pro­
cedurele risico's, (2) beroepsrisico's (indirecte voorwaardelijkstelling via de eco­
nomische uitvoerbaarheidseisen van het bestemmingsplan is niet hetzelfde als 
openlijk opsommen welke bijdragen de ontwikkelaar dient te verzekeren), en (3) 
inconsistentie van het gemeentelijke publieke betoog.
• Bindende voorschriften voorwaardelijk stellen via het exploitatieplan en via goed 
onderbouwde kostenverhaalbeleidsdocumenten. Nadat een ontwikkelaar de ge­
meente benadert met een verzoek tot bestemmingswijziging/bouwaanvraag kan 
de gemeente middels een exploitatieopzet (onderdeel van het Exploitatieplan) 
duidelijkheid creëren over welke deel van de kosten voor rekening komen van 
de grondeigenaren wanneer de gemeente een exploitatieplan zou vaststellen. 
Wanneer gemeenten de eerder genoemde beleidsaanbevelingen introduceren 
en kostenverhaal-beleidsdocumenten vaststellen, is het mogelijk om deugdelijk 
te motiveren dat een bestemmingswijziging kosten met zich meebrengt die ver­
der gaan dan een minimaal pakket aan on-site infrastructuur, maar ook bredere 
bijdragen vereisen voor andere openbare infrastructuur en faciliteiten binnen 
en buiten het plangebied. Deze kostenverhaal-beleidsdocumenten zijn van we­
zenlijk belang: zonder die documenten zou het zeer waarschijnlijk niet luk­
ken om alle kosten te berekenen en deugdelijk te motiveren. Wanneer uit de 
exploitatieopzet blijkt dat de gemeente niet alle kosten kan verhalen, dan kan 
ze het verzoek openlijk weigeren met het argument dat ze dat deficit niet zelf 
kan dekken. Dit alternatief van voorwaardelijkstelling brengt nog steeds het eer­
ste van bovengenoemde neveneffecten (procedurele risico's) met zich mee, en 
voegt er een nieuw negatief neveneffect aan toe. Wanneer de ontwikkelaar zou 
instemmen om in een anterieure overeenkomst het tekort te zekeren (maar niet 
de kosten die middels een exploitatieplan zouden kunnen worden verhaald) dan 
zouden gemeenten niet meer het argument van economische uitvoerbaarheid 
kunnen aanvoeren om het verzoek te weigeren.
Om alle negatieve neveneffecten van beide alternatieven weg te nemen wordt hier 
aan het Rijk aanbevolen om middels een wetswijziging directe voorwaardelijkstel­
ling, op een vergelijkbare wijze als in Valencia en Engeland, mogelijk te maken. 
Hiervoor worden twee specifieke wijzigingen voorgesteld voor de Wro en wellicht 
ook voor de Bro.
Grondeigendomsrechten wijzigen
Samenvatting van de bevindingen
Zowel in Engeland als Nederland bestaat een sterke onderlinge afhankelijkheid tus­
sen gemeenten, grondeigenaren en ontwikkelaars. In de regel zijn de transacties die
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nodig zijn om op een locatie de grondexploitatie te voeren, behoorlijk afhankelijk 
van overeenstemming tussen alle partijen omdat geen van hen over alle nodige mid­
delen beschikt: gemeenten hebben de wettelijke bevoegdheid over planologische 
inpassing, maar grondeigenaren en ontwikkelaars hebben de financiële middelen 
en het exclusieve recht om de grond te ontwikkelen. Deze onderlinge afhankelijk­
heid kan lang niet altijd worden omzeild door gebruik te maken van onteigening 
of het voorkeursrecht. Dat is het geval omdat de toepassing van deze instrumenten 
aan beperkingen onderhevig is, en omdat zij met zich meebrengen dat de overheid 
direct, organisatorisch en financieel, betrokken raakt. De situatie in Valencia veran­
derde radicaal nadat de regionale overheid in 1994 een nieuwe wet introduceerde. 
Vanaf dat moment is er geen onvermijdbare onderlinge afhankelijkheid meer tus­
sen gemeenten en grondeigenaren om de grondexploitatie te voeren. Valenciaanse 
gemeenten kunnen nu kiezen voor gedwongen herverkaveling zonder de behoefte 
om direct organisatorisch en financieel betrokken te raken. De gemeente selecteert 
in een publieke tender de urbaniseerder. Grondeigenaren kunnen kiezen tussen vrij­
willige onteigening of deelname aan de grondexploitatie. Wanneer zij voor onteige­
ning kiezen, betaalt de urbaniseerder de schadevergoeding en ontvangt hij de grond. 
Wanneer grondeigenaren kiezen om mee te doen, zijn zij verplicht om de grond te 
leveren die nodig is voor de openbare infrastructuur en faciliteiten, en aan de urbani­
seerder een proportioneel deel van de grondexploitatiekosten te betalen. In ruil hier­
voor delen de grondeigenaren de waardestijging. Nadat de urbaniseerder de grond­
exploitatie heeft gevoerd, levert hij de bouwkavels aan de grondeigenaren en draagt 
hij de openbare infrastructuur en faciliteiten, vrij van kosten, over aan de gemeente. 
Samengevat: alhoewel grondeigenaren nog steeds de grond controleren, is de onder­
linge afhankelijkheid nu gemakkelijk vermijdbaar omdat gemeenten de mogelijkheid 
hebben om een derde partij (die geen grond hoeft te hebben) als urbaniseerder aan 
te wijzen. Hierbij hoeven gemeenten financieel noch organisatorisch direct betrok­
ken te raken. Gemeenten zijn ook niet afhankelijk van een urbaniseerder omdat zij 
een publiek grondbedrijf kunnen aanwijzen als urbaniseerder of daarvoor via een 
publieke tender een commerciële partij kunnen uitkiezen.
De onderlinge afhankelijkheid tussen overheden en grondeigenaren in Engeland 
en Nederland geeft grondeigenaren de optie om te wachten. Die optie wordt door 
grondeigenaren ook vaak gebruikt om zich tegen eisen van gemeenten te verzetten. 
In het bijzonder in Nederland trekken gemeenten dan vaak de conclusie dat ze niet 
veel kunnen vragen, wat leidt tot laag waardestijgingsverhaal. Deze afhankelijkheid 
leidt vaak ook tot vertraging van het planproces omdat grondeigenaren of ontwik­
kelaars gemeentelijke eisen afwijzen, of omdat ontwikkelaars niet succesvol zijn in 
het verwerven van alle gronden voor een redelijke prijs. Het resultaat van de onder­
handelingen is afhankelijk van de verwachtingen van ontwikkelaars en grondeige­
naren dat, door de onderhandelingen te vertragen, hun winst zal toenemen. Hogere 
inbrengwaardes voor de grond zijn een ander gevolg: marktpartijen zijn meer geïnte­
resseerd in het verwerven van grondposities omdat die hun een sterke onderhande­
lingspositie geven, wat vervolgens de grondprijzen doet stijgen.
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In aanvulling hierop, suggereren de bevindingen dat onderlinge afhankelijkheid tot 
een inefficiënt en stroperig planproces leidt waarin kosten onnodig hoog zijn en 
waarin verschillende actoren de waardestijging naar zich toetrekken. Dit leidt tot 
hogere grondexploitatiekosten (waaronder bouw- en woonrijp maken en de plankos­
ten). In Engeland en Nederland zijn deze kosten vaak tussen 1,5 en 4 keer hoger dan 
in Valencia. Dit leidt ertoe dat Valenciaanse ontwikkelaars meer financiële ruimte 
hebben om bijdragen te leveren dan de Nederlandse en Engelse ontwikkelaars.
Conclusies voor het academische debat
De bevindingen bevestigen de eerste hypothese:
Een specifieke vorm van scheiding van grondeigendomsrechten (grondexploitatie 
scheiden van eigendomsrechten) kan de machtsverhoudingen in het actorennetwerk 
in stedelijke herstructurering veranderen, en dit kan het publieke waardestijgingsver- 
haal verbeteren.
Dit onderzoek zocht empirische evidentie die relevant is voor het debat over de 
splitsing van ontwikkelingsrechten en grondeigendomsrechten. De bevindingen on­
dersteunen de assumptie dat de grondexploitatie middels een herverkavelingregeling 
uit de controle van de grondeigenaren weggenomen kan worden en dat het publieke 
waardestijgingsverhaal daardoor kan verbeteren. Tevens suggereren de bevindingen 
dat de herverkavelingregeling een deflationair effect kan hebben op de grondexploi­
tatiekosten, en mogelijk ook op de inbrengwaarde van grond. De regeling kan ook 
helpen om problemen met bouwstagnatie op te lossen. De bevindingen zijn interes­
sant voor het debat in Nederland omdat ze overeenkomen met de positie van diege­
nen die beargumenteren dat de toename van private controle op ontwikkelingsgrond 
vanaf de jaren '90 onvoordelig heeft uitgewerkt op de publieke doelen en uitgaven. 
De bevindingen ondersteunen ook de conclusie dat het hervormen van grondei­
gendomsrechten kan helpen om publieke doelen in ruimtelijke ontwikkeling beter 
te verwezenlijken. In het Spaanse debat ondersteunen de bevindingen de kritische 
benadering van diegenen die, in de jaren '90, beargumenteerden dat het doorbreken 
van de monopolistische/oligopolistische positie van grondeigenaren, de enige weg is 
om voldoende en kwalitatief adequate openbare infrastructuur en faciliteiten te ga­
randeren. Tenslotte is er meer onderzoek nodig naar een internationale vergelijking 
van grondprijzen en ontwikkelingskosten. Dit onderzoek zou moeten focussen op 
de verschillen tussen landen en hiermee meer data genereren die gebruikt kunnen 
worden om deze conclusies aan te scherpen.
Beleidsaanbevelingen voor de Nederlandse praktijk
In de eerste plaats zouden gemeenten in een vroeg stadium van planprocessen meer 
onderzoek moeten doen naar de winstmarges, en deze informatie vervolgens in de 
onderhandelingen met grondeigenaren en ontwikkelaars gebruiken . Dit onderzoek 
zou gelijktijdig moeten plaatsvinden met het opstellen van de eerste plandocumen­
ten die ontwikkelingsverwachtingen wekken.
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In de tweede plaats, om de negatieve gevolgen van de onderlinge afhankelijkheid 
tussen gemeenten en grondeigenaren of ontwikkelaars te vermijden, wordt hier een 
specifieke contractuele formule van herverkaveling aanbevolen die gebaseerd is op 
een tweetal anterieure overeenkomsten. Een commerciële ontwikkelaar, in de rol van 
een soort Valenciaanse urbaniseerder, kan met de grondeigenaren overeenkomen 
dat, in ruil voor de waardestijging, zij zullen participeren in de grondexploitatie. De 
gemeente zou dit moeten ondersteunen door bestemmingswijziging voorwaardelijk 
te stellen aan een overeenkomst tussen de grondeigenaren en de urbaniseerder. Des­
noods zou de gemeente daarbij gebruik moeten maken van onteigening, voorkeurs­
recht of een of meerdere exploitatieplannen. Wanneer deze aanbeveling toegepast 
zou worden, zou dat een aantal voordelen met zich meebrengen: (a) het neemt de 
noodzaak weg om de grond te verwerven, of tenminste alle grond, aangezien de 
grondeigenaren zelf meedoen aan de grondexploitatie; (b) het verkleint het risico van 
vertraging dat zou plaatshebben wanneer de grondeigenaren, in plaats van meewer­
ken, zich strategisch zouden gedragen om de hoogst mogelijke prijs af te dwingen; 
(c) a en b zouden de kosten aanzienlijk verminderen: er zou geen behoefte zijn om 
de grond vooraf te kopen. De gereserveerde bedragen voor onverwachte kosten en 
plankosten zouden hierdoor verminderen; (d) c zou de financiële kosten aanzienlijk 
doen verminderen omdat er dan minder of geen behoefte zou zijn aan externe finan­
ciering.
Echter, de vaststelling van een exploitatieplan, wat nodig zou kunnen zijn om som­
mige grondeigenaren te dwingen mee te werken, heeft zoals reeds gemeld nadelen. 
Tevens is het heel duur om grond te onteigenen en brengt dit een directe financiële 
betrokkenheid van de gemeente met zich mee. Dit is ook nog een politiek gevoelige 
maatregel die sowieso niet toegepast kan worden als grondeigenaren de bestemming 
zelf zouden willen realiseren. Om deze nadelige effecten weg te nemen zou het Rijk, 
geïnspireerd door de Valenciaanse herverkavelingregeling, een wettelijke stedelijke 
herverkavelingregeling moeten introduceren.
Slotwoord
Aan het einde van de jaren '80 en '90 introduceerde de Nederlandse overheid be­
langrijke beleidsveranderingen om de publieke uitgaven en financiële risico's te ver­
minderen. Echter, de praktijk heeft sindsdien laten zien dat deze veranderingen noch 
geleid hebben tot minder subsidies, noch tot nieuwe wijken met voldoende en goede 
openbare infrastructuur en faciliteiten. De grondexploitatiewet is een poging om dit 
probleem op te lossen. Alhoewel deze wet onder bepaalde omstandigheden nuttig 
kan zijn, lijdt die aan twee fundamentele tekortkomingen. Ten eerste gaat de wet 
ervan uit dat de grondeigenaar de enige is die gelegitimeerd is om de economische 
waardestijging die door herbestemming is ontstaan, naar zich toe te trekken. Hier 
ontkende de wetgever een andere mogelijkheid die populair is in andere Europese 
landen: dat overheden ook recht hebben op een deel van de waardestijging. Ten 
tweede gaat de wet ervan uit dat de enige manier om publieke doelen te verwezen­
lijken een directe en financiële betrokkenheid van de overheid is. Dit resulteerde in
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een te complexe reeks van wettelijke instrumenten die gemeenten overlaadt met te 
veel taken en risico's. De ervaring in Engeland en Spanje laat zien dat publieke regie 
in ruimtelijke ontwikkeling gebaseerd moet zijn op simpele en duidelijke rollen: 
overheden reguleren vooraf, private partijen implementeren en dragen alle risico's.
Een laatste woord: de internationale financiële en economische crisis leidt er reeds 
toe dat overheden moeten bezuinigen om minder uit te geven. Wanneer geen maat­
regelen worden genomen om een deel van de economische waardestijging te gebrui­
ken om de openbare infrastructuur en faciliteiten te betalen, zullen de bezuinigin­
gen er toe leiden dat ruimtelijke ontwikkeling en diens kwaliteit onder druk komt te 
staan, in het bijzonder in stedelijke herstructureringslocaties.
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